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Thesis Summary 
 
 
Josiah Tucker, who was the Anglican Dean of Gloucester from 1758 until his death in 
1799, is best known as a political pamphleteer, controversialist and political economist. 
Regularly called upon by Britain’s leading statesmen, and most significantly the 
Younger Pitt, to advise them on the best course of British economic development, in a 
large variety of writings he speculated on the consequences of North American 
independence for the global economy and for international relations; upon the 
complicated relations between small and large states; and on the related issue of 
whether low wage costs in poor countries might always erode the competitive advantage 
of richer nations, thereby establishing perpetual cycles of rise and decline. As a 
vehement critic of war in all its forms, Tucker was a staunch opponent of Britain’s 
mercantile system – a pejorative term connoting, amongst other things, the aggressive 
control of global trade for the benefit of the mother country so as to encourage imperial 
expansion throughout known parts of the world. Though recognising Tucker to be a 
pioneer of the anti-mercantilist free trade school, extant Tucker scholarship has tended 
to concentrate on the perceived similarities and dissimilarities between he and the 
classical economists, particularly Adam Smith. Yet whilst acknowledging the veracity 
of these various connections and claims, this thesis approaches Tucker from an 
alternative perspective. Placing Tucker in his proper historical context, the main 
purpose of this study is to explore the intellectual, political and theo-philosophical 
background to Tucker’s economic thought. Its most original and profound contribution 
consisting in a detailed and critical analysis of Tucker’s links with his ecclesiastical 
mentor Bishop Joseph Butler, its central concern is to argue the case for Butler’s crucial 
influence over Tucker’s free trade ideas – particularly in the guise of the neo-Stoic, 
Anglican providentialism that buttressed much of Butler’s own theories in the field of 
meta-ethics and moral philosophy. 
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Introduction. 
 
 
As is occasionally the case with certain historical figures, posterity has not been 
particularly kind to Josiah Tucker (1713-99).1 Unknown to modern economists and 
demoted by economic historians, to those scholars who do recognise his name he has 
long been considered a mere forerunner to celebrated classical economists in the mould 
of Adam Smith (1723-90), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), Thomas Robert Malthus 
(1766-1832), David Ricardo (1772-1823) and John Stuart Mill (1806-73). Yet the 
injustice is severe, for as he was to demonstrate on numerous occasions throughout his 
long life, Tucker was more than capable of rubbing shoulders with some of the most 
profound intellects of his day. So ‘independent in judgement’ was he, and so ‘fearless in 
expression’,2 he was frequently engaged in debate with some of the more prominent 
members of the eighteenth-century République de Lettres: men of the calibre of David 
Hume (1711-76), Henry Home Lord Kames (1696-1782) and Edmund Burke (1729-97), 
to name but a very small few. A formidable intellectual adversary, and yet a welcome 
friend and ally, probably the most revered intellectual historian alive today, J. G. A. 
Pocock, once referred to him as a ‘florid, abusive and egocentric writer’ – and yet a 
‘neglected genius’ for all that.3  
 																																																																				
1 The earliest useful account of Tucker is Paul Leicester Ford’s article ‘Appendix II: Josiah Tucker and His 
Writings: An Eighteenth Century Pamphleteer on America’ in The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 2, 
No. 2, (Mar., 1894), pp. 330-47. Tucker’s bibliographical materials for this thesis have been collated from 
W. E. Clark, Josiah Tucker Economist. A Study in the History of Economics, (New York, 1903); Robert L. 
Schuyler’s introduction to Josiah Tucker: a selection from his economic and political writings, (New 
York, 1931) [see p. 5, nn. 5, 6 for further biographical points of interest]; W. George Shelton, Dean 
Tucker and Eighteenth-Century Economic and Political Thought, (London, 1981); the short introduction 
to J. Stern (ed.), The Collected Works of Josiah Tucker, 6 vols., (London, 1993), and finally Rory T. 
Cornish’s ODNB article.  
 Whilst being useful starting points, all of these sources are introductive rather than being interpretative, 
and offer little insight into the subjects of religion and providence, or their broader connections with 
Tucker’s political economy. Note, e.g., J. G. A. Pocock’s review of Shelton’s Dean Tucker, in which he 
states that it is a ‘useful if slightly monochrome account’ of a figure ‘on whom much remains to be done’, 
in The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 55, No. 1, (Mar., 1983), pp. 116-18. See also, Pocock, Gordon J. 
Schochet & Lois G. Schwoerer (eds.), The Varieties of British Political Thought: 1600-1800, (Cambridge, 
1993), p. 264, n. 46: ‘… a full-length examination of Tucker remains desirable’. 
2 The phrases are Schuyler’s, Josiah Tucker, p. 3. 
3 Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the 
Eighteenth Century, (Cambridge, 1985), p. 161, & Pocock, ‘Religious Freedom and the Desacralisation of 
Politics: From the English Civil Wars to the Virginia Statute’ in Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan 
(eds.), The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, (Cambridge, 1988), p. 68. 
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In the main, Tucker’s contemporary reputation rested on his important contributions to 
economic thought. Acknowledged primarily as an early pioneer of the free trade school, 
at first glance much that has come to be associated almost exclusively with Smith’s 
seminal Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) [henceforth 
WN]—economic liberty, specialisation, the division of labour and so on—was already 
present in Tucker’s economic tracts, written well over two decades earlier. Yet Tucker 
was also an unusual thinker of genuine distinction. Accordingly, his contemporaries took 
him very seriously. In 1755, for example, a two-part pamphlet of his was translated by 
Turgot (1727-81) and widely distributed among the Physiocrats.4 In addition, a number 
of his works graced the private library of Smith (even if the Scot is well known for his 
reluctance to acknowledge his intellectual debts).5 Finally, in the context of Tucker’s 
vociferous views on North American independence, an editor of Benjamin Franklin’s 
(1706-90) private papers even went so far as to claim that he was Franklin’s ‘bête 
noire’.6 Yet despite Tucker’s undoubtedly high standing among his contemporaries, in 
truth, Tucker’s career encompassed a great deal more than merely his insights into 
domestic and foreign economic policy, undoubtedly important as they were. In fact, 
Tucker’s purely economic works comprise perhaps only a third of his entire output, 
constituting the ‘middle period’ of a public career spanning almost five decades.7 
Buttressed on either side by numerous writings on religion, naturalisation, toleration, 
education, poverty, charity and the origins and ends of civil government, these works 
supplement, if not undergird, Tucker’s economic ideas to an astonishingly large degree – 
far more so than historians have hitherto been capable of acknowledging.  
 
As Tucker’s biographers have noted, the reasons for the clergyman’s relative neglect are 
hardly ambiguous. In 1931, Robert L. Schuyler pointed out that the polemical character 																																																																				
4 The pamphlet Turgot translated was Tucker’s two-part Reflections on the Expediency of a Law for the 
Naturalization of Foreign Protestants, (London, 1751-2) [henceforth NFP I & NFP II], published under 
the title Questions importantes sur le commerce … (London, 1755). See Henry Higgs, The Physiocrats, 
(London; Macmillan, 1897), pp. 31-2, n. 
5 James Bonar (ed.), A Catalogue of the Library of Adam Smith, (Macmillan, London & New York, 1894), 
p. 115; updated in Hiroshi Mizuta, Adam Smith’s Library: A Supplement to Bonar’s Catalogue, 
(Cambridge, 1967), pp. 147-8. For the ‘parsimonious treatment [Smith] accorded to some of his 
predecessors and closest contemporaries’, see Donald Winch, Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History 
of Political Economy in Britain, 1750-1834, (Cambridge, 1996), Chap. 2: ‘An excessive solicitude for 
posthumous reputation’, at p. 35. 
6 William B. Willcox (ed.), The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Vol. 23, (Princeton, 1983), p. 69.  
7 Tucker’s first official publication arrived in 1739, and his last forty-six years later in 1785. 
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of much of his writing ensured that ‘the presuppositions and standards of later times … 
affected his subsequent reputation’ – a fate sealed by the fact that his literary style lacked 
the ‘charm that conquers time’.8 Writing half a century later, W. George Shelton noted 
similarly that because of Tucker’s penchant for controversy, there has been a ‘tendency 
to give his thought less weight than it might have received if he had been more 
dispassionate and more systematic’.9 As Jeffrey Stern puts it far more laconically, then, 
though no less accurately, of Tucker’s writings – they ‘virtually died with him’.10 Yet it 
is with some irony, given that there is little ambiguity as to why Tucker’s ideas fell into 
obscurity, that a great deal of uncertainty continues to surround Tucker himself. For 
instance, some commentators, such as Bernard Semmel, have claimed that Tucker was a 
‘free trade imperialist’; a theorist who turned a blind eye towards issues that had no 
direct bearing on the British national interest.11 Others still, such as Shelton again, 
writing in full accordance with Tucker’s personal declaration that he himself wrote ‘in 
the best Enlightenment manner … not as an Englishman, but as a Citizen of the World’, 
have described the clergyman as merely a ‘defender of the faith’, and ‘a well-wisher to 
all mankind’.12 Most intriguingly of all, perhaps, is a remark made by Karl Marx (1818-
83) in the first volume of Das Kapital (1867), in which he noted half-disparagingly and 
half-admiringly, though certainly noncommittally, that Tucker was ‘a parson and a Tory 
[sic], but, for the rest, an honourable man and a competent political economist’.13 And 																																																																				
8 Schuyler, Josiah Tucker, ‘Preface’, pp. 1, 4. 
9 Shelton, Dean Tucker, ‘Preface’. 
10 Stern (ed.), Collected Works of Tucker, p. vii. 
11 Bernard Semmel, The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Free 
Trade and Imperialism 1750-1850, (Cambridge, 1970), esp. Chap. 2. Cf., more recently, Nancy F. Koehn, 
The Power of Commerce: Economy and Governance in the First British Empire, (Ithaca and London, 
1994), esp. Chap. 3. As Semmel himself acknowledged, this line of reasoning owed much to the historical 
trajectories laid out earlier by the likes of Schuyler and Klaus E. Knorr, both writing in the shadow of the 
Great Wars; of which the latter in particular declared that in spite of the fact that Tucker ‘incessantly … 
claimed that the conduct of international trade was mutually beneficial to all nations involved’, 
nevertheless, it is ‘quite correct to say that he was, from bottom, a mercantilist’, in Klaus E. Knorr, British 
Colonial Theories: 1570-1850, (Toronto, 1944), p. 118; also Schuyler, The Fall of the Old Colonial 
System: A Study in British Free Trade, 1770-1780, (NY: Oxford, 1945). 
12 Cui Bono? Or, an Enquiry, What Benefits can Arise … from the Greatest Victories, or Successes, in the 
Present War? … Addressed to Monsieur Necker, (Third Ed., Gloucester, 1781) [henceforth Cui Bono?], 
pp. 4-5. Cf. Shelton, Dean Tucker, Chaps. 8 & 11; Brian W. Young, ‘Christianity, Commerce and the 
Canon: Josiah Tucker and Richard Woodward on Political Economy’, History of European Ideas, Vol. 22, 
No. 5/6, (1996), pp. 385-400, at p. 390. The second turn of phrase ‘well-wisher to all mankind’ alludes to 
Tucker’s description of himself in a letter from Tucker to William Seward, 29 Oct 1790. 
13 Karl Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie [Capital: Critique of Political Economy], Vol. 
1 (1867), Chap. 31: ‘Genesis of the Modern Industrial Capitalist’. Knorr makes the same mistake of 
describing Tucker as a ‘Tory’ as opposed to ‘Adam Smith, the economist and Whig’; when in truth the 
latter adequately describes both thinkers, see his British Colonial Theories, p. 195. This is precisely the 
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even Tucker’s memorial tablet, erected on the east wall of the south transept of 
Gloucester Cathedral, is notable for its simultaneous accuracy and imprecision. 
Correctly lauding the Dean as one who was ‘[d]istinguished by a vigorous 
comprehensive and independent mind … eminently conspicuous for political 
discernment on the important subject of national commerce’, nevertheless, the claim that 
his publications were ‘of a nature not soon to be forgotten’, and that ‘being dead he yet 
speaketh’ and will not speak in vain’, has proven to be well wide of the mark.14 
 
As alluded to above, by far the most important reason for Tucker’s persistent neglect lies 
in what may be termed the ‘Tucker-Smith conundrum’, by which it is commonly argued 
that Tucker’s ideas were merely ‘watered-down’ or preparatory versions of the eminent 
Scot’s. As Tucker’s first significant biographer W. E. Clark put it, then, in 1903, Tucker 
‘undoubtedly helped to create and to extend the demand for larger commercial and 
industrial freedom’, thereby ‘preparing the British mind for a readier reception of … a 
[seminal text such as] a [WN]’.15 Yet whilst in some respects this pronouncement of 
Tucker’s influence is entirely justified, in truth, the relative oversimplification of Clark’s 
line of inquiry merely points to yet another reason for Tucker’s scholarly mistreatment: 
the hegemonic importance afforded to WN itself. Famously described by the Chicago 
economist George Stigler as ‘that stupendous palace erected upon the granite of self-
interest’, the notion that the ‘rational’, ‘secular’, ‘self-interested’ and ‘utility-
maximising’ roots of modern economics owes its intellectual provenance to WN is 
seemingly beyond dispute. 16  However, in recent decades intellectual historians in 
particular have begun to challenge this viewpoint, seeking instead to place Smith’s ideas 
in their proper context, and particularly in the context of fellow political economists of 
the day who were deemed to be important by contemporaries. This being the case, no 
thinker was as significant for the development of Smith’s free trade ideas, and for 
eighteenth-century political economy more generally, than Tucker. 					
type of thinking Pocock was attempting to overturn when he wrote that ‘if conservatism is the defense of 
the existing order, the conservatism of the eighteenth-century was the defense of a revolution’; by which 
he meant the Whig rather than Tory conservatism of the post-1688 Revolution Settlement, and which he 
attributes to Tucker amongst others. See ‘Josiah Tucker on Burke, Locke and Price: A study in the 
varieties of eighteenth-century conservatism’, in Pocock’s Virtue, pp. 157-91, this citation at p. 158. 
14 Cited in Clark, Josiah Tucker, Economist, p. 36. 
15 Ibid. pp. 225-6. See also, e.g., Schuyler, Josiah Tucker, p. 13; Ronald L. Meek, Precursors of Adam 
Smith (1750-1775), (Dent, London, 1973), pp. 176-7 & Shelton, Dean Tucker pp. 49-52, 57, 60-1, 65-7, 
91-2, 94, 96, 101, 110-11, 113, 163, 166, 258-60, 262-3. 
16 George J. Stigler, ‘Smith’s Travels on the Ship of State’, History of Political Economy 3, (1971),  
p. 265. Cf. Chapter One, p. 35, n. 46. 
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Like Smith, Tucker was an unstinting advocate of free trade. Yet where he differed from 
the Scottish philosopher was in his far weightier insistence on the providential role he 
felt economic liberty had to play in societal evolution – such that it might ultimately be 
capable of establishing perpetual peace. In light of this, the argument forming the basis 
of this thesis is that the important link between providence and free trade has so far been 
neglected in the history of political economy. Accordingly, the main thrust of this work 
concerns itself with Tucker’s unwavering faith in the workings of divine providence in 
generating economic liberty, and so a betterment in humanity’s material and thereby 
spiritual condition. Appositely, this thesis therefore seeks to reintegrate dominant 
theological perspectives in the history of eighteenth-century British political economy 
which have hitherto been downplayed or ignored in light of classical, liberal economic 
tradition.  
 
I. Note on Method. 
 
A pivotal figure in this study is Tucker’s ecclesiastical and spiritual mentor, Bishop 
Joseph Butler (1690-1752). A towering figure in the history of Anglophone moral 
philosophy and theology, acknowledgement of Butler’s influence on the development of 
eighteenth-century economic thought remains almost non-existent.17 In order to remedy 
this, this thesis seeks to explore, perhaps for the first time, the various connections 
between the two clergymen, culminating in a piecemeal assessment of Tucker’s 
economic adaptation and reformulation of Butler’s theo-philosophical thought, so as to 
refute the powerful Epicurean-Augustinian-materialism of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) 
and his eighteenth-century follower Bernard de Mandeville (1670-1733). Comprised of a 
series of interweaving narratives, this thesis is organised thematically rather than 
adhering to a strict chronological account of events. It does not wish nor claim, 
therefore, to provide an authoritative history of early-modern religious and economic 
thought in its entirety, nor of the English Church in the long eighteenth century replete 
with all the religious debates of the period. Neither does it attempt to relay purely 
descriptive or biographical accounts of Butler and Tucker’s lives and works, except 																																																																				
17 Bob Tennant, Conscience, Consciousness and Ethics in Joseph Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, 
(Woodbridge, 2011), p. 157, n. 27. 
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where relevant. Rather, as a work of intellectual history, this study gathers those 
elements of early-modern and Anglican Church history which pertain to Butler and 
Tucker’s roles as historical agents, acting in their beliefs, assumptions, values, 
judgements and so on, within the bounds of their own social, cultural and intellectual 
environment.  
 
This being said, all of the chapters housed within this thesis are in part expository in 
nature, in part analytical in scope; and at times the present author has chosen to jump 
between the two modes of discourse. However, in order to aid the reader in terms of 
narrative intent, and likewise in the interests of thematic clarity, the thesis is divided into 
three parts – Part I: ‘The Theo-Philosophical Background’; Part II: ‘The Butler-Tucker 
axis’; and Part III: ‘Tuckerian Political Economy’. Finally, since the intention of this 
study is to seek always to progress from the general towards the particular, each chapter 
begins with a general introduction, followed by the main body and content of the chapter 
itself, and is finally brought to a close with brief concluding remarks. Likewise, then, the 
same formula is adopted on macrocosmic scale when considering the study as a whole. 
 
Chapter One, the first of two chapters detailing ‘The Theo-Philosophical Background’ to 
Butler and Tucker’s ideas, is concerned above all with an explication of the context of 
current study at its broadest level. Here, then, introductory explanations of the two 
foremost terms housed within the title of the thesis, ‘Providence’ and ‘Political 
Economy’, are provided, and the historical and historiographical connotations 
surrounding their putative convergence during the early-modern period highlighted and 
discussed. In doing so, particular emphasis is placed on the early-modern debate 
between Epicureans, Augustinians and Stoics, and the related confrontation between 
‘self-interest’ and ‘sociability’-based arguments concerning human nature, which, the 
chapter argues, were the harbingers of eighteenth-century political economy. Set within 
this framework, Butler’s Christian Stoicism is picked out – a theo-philosophical 
endowment, the chapter claims, from the sixteenth and seventeenth-century humanists 
and natural law jurists, Justus Lipsius (1547-1606), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and 
Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-94). In conclusion, the claim is made that Butler and 
Tucker’s ideas are important enough to warrant integration into a vast nexus of 
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contemporary scholarship emphasising the influence of classical philosophy on the 
early-modern and eighteenth-century mind. 
 
The purpose of Chapter Two is to home in on the specific context of early eighteenth-
century Britain, the immediate locale of Tucker and Butler. Here an effort is made to 
explain the unusual set of circumstances surrounding the Anglican Church at about the 
turn of the eighteenth century. England was a nation ecclesiastically divided along party 
political lines, and the chapter therefore explores the significance of the confrontation 
between religious orthodoxy and heterodoxy as an extension of this division, and the 
related issue of Establishment Church and State attempts to defend the burgeoning 
commercial order on the grounds that it fostered and was conducive to a specific brand 
of English Protestantism increasingly labelled a ‘social religion’. Intended as preparation 
for Butler’s ideas in Chapter Three and beyond, the main purpose of the chapter is to 
provide an account of the central controversies, historical and historiographical, resulting 
from the onset of ‘commercial modernity’ in post-Reformation England/Britain, 
particularly in the wake of the Glorious Revolution (1688-9). In conclusion, then, the 
chapter shows how the broader early-modern debate between Epicureanism, 
Augustinianism and Stoicism continued to inform these various debates. 
  
In Chapter Three, the first of two chapters detailing the ‘Butler-Tucker axis’, we focus 
primarily on Butler himself. Here our main concern is to provide a detailed revisionist 
interpretation of Butler’s most compelling work centring on the ‘self-interest versus 
sociability’ conundrum, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel (1726; Second 
Ed., 1729), in which particular attention is paid to Butler’s response to, acceptance of, 
and support for, modern commercial society. Beginning with Butler’s dissenting 
heritage, his intellectual affiliations with the continental Reformation, and his eventual 
conversion to the Anglican Church via the Newtonian Boyle Lecturer Samuel Clarke 
(1675-1729), the chapter claims that Butler was a central figure in the establishment-turn 
towards ‘social religion’, such that his novel ideas on commercial sociability came in 
time to be the very seedbed for Tucker’s later economic thought. Not insignificantly, 
throughout the chapter, emphasis continues to be placed on Butler’s incorporation and 
utilisation of neo-Stoic providence, culminating in an account of the ways and means in 
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which this impinged upon his wider meta-ethics, and his pioneering treatment of the 
individual and collective social affections. 
 
In Chapter Four we introduce more fully the concept of the ‘Butler-Tucker axis’, in 
which we begin to divulge in specific terms the intellectual and theological connections 
between the two clergymen. Briefly summarising Butler’s initial success and recognition 
in the wake of Fifteen Sermons, the chapter commences with a biographical introduction 
to Tucker’s early life up until his arrival in the commercial hub of Bristol, and thereby 
his introduction to Butler in 1739. Thereafter, the chapter shifts to an account of Butler’s 
most popular and enduring work in his own day, The Analogy of Religion (1736), in an 
effort to accentuate even further the bishop’s contemporary theological importance, his 
defence of the orthodox establishment, and the influence he exerted on the young 
Tucker. This having been asserted, the remainder of the chapter turns to Butler and 
Tucker’s travails with the early Bristol Methodists during the late 1730s and early 1740s, 
thereby enabling us to demonstrate with particular clarity Tucker’s faithful, and indeed 
consistent, adoption of the Butlerian ‘brand’ of establishment orthodoxy.  
 
In the final chapter, which falls under the remit of ‘Tuckerian Political Economy’, we 
undertake a detailed examination of Tucker’s economic tracts. The culmination of the 
work conducted in previous chapters, here it is argued that the key to understanding 
Tucker’s economic thought lies not so much in his connection with Smith or the later 
classical economists, but rather with Butler. Beginning with an account of Tucker’s 
economic adaptation of Butler’s conceptions of sociability, self-love and divine 
providence, thereafter, the chapter moves on to a detailed examination of Tucker’s 
economic tracts in tandem, and concerns itself with the Anglican ‘social thinking’ that 
informed the various proposals and polities housed within them. In doing so, the chapter 
aims above all to make better sense of those concepts which made the transition from 
Butlerian meta-ethics to Tuckerian political economy. Accordingly, the chapter is 
brought to a close with an account of Tucker’s fundamentally important views on the 
relationship between self-love and monopolisation – Tucker’s most compelling 
engagement, the chapters contends, with the Epicurean-Augustinian-Stoic ‘self-interest-
sociability’ conundrum. 
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The conclusion to the study is divided into two parts. Concerned above all with 
providing summaries of the key points raised throughout preceding chapters, in the first 
half, emphasis continues to be placed on Butler’s legacy, especially via the importance 
he ascribed to the Christian virtue of Caritas within the wider Butlerian scheme. 
Continuing, then, with Tucker’s likeminded endorsement of charitable education, moral 
duty to the poor and the politico-ethical liberty which he and his mentor believed 
sustained such Christian virtues, the study is thereby brought to a close with a forceful 
statement of Tucker’s unique brand of political economy, wherein it is claimed that 
Butler’s neo-Stoical maxims contributed directly to Tucker’s status as perhaps the 
unique theorist of the eighteenth-century free trade movement. 
	 21	
Part I. 
 
The Theo-Philosophical Background. 
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Part I. 
 
The Theo-Philosophical Background. 
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Chapter One. 
 
‘Providence and Political Economy’. 
 
 
In Samuel Johnson’s (1709-84) famous Dictionary (1755), ‘providence’ is defined in 
three ways: first, as ‘[f]oresight; timely care; forecast; the act of providing’; second, as 
‘the care of God over created beings; divine superintendence’; and third, as ‘[p]rudence; 
frugality; reasonable and moderate care of expence’.1 These definitions are instructive, 
in that they provide the three main ways in which Tucker and his eighteenth-century 
British contemporaries would have understood the term. Yet somewhat puzzlingly, 
given that the phrase ‘l'économie politique’, or ‘political economy’, was first coined 
almost a century and a half earlier in the French court of Louis XIII (1601-43), this term 
does not make an appearance in Johnson’s work.2  
 
Johnson’s neglect of the latter demonstrates the relative infancy of ‘political economy’ 
within the mid-eighteenth-century lexicon, not only in terms of theory but also practice. 
And indeed, Donald Winch once affirmed that the modern ‘science of economics’, of 
which political economy was its forerunner, cannot be said to have emerged until 
approximately 1750, when Tucker first began to write and publish his economic tracts.3 
Yet by contrast, Johnson’s carefully worded, almost polyphonic, descriptions of 
‘providence’ hint at the ubiquity of providentialist language in the early-modern (to 
modern) period. How and why, then, given that both ‘P’ terms do not necessarily appear 
to have much in common, is it plausible for them to be placed alongside one another? 
Moreover, in what ways did their coalescence impinge upon the increasingly influential 
free trade debates of the eighteenth-century and beyond? As we know, it is very much 
the task of this thesis to make some attempt at answering these difficult and complex 
questions. The purpose of this first chapter, however, is merely to set the ball rolling in 
the right direction. 
																																																																		
1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, (London, 1755). 
2 Antoine de Montchrétien, Traité de l’economie politique  [A Treatise of Political Economy] (Paris, 
1615).  
3 Winch, ‘The emergence of economics as a science, 1750-1870’, in C. M. Cipolla (ed.), Fontana 
Economic History of Europe, Vol. 3, (London, 1971), pp. 507-73. For Tucker’s economic tracts, see 
Chapter Five. 
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I. Introduction: Divine Providence. 
  
Providence—or the Latin providentia; pro, ‘ahead’, and videre, ‘to see’—typically 
refers to the belief in a divine quality, whereby benevolent intervention in human and 
worldly affairs is deemed to be perceptible, and is moreover usually welcomed. In this 
sweeping cross-cultural and multi-denominational sense, providence has often been 
invoked by humans as a means of bringing a feeling of meaning, awe or wonder to their 
lives; either to demonstrate that humanity is cared for and that it matters, or even to 
justify those moments when humanity is believed to be under imminent threat of 
survival. To most if not all world religions, then, the belief in a divine, transcendent 
and/or supernatural presence, which both coordinates and ensures that earthly human 
life is in some way intelligible or comprehensible, is usually deemed to be of immense 
cultural and theological significance. 
 
In this study, we are concerned with two very specific varieties of providence, both of 
which fall within the parameters of the Western tradition: firstly, the polytheistic Pagan; 
and secondly, the monotheistic Judeo-Christian. Leaving aside the former for the 
present, within the Judeo-Christian tradition, Divine Providence (or the providentia dei 
to give it its official theological title) is an extremely influential doctrine, which 
typically refers to the omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, or simply the divine 
wisdom of God Himself. Deriving its heritage from the early Church Fathers, and 
particularly the writings of St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430), during the High-Middle 
Ages Christian conceptions of providence came in turn to be dominated by the 
scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas (1225-74). Linking, in his Summa Theologiæ (1265-
74), God’s providence to traditional Aristotelian notions of prudence, Aquinas was most 
notable for maintaining the customary distinction between ‘particular’ and ‘general 
providence’ – the former concerned with God’s direct hand in human affairs (for 
example, miracles), and the latter concerned with God’s preservation and continuation 
of the world via secondary causes (such as those laws of nature which He had 
established at the Creation). This differentiation between general and particular 
providence was to remain a commonplace well into Tucker’s time, as can be gleaned 
from Johnson’s definitions above. Yet, importantly, it was in many respects the 
	 24	
emphasis on which was the more significant, or indeed the more plausible or believable, 
that altered substantially in the eighteenth century, as we shall see.4 
 
According to Alexandra Walsham, the Lutheran Schism brought about a renewed 
elevation in the doctrine of divine providence, constituting a watershed moment in its 
history. For it was at this time, she argues, that providence came to be seen as an 
important manifestation of the Protestant emphasis on the ‘expulsion of all 
intermediaries between God and soul’, thereby ensuring that it was the ‘logical corollary 
of elevating divine grace above strenuous human effort’, and of ‘making it the sole 
criterion for human salvation’.5 In Walsham’s view, this perspective can be discerned in 
the theological writings of perhaps the most influential Reformer, John Calvin (1509-
64). In his Institutes of the Christian Religion (1536) and Defense of the Secret 
Providence of God (1558), for example, Calvin had brought into sharp relief those 
questions surrounding Scriptural authority, free will, determinism and predestination, all 
of which were, and remain, significant intellectual and theological corollaries of 
Calvinist doctrine itself.6 In a similar vein, one of Calvin’s most important followers, 
Zacharias Ursinus (1534-83), put equal stock in the doctrinal value of providence when 
he co-authored the highly influential reformed document, the Heidelberg Catechism 
(1563). ‘What dost thou mean by the providence of God?’ asks its twenty-seventh 
question, and the typically Calvinistic rejoinder is as follows: 
 
The almighty and everywhere present power of God; [Acts 17: 25-8] whereby, as it were by 
his hand, he [Heb. 1:3] upholds and governs heaven, earth, and all creatures; so that herbs 
and grass, rain [Jer. 5:24] and drought, fruitful [Acts 14:17] and barren years, meat and 
drink, [John 9:3] health and sickness, [Prov. 22:2; Job 1:21] riches and poverty, yea, and all 
things [Mat. 10:29-30; Eph. 1:11] come, not by chance, but by his fatherly hand.  
 
As can be seen, then, during the Reformation period the doctrine of divine providence 
became ever more profoundly important on high-theological grounds. Yet even in terms 																																																																		
4 See also, e.g., in a specifically economic context, Charles Davenant, An Essay on the East India Trade 
[1696] in The Political and Commercial Works of … Charles Davenant, (London, 1771), Vol. 1, pp. 98-9: 
‘Trade is in its Nature Free, finds it own Channel, and best directeth its own Course: and all Laws to give 
it Rules, and Direction, and to Limit, and Circumscribe it, may serve the Particular Ends of Private Men, 
but are seldom Advantageous to the Publick. Governments in Relation to it, are to take a Providential 
Care of the Whole, but generally to let Second Causes work their own way’; emphasis added. 
5 Alexandra Walsham, Providence in Early Modern England, (Oxford, 2001), p. 9. 
6 Ibid., p. 15. See also Ronald J. Vander Molen, ‘Providence as Mystery, Providence as Revelation: 
Puritan and Anglican Modifications of John Calvin’s Doctrine of Providence’, Church History, 47/1 
(Mar., 1978), pp. 27-47, esp. pp. 29-33. 
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of the mundane, the Protestant reformulation of divine providence, described by 
Walsham as a type of ‘anthropocentricism’, also went on to transform perceptions of the 
direct relationship between God and humankind, in the sense that providence came 
increasingly to be viewed in terms of God’s relation to the cosmic, social order – in 
other words, to the physico-temporal world as humans live and breathe within it.7 
Significantly in our context, this ‘anthropocentric turn’ had already been recognised by 
the likes of Keith Thomas and Jacob Viner in the mid-twentieth-century, both of whose 
classic works remain important to present-day scholars in that they continue to direct 
attention towards the significance of providence on the political, ideological, social, and 
of course economic structures of the early-modern period – particularly within 
England/Britain, our predominant locus of study.8  
 
For our immediate purposes Viner’s work is especially germane, since it was he who 
attempted to explore in specific terms the link between providence and the genesis of 
modern economic thought (and so economic man): summarised most aptly in the phrase 
‘The Cosmic Order in the Service of Man’.9 Concurring with Thomas’s view that during 
the early-modern period it was ‘for many men impossible that God did not constantly 
have man in his providential care’, Viner stated that though much ‘early theological 
doctrine, Christian and non-Christian … was not expressly anthropocentric’, 
nevertheless, just as Walsham later described it, this perspective transformed during the 
post-Reformation period. Thus it ‘was in this area’, claimed Viner, ‘where, by virtue of 
new observations and discoveries, apparent discrepancies between Biblical texts and 
observed or reasonably inferable facts first became important’: 
 
The general framework of providentialist doctrine thus was set up largely in terms of the 
relation of God to the physical order of the cosmos he had created, and on the part to 																																																																		
7 Walsham, Providence in Early Modern England, p. 15. Cf. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, (Harvard, 
2007), p. 178, which describes this phenomenon as ‘the sanctification of ordinary life’. 
8  Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in popular beliefs in sixteenth and 
seventeenth century England, (Oxford, 1971), esp. Chap. 4: ‘Providence’ – e.g., pp. 131-2: ‘In the 
seventeenth century most economic writers were happy to teach that the poor had only themselves to 
blame; it was their idleness and improvidence which had landed them where they were. This was 
comfortable doctrine for the well-to-do, but it can hardly have appealed to that sizeable part of the 
population which never had any hope of dragging itself above subsistence level. The clergy therefore 
endeavoured to console these unfortunates with the doctrine of divine providence, stressing that there was 
a purpose behind everything … It was a gloomy philosophy, teaching men how to suffer, and stressing 
the impenetrability of God’s will. At its most optimistic it promised that those who bore patiently with the 
evils of this world would have a chance of being rewarded in the next’. 
9 Jacob Viner, The Role of Providence in the Social Order, (Princeton, NJ, 1972), pp. 1-26.  
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immortal life he had established for mankind. […] The new optimism of the seventeenth 
century and later, which was to have an important impact on social thought, was in part a 
turning away from the Augustinian tradition in Christianity and from the doctrine of original 
sin.10 
 
Viner’s allusion here to the ‘new optimism’ of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
alongside its opposition to the ‘Augustinian tradition’ is especially relevant and 
portentous, since it provides us with a platform by which to turn our attention to the 
aforementioned alternative conceptions of providence, based not on the Judeo-Christian 
tradition but on the classical philosophies of ancient Greece and Rome. Yet before 
embarking on a narrative of these themes (which, as we shall see, are axiomatic in the 
context of Butler and Tucker’s ideas), we turn momentarily to an examination of early-
modern economic thought – initially by means of an elucidation of the term ‘political 
economy’. 
 
II. Political Economy. 
  
The term ‘political economy’ was first coined in the early seventeenth century by the 
French economist, adventurer and courtier, Antoine de Montchrétien (c. 1575-1621), in 
his once highly influential Traité de l’economie politique [A Treatise on Political 
Economy] (1615). In it, Montchrétien’s main concern was to challenge the pervasive, 
Aristotelian maxim that economic activity and politics were distinct and separate 
entities. As such, Montchrétien sought to advise King Louis XIII that the management 
of the household (derived from the Greek term oikonomike, or oikonomia/oeconomia) 
was in truth a useful model for the management of a polity. Accordingly, 
Montchrétien’s treatise urged rulers and legislators to base their future policies on the 
assumption that statecraft increasingly entailed an understanding of how market 
economies were organised, and how they ought to function. In light of this, 
Montchrétien was arguably the first thinker to define economic activity in terms of it 
being a publicly administered and policy-based enterprise – a significant point, in that 
this conception of commercial activity and its attendant features bore a distinctly 
‘modern’ flavour, which present-day economists, politicians and policy-makers would 																																																																		
10 Ibid., pp. 5, 7. Cf. Marshall Sahlins et al., ‘The Sweetness of Sadness: The Native Anthropology of 
Western Cosmology [and Comments and Reply]’, Current Anthropology, Vol. 37, No. 3, (Jun. 1996), pp. 
395-428. 
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no doubt instantly recognise.11 
 
In recent decades, studies which either incorporate or centre-on the historical rise of 
political economy have proliferated, chiefly within the field of intellectual history.12 
Consequently, two towering works of contemporary scholarship, both of which ought to 
be viewed as by-products and exemplars of this new approach, are Istvan Hont’s 
Jealousy of Trade (2005) and John Robertson’s Case for Enlightenment (2007). Tracing 
in the latter the roots of political economy to late seventeenth and early-eighteenth-
century Naples and Scotland, particularly via the writings of Giambattista Vico (1668-
1774) and Hume, Robertson’s central claim in Case for Enlightenment is that political 
economy was such a powerful force that it came to define enlightenment across the 
eighteenth-century transatlantic world. 13  By contrast, though not necessarily 
contradictorily, Hont’s main argument is that when ‘jealousy of trade’ between rival 
nations finally came to be seen as a ‘reason of state’ (a phenomenon which, to all intents 
and purposes, was ‘inaugurated’ by Montchrétien, as we have just seen, and which 
flourished most profoundly in the century between Hobbes and Marx), the era’s singular 
synthesis of politics and economics contributed enormously towards the concept of the 
modern nation-state.14  
 
Taken together, these two ‘iconoclastic books’ highlight in explicit terms the 
distinctiveness of the eighteenth century as an era in which contemporary thinkers 
sensed that the challenges they faced were epochal, particularly with regard to an 
inevitable embracement of commercial modernity at the putative expense of classical 																																																																		
11 As such, Montchrétien’s view represents perhaps the historical ‘starting point’ in what John Dunn calls 
the ‘recovery and replenishment of political economy as it first emerged in early modern Western thought 
– namely, an inquiry distinctly concerned with the conduct, institutions, and values of market societies, 
but always ready to borrow from history, jurisprudence, moral philosophy and political theory’, in John 
Dunn, (ed.), The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, (Cambridge, 1990), ‘Preface’, p. vii. See also, P. 
Bridal, ‘Montchrétien, Antoine de’, in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics [1987], (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Second Ed., 2008), vol. 3, pp. 546-7; Richard Whatmore, Republicanism and the French 
Revolution: An Intellectual History of Jean-Baptiste Say’s Political Economy, (Oxford, 2000), p. 18; 
Taylor, Secular Age, p. 178.  
12 E.g., Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, esp. Chaps. 13, 14; Virtue, esp. Chaps. 3, 6, 7, 9, 10; Winch, 
Adam Smith’s Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision, (Cambridge, 1978); Riches and Poverty; 
Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff (eds.), Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the 
Scottish Enlightenment, (Cambridge, 1983); Dunn (ed.), Economic Limits to Modern Politics. 
13 John Robertson, The Case for Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples, 1680-1760, (Cambridge, 2007). 
14 Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation State in Historical Perspective, 
(Cambridge, MA, 2005). Some of Hont’s chapters are updated versions of older essays, which were 
contributions to Hont & Ignatieff (eds.), Wealth & Virtue, & Dunn (ed.) Economic Limits. 
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authority and/or Christian tradition.15 Paying particular attention to political economy’s 
distinctly ‘modernising’ features, then, Hont and Robertson’s narratives dovetail with a 
number of broader developments within the field of intellectual history, which, since the 
middle decades of the twentieth century, have tended to revise perspectives on 
customary themes in the history of Western political thought:16 including the trope of 
Enlightenment (whether in the singular or plural); 17 civic humanism and/or classical 
republicanism, 18  natural law, natural rights, natural jurisprudence and moral 
philosophy;19 the early-modern debate between ancients and moderns;20 positive and 																																																																		
15 For a valuable summary, see Knud Haakonssen & Whatmore, ‘Essay Reviews: Commerce And 
Enlightenment’, Intellectual History Review, 18 (2), 2008, pp. 283-303. The reference to their being 
‘iconoclastic’ works is at p. 283. 
16 See esp. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, (Oxford, 1946); Pocock, ‘The History of Political 
Thought: a methodological enquiry’, in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics, and 
Society, 2nd series, (Oxford, 1962), pp. 183- 202; John Dunn, ‘The Identity of the History of Ideas’, 
Philosophy 43 (1968), pp. 85-104; Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of 
Ideas’, History and Theory 8 (1969), pp. 3- 53.  
17 Robert Darnton, ‘In search of the Enlightenment: Recent Attempts to Create a Social History of Ideas’, 
Journal of Modern History, 43 (1): March 1971, pp. 113-32; Roy Porter & Mikulás Teich (eds.), The 
Enlightenment in National Context, (Cambridge, 1981); also Porter’s introductory The Enlightenment 
(London, 1990; 2nd ed. 2001), & Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World, (Penguin: 
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1981); J. W. Yolton et al. (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment, (Oxford, 1991); Ulrich 
Im Hof, The Enlightenment, (Oxford, 1994); Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment, (Cambridge, 1995); 
Darnton, Forbidden Bestsellers of Pre-Revolutionary France, (New York, London, 1995); W. Schneiders 
(ed.), Lexikon der Aufklärung (Munich, 1995); Vincenzo Ferrone & Daniel Roche (eds.), L’Illuminismo 
Dizionario storico (Rome and Bari, 1997); M. Delon (ed.), Dictionnaire européen des lumière, (Paris, 
1997); Edoardo Tortarolo, L’Illuminismo. Ragioni edubbi della modernita, (Rome, 1999); James 
Schmidt, ‘What Enlightenment Project?’, Political Theory, 28 (2000), pp. 734-57; Fania Oz-Salzberger, 
‘New approaches towards a history of the Enlightenment: can disparate perspectives make a general 
picture?’, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte, 29 (2000), pp. 171–6; Thomas Munck, The 
Enlightenment: a Comparative Social History 1721–1794, (London, 2000); Margaret C. Jacob, The 
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Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, 4 vols., (New York and Oxford, 2003).  
18 Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance, 2 Vols., (Princeton, 1955); Hannah Arendt, 
The Human Condition, (Chicago, 1958), & On Revolution: (New York, 1963); Caroline Robbins, The 
Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthmen, (Cambridge, Mass., 1959); Pocock, The Ancient Constitution 
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1978); Liberty Before Liberalism, (Cambridge, 1998); Markku Peltonen.: Classical Humanism and 
Republicanism in English Political Thought 1570-1640: (Cambridge, 1995); Philip Pettit, Republicanism: 
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negative liberty, and so on.21 Though it is clearly beyond the remit of this present study 
to delve into the particulars of these complex debates (and in any event there are 
valuable summaries provided elsewhere),22 in many important respects, however, they 
do necessarily impinge on many of the narratives housed within the current work. Yet 
what marks Robertson and Hont’s work out amongst them all, thereby rendering them 
particularly significant to us in the early stages of this thesis, is the primary importance 
they both ascribe to political economy as an agent – indeed the principle agent – in the 
historical shift towards a recognisably ‘modern’ world.  
  
Political economy, understood, then, as the precursor to the modern science of 
economics, emerged in a seventeenth and eighteenth-century which saw, amongst many 
other ‘paradigmatic shifts’,23 the advent of the modern nation-state, the gradual yet 
palpable shift away from mercantilism towards ‘free trade based’ arguments, and 
thereby nascent manifestations of what we now refer to as international relations. As 
Richard Whatmore has pointed out, this was consequently an age in which 
contemporaries increasingly acknowledged the imperativeness of striking a balance 
between national self-determination on the one side, and economic wellbeing on the 
other – a viewpoint which still predominates in the modern world.24 Significantly 
however, unlike the Europe (or indeed the increasingly globalised markets) of today, 
both the seventeenth century in particular and the eighteenth century in general were 
centuries of unprecedented religious strife, in which the increasingly competitive 
commercial monarchies of the day tended to tie their projects for national defence to 
confessional allegiance. As we shall later see, as a direct result of these circumstances 
three states were to become particularly prominent. Firstly, the relatively small 																					
others departed from, civic humanism, see Pocock, ‘Cambridge paradigms and Scotch philosophers: a 
study of the relations between the civic humanist and the civic jurisprudential interpretation of eighteenth-
century thought’ in Wealth and Virtue, pp. 235-52, and in the same publication, Winch, ‘Adam Smith’s 
‘enduring particular result’: a political and cosmopolitan perspective’, pp. 253-69, esp. pp. 262-3. 
21 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty: An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford 
on 31 October 1958, (Oxford, 1958); Skinner, ‘A Third Concept of Liberty’, Proceedings of the British 
Academy, 117 (2002), pp. 237-68.  
22 See the introductions to Stefan Collini, Whatmore & Brian Young (eds.), Economy, Polity, and Society 
& History Religion and Culture: British Intellectual History 1750-1950 (both Cambridge, 2000). See also 
Whatmore, ‘Intellectual History and the History of Political Thought’ in Whatmore & Young (eds.), 
Palgrave Advances in Intellectual History, (Palgrave; Basingstoke, 2006), pp. 109-29, including 
consultation of the endnotes. 
23 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago, 1962). 
24 Whatmore, ‘Luxury, Commerce, and the Rise of Political Economy’ in James A. Harris (ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, (Oxford, 2013), pp. 575-95.  
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Protestant Dutch Republic, which, from its inception in 1574, had ensured its own 
survival via means of commercial innovation and religious toleration. Secondly, the 
dominant and increasingly bureaucratic Catholic France, which, under Louis XIV 
(1638-1715), had offered Europe the prospect of religious unity, intolerance towards 
heretics, and the establishment of a pax Francia modelled along Roman lines. And 
lastly, Protestant England (Great Britain after the Parliamentary Act of Union with 
Scotland in 1707), which emerged out of its own civil wars in the middle decades of the 
seventeenth century to form a decisive politico-religious, military and commercial 
alliance with the Dutch in 1688-9, so as to quell the perceived threat of Gallican 
universal monarchy.  
 
III. The Conjunction Between Providence and Political Economy: Epicureanism, 
Stoicism and Augustinianism. 
 
It is by these means, then, that we begin to perceive the first seeds of ‘cross-pollination’ 
between the religious and the economic in the early-modern European world. Yet before 
proceeding, it is important to acknowledge that scholarly recognition of this 
phenomenon has hardly been unique. Perhaps the most famous and influential study 
drawing sustained attention to the relationship between Christian social thinking and 
economic activity was, of course, written over a century ago, in Max Weber’s (1864-
1920) Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus [The Protestant Work 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism] (1904-5). In it Weber’s central—and, by now, 
familiar—claim was that during the post-Reformation period, the Protestant asceticism 
of the predominantly Calvinist sects generated rational, if unintentional, justifications 
for the acquisition of money, such that it ultimately came to be seen as a justifiable end 
in itself. Though the so-called ‘Weber thesis’ remains to this day notoriously difficult to 
quantify and qualify, it being ‘unproven yet unrefuted’ in the words of Whatmore,25 the 
real virtue of Weber’s monumental study lay not in the fact that Weber settled the 
debate either way, but rather that his thesis inspired a great deal of twentieth-century 
scholarship picking up on where he left off.26 From R. H. Tawney’s Religion and the 																																																																		
25  Whatmore, ‘The Weber Thesis’: unproven yet unrefuted’, in William Lamont (ed.), Historical 
controversies and historians, (Routledge, 1998), pp. 95-108. 
26 Ibid., p. 104, draws particular attention to Weber’s fruitful ‘historical imagination’ – one of the most 
useful tools at the disposal of the intellectual historian, according to John W. Burrow. For discussion, see 
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Rise of Capitalism (1926), which essentially agreed with Weber’s central claim about 
the Protestant sanctification of economic life;27 to Joseph Schumpeter’s classic History 
of Economy Analysis (1954), which spoke of the ‘ease with which the economics of the 
[scholastic] doctors absorbed all the phenomena of nascent capitalism … [serving] so 
well as a basis of the analytical work of their successors’;28 to more direct writings 
published in the latter decades of the twentieth century examining the role and influence 
of Christianity on post-Smithian classical economics.29 All of these works (and more 
besides) have homed in on various aspects of ‘religio-economic’ history, so as to deepen 
our understanding of those theological processes that shaped, and arguably continue to 
shape, the socio-economic structures of the modern world.30  
  
Amongst these various studies, Viner once again deserves special mention. As early as 
1927, for example, he had already begun to explore the theological dimensions to 
Smith’s work;31 and shortly thereafter, Viner went on to develop his ideas by focussing 
on ‘English theories of trade before Smith’, noting in particular the significance of the 
puritan rejection of luxury, and what he called the ‘providential harmony of interests’ in 
early-modern mercantilist thought – a grounding principle, Viner maintained, in the 
genesis of modern economics. 32  In Viner’s view, this ‘providential harmony of 
interests’ was in fact a synonym for the type of Christian ‘optimistic providentialism’ 
we briefly touched on earlier, and was chiefly associated with the competing claims of 																					
Cesare Cuttica, ‘Eavesdropper on the Past: John W. Burrow (1935-2009), Intellectual History and its 
Future’, in History of European Ideas, Vol. 40, No. 7 (2014), pp. 905-24. 
27 R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, (1926). 
28 Joseph Schumpeter, A History of Economic Analysis [1954], (London: Allen & Unwin Ed., 1982), p. 
94. 
29 E.g., John Pullen, ‘Malthus’s theological ideas and their influence on his principles of population’, 
History of Political Economy, 13/1 (1981), pp. 39-54; Salim Rashid, ‘Richard Whatley and Christian 
political economy at Oxford and Dublin’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 38/1, (1977), pp. 147-55; 
Anthony M. C. Waterman, ‘The ideological alliance of political economy and Christian theology, 1798-
1833’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 34/2 (1983), pp. 231-44; Revolution, Economics & Religion: 
Christian Political Economy 1798-1833, (Cambridge, 1991). 
30 For further twentieth-century scholarship in Weber’s wake see, e.g., Werner Sombart, Die Juden und 
das Wirtschlaftseben [The Jews and Modern Capitalism], (1911); Ernst Troeltsch, Die Soziallehren der 
christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen [The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches] (1912); Marjorie 
Grice-Hutcheson, The School of Salamanca: Readings in Spanish Monetary History, 1544-1605, (Oxford; 
Clarendon, 1952); Raymond de Roover, ‘Scholastic economics: survival and lasting influence from the 
sixteenth century to Adam Smith’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 79/2 (1955), pp. 161-90.  
31 Viner, ‘Adam Smith and laissez faire’, Journal of Political Economy, 35/2 (1927), pp. 198-232. 
32 Viner, ‘English Theories of Foreign Trade Before Adam Smith’, Journal of Political Economy, 38/3 
(June, 1930), pp. 249-301; ‘English Theories of Foreign Trade Before Adam Smith (Concluded)’, Journal 
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Original Sin’, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, (1963), XXIX/04, pp. 548-59; 
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the Reformist sects, the new mechanical philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries (which had its basis in natural theology), and with early forms of 
enlightenment.33 These phenomena were all tantamount to what Viner called ‘the 
“secularization” of even religious thought’. Yet nevertheless, and crucially, Viner 
insisted that such ‘optimistic providentialism’ was not a characteristic of 
Augustinianism, since, according to that tradition, ‘the doctrines of the Fall of Man, the 
curse of Adam, the second Fall of Man and the Flood, were insurmountable barriers to 
acceptance of optimistic pictures of the destiny of man while on this earth’.34 In light of 
this observation, the central question that ought to be raised at this stage is, why, given 
that Augustinianism was (and to large extent remains) de rigueur in the Christian 
tradition, was Viner so confident in ascribing to it a type of worldly optimism that, up 
until the early-modern period, it had habitually rejected? 
  
The answer to this complex question lies, in the first instance, in an examination of 
alternative rival traditions within Western philosophy, which competed with the Judeo-
Christian/Augustinian for prominence and influence – namely, Epicureanism and 
Stoicism. Originating in Greece in c. 300 BCE, both philosophies were typical of the 
Hellenistic schools in that they were rooted in the shared conception that philosophy 
was a way of life, rather than a mere systemisation of ideas. Nevertheless, the 
differences between the pair were far more marked than their similarities. According to 
the Stoics, the universe was a divinely ordered and rational whole in complete 
accordance with nature, meaning in turn that the dictates of reason were considered to 
be of primary importance in matters relating to human conduct. Thus, as far as the 
Stoics were concerned, the key to leading the good life was in acting virtuously, above 
all by subduing the passions.35 Contrariwise, however, Epicureans claimed that the 
notion of divine order was merely an abstract principle, and that, in truth, the 
arrangement of the universe was as a result of an incalculable number of atomic 
particles merging, dissolving and departing from one another, in an infinite array of 
‘natural’ (or randomised) movements. In light of these points, Epicureans held that 
reason and virtue were not decisive facets of human conduct. Rather, true happiness lay 																																																																		
33 See pp. 25-6 above. 
34 Viner, Providence in the Social Order, pp. 25-6. 
35 Based on the Stoic emphasis on the four cardinal virtues: justice, wisdom, courage and temperance, so 
as to achieve the state of apatheia – ‘things indifferent’. 
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in the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Only by embracing the passions, 
they argued, could it be possible for humankind to obtain this end. For they taught that 
it is the passions that lead humans away from all bodily discomfort, pointing them 
instead towards the path of tranquillity residing within the soul.36  
  
As is now well known, the teachings of Stoicism and Epicureanism enjoyed a great deal 
of exposure in the classical world, particularly in Augustan and early-imperial Rome. 
Having fallen by the wayside during the Christian millennium, however, it was not until 
the Renaissance period that a widespread renewal of interest in their ideas took root, via 
such humanists as the Stoically-inclined Justus Lipsius (an important figure whom we 
shall return to in Section V below) and the Epicurean-minded Pierre Gassendi (1592-
1655), who began editing and circulating translations of ancient Stoic and Epicurean 
texts. By these means, new ideas based upon millennia old doctrine were disseminated 
across the continent, and whilst on the one hand this ancient revivalism can be said to 
have been somewhat short-lived, on the other, truncated and modified versions of 
Epicureanism and Stoicism were woven into the very foundations of the early-modern 
lexicon.37 As Ben Dew has recently noted, then, the full significance of this early-
modern reappropriation of Epicurean and Stoic thought has only very recently begun to 
emerge in contemporary scholarship.38 This is notable in work of Jonathan Israel, who 
has maintained that in the work of seminal ‘irreligious’ seventeenth-century thinkers 
such as Benedict Spinoza (1632-77), Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) and Bernard de 
Fontenelle (1657-1757), the confrontation between Epicureanism and Stoicism 
anticipated what he has influentially termed the ‘Radical Enlightenment’.39 As Dew 																																																																		
36 The Epicureans called this the state of ataraxia. The relevant sections of the following texts are 
invaluable sources of information on traditional Epicurean and Stoic thought: Julia Annas, The Morality 
of Happiness, (Oxford, 1993), esp. chap. 5; Brad Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, 
(Cambridge, 2003); John Sellars, Stoicism, (California, 2006); James Warren, The Cambridge Companion 
to Epicureanism, (Cambridge, 2009); Tim O’Keefe, Epicureanism, (California, 2009). 
37 See Margaret J. Osler, ‘Early Modern Uses of Hellenistic Philosophy’, in Jon Miller & Inwood (eds.), 
Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy, (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 30-44, esp. at p. 30. Also Osler (ed.), 
Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought, (Cambridge, 1991); 
Catherine Wilson, Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity, (Oxford, 2008); Neven Leddy & Avi S. 
Lifschitz (eds.), Epicurus in the Enlightenment, (Oxford, 2009). 
38 Ben Dew, ‘Epicurean and Stoic Enlightenments: The Return of Modern Paganism?’, History Compass, 
11/6 (2013), pp. 486-95. Dew’s slightly ironic title alludes to Peter Gay’s infamous claim made in the 
1960s, and much refuted in the decades since its pronouncement, that the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment constituted the ‘birth of modern paganism’, in his The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, 2 
Vols., (New York, 1966-9). 
39 Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750, (Oxford, 
2001). Interestingly, Israel juxtaposes radical Enlightenment with a distinctly Newtonian and Lockean 
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continues, however, the origins of Israel’s account actually hearken back to the work of 
the French literary scholar Jean Lafond, who argued that during the second half of the 
seventeenth century, Epicurean thought merged with the third tradition of 
Augustinianism, so as to form a powerful critique of man as a passion-led creature 
whose innate selfishness came (albeit paradoxically) to be seen as the means to 
successful social flourishing.40 	
  
At first glance, the thought of Epicureanism and Augustinianism in coalition seems 
implausible. As we have just seen, Epicureans believed that the key to happiness lay in 
embracing the passions, and that spiritual and material contentment could only be 
attained by these means. By contrast, Augustinianism was a theological position 
predicated on the belief that post-lapsarian humankind was enslaved by its passions, and 
that all human life on earth is therefore a sinful and squalid existence. Nevertheless, in 
the work of French Jansenists such as Pierre Nicole (1625-95), Blaise Pascal (1623-62), 
and Bayle’s notorious disciple, Bernard Mandeville, Lafond demonstrated that rigorous 
Augustinianism could indeed be conjoined to the Epicurean tradition. Such thinkers 
admitted, for example, that humankind was frequently induced by the passions. 
Moreover, they were all intrigued by the capacity for human selfishness to effectuate 
meaningful social change in the exterior world. In light of these claims, antithetical 
Stoic ideals concerning virtuous conduct and rational abstinence seemed imprudent, if 
not even prideful, by comparison; and the resulting oscillation between these various 
interpretations of humanity—fallen, wretched and self-serving on the one side, or 
capable of extreme feats of elevation on the other—continued to dominate educated 
discussion well into the eighteenth century, as this study will show.41 																					
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40 Dew, ‘Epicurean and Stoic Enlightenments’, p. 289; Jean Lafond, L’Homme et son Image: Morales et 
littératures de Montaigne à Mandeville, (Paris, 1996), esp. ‘Augustinisme et Épicurisme’, pp. 353-4.  
41  See Christopher Brooke, Philosophical Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to 
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Building on the work of Lafond and Israel amongst others, then, much recent 
scholarship has concerned itself with attempted to demonstrate just how far-reaching the 
early-modern confrontation truly was between the Epicurean-Augustinian hybrid and its 
Stoic challengers. Additionally, emphasis is now increasingly placed on the extent to 
which this can be said to have impinged upon the development of political economy as 
a distinct discipline in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.42 Two prime examples 
of this pendulum-swing movement between two extremes can be evidenced, for 
instance, in the contrast between the work of Robertson and Pierre Force.43 Tracing in 
the former the elaboration of Vico and Hume’s economic ideas back to the Augustinian-
Epicurean fideism of Bayle, Robertson maintains that it was Bayle who offered a 
critique of humanity whose standard of morality was once again based upon its selfish 
wants and desires – i.e., its passions.44 Consequently, in the Pensées Diverses (1682) 
Bayle had reached the conclusion that a society of atheists might be just as virtuous as a 
society of idolaters; and in responding to this Baylean conception of human nature (via 
engagement with Mandeville), Robertson maintains that Vico, Hume, and a host of 
‘lesser’ contemporaries fashioned an original account of human nature which placed 
self-interest at its core.45 Contrariwise, however, in the work of Force an alternative 
account of human nature is accentuated instead, emphasising the rival Stoic current in 
the ‘genealogy of economic science’. By recognising that human actions are shaped not 
by self-interest alone but by sympathy and pity also, Force maintains that it was Adam 
Smith, no less, who spoke the language of natural harmony between the interests of the 
individual and the interests of society at large – a cornerstone of the Stoic philosophy, as 
we shall shortly see.46  
 
 
 																																																																		
42 Dew, ‘Epicurean and Stoic Enlightenments’, pp. 487, 490, 491, 493. 
43 Robertson, Case for Enlightenment; Pierre Force, Self-Interest Before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of 
Economic Science, (Cambridge, 2003). 
44 Robertson, Case for Enlightenment, esp. chaps. 3, 5-7. 
45 Ibid., prefatory summary on title page, where Robertson claims that the Epicurean philosophy therefore 
proved to be the ‘midwife’ of eighteenth-century political economy and the Enlightenment. 
46 Force, Self-Interest Before Smith, p. 2. In proposing this viewpoint, Force’s stated objective is to 
overturn Stigler’s influential assessment of the historico-intellectual roots of homo economicus, which 
Force believes overemphasises the role of self-love and/or self-interest. Cf. Stigler, ‘Smith’s Travels on 
the Ship of State’, noted in our Introduction, p. 15. 
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IV. Competing Visions of Providence. 
  
Of the two accounts provided above, clearly Robertson’s is the more traditional and 
familiar in that it bases the roots of modern economic thought in pessimistic, sceptical 
or selfish interpretations of human nature: a largely cynical reading of the genesis of 
political economy normally associated with such thinkers as Pascal, François de la 
Rochefoucauld (1613-80), Nicole, Jean-François Melon (1675-1738), Hobbes, 
Mandeville, Hume, Charles de Secondat Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Adam 
Smith (with qualifications).47  Yet as we have just seen, the rival Stoic tradition 
increasingly picked out by the likes of Force alongside Peter N. Miller and Christopher 
Brooke, presents human nature in an altogether different light, centring not on its selfish 
qualities, but on humanity’s innate propensity towards sympathy, benevolence, 
sentimentality, and the ‘common good’. 48  Thinkers normally associated with this 
tradition include Lipsius, Anthony Ashley-Cooper, the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-
1713), Francis Hutcheson, (1694-1746), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), Charles 
Bonnet (1720-93) and Smith (again with qualifications).49  
  
Concerning the theo-philosophical fault lines dividing the two rival traditions, what is of 
particular interest to us in this study, however, is the providentialism which lay at the 
core of these differences.50 In the initial case of Epicurean-Augustinianism, for example, 
it is important to note that classical Epicureans rejected, outright, Stoic claims to 
																																																																		
47 This hearkens back at least to the publication of Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and Interests: 
Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its Triumph [1977], (Twentieth Anniversary Ed., Princeton, 
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48 Peter N. Miller, Defining the Common Good, (Cambridge, 1994), esp. Chap. 1. Also his ‘Hercules at 
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Pierre Force’s Self-Interest Before Adam Smith’, The European Journal of the History of Economic Ideas, 
12/4, 2005, pp. 701-12. 
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universality, on account of the Epicurean denial of the existence of divine, rational order 
itself (a Stoic synonym for divine providence). Yet however that may be, when 
Epicureanism merged with the third tradition of Augustinianism during the seventeenth 
century, a particularly powerful brand of providentialist theology came to the fore, 
which, contrary to the Stoic emphasis on harmonic nature and reason and/or 
philosophical contemplation, stressed instead post-fallen humanity’s abundant self-love 
and fear of death – by which means the human instinct for survival became a matter of 
indirect influence, in the guise of flattery, persuasion, coercion and so on. In this 
thoroughly negative reading of human nature, associated most fulsomely with the 
Epicurean-materialism of Hobbes, the means to human greatness ultimately depend 
upon human weakness (read as the passions). For within this scheme, the putative 
transition from ‘selfishness’ to ‘society’ is deemed to be of a fundamentally precarious, 
chaotic and ‘anti-social’ nature. Nevertheless, there is a providentialist explanation for 
this sequence of events, in that under such tumultuous circumstances, the formation of 
society can only be said to have come about ‘from God, by miracle’, in the words of the 
eighteenth century’s most commanding proponent of the Augustinian-Epicurean 
position, Mandeville.51 As Gilbert Faccarello has pointed out, then, this viewpoint 
epitomises the ‘countervailing passions principle’ popularised by Albert O. Hirschmann 
in his Passions & the Interests (1977), in which Hirschman spoke of those seventeenth 
and eighteenth-century thinkers who were at pains to ‘[devise] …which passions were 
typically to be assigned the role of tamers, and which ones, on the contrary, were the 
truly ‘wild’ passions that required taming’.52 
  
By contrast, the early-modern appropriation of the Stoic conception of human nature 
tended to be far more optimistic than its neo-Augustinian/Epicurean analogue: a fact 
attributable to some of the central tenets of classic Stoic philosophy itself.53 As we have 
																																																																		
51 Bernard de Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits [1714, 1723], F. B. 
Kaye (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924), II, p. 205.  
52 Faccarello, ‘A tale of two traditions’, p. 706; Hirschman, Passions and Interests, p. 31. Openly 
acknowledging the ‘intellectual debt’ he owes to Hirschman, Force restates the countervailing passions 
principle in specifically Augustinian-providentialist terms, in which ‘the passions’, he writes, ‘can be 
checked by the other passions or even check themselves’ – an example being the ‘ruler driven by the 
passion of greed who will refrain from confiscating his subject’s property because maximization of his 
own wealth is dependent upon the economic well-being of his subjects’, in Self-Interest Before Smith, pp.  
2, 135. 
53 Again, Force, Self-Interest Before Smith, pp. 86-90, notes some of the similarities between, and yet 
difficulties in ascribing with too much confidence, this type of Stoic ‘optimism’ with Viner’s ‘optimistic 
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seen, a core characteristic of the Stoic philosophy was the belief in a divinely ordered 
and rational universe, functioning in complete accordance with nature. Nevertheless, 
Stoic thinkers maintained that humans had a particularly important role to play within 
this scheme, based upon the idea that the human capacity for rational thought resulted in 
a distinctive relationship between (interior) humanity and (exterior) nature. Since, 
according to the Stoics, living in accordance with nature was deemed to be the final end 
of all rational endeavour, they therefore contended that it was only via humanity’s 
utilisation of reason that it was truly possible to discover nature itself – and by this it 
was meant not only ‘human nature’ but also ‘cosmic nature’, of which human nature 
was but a small part. This radically teleological component of the Stoic philosophy is of 
fundamental importance to this study, then; the reason being that it is a stance which 
enjoins all rational creatures to view the world not from the limited standpoint of self-
centeredness (or self-interest), but rather from the perspective of one’s relation to a 
greater whole.54 As various scholars affirm, then, there is an assortment of labels 
ascribed to this typically Stoic model: Stoic universalism; Stoic naturalism; 
cosmopolitan providence; the providential design model; or simply providential 
naturalism. 55 Yet perhaps the most faithful though difficult to translate into the modern 
vernacular, oikeiosis, loosely translated as ‘approbation’ or ‘familiarisation’, is a term 
denoting above all else the conceptual space existing within rational creatures between 
their ‘self-interest’ on the one side, and their ‘concern for others’ or ‘benevolence’, on 
the other.56 In the eighteenth-century this concept has come to be associated most 
readily with Shaftesbury (and to a lesser extent his disciple Hutcheson), as for example 																					
providentialism’. Cf. Viner, Role of Providence in the Social Order, pp. 5, 7, & pp. 25-6 of this study 
above. 
54 See Annas, Morality of Happiness, Chap. 5: ‘The Stoics: Human Nature and the Point of View of the 
Universe’. Cf. Arthur Eyffinger, ‘The fourth man’, in Hans W. Blom & Laurens C. Winkel (eds.), Grotius 
and the Stoa, (Van Gorcum, Netherlands, 2004), pp. 117-156, at pp. 150-1: ‘Along the line numerous 
issues have been discussed which had been at the core of the Stoic debate throughout the centuries: the 
nature of God and Creation; God’s care for man; natural law vs. positive laws; mantic and providence; the 
paramount role of reason; the absoluteness of virtue; act and intention; emotions; suicide; the just ruler; 
the role of the personal example’. 
55 Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, pp. 24-6, 50-1, 61, 90-4; T. H. Irwin, ‘Stoic 
Naturalism and its Critics’, in Inwood (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Stoics, pp. 345-64; Laurence 
Dickey, ‘Doux-commerce and humanitarian values’, in Blom & Winkel (eds.), Grotius and the Stoa, pp. 
271-317, esp. at. p. 310, n. 202; Long, ‘Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition: Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler’, 
in Inwood (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Stoics, pp. 365-92, at pp. 374-5; also in another version of this 
essay, in Miller & Inwood (eds.), Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy, pp. 7-29, at p. 13. 
56 C. O. Brink, ‘Oikeiosis and oikeiotes: Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in Moral Theory’, Phronesis I 
(1956), pp. 123-45; S. G. Pembroke, ‘Oikeiosis’, in A. A. Long (ed.), Problems in Stoicism, (London, 
1971), pp. 114-49; Troel Engberg-Pederson, The Stoic theory of oikeiosis: Moral development and social 
interaction in early Stoic philosophy, (Aarhus, 1990). 
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when Shaftesbury writes that 
 
if, by the natural Constitution of any rational Creature, the same Irregularitys of Appetite 
which make him ill to Others, make him ill also to Himself; and if the same Regularity of 
Affections, which causes him to be good in one Sense, causes him to be good also in the 
other; then is that Goodness by which he is thus useful to others, a real Good and Advantage 
to himself. And thus Virtue and Interest may be found at last to agree.57 
 
As scholarship increasingly acknowledges, then, it is over this very specific issue of 
providence that the differences between Epicurean-Augustinian and Stoic currents of 
thought come most conspicuously to the fore. And, as Whatmore reiterates by way of 
summation, it was thereafter the discipline of political economy that ‘emerged’ in 
consequence of this intense ‘controversy’ between the ‘positive passions or virtues’ 
(i.e., the neo-Stoic tradition) on the one side, ‘and the negative virtues or vices’ (i.e., its 
Augustinian-Epicurean analogue) on the other.58 As we shall see, it is very much this 
binary conundrum between two ‘Manichean’ extremes which informs much, if not all, 
subsequent discussion of Butler and Tucker housed within this study. Yet the point 
requiring particular emphasis in the remainder of this opening chapter is the Stoic—and 
more specifically the distinctly Christian Stoic (or ‘neo-Stoic’)—thread in the history of 
political economy, the nuances of which have remained largely unexplored in extant 
scholarship.59 
 
V. The Relationship Between Christian Stoicism and Protestant Natural Law. 
 
By necessity, the Augustinian-Epicurean and Stoic conceptions of providence outlined 
above provide mere summaries of the vast penumbra of conflicting positions generated 
between various thinkers across centuries, and usually set against the backdrop of 
extreme confessional and sectarian conflict. Yet what they do serve to illustrate with 
particular clarity, at least for our introductory purposes, is the intriguing interplay 																																																																		
57 Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, An Enquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit [1699], in 
Characteristicks, II, p. 16. 
58 Whatmore, ‘Luxury, Commerce, and the Rise of Political Economy’, in Harris (ed.), Oxford British 
Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century. 
59 Henceforth, the terms ‘neo-Stoicism’ and ‘Christian Stoicism’ are used interchangeably. It should be 
noted that Force’s ideas do flirt at times with neo-Stoicism as distinct from classical Stoicism, e.g., Self-
Interest Before Adam Smith, p. 80: ‘[The] neo-Stoic conception of Providence can be found in early 
eighteenth-century authors like Shaftesbury and Butler’ (but note how Force conflates Shaftesbury’s and 
Butler’s brand of neo-Stoicism here). Likewise, Robertson emphasises Christian Stoicism to a larger 
extent than most, in his Case for Enlightenment, esp. pp. 94-146.  
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between Hellenistic, Roman and Judeo-Christian ‘first principles’, all of which 
impinged upon notions of self-interest and sociability in the period leading up to and 
including Smith.60 When it comes to the specific issue of Stoicism in the early-modern 
world, however, one further consideration that must be taken into account is the clear 
distinction that ought to be made between classical Stoic thought, and the types of 
Stoicism that were adopted by those early-moderns who attempted to ‘liberate’ it from 
its basis in heretical paganism. This need to distinguish between classical Stoicism as 
distinct from Christian Stoicism is aptly demonstrated, for example, by the marked 
differences between Shaftesbury (who in the eighteenth century is taken to be for the 
Stoic tradition what Mandeville was for the Epicurean-Augustinian) and his disciple 
Hutcheson, both of whom were notable devotees of the Stoic philosophy, and yet 
differed fundamentally on their opinion of the Christian revelation. According to 
Hutcheson, Christianity was thoroughly compatible with the study of human nature, 
morals, natural religion, jurisprudence and the ends of government.61 By contrast, 
Shaftesbury admonished orthodox Christianity as a ‘vulgar religion … that sordid, 
shameful nauseous idea of Deity’.62 As we shall see, examples of discrepancies between 
such thinkers as these, who might otherwise agree in the general tone of their views, is 
by no means inconsequential in the context of Butler and Tucker’s ideas – which, 
unsurprisingly, given that both were clergymen, inclined far more towards Hutcheson 
(who was in fact an earlier admirer of Butler).63 Yet what differentiated the likes of 
Hutcheson, Butler and Tucker from Shaftesbury and his freethinking followers is, we 
want to suggest, that each was operating—indirectly and in roundabout ways—under a 
specific type of Christian Stoicism associated with the sixteenth-century Flemish 
humanist, Justus Lipsius.64  
  
An accomplished classical scholar and philologist, in the late-sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century Lipsius had built his reputation on the publication of numerous 
editions of the works of his favourite Stoic authors, including Seneca, Epictetus and 																																																																		
60 Again, it is the stated intention of Force’s Self-Interest Before Smith to examine the historical dynamics 
of these ‘first principles’. 
61 See, e.g., an explicit statement of this position in William Leechman’s (1706-85) preface to Francis 
Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy, 2 vols., (London, 1755), I, pp. xii-xiii, xxxvi. 
62 Benjamin Rand (ed.), The Life, Unpublished Letters and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of 
Shaftesbury, (London, 1900), p. 24. 
63 For the connections between Butler and Hutcheson, see esp. Chapter Four, pp. 118-24, 164-5 below. 
64 For earlier biographies, see Léontine Zanta, La Renaissance du stoïcisme au XVIe siècle, (Paris, 1914) 
& Jason Lewis Saunders, Justus Lipsius: The Philosophy of Renaissance Stoicism, (New York, 1955). 
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Tacitus amongst others. Out of the scattered fragments surviving from classical 
antiquity, Lipsius’s main aim, however, was to reformulate a type of ancient Stoicism 
that was compatible with Christianity. In the context of the religious and civil wars then 
ravaging his adopted homeland of the Low Countries, Lipsius therefore drew heavily 
from the ancient Stoics in order to offer his readers consolidation in times of public 
calamity.65 So successful were his ideas that in the years and decades following his 
death, a distinct form of Lipsian neo-Stoicism emerged throughout the academies and 
courts of Europe, having a profound and lasting impact on such thinkers as Michel de 
Montaigne (1533-92), Guillaume Du Vair (1556-1621), Pierre Charron (1541-1603), 
Francisco de Quevedo (1580-1645), and Robert Leighton (1611-84) amongst others. As 
A. A. Long has put it, then, Lipsius’s ‘unprecedented knowledge’ of ancient Stoicism 
ensured that he exerted an immense ‘cultural influence from about 1600 to 1750’, 
thereby earning him an ‘enormous vogue’ in Skinner’s corresponding view.66 As if to 
emphasise the point, contemporaneously, Montaigne also praised Lipsius as one of the 
‘most learned men [then] alive’.67  
  
In recent years the importance of Lipsian neo-Stoicism has become increasingly 
acknowledged in scholarship. 68  Perhaps the most well known examples (and 
controversial, too, given their alleged affinities with National Socialism) relate to the 
twentieth-century analyses of Gerhard Oestreich and Otto Brunner; both of whose 
works contended that the Lipsian emphasis on discipline and order was effectively the 
harbinger of seventeenth-century absolutism, military innovation, and thereby the 
																																																																		
65 See esp. such writings as Lipsius’s De Constantia [On Constancy] (Antwerp, 1584) (with reference to 
oikeiosis at I. XI); Politicorum sive Civilis doctrinae libri sex [Six Books on Politics or Political Doctrine] 
(Antwerp, 1589); Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam [A Guide to Stoic Philosophy] (with reference to 
oikeiosis at II. XIII), & Physiologia Stoicorum [Physics of the Stoics] (both Antwerp, 1604). 
66 Long, ‘Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition: Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler’, in Inwood (ed.), Cambridge 
Companion to Stoics, p. 379; & in Miller & Inwood (eds.), Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy, p. 
16. See also Skinner, Foundations of Political Thought, II, p. 278. Cf. more generally, Sellars, Stoicism, 
‘The Stoic Legacy: The Renaissance and early-modern philosophy’, pp. 139-50.  
67 Montaigne, Essais, (Paris, 1580-95), 2.12; cited in Sellars, Stoicism, p. 143. 
68 See, e.g., Skinner, Foundations of Political Thought, II, pp. 278-83; Mark P. O. Morford, Stoics and 
Neo-Stoics: Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius (Princeton, 1991); Richard Tuck, Philosophy and 
Government, 1572-1651, (Cambridge, 1993), esp. pp. 45-63; A. McCrea, Constant Minds: Political 
Virtue and the Lipsian Paradigm in England, 1584-1650, (Toronto, 1997); A. Shifflet, Stoicism, Politics 
and Literature in the Age of Milton, (Cambridge, 1998); A. Moss, 'The Politics of Justus Lipsius and the 
Commonplace Book', Journal of the History of Ideas, 59.3 (1998), pp. 421-36; E. D. Bom, M. Jannsens, 
T. van Hoont & J. Papy (eds.), (Un)masking the Realities of Power: Justus Lipsius and the Dynamics of 
Political Writing in Early Modern Europe, (Leiden, 2011).  
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modern state.69 Interestingly, this line of enquiry would go on to be adopted by Michel 
Foucault when he claimed that the ‘sixteenth century return to Stoicism [revolved] 
around the re-actualisation of the problem of how to govern oneself’ – in large part a 
reference to Lipsius’s thought.70  More recently still, a recognisably Lipsian-Stoic 
tradition presents itself in the work of Christopher Brooke, where it plays a foundational 
role in his important account of the early-modern conflict between Augustinians, 
Epicureans and Stoics.71 Yet most intriguingly of all for our present purposes is the 
thesis of Peter N. Miller, who claims that Lipsius’s ideas on classically Stoic themes 
such as constancy, ethics, organisation, conversation and friendship held important 
ramifications for broader early-modern notions of ‘sociability’ itself. Deploying an 
interesting analogy between the Senacean account of ‘Hercules at the crossroads’ (i.e., 
the Stoic emphasis on ‘Choice’ as ‘Freedom’), and the notion that Lipsian neo-Stoicism 
was poised on the cusp between seventeenth-century ‘aristocratic society’ and 
eighteenth-century ‘commercial society’, Miller thereby concludes that Lipsian neo-
Stoicism ought to be viewed as ‘a key – even the key – ingredient in the making of a 
modern society that is either ‘civil’ or ‘disciplining’’.72 Concurring, therefore, with 
Force’s view that in a nascent ‘modern society that was a continuous, churning, 
challenge’ Smith ‘turned to’ the Stoics for guidance, Miller suggests that the resulting 
Smithian dichotomy between the ‘partial’ and ‘impartial spectator’, a sort of 
psychologically-based prolegomenon to classical ‘Smithian economics’, was at least 
partially of Lipsian origin.73  
																																																																		
69 See esp. the posthumously published Gerhard Oestreich, NeoStoicism and the Early Modern State, 
Brigitta Oestreich & H. G. Koenigsberger (eds.), tr. David McLintock, (Cambridge, 1982). For Oestreich 
and Brunner’s controversial links to Nazism, see Miller, ‘Nazis and Neo-Stoics: Otto Bruner and Gerhard 
Oestreich Before and After the Second World War’, Past and Present, 176 (2002), pp. 144-86. 
70 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, (New York, 1979), pp. 135-8, 170 & 
Michael Senellart (ed.), Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1978, 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2007), pp. 88-99. Cf. Brooke, Philosophical Pride, pp. 16, 34-6. 
71 Esp. Brooke, Philosophical Pride, Chap. One: ‘Justus Lipsius and the Post-Machiavellian Prince’, pp. 
12-36. 
72 Miller, ‘Hercules at the Crossroads in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Neo-Stoicism 
Between Aristocratic and Commercial Society’, in Christian Mouchel & Colette Nativel (eds.), 
République des Lettres, Republique des Arts, (Geneva, Drosz, 2008), pp. 167-92; & this citation in his 
‘Nazis and Neo-Stoics’, p. 148. Cf. also Miller’s Defining the Common Good, pp. 8-11, 37-8. For more 
on ‘aristocratic sociability’ see Hugh Trevor-Roper, ‘The Great Tew Circle’ in Catholics, Anglicans and 
Puritans: Seventeenth-Century Essays, (London, 1987); Jonathan Dewald, Aristocratic Experience and 
the Origins of Modern Culture: France, 1570-1715, (Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford, 1993) & again, 
Miller, Peiresc’s Europe: Learning and Virtue in the Seventeenth Century, (New Haven and London, 
2000), esp. chaps. 1-2.  
73 Miller, ‘Hercules at the Crossroads …’, pp. 184, 186-9. Most scholars acknowledge that the ‘impartial 
spectator’ represents Smith at his ‘most Stoic’, e.g., Haakonssen & Whatmore, p. 300. For more, then, on 
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Whilst increasing emphasis on Lipsian neo-Stoicism has garnered much interest 
amongst historians of early-modern political thought, it is notable too that concern for 
Lipsius’s ideas have now begun to cross the interdisplinary divide. In a recent article in 
the Review of International Studies, for instance, Halvard Leira lends further credence 
to these various interpretations by highlighting the influence of Lipsius on present-day 
international relations. Claiming that he stood ‘on the threshold of modernity’, and that 
he therefore ‘provides an important theoretical link and synthesis between earlier 
thinking on reason of state and natural law and later theories of absolutism and 
international law’, Liera notes with particular clarity the significance of Lipsius on the 
early ‘canonical IR-writers’, Grotius and Pufendorf.74 Famed for their theories in 
Protestant natural law, and for extending their views on modern forms of commercial 
sociability, in recent decades much scholarship has sought to address the enormous 
influence Grotius and Pufendorf exerted on eighteenth-century British society, and 
particularly the development of its political economy north of Hadrian’s Wall.75 In 
terms of their particular relevance to this study, however, what is of axiomatic 
importance as we move forward is increasing scholarly recognition of the Lipsian-Stoic 
legacy housed within Grotius and Pufendorf’s thought, which, it is gradually 
acknowledged, became an important facilitator of Miller’s transition from ‘aristocratic 
to commercial society’ (or what we may take to be a synonym for ‘early-modernity to 
modernity’).76   																					
Smith’s ‘partial’ and ‘impartial spectator’ in the context of Butler and Tucker, and more specifically the 
former’s influence on the Scot, see Chapter Four, pp. 121-3. 
74 Halvard Leira, ‘Justus Lipsius, political humanism and the disciplining of 17th century statecraft’, 
Review of International Studies, 34/04 (October 2008), pp. 669-92, these citations at p. 670-1.  
75 E.g., Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical Politics, esp. Chaps 1 & 2; Tuck, Philosophy and Government; 
Rights of War and Peace, esp. Chaps. 3-4; Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, esp. pp. 26-
31, 35-46; Hont, ‘The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical 
Foundations of the “Four-Stages” Theory’, in Jealousy, pp. 159-84; Robertson, Case for Enlightenment, 
esp. pp. 136, 319, n. 100. 
76 See Blom & Winkel (eds.), Grotius and the Stoa, esp. Blom & Winkel, ‘Introduction’, pp. 3-20; 
Reinhard Brandt, ‘Self-consciousness and self-care: on the tradition of oikeiosis in the modern age’, pp. 
73-91; Brooke, ‘Stoicism and anti-Stoicism in the seventeenth century’, pp. 93-115; Jon Miller, ‘Innate 
ideas in Stoicism and Grotius’, pp. 157-76; John W. Cairns, ‘Stoicism, slavery, and law’, pp. 197-232; 
Fiammetta Palladini, ‘Pufendorf and Stoicism’, pp. 245-55 (which challenges the extent of ‘pure’ 
Stoicism in Pufendorf’s thought); Kari Saastamoinen, ‘Pufendorf and the Stoic model of natural law’, pp. 
257-69; Dickey, ‘Doux-commerce and humanitarian values’, pp. 271-317, esp. pp. 279-83. Also 
Oestreich, Neo-Stoicism, esp. Chap. 2; M. A. Stewart, ‘The Stoic legacy in the early Scottish 
enlightenment, in Osler (ed.), Atoms, Pneuma and Tranquillity, pp. 272-96; Haakonssen, Natural Law 
and Moral Philosophy, pp. 4, 42; Christopher A. Ford, ‘Preaching Propriety to Princes: Grotius, Lipsius 
and Neo-Stoic International Law’, Case Western Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, No. 2, (Spring, 
1996), pp. 313-66; Jan Waszink, ‘Lipsius and Grotius: Tacitism’, History of European Ideas, Vol. 39, No. 
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The significance of these connections cannot be overemphasised. As Christopher A. 
Ford notes, Grotius in particular has long been considered ‘the father’ of ‘modern 
constitutional law and contemporary international law’;77 if not even an ‘early pioneer 
of innumerable pet causes’ associated with modernity – ‘human rights, international 
peace-keeping institutions, the law of the sea, the legal equality of all sovereign states, 
the supremacy of international law over national enactments, the protection of non-
combatants of warfare, principles of jus cogens [i.e., pre-emptory norms/compelling 
law]’, and ‘humanitarian intervention’.78 Nevertheless, as Ford spells out further: ‘the 
Stoic roots of Grotian natural law may be found in the person of  … Lipsius … whose 
articulation of a distinctive “Neo-Stoic” political philosophy helped develop ideas that 
would become core elements of the Grotian scheme’.79 Viewed from this perspective, it 
is very much by means of Grotius and Pufendorf’s ‘modernising’ variants of Protestant 
natural law that we note some of the core characteristics of the Stoic conception of 
providence coming to the fore in the early-modern world. Centring once again on the 
primacy of reason and nature, on the ‘innateness’ of Stoic oikeiosis, and on the 
cosmopolitan and universalistic potentiality of the human species, Jon Miller points out, 
for example, that the Stoic qualities replete within Grotius’s work consist above all in 
his endorsement of the natural sociability of man (or the appetitus societatis, ‘a primary 
source for Grotius’ natural law-theory’), and likewise in Grotius’s ‘Stoic insistence on 
the parallel micro- and macrocosmos, private and public spheres, and the concurring 
morals of pater familias and public sovereign’.80 As Arthur Eyffinger adds further, then, 
within the Grotian system, even those qualities which cannot not be ‘drawn straight 																					
2, (1996), pp. 151-68; Tuck, Rights of War and Peace, pp. 37, 39, 101; T. J. Hochstrasser, ‘Socialitas and 
the history of natural law: Pufendorf’s defence of De Jure Naturae et Gentium’, in his Natural Law 
Theories in the Early Enlightenment, (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 40-71, esp. pp. 41-2, 45, 58, 62-3, 65-6, 68, 
70, 73; Hont, Jealousy, pp. 166, 175; Jon Miller, ‘Stoics, Grotius, and Spinoza and Moral Deliberation’, 
in Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy, pp. 116-39; Brooke, Philosophical Pride, esp. ‘Grotius, 
Stoicism and Oikeiosis’, pp. 37-58; Blom, ‘Sociability and Hugo Grotius’, History of European Ideas, 
Vol. 41, No. 5 (2015), pp. 589-604, esp. pp. 590-1, 600, 602, 603. 
77 Analogous, perhaps, to Smith’s prescribed moniker as “the father” of modern economics. 
78 Ford, ‘Preaching Propriety to Princes’, pp. 314 & esp. p. 315, nn. 9-17. 
79 Ibid., p. 317; cf. explicitly in Tuck, Philosophy and Government, pp. 155, 159, 176, 185; also Blom & 
Winkel (eds.), Grotius and the Stoa, pp. 11, 97, 124, 198-9. 
80 Jon Miller, ‘Innate ideas in Stoicism and Grotius’, in Grotius and the Stoa, pp. 151, 163-5. Cf. in the 
same publication, Brooke, ‘Stoicism and anti-Stoicism in the seventeenth century’, p. 94: ‘[Like] Grotius, 
the Stoics taught that a natural instinct for self-preservation, which they called oikeiosis, could be used as 
a foundational principle for a science of the morality of human conduct’. For a convincing statement, 
however, of the Hebraic influence on Grotius’s natural law in tandem with its neo-Stoicism, see Meirvav 
Jones, ‘Philo Judeaus and Hugo Grotius’s Modern Natural Law’, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 74, 
No. 3, (July, 2013), pp. 339-59. 
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from natural law doctrine’ happen to be ‘distilled from [the] consensus gentium’; a 
quasi-Stoic term denoting the ‘agreement of the people’, ‘consensus’, ‘concord’, or 
simply ‘the common good’ – or as Eyffinger otherwise puts it, ‘the accumulated 
congruent experience of mankind as recorded in classical sources’ (most notably 
Cicero’s De Finibus, De Officiis and De Legibus).81 
  
Like Grotius, Pufendorf’s affinities with Christian Stoicism are palpable, though far 
subtler. Whereas Grotius was directly influenced by Lipsius, who was still alive when 
the former was young, according to T. J. Hochstrasser, Pufendorf’s ‘achievement above 
all’ was to have ‘evolved a tortuous path through [the] intellectual minefield’ of 
Aristotelian Scholasticism and Protestant moral theology ‘towards a [truly modern] 
science of natural law, that used Stoic ethics to reconcile the voluntarism of Hobbes 
with … divine positive law’.82 Confronted, then, unlike Grotius, by the powerful 
scepticism of Hobbes, whose system was predicated on the belief that self-preservation 
was humanity’s fundamental natural instinct, by necessity Pufendorf’s incorporation of 
Stoicism was far more cautious than Grotius’s. For one thing, Pufendorf was compelled 
to admit that the wellspring of the natural law was, indeed, based upon individual self-
preservation and/or self-love; and on this basis he was forced to diverge from the 
Grotian appetitus societatis and adhere rather to Hobbes’s neo-Augustinian-Epicurean 
model, erected upon human depravity and the passions.83 Yet crucially, according to 
Pufendorf, this did not necessarily imply that self-love should be placed in direct 
opposition to Grotius’s ‘neo-Stoic’ thesis.84 On the contrary, as Hochstrasser points out 
further, Pufendorf himself described Hobbes as an Epicurean in the pejorative sense, 
and tended to use the ‘shorthand labels of ‘Stoic’ and ‘Epicurean’’ not as ‘crude 
reductive slogans’, but as a ‘mirror [for] the way he had encountered and transcended 
Hobbesian natural law within his own mind’. This being the case, it was above all Stoic 
moral theory which proved to be so ‘very helpful’ to Pufendorf ‘in providing an answer 
to Hobbes’; by which means, adds Jon Parkin, it was possible for Pufendorf to at least 
attempt to ‘tame the Leviathan’.85  																																																																		
81 Eyffinger, ‘The fourth man’, in Grotius and the Stoa, p. 126. 
82 Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, p. 4. 
83 Blom & Winkel (eds.), Grotius and the Stoa, p. 19. 
84 Hochstrasser, ‘Socialitas and the history of natural law’, in his Natural Law Theories, p. 63. 
85 Ibid., pp. 70, 73; Jon Parkin, ‘Taming the Leviathan – Reading Hobbes in Seventeenth-Century 
Europe’, in Hochstrasser & P. Schröder (eds.), Early Modern Natural Law Theories: Contexts and 
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Fittingly, then, it is with the figure of Pufendorf that we arrive at our conclusion to this 
opening chapter. A thinker whose writings incorporated from all varieties of providence 
explored within these pages, and yet (as far as this work argues) tended towards the neo-
Stoic wherever possible, the key to understanding Pufendorf’s specific brand of 
Stoicism – and thereby his ‘auxiliary’ importance to this study – therefore lies in 
acknowledging the intellectual dynamic that existed between him, Grotius and Hobbes, 
and the ancient sources which informed them. 86  For whilst Pufendorf admitted, 
ostensibly against Grotius and with Hobbes, that self-love/self-interest governed all 
human behaviour, and that this was a direct consequence of human weakness/human 
depravity, yet for Pufendorf (with Grotius and against Hobbes), in no way could this be 
said to be the wellspring of the natural law. Rather, in order to assist him in his theory 
about where it was the natural law did in fact derive from, Pufendorf’s strategy was to 
call upon the ‘sublime … moral teachings … of the Stoics’; by which means he 
attempted to invert the Hobbesian scheme by claiming that it is precisely because 
individual humans in a state of nature are so incredibly weak that they feel compelled to 
seek their own safety (salvum) within society.87  
  
This recourse to mutual co-operation, by which means it is possible for humans to 
survive and prosper despite the fact that they are most capable of inflicting damage 
upon themselves and their fellow kind, Pufendorf calls socialitas (‘sociality’). 
Furthermore, according to Pufendorf it is this fundamental principle of natural law 
which every human is obliged to cultivate and preserve in the interests of the collective 
– though in the first instance, and crucially, by caring for oneself. Most importantly of 
all, however, whilst it can be said once again that within the Pufendorfian scheme self-
preservation does indeed hold sway over all other human affections, à la Hobbes, 
nevertheless, it is Pufendorf’s ‘neo-Stoic’ concern for the safety and preservation of the 
human species at large, obtainable solely by means of socialitas, and which in turns 
																					
Strategies in the Early Enlightenment, (Dordrecht, 2003), pp. 31-52, with the statement of Pufendorf’s 
‘Stoic account of natural law’ at p. 45. Cf. also in the same publication, Ian Hunter, ‘The Love of a Sage 
or the Command of a Superior: The Natural Law Doctrines of Leibniz and Pufendorf’, pp. 169-193, with 
minute reference to Pufendorfian-Lipsian neo-Stoicism at p. 177. 
86 Again, particularly via the figure of Cicero. 
87 Samuel von Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium [Of the Law of Nature and Nations, 1672], Jean 
Barbeyrac (ed.), (Amsterdam, 1734), II, 3, 15. 
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appears to be akin to Stoic oikeiosis, which constitutes the very bedrock of Pufendorfian 
natural law.88 
  
VI. Concluding Remarks: Butler and Tucker’s Relevance to Modern Scholarship. 
 
The overriding concern of this sweeping introductory chapter has been to define 
‘providence’ and ‘political economy’, the two terms around which this study revolves, 
and to note the various ways and means in which the pair can be said to have 
‘coalesced’ in the period leading up to our area of study, eighteenth-century British 
society. Observing in particular the early-modern appropriation of ancient Greco-
Roman and Judeo-Christian conceptions of providence, by these means we have been 
able to expand on some of the major historiographical debates of the last century or so, 
emphasising the prevalent role religion played in upholding the intellectual, social, and 
above all increasingly economic structures of the early-modern world. As Viner once 
contended, these phenomena can indeed be described in terms of a broad and yet 
gradual historical shift away from belief in ‘particular’ towards ‘general’ providence; 
read specifically, Viner suggests, as the transition away from Augustinianism towards a 
type of worldly ‘optimistic providentialism’ characterised by scientific rationalism, its 
concomitant in the new mechanical philosophy, and thereafter early forms of 
enlightenment. 89  Yet in utilising the findings of still more recent scholarship, 
demonstrating how Renaissance humanists and Reformation (not to mention Counter-
Reformation) moralists co-opted rival conceptions of divine providence for their own 
ends, this has enabled us to build upon Viner’s observations via comparative analysis of 
the resulting early-modern confrontation between ‘optimistic’ neo-Stoical 
representations of human nature, emphasising humanity’s innate propensity for mutual 
intercourse and society; and its ‘pessimistic’ neo-Epicurean-Augustinian counterpart, 
which vested the prospect of peaceable society within the maxim that ‘individual 
																																																																		
88 Palladini, ‘Pufendorf and Stoicism’, pp. 245-55, esp. pp. 245, 250; Saastamoinen, ‘Pufendorf and the 
Stoic model of natural law’, pp. 257-69, both in Blom & Winkel (eds.), Grotius and the Stoa. 
89 Viner, Role of Providence in the Social Order, pp. 6-7: ‘… it was those branches of Christian faith 
which departed most widely from the Augustinian tradition who were most receptive to innovations in 
science and went furthest in accommodating their theology to the finding of scientists’.  
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acquisitiveness promotes the public good’ – or as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) would 
later call it, the paradox of ‘unsocial sociability’.90  
  
Focussing latterly on a particular brand of Christian Stoicism associated with Lipsius 
and Grotius, these various lines of enquiry have led us to the figure of Pufendorf, 
arguably Lipsius and Grotius’s most significant ‘intellectual heir’. In doing so, we have 
finally been able to document (in perhaps its most crystallised form prior to the 
eighteenth century) the Epicurean-Augustinian-Stoic conundrum in the guise of 
Pufendorf’s attempts to grapple with and stifle the formidable scepticism of Hobbes. 
For as we have seen, though Pufendorf was forced to accept Hobbes’s claim that self-
preservation was the quintessential force accounting for all human motive and conduct, 
this did not prevent Pufendorf from acknowledging in tandem the legitimacy of the 
Grotian appetitus societatis. Significantly in our context, then, in Hont’s view, it is 
precisely this tension within Pufendorf’s thought—i.e., between the Hobbesian and the 
Grotian scheme—which proved to be the catalyst for later explanations about the 
genesis of modern commercial society, especially in eighteenth-century Britain.91 
Calling this the ‘pseudo-Aristotelian move’ of ‘twinning society and politics’, it is by 
these means, Hont insists, that the Pufendorfian scheme ought to be viewed as the 
‘origin’ of the type of political economy articulated most profoundly in Hume and 
Smith’s intellectual world.92 Yet whilst entirely convinced by, and indeed indebted to 
Hont’s compelling narrative on this score, we would do well to consider one major 
qualification to the ‘Hontian scheme’, by which means it will finally be possible to draw 
Butler and Tucker into the wider debate.  
  
																																																																		
90  Immanuel Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht [Idea for a 
Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, 1784], in Günter Zöller & Robert B. Louden (eds. 
& tr.), The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, 
(Cambridge, 2007), p. 111: ‘[By] ‘antagonism’ [I mean] the unsocial sociability of human beings, i.e. 
their propensity to enter into society, which, however, is combined with a thoroughgoing resistance that 
constantly threatens to break up the society … it is this resistance that awakens all the powers of the 
human being … thus happen the first true steps from crudity toward culture … thus all talents ... [and] 
taste is formed.’ For surveys of ‘unsocial sociability’ in an eighteenth-century British context, see 
Haakonssen & Whatmore, ‘Commerce and Enlightenment’, & Iain McDaniel, ‘Unsocial Sociability in the 
Scottish Enlightenment: Ferguson and Kames on War, Sociability and the Foundations of Patriotism’, 
History of European Ideas, Vol. 41, No. 5, (2015), pp. 662-82. 
91 Esp. Hont, Jealousy, pp. 38-47, 159-84. 
92 Ibid., pp. 45-6. 
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As Haakonssen and Whatmore have recently pointed out, a significant charge that may 
be reasonably levelled at Hont concerns his general lack of engagement with the various 
theo-philosophical strands which contributed not a little to the thesis he propounds – not 
least, Christian Stoicism.93 Evinced above all in Hont’s claim that Pufendorf’s primary 
influence on eighteenth-century political economy was that he offered an account of 
commercial sociability purged of theological considerations, Hont notes correctly that 
this was because Pufendorf ‘explicitly insisted on the separation of natural law from 
theology’.94 Yet whilst this is undoubtedly true, an important underlying claim of this 
study is that, though Pufendorf was certainly at pains (like Grotius before him) to limit 
the hegemonic influence of Christianity within his scheme, nevertheless, there is good 
reason to believe that he did in fact consider human sociability in neo-Stoic terms, i.e., 
as a providential endowment from God. Kari Saastamoinen has argued this 
convincingly, for example, by claiming that Pufendorf’s ‘Epicurean-Augustinian’ 
acceptance of the human passion for self-preservation was mollified by his ‘neo-Stoic’ 
theory about God’s concern for the continuation and survival of the species as a whole: 
 
In Pufendorf’s theory the ultimate epistemological foundation of natural law, the one that 
gives us its end, is not human nature, but the idea that God wants the human species to 
survive … That God wants the safety of the whole human species is taken for granted 
throughout his discussion on natural law. This is the normative principle which Hobbes’ 
theory lacked, and which explains why we have an obligation to act peacefully even towards 
those who are able to hurt us …95 
 
Likewise, Horst Denzer has shown that there are at least 310 references to Stoic authors 
in Pufendorf’s De Jure Naturae, which Hochstrasser continues to see as evidence of 
Pufendorf’s ‘eclectic method in … combining conceptual analysis of both a modern 
author (Grotius), and of ancient Stoic insights, to rebut central contentions from 
[Hobbes]’.96 																																																																		
93 For explicit statements, see Haakonssen & Whatmore, ‘Commerce and Enlightenment’, pp. 293, 303. 
94 Hont, Jealousy, p. 40. The by-product of this is that, insofar as Hont accepts any theological basis for 
the genesis of eighteenth-century political economy (and it is important to note that he hardly insists upon 
the point), it is the familiar Augustinian-Epicurean tradition of French Jansenists like Nicole, and not the 
Stoic, which Hont believes holds sway over subsequent eighteenth-century discussions about the roots of 
commercial modernity. In this respect Hont is therefore in broad agreement with Robertson’s Case for 
Enlightenment, as well as more traditional ‘self-interest’-based accounts of the genesis of modern 
economic science. 
95 Saastamoinen, ‘Pufendorf and the Stoic model of natural law, in Grotius and the Stoa, pp. 257-69; 
citation at p. 267.  
96 Horst Denzer, Moralphilosophie und Naturrecht bei Samuel Pufendorf (Munich, 1972), p. 260; cited in 
Hochstrasser, ‘Socialitas and the history of natural law’, Natural Law Theories, p. 62, n. 72, which notes 
	 50	
  
Whilst it would be foolish, then, to disregard the fact that the theo-philosophical 
foundations of Pufendorf’s thought remain a rather large bone of contention among 
various intellectual historians, nevertheless, the argument that Pufendorf’s ideas were 
significantly indebted to neo-Stoicism harbours a number of important ramifications for 
forthcoming claims made within this thesis, and indeed for scholarship at large.97 For 
one thing, in attempting to stack more evidence on the Stoic side of the early-modern 
‘Stoic versus Augustinian-Epicurean’ scale, it is to be hoped that this study will 
contribute, however modestly, to future reappraisals of the extent to which the Stoic 
tradition can be said to have contributed to the development of eighteenth-century 
political economy.98 For as Haakonssen and Whatmore have put it most succinctly, thus 
far it is very much the Epicurean-Augustinian tradition which holds the upper hand in 
this controversial and incredibly divisive historiographical ‘battleground’.99 Yet far 
more significant and indeed pressing in the immediate context is the fact that these 
wider debates present us with the perfect opportunity to set down a relatively small, 																					
Denzer’s ‘detailed breakdown of citations according to [Stoic] authors as follows: Cicero: 155 
references;  Seneca: 109 references;  Marcus Aurelius: 12 references; Epictetus: 34 references (including 
those derived through Arrian)’.   
97 For a completely contradictory account of Pufendorf, see, e.g., Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and 
Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany, (Cambridge, 2001), esp. Chap. 4: ‘Pufendorf’s civil 
philosophy’, pp. 148-96. As Hunter points out [at pp. xii, 7], his interpretation of Pufendorf revolves 
around his supposed ‘desacralisation of civil governance’, alongside an ‘Epicurean anthropology’ 
premised on the ‘radical separation of moral theology from politics and law’. To the present author’s 
mind, then, Hunter’s Pufendorf is almost more Hobbesian than Hobbes himself, e.g., pp. 23-4: ‘In 
Pufendorf’s natural law we discover a political anthropology of man as a creature whose violent passions 
threaten his capacity for sociality, thereby necessitating the creation of a sovereign power capable of 
imposing the rules of sociability as law’. Cf. also Dickey, ‘Doux-commerce and humanitarian values’, in 
Grotius and the Stoa, p. 280, n. 31, which draws attention to Pufendorf’s putative alignment with ‘asocial 
sociability’, which Dickey nonetheless disavows. 
98 Note, e.g., Robertson’s suggestion that Epicureanism replaced Stoicism as the more ‘intellectually 
reputable’ of the two during the latter half of the seventeenth-century, in his Case for Enlightenment, p. 
213. 
99 Haakonssen & Whatmore, pp. 300-1. Highlighting the Stoic influence on the particular score of 
Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’, in the final analysis Haakonssen & Whatmore declare that: ‘Smith owes a 
considerable debt to Epicureanism […] The characterization of Smith as a Stoic seems simply to get the 
fundamental nature of his enterprise wrong. The Stoic argument is an argument from above, so to speak, 
that is to say, it begins from the premises that the world constitutes a closed system and that its 
components are determined by the laws of the system, from which it is concluded that the human 
components have to live a certain kind of life. Smith’s order of argument is the very opposite – starting 
from below, as it were. In order to appreciate this, we have to make a distinction that was central to the 
ancient division between Stoics and Epicureans (and the relevance of which was forcefully revived by 
Hume). The former argued from the state of the universe to the determination of people. The latter simply 
argued that people empirically speaking lacked control over all but the trivial features of their 
environment, but they did not infer a doctrine of fate from this. It is quite clear that Smith in this matter 
does not follow the metaphysical line of the Stoics but the empirical Epicurean line, arguing from 
people’s lack of control over their world’. 
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though hardly insignificant, piece of the narrative puzzle, highly conspicuous by its 
absence – namely, Bishop Butler’s influence on eighteenth-century commercial 
sociability, and not least on Tuckerian political economy.  
  
Widely considered to be on a par with his Stoic contemporaries Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson, recognition of the Stoic tendency within Butler’s thought has not been 
uncommon in the centuries since the publication of his major works in the first half of 
the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, it is only relatively recently that scholars have 
begun to pick up on the full significance of Stoicism to the wider Butlerian scheme. 
Terence Irwin has gone so far as to suggest, for example, that though Butler’s ‘moral 
outlook’ and ‘appeal to nature … reasonably invites a comparison with Stoicism’, 
Butler’s ideas on human conscience might even be ‘strengthened, not weakened, by 
closer adherence to Stoic naturalism’.100 Similarly, though more pertinently in terms of 
the thesis advanced in this study, A. A. Long draws Butler firmly within the neo-Stoic 
trajectory we have been tracing in these pages, claiming (we might say similarly to 
Pufendorf) that in order ‘to refute Hobbes and various contemporaries’ Butler’s 
‘treatment of the two basic instincts – self-love and conscience – is too similar to the 
Stoic concept of oikeiosis to be adventitious’. 101 As we shall see, by ‘various 
contemporaries’ Long is undoubtedly referring here to Mandeville, the stylised 
eighteenth-century ‘populariser’ of Hobbes, whose outlook, Brooke reiterates, had a 
‘basically anti-Stoic orientation’.102 In light of this, one of our central tasks in the 
chapters to come is to argue (with Force, Miller and Brooke) in favour of a continuance 
of the neo-Stoic, providentialist trajectory, which clearly still held a great deal of 
currency in eighteenth-century Britain, as these scholars have shown.103 In doing so, a 
further claim will also be made that it was above all Butler’s theo-philosophical 
opposition to Mandeville which ensured that it was he, rather than Shaftesbury or 
Hutcheson, who proved to be the most significant eighteenth-century ‘populariser’ of 
																																																																		
100  Irwin, ‘Stoic naturalism in Butler’, in Miller & Inwood (ed.), Hellenistic and Early Modern 
Philosophy’, pp. 274-300, citations at pp. 274, 297. 
101 Long, ‘Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition’, in ibid., p. 9; also in Inwood (ed.), Cambridge 
Companion to Stoics, pp. 368-9. 
102 James Dean Young, ‘Mandeville: A Popularizer of Hobbes’, Modern Language Notes, 74/1, (Jan., 
1959), pp. 10-13; Brooke, Philosophical Pride, p. 155. 
103 As Miller, Defining the Common Good, p. 149, notes most explicitly, this neo-Stoic ‘Ciceronian 
heritage of prudence and natural law’ continued to thrive in mid-eighteenth-century Britain. 
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Christian Stoicism; such that his concomitant ideas on commercial sociability came in 
time to be the epistemological fount from whence Tucker’s free trade ideas flowed. 
  
In conclusion, it is important to note that thus far, only Laurence Dickey has made 
explicit the connection between Tucker’s economics as ‘a modernization of the 
oikeiosis process and a Christianization of it’, and as a ‘reinforcement’ of ‘Grotius and 
Pufendorf in their natural law versions of the sociability argument’. In Dickey’s view, 
then, Tucker’s economics are effectively the high-water mark of the neo-Stoic 
providentialist process, such that ‘free trade begins for [Tucker] as an economic agent of 
self-preservation in the utilitarian sense’, and ‘eventually becomes an ethical agent of 
universal benevolence in a humanitarian sense’. Accordingly, for Dickey, it is very 
much this aspect of Tucker’s thought which marks the clergyman out as a crucial figure 
in broader, traditional conceptions of a so-called ‘humanitarian’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ 
enlightenment – albeit of a peculiar sort that is yet to be ‘integrated into the intellectual 
history of the period’, as we have already argued in part.104 Yet where the present work 
intends to build upon Dickey’s thesis, thereby offering an original and substantive 
contribution to scholarship in the process, is in providing an alternative account of 
Butler’s central role as the theo-philosophical conduit between the neo-Stoicism of 
Lipsius, Grotius and Pufendorf on the one side, and Tucker on the other; a point Dickey 
fails to mention, let alone account for (no doubt on account of constraints in time and 
space rather than ignorance).105 
 
Once again, then, it is very much this ‘missing’ part of the narrative that the present 
study intends to fill. Yet as we continue that process by turning now to the specific 
context of post-Reformation England/Britain and the advent of ‘commercial modernity’ 
at about the turn of the eighteenth century, it is well to remember that both Butler and 
Tucker considered themselves first and foremost to be Anglican ministers, over and 
above any alternative description of ‘moral philosopher’, ‘metaphysician’, ‘political 
economist’ – or indeed ‘neo-Stoic’. And as we shall imminently see, as a consequence, 
our two clergymen were faced with their own sets of controversies and conundrums 
peculiar to the island nation they inhabited. 																																																																		
104 Dickey, ‘Doux-commerce and humanitarian values’, in Grotius and the Stoa, pp. 289, 310, 316. 
105 For a concise summary of the present work in relation to Dickey’s ideas and vice-versa, see 
Conclusion, Section III, below. 
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Chapter Two. 
 
Christian Virtue, Commercial Society, and Eighteenth-
Century Anglicanism. 
 
 
Towards the end of the Victorian era, two English clergymen and ecclesiastical 
historians, C. J. Abbey and J. H. Overtan, remarked that the church of the previous 
century had been one of ‘listlessness’, ‘moral poverty’ and ‘spiritual lethargy’.1 Firm in 
the belief that their eighteenth century predecessors had been insufficiently equipped to 
meet the exacting standards of their own age, Abbey and Overtan were undoubtedly 
foremost examples of what Peter Virgin has labelled the ‘self-confident and self-
assertive’ Victorian ‘mythology’ of the Georgian Church.2 Yet ever since the pioneering 
and rehabilitative work of Norman Sykes in the mid-twentieth-century, studies which 
centre on the eighteenth-century English Church have increasingly sought to reject the 
Victorian era’s relative denigration of it.3 Liberated from the constraints and biases of 
what we now refer to as ‘Whiggish history’,4 present day historians attempt far more 
nuanced accounts of the complex relationship between eighteenth century church 
authority and the laity, alongside the tacit ‘quasi-Erastianism’ that undergirded it.5  
 																																																																			
1 C. J. Abbey & J. H. Overton, The English Church in the Eighteenth Century, (London, 1887), I, pp. 113, 
406, II, p. 4. Cf. Overtan’s Life in the English Church 1660-1714, (London, 1885), where he implies that 
the ills of the Church began with the Hanoverians. The eighteenth-century Evangelical Joseph Milner 
(1744-97) described this as the Church’s penchant for ‘reasoning to excess’, in his Essays on Several 
Religious Subjects, (York, 1789), at p. 54.  
2 Peter Virgin, The Church in an Age of Negligence: Ecclesiastical Structure and Problems of Church 
Reform 1700-1840, (Cambridge, 1989), p. iv.  
3 See Norman Sykes, Church and State in England in the XVIIIth Century, (Cambridge, 1934); From 
Sheldon to Secker: Aspects of English Church History, 1660-1768, (Cambridge, 1959).  
4 See Herbert Butterfield’s seminal The Whig Interpretation of History, (London, 1931). In terms of its 
relevance to this study, see Young, ‘Religious History and the Eighteenth-Century Historian’, The 
Historical Journal, 43, 3 (2000), pp. 849-868, esp. pp. 858-9. 
5 Important surveys on eighteenth-century Anglicanism include, but are by no means limited to: G. R. 
Cragg, Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century, (Cambridge, 1964); G. V. Bennett, The Tory 
Crisis in Church & State, 1688-1730, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1975); E. Cruickshanks (ed.), Ideology and 
Conspiracy: Aspects of Jacobitism, 1689-1861, (Edinburgh, 1982); J. A. I. Champion, The Pillars of 
Priestcraft Shaken: The Church of England and its Enemies, 1660-1730, (Cambridge, 1992); William 
Gibson, The Achievement of the Anglican Church, 1689-1800, (Lewiston, NY, 1994); The Church of 
England, 1688-1832: Unity and Accord, (Routledge, London & NY, 2000); Young, Religion and 
Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century England: Theological Debate from Locke to Burke, (Clarendon, 
Oxford, 1998); Jeremy Gregory, Restoration, Reformation, and Reform, 1660-1828: Archbishops of 
Canterbury and their Diocese, (Oxford, 2000); Andrew Starkie, The Church of England and the 
Bangorian Controvery 1716-1721, (Woodbridge, 2007); Ingram, Religion, Reform and Modernity.   
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Surveying these works alongside the general religious landscape of Britain during the 
long eighteenth century century, one pattern that frequently re-emerges is the persistent 
clash between religious orthodoxy and heterodoxy.6 Indeed, this was precisely the line 
of argumentation pioneered by J. C. D. Clark in 1985, when, in an era still dominated by 
Marxisant ‘bourgeois-liberal’ interpretations of eighteenth century English society, he 
had attempted to restore ecclesiastical history to a central place in the study of the 
period.7 Claiming that religious heterodoxy was ‘conceptually basic to radicalism in the 
ancien régime sense’, and echoing the earlier scholarly pursuits of the likes of M. C. 
Jacob and Pocock,8  Clark stressed the ‘conservative’, ‘clerical’, ‘magisterial’ and 
‘aristocratic’ character of heterodoxy’s ideological opposite, the ancien régime 
establishment. Yet in the process of doing so, Clarke also made one overridingly 
important point, which most if not all historians take for granted today. No matter what 
form opposition to the establishment took, he contended, by definition it always 
constituted a religious act. For the patrician class in eighteenth-century Britain was 
invariably Anglican, he concluded, Anglicanism therefore defined the elite, and so by 
extension non-Anglicans found themselves unanimously excluded from the state.9 
  
Notwithstanding the powerful originality of Clark’s work, a consensus is still yet to be 
reached regarding whether or not the established Anglican Church was, from c. 1688-
1832, a fundamentally riven or united institution. Writing at the turn of the millennium, 
for example, William Gibson has concluded that the era’s commitment to eirenicism 
ensured that ‘unity and accord pervaded’ the Church, and that a ‘thorough reading of the 
work of the churchmen of the century’ shows that ‘divisions between them have been 
exaggerated’.10 Nevertheless, Gibson’s view is very much in the minority; for the types 																																																																			
6 For an overview of some of these recent developments, see the editors’ introduction to Sarah Mortimer 
& Robertson (eds.), The Intellectual Consequences of Religious Heterodoxy, 1600-1750, (Leiden: Brill, 
2012).  
7 J. C. D. Clark, English Society, 1688-1832: Ideology, Social Structure, and Political Practice During 
the Ancien Régime [1985], (Revised 2nd Ed., Cambridge, 2000). For Marxisant ‘bourgeois triumphalist’ 
interpretations of eighteenth-century English society, see Christopher Hill, Some Intellectual 
Consequences of the English Revolution, (London, 1980); James R. Jacob, Henry Stubbe, Radical 
Protestantism and the Early Enlightenment, (Cambridge, 1981). 
8 See, e.g., M. C. Jacob, Radical Enlightenment; Pocock, ‘British History: A Plea for a New Subject’; 
‘Clergy and commerce’; ‘Conservative Enlightenment and democratic revolutions’.  
9 Clark, English Society 1689-1832, pp. 277, 281, 283. In the words of William Gibson, this meant that 
‘Clark effectively reformulated eighteenth-century radicalism as a religious rather than a secular 
movement’, in Unity and Accord, p. 15 
10 Gibson, Unity and Accord, pp. 1, 3-4, 7, 24. Cf. John Walsh, Colin Hayden & Stephen Taylor (eds.), 
The Church of England c. 1689-1833: From Toleration to Tractarianism (Cambridge, 1993), p. 51: 
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of pejorative nouns and adjectives long synonymous with the Georgian Church—
‘factionalised’, ‘materialistic’, ‘discordant’, ‘conflicted’—remain incredibly persistent 
in the historical memory. Writing along similar lines to Abbey and Overton, for 
instance, J. H. Plumb wrote as late as in 1950 of the ‘worldliness’ and ‘venality’ of 
eighteenth-century prelates.11 Three decades later, Roy Porter quipped that the ‘year 
1800 dawned with the Anglican Church ill-equipped to serve the nation. But who 
missed it?’12 Only by 1993 did a far more balanced view emerge in the work of John 
Walsh and Stephen Taylor when they advised that the best way to view eighteenth-
century Anglicanism was with equal doses of ‘cautious optimism’ and ‘cautious 
pessimism’. For the ‘debate about the Georgian Church has moved on little since the 
1930s’, they observed. ‘The arguments of optimists and pessimists have a judgemental 
character that would be familiar to Sykes. Nonetheless, this debate has been highly 
productive’, they conclude, ‘in that we know much more about the condition of the 
Georgian Church’.13  
  
Taylor and Walsh are indeed correct in claiming that we now know far more about the 
Church Butler and Tucker subscribed to. This having being said, the aim of this chapter 
is to take the (by now) normative ‘orthodox establishment-heterodox radical’ (or 
perhaps ‘optimistic-pessimistic’) model as its staging point. In doing so, its main 
purpose is to introduce the reader to the political, social and religious milieu Butler and 
Tucker were a part of, and indeed contributed to, with particular reference to the 
economic dimensions that were increasingly associated with it. It begins, then, with a 
brief general survey of the eighteenth-century Anglican Church, its internal and external 
clashes with heterodox freethinking, deism and dissent; followed swiftly by the 
important legacy of the English Reformation and the prominence of the Thirty-Nine 
Articles and Book of Common Prayer. Thereafter, its focus shifts towards the 
contemporary response to the challenge of commercial society at the turn of the 
eighteenth century, where it is claimed that the figure who did most to antagonise the 
orthodox establishment in terms of its defence of the burgeoning, and predominantly 				
‘[Historians] frequently distort the course of Anglican history by focusing on the writings of 
controversialists and extremists …’ 
11 J. H. Plumb, England in the Eighteenth Century, (Harmondsworth, 1950), pp. 43-4. 
12 Roy Porter, English Society in the Eighteenth Century, (Harmondsworth, 1982), p. 191.  
13 John Walsh and Stephen Taylor, ‘Introduction: the Church and Anglicanism in the ‘long’ eighteenth 
century’, in Walsh et al. (eds.), The Church of England c. 1689-1833, pp. 1-64, at p. 3. This remains one 
of the most useful summaries of the history and historiography of eighteenth-century Anglicanism. 
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Whig, commercial order was of course Mandeville – the thinker whom Butler was 
largely responding to when he published Fifteen Sermons in 1726. Butler’s sermons are 
reserved for fuller discussion in the chapter immediately following. In order to arrive at 
them sufficiently equipped, however, we conclude the present with a brief alternative 
Anglican response to Mandeville which also emerged in the 1720s: that of the High-
Church mystic and non-juror William Law. 
 
I. Introduction: The Eighteenth-Century Anglican Church.14 
 
The ‘orthodox-establishment/heterodox-radical’ theses of Pocock and Clark et al. have 
proved extremely influential in the decades since their publication and proliferation.15 In 
particular, intellectual and literary historians such as Brian W. Young and Isabel Rivers 
have increasingly sought to emphasise the inter and intra intellectual diversity that this 
confrontation facilitated. According to Young, the richest debate occurred not between 
heterodox freethinkers and orthodox clergymen, but rather between established prelates 
themselves.16 Consequently, he views the eighteenth century as an era of flowering 
intellectual and theological debate revolving around the issue of subscription to the 
Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion, and the attendant issue of the moral, philosophical and 
theological legitimacy of the Church’s canonical doctrines: in other words, its 
Trinitarianism.17 As Young puts it, ‘it was the doctrine of the Trinity which was 
gradually sacrificed by some in favour of intellectual clarity and philosophical rather 
than theological respectability’.18 Yet be that as it may, such discussion could be, and 
very often was, construed as a slippery slope towards Arianism, Unitarianism and 																																																																			
14 Nicholar Tyacke has warned that the term ‘Anglican’ in the sense we interpret it today is a nineteenth-
century invention. See his Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism, c. 1590-1640, (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1987), p. vii. A similar point is made in Walsh et al. (eds.), The Church of England c. 1689-
1833, p. 51, n. 137. Nevertheless, the terms ‘Anglican’, ‘Anglicanism’, ‘Church of England’, ‘established 
Church’ or ‘establishment Church’ have been adopted and used interchangeably throughout this thesis in 
reference to the same entity.  
15 Consult Roger Lund (ed.), The Margins of Orthodoxy: Heterodox Writing and Cultural Response, 
1660-1750, (Cambridge, 1995). Within Pocock’s essay chapter entitled ‘Within the margins: the 
definitions of orthodoxy’, pp. 33-53, he aligns himself with Clark, at p. 36.  
16 Young, Religion and Enlightenment, p. 3 & passim. See also his ‘A History of Variations: the identity 
of the eighteenth century Church of England’, in T. Clayton & I. McBride (eds.), Protestantism and 
National Identity: Britain and Ireland: c. 1650-c. 1850, (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 105-28, esp. at p. 128; 
also ‘‘The Soul-Sleeping System’: Politics and Heresy in Eighteenth-Century England’, Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History, 45/1 (1994), pp. 64-81. Gibson, Unity and Accord, p. 19, notes that Young 
‘achieves a synthesis’ of Paul Hazard’s claim that reason and religion were in conflict, and of Clark’s 
thesis. For more on Hazard, see The Crisis of the European Mind 1680-1715, (London, 1953). 
17 For more on the Articles, see the following section. 
18 Young, Religion and Enlightenment, p. 11. 
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Socinianism – the denial in various degrees of the divinity of Christ; or worse still 
Deism – the outright denial of the legitimacy of the Christian revelation; and thence to 
heresy and heterodoxy.19 Put very briefly, these various positions were all on-going 
manifestations of the Protestant sectarianism that had remained incredibly persistent 
throughout post-Reformation Europe.20 Within the specific context of seventeenth and 
early eighteenth-century England/Britain, however, these sects were increasingly 
associated with the religious and political subversion of Church and State.21 As we shall 
see, one important consequence of this was that orthodox (and by the early 1700s this 
was a byword for ‘Whig’ or ‘latitudinarian’) clergymen who held potentially subversive 
views – and there were not a few among them – were well aware that it was ill advised 
to pronounce them publicly for fear of recrimination. As Young writes in summary of 
these state of affairs, then, the ‘Whig clergy were themselves often divided over 
doctrine and discipline’ precisely because of the risks involved; ‘controversy’, Young 
therefore concludes, ‘was endemic to Anglicanism in this period’.22 
 
In these last two points in particular, Rivers is in broad agreement with Young. 
According to her, however, the tensions that this facilitated were articulated in two 
specific ways. Firstly, in a general shift away from the ‘emotive’ preaching style of 
seventeenth-century English Puritans and Commonwealth ‘enthusiasts’, towards the 
plain rational and rhetorical language of the early latitude-men, such as Benjamin 
Whichcote (1609-83), John Tillotson (1630-1694) and John Wilkins (1642-1712) 
amongst others.23 And secondly, in the development of eighteenth-century ideas on 
human nature that went beyond the religious sphere into the realm of moral philosophy 
and ethics.24 Although both of these premises will prove to be incredibly important 
points of scholarly reference throughout the remainder of this study, it is the latter 																																																																			
19 Within the established Church, these various charges were usually levelled at the latitudinarians, who 
were particularly tolerant of the Protestant minorities. For Tucker’s definitions of Trinitarianism, 
Arianism and Socinianism, see Chapter Four, Section XIII. 
20 See Quentin Skinner’s classic Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume Two: The Age of 
Reformation, (Cambridge, 1978). 
21 J. C. Davis, ‘Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution’, The Historical Journal, 
Vol. 35, No. 3, (Sep., 1992) pp. 507-30. 
22 Young, Religion and Enlightenment, pp. 3, 19. 
23 Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in 
England, 1660-1770: Volume I: Whichcote to Wesley, (Cambridge, 1990). Rivers also uses the term 
‘slippery slope’ (from the previous paragraph) to denote the mutability of all English Protestantism in the 
post-Reformation period, at p. 9. 
24 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment … Volume II: Shaftesbury to Hume, (Cambridge, 2000). 
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which is of most concern to us at the present juncture. For it is here that Rivers also 
claims that the eighteenth-century British ethical landscape came to be dominated by the 
neo-Stoic deist, Shaftesbury, whose commitment to the study of a moral philosophy 
based upon human nature, she maintains, presaged such important thinkers as Samuel 
Clarke, George Berkeley (1685-1753), Francis Hutcheson, David Hume – and not least 
Butler himself.25  
 
Alongside the familiar authority of Locke, quite how far Shaftesbury’s influence 
extended into the climes of eighteenth-century British intellectual thought constitutes a 
lesser, though at times important, sub-narrative to this thesis; the reason essentially 
being that he was an immensely divisive and controversial figure in his day.26 Deemed 
to be the eloquent spokesperson for most, if not all, anti-Christian polemic, in a private 
letter dated to 1701, for example, Shaftesbury wrote with pride of his ‘general 
Acquaintance … with most of our Modern Authors and free-Writers, severall of whome 
I have a particular influence over’.27 Here, Shaftesbury was referring to the deists 
Anthony Collins (1676-1729), John Toland (1670-1722) and Matthew Tindal (1657-
1733), and particularly the latter two whom he was personally acquainted with.28 All 
were heterodox thinkers and, broadly speaking, had therefore been notorious for arguing 
that natural rather than revealed religion was a sufficient basis for belief in God.29 In the 
inevitable controversy that ensued between establishment orthodoxy and dissonant 
heterodoxy, Rivers draws important attention to the fact that both sides drew heavily 
from the philosophy of the ancients, and particularly the figure of Cicero and the Stoics, 
in order to provide ammunition for their respective causes.30 Yet if the orthodox were 
far more inclined to emphasise the compatibilities between Stoicism and Christianity, as 
																																																																			
25 Ibid. pp. 15, 154: ‘Shaftesbury’s unique importance was as a developer … of a new moral vocabulary 
which was to have a wide and lasting influence later in the century’.  
26 See Daniel Carey, Locke, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity in the Enlightenment and 
Beyond, (Cambridge, 2005), esp. Chap. 4. 
27 Robert Voitle, The Third Earl of Shaftesbury, (Louisiana, 1984), ‘To Pierre Maizeaux, 5 August 1701’, 
p. 90; cited in Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, p. 14. 
28 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, p. 14. 
29 See esp. John Toland, Christianity Not Mysterious: A Treatise Shewing, That there is nothing in the 
Gospel Contrary to Reason, Nor Above It: And that no Christian Doctrine can be properly called A 
Mystery (London, 1696); Anthony Collins, A Discourse of Freethinking, occasioned by the Rise and 
Growth of a Sect called Freethinkers (London, 1713), & Matthew Tindal, Christianity as Old as the 
Creation; or, the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature (London, 1730).  
30 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, pp. 2, 27-31. Rivers notes that post-1660 orthodoxy was the 
‘new’ orthodoxy, in I, pp. 1-2. 
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Lipsius had done,31 by contrast the heterodox were far likelier to insist upon the 
sufficiency of the classical philosophers – replete with their pagan connotations. In light 
of this, Rivers highlights the ‘appeal [freethinking] writers made to the classical 
moralists, and the resulting conflict with Christian writers for possession of the ancients 
and what they meant’.32  
 
Given all that we have discussed in our preceding chapter, it should come as little 
surprise to the reader that both Butler and Tucker were important contributors to, and 
indeed beneficiaries of, this on-going debate. Nevertheless, at this stage we are forced to 
leave the subject of freethinking for now with one final observation. Above all, 
freethinkers had attempted to purge traditional Christianity of its supposed superstition 
and Priestcraft, so as to replace it with a free spirit of inquiry accentuating nature, 
reason and rationality above all else (whether along Stoic lines or not); and this they did 
in the hopes that their contemporaries would become ‘self-conscious and self-critical 
about the way in which traditional religious language and institutions function’.33 The 
importance of this observation cannot be downplayed, for there is clearly much here 
which chimed with the trenchant desires of religious dissenters and non-conformists 
alike – groups who, for various reasons, had rejected the post-Restoration Church 
polity, and even the post-Revolution Settlement of 1689 which favoured them, on the 
grounds that their consciences would never enable them to submit to the authority of the 
established Church.34  																																																																			
31 See Chapter One, Section V. 
32 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, p. 2; also, I, p. 35, where Rivers claims that the most cited 
Stoic authors among the latitude-men besides Cicero were Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, Plutarch, Epictetus, 
Marcus Aurelius, Plotinus and Hierocles. Brooke adds that ‘Shaftesbury was ‘heir to this line of anti-
voluntarist argument’, in Philosophical Pride, p. 111. 
33 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, p. 83. See also Norman Torrey, Voltaire and the English 
Deists, (New Haven, Yale, 1930), esp. pp. 2-4, 202-3; Franco Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the 
Enlightenment, (Cambridge, 1971) esp. pp. 65-8, & Italy and the Enlightenment: Studies in a 
Cosmopolitan Century, tr. Susan Corsi, (London, 1972), esp. pp. 67, 85, 88, 98, 101-2. An indispensible 
study of the rise of reason and ethical rationalism in the seventeenth-century English Church, and of the 
challenge posed to it by deism and freethinking, is Frederick C. Beiser’s The Sovereignty of Reason: The 
Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment, (Princeton, NJ, 1996), see esp. Chap. 6: 
‘Toland and the Deism Controversy’, pp. 220-65.  
34 This does not mean to say that deism and dissent were indistinguishable movements, the crucial 
difference being that the latter did not deny the authority of revelation or scripture unlike the vast majority 
of the former. There was, however, significant overlap between the two in a political sense. See, e.g., 
David Nicholls, ‘Deists, Dissenters and Free Thinkers’, in his God and Government in an ‘Age of 
Reason’, (Routledge, London & NY, 1995), pp. 128-60. The irony here is that in some respects, 
freethinking and deism was facilitated by the earlier emphasis placed on nature, reason and rationality 
within seventeenth-century Anglicanism, especially via early latitudinarianism and the Cambridge 
Platonists. Again, Shaftesbury was a connecting figure between these two movements. 
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As Nicholas Phillipson summarises, then, of the political outlook at the turn of the 
eighteenth century: 
 
Fundamental questions about the relationship of the monarch to parliament, parliament to 
people and the Church of England to a protestant nation deeply penetrated by dissent, 
remained unanswered and would continue to fracture the politics of a notoriously volatile 
political nation.35  
 
Indeed, even as late as 1811, the North American patriot William Goddard (1740-1817) 
was still anticipating – note, in the future tense – that ‘the Church of England would 
soon find itself outnumbered by “Sectaries”.36 So harangued did established prelates 
perceive themselves to be, then, that throughout the long eighteenth century many felt it 
was their fundamental clerical duty to remain, in effect, on constant vigilance. As Walsh 
and Taylor aptly describe it, the Hanoverian Church found itself caught in the midst of a 
‘crise de conscience’, whereby the best form of attack was no longer to ‘coerce’, but 
rather to ‘persuade’ – for some churchmen a thoroughly ‘traumatic’ experience.37 
 
II. The Thirty-Nine Articles and the Book of Common Prayer.  
 
The deep roots of eighteenth-century religio-political enmity hearkened back to the 
heavily contested legacy of the Henrician Reformation, and particularly the Elizabethan 
Settlement of 1559.38 For it was at this time that the two most important, and therefore 
disputed, charters of the Anglican faith were given form and substance.39 The first of 
these, the Thirty-Nine Articles, we have already touched on. Issued in 1563 and ratified 
in 1571, upon their completion the Protestant monarch Elizabeth I (1533-1603) ensured 																																																																			
35 Nicholas Phillipson, ‘Politeness and politics in the reigns of Anne and the early Hanoverians’, in 
Pocock et al. (eds.), Varieties of British Political Thought: 1600-1800, pp. 211-45, at p. 211.  
36 Cited in D. Lovegrove, Established Church, Sectarian People, Itinerancy and the Transformation of 
English Dissent 1780-1830, (Cambridge, 1988), p. 124; emphasis added. 
37 Walsh, et al. (eds.), The Church of England c. 1689-1833, ‘Introduction’, p. 16. Cf. Gregory, 
‘Anglicanism and the arts: religion, culture and politics in the eighteenth century’, in Jeremy Black & 
Gregory (eds.), Culture, Politics and Society in Britain 1660-1800, (Manchester, 1991), pp. 82-109, at p. 
84. 
38 Although, as Rivers points out in Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I, p. 2, the ‘underlying tensions were 
as old as Christianity’ itself.  
39 For useful discussions of the impact of the English Reformation on early-modern English political 
thought, see John Guy, ‘The Henrician Age’, in Pocock et al. (eds.), Varieties of British Political 
Thought: 1600-1800, pp. 13-46 & in the same publication, Donald R. Kelley, ‘Elizabethan political 
thought’, pp. 47-79. 
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that adherence and subscription to them became legally binding.40 Originally intended 
as definitive statements of the doctrines of the English Church, and particularly of its 
intention to act as a via media, or moderate ‘middle way’, between Reformed Calvinism 
and Roman Catholicism, it was this issue of subscription, so central to Young’s thesis, 
that returned time and again to the forefront of eighteenth-century debate, particularly 
during the 1760s and 70s.41  
  
Be that as it may, A. M. C. Waterman has recently contended that the ‘definitive 
document’ of the post-Reformation Church of England was not the Articles, but rather 
the Book of Common Prayer, wherein the articles were printed. For it was the Prayer 
Book, Waterman insists, that was the truly ‘dominant symbol’ of ‘Establishment 
Culture’ in the long eighteenth century,42 it being something that ‘every church-going 
English man, woman and child’, he writes, ‘heard continually from earliest infancy to 
the last hours of their lives’.43 Yet whilst it is indeed correct that the Prayer Book 
remained incredibly influential throughout post-Reformation England, it is important to 
note that it was for this very reason that its authority was often challenged, if not 
undermined, in the years, decades and centuries following its original publication. For 
indeed, ever since its editorial inception at the hand of Thomas Cranmer (1489-1556) in 
1544, it had gone through numerous editions (1549, 1553, 1604 and 1662), each time 
being modified in accordance with the religio-political ‘tone’ of the Act of Uniformity 
accompanying it.  
  
For instance, when in 1559 Elizabeth’s revisions attempted to install a liturgical 
‘middle-way’ between the First (1549) and Second (1553) editions, her various 
concessions and condonements proved to be insufficient for a large number of courtiers 																																																																			
40 Elizabeth had the Articles divided into four sub-sections: ‘The Catholic Faith’ (Articles I-VIII), 
‘Personal Religion’ (IX-XVIII), ‘Corporate Religion’ (XIX-XXXI) and ‘Miscellaneous’ (XXXII-
XXXVIII). 
41 See esp. Young, ‘‘Subscribe or Starve’: The Subscription Controversy and its Consequences’, in 
Religion and Enlightenment in England, pp. 45-80. In many respects the importance of subscription to the 
Articles was unsurprising, given that they were seen to be synonymous with English perceptions of 
national identity. According to Walsh, they were ‘the doctrinal mirror in which Anglicans … officially 
viewed themselves’, and effectively ‘welded into the structure of the confessional state’, in his ‘The 
Thirty-Nine Articles and Anglican Identity in the Eighteenth Century’, in Christine d’Haussy (ed.), 
Quand Religions et Confessions se Regardent, (Paris, 1998), pp. 61-70, at p. 61. Cf. Ingram, Religion, 
Reform and Modernity, p. 103; Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, pp. 345-6. 
42 ‘Establishment Culture’ is a term replete throughout Clark, English Society, 1688-1832. 
43 Waterman, Christian Theology and Political Economy, p. 36. 
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and clergymen, whether they be ‘Popish’ Lords on the one side who believed in the 
Real Presence of Christ at the Eucharist, or returning Marian Exiles on the other, who 
deemed the sacrament of transubstantiation to be utterly repugnant. Ironically, then, in 
many eyes the difficulty with the Prayer Book was not that it was too reformed or too 
traditional, but rather that it was too moderate.44 Hence, whilst the seventeenth-century 
latitudinarian Bishop, Simon Patrick (1626-1707), may have claimed that Elizabeth had 
achieved a ‘virtuous mediocrity’ between ‘the meretricious gaudiness of the Church of 
Rome and the squalid sluttery of fanatic conventicles’, elsewhere a Reformed party 
within the Anglican Church criticised the Book as ‘unperfect Boke, culled and picked 
out of that Popishe dunghill the Portuise and Masseboke, full of abominations’.45 In 
light of these difficulties, the central—indeed definitive—question could be, and very 
often was, raised: if the origins of establishment Church doctrine were so ambiguous, 
from whence did its authority or legitimacy derive?46  
  
In Waterman’s view, the Prayer Book remained closer to Rome than Geneva. Rooted in 
Catholic ecclesiology, Pauline Soteriology and Athanasianism, he contends that the 
book was openly steeped in the notion that Christ was both human and divine, and 
therefore immanent in body and spirit. To ‘Puritan’ critics of the establishment, 
alongside the likes of early English Socinians such as Paul Best (c. 1590-1657) and 
John Biddle (1615-62),47 these doctrines confirmed that the Prayer Book was intimately 
linked to (or rather tainted by association with) the pre-Reformation doctrines of the 
Holy Trinity, the Incarnation and Episcopalian hierarchical polity – or that which 
Waterman calls the anti-voluntaristic ‘grand scheme of subordination’, and the 
‘organicist conception of the state’.48 Moreover, as in the case of Richard Hooker’s 																																																																			
44 See Alan Cromartie, ‘Puritans and Anglicans’, in The Constitutionalist Revolution: An Essay on the 
History of England, 1450-1642, (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 115-47. 
45 S.P., presumed Simon Patrick, A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitude-Men, (1662), p. 4;  
F. Proctor & W. H. Frere, The Book of Common Prayer, with a Rationale of its Offices, (London, 1958), 
p. 114. 
46 The obvious recourse was to the primitive church, and on this head practically all European Protestants 
were united – a perception given renewed impetuous following Lorenzo Valla’s (1407-57) discovery in 
the fifteenth-century of the fraudulency of Donatio Constantini, on solid philological grounds. See his De 
falso credita et ementita Constantini donatione declamatio [Discourse on the Forgery of the Alleged 
Donation of Constantine], (1440); also Jerry H. Bentley, Politics and Culture in Renaissance Naples, 
(Princeton, 1987), pp. 180-2; Robertson, Case for Enlightenment, pp. 118-9.  
47 Mortimer, Reason and Religion in the English Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism, (Cambridge, 
2010). 
48 Waterman, Christian Theology and Political Economy, pp. 32-39, 41-6, & Chaps. 2-4 generally. For 
further clarifications of the term ‘grand scheme of subordination’, see pp. 32-4, 41-3, 46-8, 50-1, 56-60, 
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(1554-1600) classically Anglican Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie (1594-1662), 
establishment culture, and all that it entailed, could be justified both spiritually and 
intellectually:49 
 
Without order there is no living in public society, because the want thereof is the mother of 
confusion, whereupon division of necessity followeth, and out of division inevitable 
destruction … And if things or persons be ordered, this doth imply that they are 
distinguished by degrees. For order is a gradual disposition.50 
 
As Waterman puts it, then, ‘orthodox … Christology implies and is implied by Catholic 
ecclesiology’.51 And once again, according to its critics, comprised of a vast and 
disparate array of freethinkers, deists, dissenters, non-conformists, Arians, Socinians 
and Unitarians, these notions confirmed that the Prayer Book and Thirty-Nine Articles 
transmitted an ecclesiology that was overwhelmingly Catholic (i.e., Nicean and 
Chalcedonian) in origin, whilst at the same time conveying a ‘biblical and patristic 
understanding of the Church as a divine society’; a providential and mystical extension 
of God’s person, whereby the individual’s salvation could only be obtained through the 
figure of Christ as the literal Godhead.52 Naturally, these state of affairs remained 				
61-3, 66, 68-9. At p. 196 and Chap. 4 generally, Waterman states that the principle can be ascribed to 
Samuel Johnson, William Paley & Tory doctrine. For a variation of these themes, see also Waterman’s 
chapter ‘The nexus between theology and political doctrine in Church and dissent’, in Haakonssen (ed.), 
Enlightenment and Religion: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain, (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 
193-218. For anti-voluntarism as the correlate of seventeenth-century latitudinarian thought derived from 
the Stoics, see Brooke, Philosophical Pride, pp. 109-11. 
49 This was done on both neo-Stoic and scholastic grounds of natural law, thereby rendering it an ‘eclectic 
and apologetic commentary’ of the Elizabethan settlement, according to Kelley, ‘Elizabethan political 
thought’, in Pocock et al. (eds.), Varieties of British Political Thought: 1600-1800, pp. 63-4, 71, 78. See 
also Beiser, Sovereignty of Reason, Chap. 2: ‘Hookers Defense of Reason’, pp. 46-83. 
50 Richard Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie [1594-1662], A. S. McGrade (ed.), (Cambridge, 
1989), VIII, 2.1, p. 139, & cited in Waterman, Christian Theology and Political Economy, p. 33. In A 
Treatise Concerning Civil Government, (Gloucester, 1781) [henceforth Treatise], pp. 400-9, Tucker 
appeals to Hooker as a bastion of civilisation.  
51 Waterman, Christian Theology and Political Economy, p. 47; emphasis added. 
52 Ibid. Cf. Pocock, ‘Within the margins: the definitions of orthodoxy’, Lund (ed.), Margins of Orthodoxy, 
p. 38: ‘ … the church as by law established and the church that was the continuing presence of Christ, 
promised to his Apostles at the Ascension and revealed to them on the Day of Pentecost’. As Pocock 
notes elsewhere, within England the divorce from Papal authority took on a uniquely providentialist 
character, encapsulated in the belief that theirs’ was an Elect Nation: divinely appointed by God and 
therefore sacred on the one side, and yet also acting within the perceived bounds of a public and temporal 
time-frame, and so historically and civically minded on the other. The resulting narrative, which revolved 
around the struggle between radical and conservative forces over the nation’s providential destiny, plays 
an important role in much of Pocock’s early work. See, e.g., Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, 
esp. Chaps. 1 & 2; Machiavellian Moment, pp. 337, 342, 343-7, 373, 396, 403. Cf. Brendan Bradshaw & 
Eamon Duffy (eds.), Humanism, Reform and the Reformation: The Career of Bishop John Fisher, 
(Cambridge, 1989), p. 195, n. 17. See also David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British 
Empire, (Cambridge, 2000), p. 10, which describes this concept of English exceptionalism as ‘a 
providential charter for insularity’. 
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unacceptable to independents and antinomians alike, contributing in large part to the 
persistent destabilisation of the era’s politics, whether that be in the guise of Regicide 
(1648-9), Restoration (1660) or Revolution (1688-9). Unsurprisingly, this therefore cast 
a long and malignant shadow over the establishment well into the following century, as 
Pocock has magisterially summarised. For this oftentimes bitter wrangling, over that 
which Pocock calls an overt ‘politics of Christology’ in a country ‘dynastically and 
ecclesiastically divided’, resulted in a fractured eighteenth-century landscape of 
itinerant religio-political crisis, wherein the fault-lines between orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy became seemingly ever more firmly entrenched:  
 
There arose a systematic and resolute identification of the religious with the social … by 
which society was governed; … with the paramount need to maintain that the spirit 
manifested itself, and even became incarnate, only through social channels, reasonable, 
humane, and obedient to authority, and never in ways subversive of the human and sociable 
order. Christ as saviour had been king as well as priest and prophet, and the Christian was 
enjoined to an unconditional subjection to the higher powers; Christ’s role as saviour had 
been to add supernatural sanction to the natural authority of common social morality, 
through which … the individual was to be saved. Doctrines of this kind were advanced in 
ecclesiastical as well as secular circles, but might reach a point at which the central tradition 
of Christianity began to be challenged. For if Christ came only to reinforce the law, in what 
ways did the function and the person of the Son differ from those of the Father?  
 […] Problems of this order were in the making before the revolution of 1688, but 
were aggravated by the implications of that event and all that followed. There came to be an 
explicit, if only an occasional, association between strong support of the [Glorious] 
Revolution and Hanoverian succession, an ecclesiology which reduced the Church of 
England to a civil association, an epistemology which reduced the knowledge of God to the 
holding of opinions, and a theology which reduced Christ to something less than a co-equal 
and co-eternal person of the Trinity.53 
 
This, then, was the tumultuous religious and political climate both Butler and Tucker 
were born into, albeit one generation removed from each other, and from either side of 
the established-dissenting divide.  
 
III. ‘The Point of Departure’: The Anglican Response to Commercial Modernity. 
 
In adhering to the ‘establishment-radical’ model of Clark and Pocock et al., Waterman’s 
work is particularly novel and useful to us in that it draws sustained attention to the 
complex theological origins of classical British political economy, and more particularly 																																																																			
53 Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, 5 Vols. [Vol. 6 forthcoming], (Cambridge, 1999-2011), I. pp. 22, 26, 
27; emphases added.  
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still, the role of Anglican orthodoxy in contributing to its development.54 In doing so, 
Waterman’s arguments also dovetail with many of the broader themes we discussed in 
our forgoing chapter, regarding the conjunction between the historical development of 
political economy on the one side, and the varieties of providence (i.e., pagan, neo-
pagan and Judeo-Christian) on the other; both of which tinctured the religious and 
increasingly economic language of early-modern Europe. As we are now beginning to 
see, the English/British scene was characterised by political and religious heterogeneity 
to an extent unparalleled anywhere else on the continent – with the one significant 
exception of the Netherlands. Notoriously tolerant of heterodox views, and therefore a 
‘refuge’ and ‘haven of … liberty and peace unknown in Europe’,55 the United Provinces 
was similarly famous for its innovations in and dependence upon trade and commerce – 
a legacy of their resistance and survival against Habsburg Spanish, and therefore 
Catholic, dominion during the Eighty Years War (1568-1648).56 Indeed, so prosperous 
had the Netherlands become by the late seventeenth century that Simon Schama has 
described it as a state blessed with an ‘embarrassment of riches’, set amidst a veritable 
‘golden age’. In light of this, it has often been remarked that the Dutch found 
themselves in the vanguard of an early-modern, European-wide movement which 
witnessed the transition from what Daniel Roche calls an ‘economy of salvation, 
scarcity and morality to an economy of happiness on earth, plenty and utility’.57  
  
In many important respects, the English followed swiftly in the Dutch wake. For indeed, 
the intellectual, politico-religious and commercial alliances formed between the two 																																																																			
54 The crucial moment in Waterman’s thesis is in reinterpreting Smith’s WN as a work of establishment 
Newtonian natural theology. See, e.g., Christian Theology and Political Economy, Chap. 6: ‘Wealth of 
Nations as Theology’, pp. 88-106 & Chap. 7: ‘The Sudden Separation of Political Economy’, pp. 107-26. 
For Waterman’s explicit acknowledgment of Clark’s influence, see ‘Preface’, p. xi. For his indebtedness 
to Pocock, see Chap. 2: ‘Why the “English Enlightenment” Was Different’, pp. 16-30. As an 
acknowledged admirer of Pocock, Young’s work may also be placed in the same bracket as these works; 
indeed, Gibson has stated that these scholars ‘created a new synthesis in eighteenth-century thought’, in 
Unity and Accord, p. 22. 
55 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, p. 14. Here Rivers notes, e.g., the ‘common bond’ and 
‘impact’ of the Netherlands on English freethinkers during this period, based upon this reputation. For 
further evidence, see Rivers’ reference to Shaftesbury’s many sojourns to the United Provinces at pp. 96-
7. 
56 See, e.g., Israel, Empires and Entrepots: The Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy and the Jews 1585-1713, 
(Hambledon Press, London, 1990); The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall: 1477-1806, 
(Clarendon; Oxford, 1995). 
57 Simon Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age, 
(NY, 1987); Daniel Roche, A History of Everyday Things: The Birth of Consumption in France, 1600-
1800, (Cambridge, 2000), p. 8. See also Karl Polanyi’s classic The Great Transformation [1944], 
(Boston, 1957). 
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states in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution of 1688-9, alongside their broader 
global and domestic ramifications, are increasingly debated in scholarship.58 We shall 
turn to some of the ramifications of these debates in the remainder of this chapter, and 
still again in the specific context of Tucker’s economic ideas in later stages of this 
thesis.59 For the present, however, it is incumbent upon us to shift our immediate focus 
to the subject of broader Anglican attempts to come to grips with the nature of 
commercial society at the turn of the eighteenth century – the so-called ‘point of 
departure’ in early-modern history in Pocock’s view – in anticipation of Butler’s 
treatment of the subject in Fifteen Sermons and beyond.60 For, by doing so, we shall 
also attempt to address that which Frank O’Gorman describes as those progressive and 
‘modernising elements upon which’ eighteenth-century English society increasingly 
‘depended: industry, capitalism, commerce and new patterns of consumption’.61  
  
As Paul Slack has recently demonstrated, the issues surrounding ‘material progress and 
the challenge of affluence’ were not consigned solely to eighteenth-century 
English/British society, but had already begun to concern various thinkers and policy-
makers throughout the preceding century. ‘Applause and anxiety with respect to 
material progress’, writes Slack, ‘were two sides of a single coin minted on evident 
facts’.62 On the one side were teleological-minded optimists such as the ‘political 
arithmetician’ William Petty (1623-87), who revelled in the juxtaposition between what 
he called ‘the highest improvements of mankind in his mass with the rudest condition 
that man was ever in’.63 Likewise were the sentiments of the English gardener and 
diarist John Evelyn (1620-1706), who wrote in 1674 that ‘the miracles of Commerce’ 
had already begun to teach the English ‘religion, instructed us in polity, cultivated our 																																																																			
58 See, e.g., Israel (ed.), The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World 
Impact, (Cambridge, 1991); Dale Hoak & Mordechai Feingold, The World of William and Mary: Anglo-
Dutch Perspectives on the Revolution of 1688-9, (Stanford, 1996) (consult their bibliographies). 
Interestingly, although somewhat against the grain, Steven Pincus argues that James II ‘inherited’ as early 
as in 1685 an English society that was already ‘going Dutch’, in 1688: The First Modern Revolution, 
(New Haven: Yale, 2009), Chap. 3, pp. 49-90, at p. 51.  
59 Specifically, Chapter Five, Section VII. The extent to which Anglo-Dutch relations played a central 
role in fostering much of Butler’s thought will also be explored in Chapter Three, Section I. 
60 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 426. 
61 Cited in Gibson, Unity and Accord, p. 9. 
62 See Paul Slack, ‘Material progress and the challenge of affluence in seventeenth-century England’, 
Economic History Review, 62, 3, (2009), pp. 576-603, this citation at p. 577. Avner Offer has also used 
the term ‘the challenge of affluence’ in the parallel context of the twentieth-century post-war years, in The 
Challenge of Affluence: Self-control and Well-being in the USA and Britain since 1950, (Oxford, 2006). 
63 [H. W. E. Petty-Fitzmaurice] Marquis of Lansdowne (ed.), The Petty papers, 2 Vols. (London, 1927), 
II, p. 24. 
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manners and furnish’d us with all the delicacies of virtuous and happy living’.64 On the 
other hand, however, were pessimists in the mould of the merchant Thomas Tryon 
(1634-1703), who appeared far more sceptical about the prospects for unbridled 
economic progress. Though Tryon praised what he called those palpable improvements 
in the ‘arts, sciences and trades’ which England so clearly depended on for its 
increasing prosperity, nevertheless, he was also concerned that the general shift in 
labour from agriculture to services left trade ‘overstocked’, and the ‘generality of the 
people … poor and miserable’. 65 Similarly, Daniel Defoe (1660-1731), who was 
otherwise an enthusiastic supporter of the new commercial apparati underpinning the 
English state, noted that despite rising national wealth, the disparity between the 
luxurious rich and the profligate poor was so great that a paradox of ‘lazy diligence’ 
now characterised the British Isles.66  
  
This tendency towards extremes remained prevalent well into Tucker’s time, though 
with greater degrees of subtlety and sophistication, and with differing emphases, as shall 
be seen. Yet what is particularly notable for our present purposes is the fact that, amid 
these debates, the interests and concerns of Christian, and specifically Anglican, 
thinkers could be mapped surprisingly comfortably on to the new realities of the 
burgeoning market economy. So much so, in fact, that this has prompted some students 
of ecclesiastical history, such as Jeremy Gregory, to paint a picture of the Georgian 
Church which, rather than condemning commercial activity unreservedly on the basis 
that its interests were antithetical to the traditional tenets of Christianity, began instead 
to ‘accept’ that the ‘‘commercialization of religion’ necessitated entering the market-
place’.67 In Taylor and Walsh’s view, this phenomenon reflected ‘the tendency of a 
minority, in the cities at least, to ‘shop around’ in search of a full spiritual life’.68 Yet in 
spite of the mercenary tones on display here, it would be wrong to describe this 
enterprise solely in terms of a seemingly exploitative market impinging upon the 
salvific role of the Established Church. On the contrary, in order to cement its privileged 																																																																			
64 John Evelyn, Navigation and commerce, their original and progress [1674], in John Evelyn (ed.), 
Miscellaneous Writings of John Evelyn, (London, 1825), p. 633. 
65 Thomas Tryon, A Brief History of English Trade, (London, 1702), pp. 23, 43, 123. 
66 Daniel Defoe, Giving alms no charity, (London, 1704), pp. 24-6. 
67 Gregory, ‘The eighteenth-century Reformation: the pastoral task of Anglican Clergy after 1689’, in 
Walsh et al. (eds.), The Church of England c. 1689-1833, pp. 67-85, at p. 70.  
68 Ibid., Taylor & Walsh, ‘Introduction’, pp. 24-5. It is precisely this type of activity that facilitated 
nineteenth-century accusations of the worldliness and materialism of the Georgian Church. 
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status, whilst at the same time attempting to re-assimilate dissenters and non-
conformists back into the pale of the Church, for many establishment minds, ‘selling’ 
the Church was indeed perceived to be the best means of achieving this end.69 As 
Jonathan Barry puts it, then, with regard to the interdependent relationship between 
commercial activity and the Georgian Church:  
 
Both in practical terms and in the legitimation of new cultural activity, the Church's support 
was important, not least because of a long-lasting distrust of a totally commercial culture 
controlled by market forces alone. This interdependence lies at the heart of understanding 
eighteenth-century England as neither a confessional state … nor a secular consumer society 
without any use for an established Church, but rather as a commercial society with genuine 
religious pluralism, that is with a genuine pluralism based on genuine religious allegiances.70 
 
Here, then, Barry reiterates that which we noted earlier via Pocock’s observation: that 
during the eighteenth century there was an increasing identification of the religious with 
the social.71 Yet set within this context, it is well to consider that whereas in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Anglican notions of ‘the social’ were typically 
associated with the desire for order and harmony within ecclesiastical (and thence to 
social) polity, à la Hooker, by the early eighteenth century the means of achieving this 
end was increasingly seen to be dependent upon the modernising effects of trade and 
commerce. And all this, it should be noted, in spite of the fact that contemporary 
acceptance of these state of affairs was far from straightforward, in an era when the 
business of conspicuous consumption was still largely scorned, if not altogether 
shunned; a longstanding consequence of Christian doctrinal and eschatological distrust 
over the pursuit of earthly wealth-creation:  
 
Within the tradition of Western Christianity the pursuit of wealth through commercial 
activity and trade has generally occupied a dubious moral position. Whether one looks to the 
teachings of Jesus and Paul, the writings of the early Church Fathers and medieval doctors, 
the way of life of the primitive Church and the early monastic orders, of the teachings of the 
various Protestant reformers … the acquisition of wealth … has generally been seen as a 
great moral evil that would inevitably corrupt the soul and destroy all basis for a genuinely 
																																																																			
69 See Gregory, ‘Anglicanism and the arts’ in Black & Gregory (eds.) Culture, Politics and Society in 
Britain 1660-1800, p. 85; cf. Walsh et al. (eds.), The Church of England c. 1689-1833, p. 16. 
70 Jonathan Barry, ‘Cultural patronage and the Anglican crisis: Bristol c. 1689-1775’, in Walsh et al. 
(eds.), The Church of England c. 1689-1833, pp. 191-208, this citation at p. 208; emphases added. Barry’s 
case study is particularly useful in our context, since Bristol was the city of Tucker’s residence for the 
vast majority of his life. 
71 Pocock, Barbarism, I. p. 22; cf., above, p. 65. 
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Christian life […] The pious Christian, while living in this world, was always seen as one not 
totally of this world.72 
 
IV. Private Vices, Public Benefits: The Mandevillean Critique. 
  
In order to deepen our understanding of Christian unease over, and yet acceptance of, 
commercial innovation and proliferation at the dawn of the eighteenth century, we move 
forward at this stage with Istvan Hont’s broader observation that the era’s flourishing 
debate on commerce and luxury constituted what he calls the ‘central moral and 
political issue’ of the ‘European thought of the period’.73 Entailing what Young 
elsewhere describes as a ‘contest between Christian moral economy’ on the one side 
‘and secular political economy’ on the other,74 these debates were arguably at their most 
potent in England/Britain for the important reason that, in order to fund the new 
Protestant monarch William III’s (1650-1702) dynastic and increasingly gruelling wars 
of attrition against the might of Catholic France, the establishment’s dependence upon 
commerce (and especially the National Debt from 1694 onwards) became deeply 
intertwined with the religio-political travails we have so far been documenting within 
this chapter.75 In the main, these debates increasingly hinged upon a complex narrative 
emphasising the putative decline and corruption of England/Britain’s liberties, virtues 
and morals, whether on neo-classical civic humanist grounds, or based upon the ascetic 
teachings of Christian and especially Augustinian tradition.76 Again, the particulars of 
																																																																			
72 Russell Nieli, ‘Commercial Society and Christian Virtue: The Mandeville-Law Dispute’, The Review of 
Politics, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1989), pp. 581-610, at p. 582. This position is evinced above all in such 
biblical passages as Matthew, 6:19-21, 24: ‘Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth … Ye cannot 
serve God and Mammon’; and 1 Timothy 6:8-10: ‘ … having food and raiment let us be therewith content 
… For the love of money is the root of all evil’.  
73 Hont, ‘The early Enlightenment debate on commerce and luxury’ in Mark Goldie & Robert Wokler 
(eds.), The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 377-418, 
at pp. 379, 383. Cf. Christopher Berry, The Idea of Luxury: A Conceptual and Historical Investigation, 
(Cambridge, 1994); Maxine Berg, Luxury and Pleasure in Eighteenth Century Britain, (Oxford, 2005), 
esp. pp. 31-7. 
74 Young, ‘Christianity, Commerce and the Canon’, p. 386. 
75 William’s strategy of incorporating British forces into his grand alliance – predominantly made up of 
Protestant states, excepting the elephant in the room that was the Holy Roman Empire – embroiled his 
new subjects in a series of confessional, dynastic and pan-European wars: first, the War of the Grand 
Alliance/Nine Years War (1688-97), and second, the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14). For a 
narrative of these events in the context of European military, political and religious history, and in the 
context of commercial modernity, see Pocock, Barbarism, I, Chap. 4: ‘The Hampshire militia and the 
problems of Modernity’, pp. 94-120. 
76 Pocock, ‘Cambridge paradigms and Scotch philosophers’ in Wealth & Virtue, esp. pp. 235-40, 242; M. 
M. Goldsmith, ‘Liberty, luxury and the pursuit of happiness’, in Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Languages of 
Political Theory in Early Modern Europe, (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 225-52; Hont, ‘Free Trade and the 
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these Janus-faced debates are the subject of greater attention in later chapters.77 
However, what is of most concern to us at this juncture is the fact that many 
contemporaries throughout England, and indeed across the continent, began to view the 
emergence of modern forms of commerce as both epochal and/or unwelcome, in the 
sense that they feared that there ‘might come, and perhaps already had come’, in the 
words of Slack, ‘self-indulgence … moral and political corruption, a decline of 
deference and public spirit, social disorder, idleness, and disease’. Most damning of all 
to contemporary minds, however, and from whence all other vices flourished, was the 
persistent and ‘firmly rooted … case against luxury’: 
 
[A] sinful excess attacked in the official homilies of the Church for centuries and as great a 
threat to the fabric of the nation as the pollution of the metropolis … [Luxury]  brought with 
it the corruption and decadence that demolished commonwealths and buttressed absolutism, 
a Machiavellian theme given fresh prominence by writers in a civic republican vein 
throughout the century.78  
 
Settling in England in the 1690s, it was the Dutch-born physician and one time admirer-
turned-critic of Shaftesbury, Mandeville, who swiftly became the most vilified figure 
within this discourse.79 For it was Mandeville who more than any other proceeded to 
criticise the orthodox establishment via a heady mix of freethinking, alongside satirical 
and caustic attacks on the new, predominantly—though by no means exclusively—
Whig, commercial order.80 In doing so, Mandeville’s views jarred with numerous 				
Economic Limits to National Politics: Neo-Machiavellian Political Economy Reconsidered’, in Jealousy, 
pp. 185-266; Haakonssen et al., ‘Commerce and Enlightenment’, pp. 283, 288. 
77 See particularly Chapter Five, Section VI. 
78 Slack, ‘Material progress …’, pp. 576-7, 582. This is the context for the ‘paper war’ of c. 1698-1702, 
which Pocock maintains is synonymous with the broader Augustan-era ‘debate over land, trade and 
credit’, in Machiavellian Moment, p. 426. See, e.g., Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun (1655-1716), A 
Discourse concerning Militias and Standing Armies [1698], in Political Works [1737], Robertson (ed.), 
(Cambridge, 1997). For the continental scene, note also the widespread influence and significance of 
Francois Fénelon (1651-1715), Les Aventures de Télémaque [The Adventures of Telemachus, 1699], 
trans. Patrick Riley, (Cambridge Ed., 1994). In utilising these two figures we discern the convergence 
between the languages of Stoicism and Republicanism during the period, alongside their shared rejection 
of luxury. Cf. Brooke, Philosophical Pride, pp. 149-53 & Pocock, ‘Cambridge paradigms and Scotch 
philosophers’ in Wealth & Virtue, p, 237: ‘[The civic humanist’s] morality was neo-Stoic … His politics 
… in principle republican, because the classical republic was the paradigmatic association for 
independent individuals desiring to affirm their virtue against corruption …’ 
79 For Mandeville’s attack on Shaftesbury, as well as his influence on and indebtedness to freethinking, 
see Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, pp. 173-5. Cf. Wendy Motooka, The Age of Reasons: 
Quixotism, Sentimentalism, and Political Economy in Eighteenth-Century Britain, (Routledge, 2013), pp. 
95-100. 
80 For the Pocockean notion of the ‘Whig commercial order’ or the ‘Whig commercial aristocracy’, see 
esp. his Virtue, passim. For the suggestion that the new commercial order was not wholly ‘Whiggish’ 
since it was criticised by some Whigs whilst also garnering degrees of acceptance from across the 
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contemporary thinkers, including the non-conforming Defoe and William Law (whom 
we shall return to shortly), and most significantly for our immediate purposes, the 
Anglican establishment duo, Richard Steele (1672-1729) and Joseph Addison (1672-
1719) – all adherents and propagators of the quasi-Stoic language of manners, 
sociability and politeness. Broadly speaking, these figures (particularly Addison and 
Steele) had argued that such axioms were hallmarks of free, civilised and above all 
Christian commercial polities; meaning that on this last point they diverged from, 
whereas on the others they skirted closely towards, the brand of sociability propounded 
by Shaftesbury.81 Hence, in Addison and Steele’s various tracts and essays on manners, 
morals and taste (such as those housed within The Tatler (1709-11) and The Spectator 
(1711-14)), they attempted to paint an image of a specifically post-Augustinian city, 
founded upon human benevolence and sociability. Demonstrating that commerce could 
be utilised as a vehicle for, rather than destroyer of Christian virtue, their vision was to 
be achieved, so they argued, via the cultivation of natural theology, friendship and 
conversation, alongside a reverence for the dignity of human nature. ‘How amiable is 
that affability and benevolence’, gushed one issue of The Spectator in thoroughly 
Shaftesburian fashion,  
 
with which [individuals might] treat [their] neighbours … An agreement and kind 
correspondence between friends and acquaintances is the greatest pleasure of life … [by] 
these and other wholesome methods … There are many other rules which … society [might 
establish] for the preservation of … ease and tranquillity.82  
 
				
political divide, see Markku Peltonen, ‘Politeness and Whiggism, 1688-1732’, The Historical Journal, 
48, (2005), pp. 391-414. With regard to Mandeville, Hont suggests that as a Dutchman he was a defender 
of the ‘English economic and political regime created by the Glorious Revolution’ on account of its 
‘foreign policy, against a Jacobite counter-revolution’, see ‘The early Enlightenment debate on commerce 
and luxury’ in Goldie & Wokler (eds.), Cambridge Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, p. 389. 
81 Phillipson has shown that while these figures shared Shaftesbury’s Whiggism, his neo-Stoic appeal to 
Cicero (albeit ‘Ciceronianism for the citizen, not the magistrate’) and his faith in the naturally benevolent 
disposition of humankind, unsurprisingly, they were far from accepting of his deistic neo-Platonism, in 
‘Politeness and politics’, Pocock et al. (eds.), Varieties of British Political Thought: 1600-1800, p. 224. 
Lawrence Klein counters that ‘Shaftesbury wrote as a Whig in an environment in which party differences 
entailed differences in religious perspective’, meaning that ‘he was implicated in the new responsibility of 
the Whigs for the defence of the Established Church against its internal enemies … an endorsement of the 
current order in church and state’. See his ‘Shaftesbury, politeness and the politics of religion’, in 
Phillipson & Skinner (eds.), Political Discourse in Early-Modern England, (Cambridge, 1993), pp. pp. 
283-301, at p. 293. 
82 The Spectator no. 424. Monday, July 7, 1712. Addison and Steele’s participation in the coffeehouse 
and print culture of the period is an important signifier of Jürgen Habermas’s well-known claim that there 
emerged a ‘public sphere’ in the eighteenth-century, in his Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere: an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society [1962], (Cambridge, Mass., 1989). 
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Yet despite the confidence with which Addison and Steele set forth their (some would 
call utopian) scheme, again, it was Mandeville, writes Phillipson, who was ‘by far the 
most deadly critic of this language of manners and politeness’.83 For as we have already 
seen, Mandeville broached the related subjects of human benevolence and commercial 
sociability from a diametrically opposed standpoint: i.e., from a Baylean, Hobbesian, 
neo-Augustinian and Epicurean perspective.84  
  
The specifics of Mandeville’s social analyses are complex, multifaceted and at times 
incredibly subtle; moreover, they have been scrutinised in detail and at length in a 
number of important studies, thereby rendering any attempt to replicate them here in 
their entirety redundant.85 Yet with regard to our present purposes, the main strength of 
Mandeville’s position rested on his insistence that the contemporaneously influential 
maxim of self-preservation—in large part a consequence of the Stoic and Sceptical 
revivals of the Renaissance period, as Richard Tuck and Peter N. Miller in particular 
have shown—was in truth little more than a byword for the ineradicable compulsions of 
self-love (amour-propre). 86  Moreover, when stripped of its idealistic undertones, 
Mandeville alleged that self-love was merely tantamount to ‘avariciousness’. 
Comparable above all to Hobbes, then, in his dismissal of the notion that man was the 																																																																			
83 Phillipson, ‘Politeness and politics’, in Pocock et al. (eds.), Varieties of British Political Thought: 
1600-1800, p. 227.  
84 See Chapter One, esp. Sections III-VI. As Robertson puts it in Case for Enlightenment, pp. 144-5, 
Mandeville ‘let the Augustinian-Epicurean cat out of the bag’, so that its suppression up to that point 
merely served to ‘magnify’ its ‘explosive force’ once it ‘finally struck’. For Robertson’s broader reading 
of Mandeville, in which he argues that the Baylean/Hobbesian/Augustinian/Epicurean hybrid greatly 
influenced Hume’s moral theory (and therefore eighteenth-century Scottish political economy more 
generally), see Chap. 6: ‘Hume, after Bayle and Mandeville’, pp. 256-324. For the most recent summary 
of Mandeville’s anti-Stoicism, see Brooke, Philosophical Pride, pp. 153-9. 
85 Mandeville scholarship is indeed exhaustive. The best study still appears to be E. J. Hundert’s The 
Enlightenment’s ‘Fable’: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society, (Cambridge, 1994); also 
Hundert’s ‘Sociability and self-love in the theatre of moral sentiments: Mandeville to Adam Smith’ in 
Collini, et al. (eds.), Economy, Polity, and Society, pp. 31-47. Further to this, see Hector Monroe, The 
Ambivalence of Bernard Mandeville, (Oxford, 1975); Thomas A. Horne, The Social and Political 
Thought of Bernard Mandeville, (London; Macmillan, 1978); Goldsmith, Private Vices, Public Benefits, 
(Cambridge, 1985); Dario Castiglione, ‘Mandeville moralised’, Annali Della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, 
17 (1983), pp. 239-290; ‘Considering Things Minutely: Reflections on Mandeville and the Eighteenth-
Century Science of Man’, History of Political Thought 7 (1986), pp. 463-488; Hont, ‘The early 
Enlightenment debate on commerce and luxury’ in Goldie & Wokler (eds.), Cambridge Eighteenth-
Century Political Thought,  II. ‘Mandeville’, pp. 387-95. Finally, see most recently Mikko Tolonen’s 
Mandeville and Hume: Anatomists of Civil Society, (Oxford, 2013), which downplays Mandeville’s neo-
Epicureanism/Augustinianism. 
86 Consult Miller, Defining the Common Good, Chap. 1: ‘The figure of Cicero’, pp. 21-87; Tuck, 
Philosophy and Government, passim, & esp. p. 7 & Chap. 2: ‘Scepticism, Stoicism and raison d’état’, pp. 
31-64, esp. p. 51. For the development of Tuck’s ideas, see The Rights of War and Peace: Political 
Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant, (Oxford, 1999).  
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zōon politikon, Mandeville instead cunningly sought to dispel the myth that either 
reason or religion (in any of its forms) was capable of controlling the irresistible ebb-
and-flow of humanity’s baser passions. Hence, in the most infamous of his works, The 
Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits (1714; 1723), Mandeville instead 
insisted that it was far more realistic and expedient for political authorities to concede 
that modern commercial societies flourished best via the combined avarice, pride and 
utility of its inhabitants.87 Only in so doing, Mandeville alleged, could the state 
anticipate being ‘flattered in peace, and feared in war’. For ‘Moral virtues’, he insisted, 
were nothing more than the ‘Political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride’:  
 
Thus every part was full of vice/ yet the whole mass was a paradise […] whilst luxury/ 
employed a million of the poor, and odious pride a million more/ envy itself and vanity, were 
ministers of industry […] Thus vice nursed ingenuity/ which joined with time and industry 
[...] to such a height, the very poor/ lived better than the rich before.88  
 
Borrowing elements from seventeenth-century Jansenism and Hobbism, Mandeville’s 
acerbic criticisms of commercial modernity—which (1) placed morality not anteriorly 
to society but rather as the product of artifice and convention; (2) emphasised the 
centrality of the passions within this scheme; and (3) argued that humans were innately 
self-centered, egoistic and selfish creatures—was clearly a dagger to the heart of the 
‘Addisonian City’, and therefore to the commercial idealism of the orthodox 
establishment itself. Moreover, these views placed the Dutch thinker squarely at odds 
with Stoic, predominantly Shaftesburian (and later Hutchesonian) conceptions of human 
nature, which attempted to elevate the virtues of reason, benevolence and sociability 
above all else.89 In light of these differences, alongside the controversies that inevitably 
arose as a result of them, eighteenth-century criticisms of Mandeville’s scheme were 
incredibly profound, eliciting a wide range of responses from across the theo-
philosophical spectrum: including from the Kirk, Hutcheson; from within the Anglican 																																																																			
87 See also Mandeville’s The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves Turn'd Honest (1705) & his contributions to The 
Female Tatler (1709-10).  
88 Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, Kaye (ed.), I, pp. 24-6, 51. J. A. W. Gunn states that Mandeville ‘was 
hostile to the traditional view’ of luxury, in Beyond Liberty and Property: The Process of Self-
Recognition in Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, (Canada, 1983), pp. 96-119. Contrast this with 
Hont & Ignatieff’s ‘Needs and justice in the Wealth of Nations …’, in Wealth and Virtue, pp. 1-44, where 
(at p. 6) they insist upon ‘Mandeville’s strongly Augustinian insistence on the corrupting influence of 
luxury’. 
89 See Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early 
Eighteenth-Century England, (Cambridge, 1994). Cf. Hundert, ‘Sociability and self-love in the theatre of 
moral sentiments’, Collini et al. (eds.), Economy, Polity, and Society, p. 43.  
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Church itself, Bishop Berkeley; later deists from across the English Channel such as 
Voltaire and Jean-Jacque Rousseau, and probably the two most lauded of the Scottish 
moralists, Hume and Smith, whose important relationship to Butler and Tucker we shall 
arrive at in due course.90  
  
Two further commentaries, or rather repudiations, of Mandeville are of particular 
concern to us in the remainder of this and in the following chapter. The first, described 
by Hundert and Waterman as perhaps the most ‘important’ and ‘powerful’ of 
Mandeville’s rejoinders, is of course Butler’s Fifteen Sermons.91 Comprised of sermons 
which for the most part had been preached between 1723-5 (the latest and second 
version of the Fable was published in 1723),92 as we shall see, Butler’s work was 
probably most similar in tone to the Anglicanism of Berkeley, and yet it also anticipated 
much that can be seen in Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, and of course Tucker himself.93 Yet 
before turning our thoughts in this direction, we linger very briefly in the final sections 
of this chapter over a separate Anglican critic of Mandeville, William Law, who 
published three incredibly influential works opposing Mandeville’s ideas around the 
same time as Butler: one appearing in the same year as Fifteen Sermons, and two on 
either side. For as we shall see, though Butler and Law approached Mandeville from 
similar (that is to say overtly Christian) standpoints, the manner in which they conveyed 
their ideas was very different in tone and execution 
 
 
 
 
																																																																			
90 See esp. Chapter Four, pp. 118-124. Wittily, and in a general summation of Mandeville’s contemporary 
reception, the novelist and satirist Henry Fielding (1707-54) reconfigured the controversialist’s name so 
that it read ‘Man-devil’. For assessments of these various thinker’s responses to Mandeville’s ideas, see 
Paul Sakmann, Bernard de Mandeville und die Bienenfabel-Controverse, (Leipzig, 1897), pp. 197-212; 
Mandeville, Fable, Kaye (ed.), II, pp. 401-17; Horne, Social and Political Thought of Mandeville, pp. 76-
95 & Hundert, Enlightenment’s Fable, esp. pp. 75-86, 96-115, 117-26, 153-68. 
91 Hundert, Enlightenment’s Fable, p. 126; Waterman, Christian Theology and Political Economy,  
p. 110. 
92 Hont argues that the first edition of the Fable was aimed at Fénelon, in ‘The early Enlightenment 
debate on commerce and luxury’, Cambridge Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, pp. 388-9. Brooke 
adds that the second edition was aimed at Shaftesbury, Philosophical Pride, pp. 153, 157. 
93 For an overt statement of the similarities between Butler and Berkeley, see Chapter Three, p. 116, n. 
135. 
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V. William Law’s Rejoinder.94 
 
Chastising Mandeville as an outright hedonist and debauchee, Law’s main concern in 
the first of his three works, Remarks upon a late Book, intitled, The Fable of the Bees 
(1724), was to flatly reject what was essentially Mandeville’s central claim: that man 
was so debased he had forsaken his higher rational and spiritual faculties. Arguing along 
classically Anglican-Thomist (and indeed Stoic) lines that man was not merely the sum-
total of his instincts or passions for the simple reason that he has the rational capacity to 
‘dispute’ them, Law conceded that humans were not perfectly ‘refined and elevated’ 
creatures, granted. Nevertheless, in Law’s view this did not mean that humans were ‘so 
addicted to an Animal Life’ that they showed ‘no Signs of an higher Principle within’ 
them.95 Interestingly, then, given that he can be read (as Young does) ‘as a foremost 
opponent of Newtonian physico-theology’, 96  Law invoked the recent, and by 
contemporary standards staggering, accomplishments of Sir Isaac Newton (1643-1727) 
as proof that there must surely be ‘greater things conceived by some Men, than can be 
ascribed to mere passions’. ‘That Reach of Thought, and strong Penetration’, he 
remarked, ‘which has carried … Newton through such Regions of Science, must truly be 
owing to some higher Principle. Or will you [i.e., Mandeville] say, that all his 
Demonstrations, are only so many blind Sallies or Passions?’97 
  
To be sure, Law was acutely aware of the recalcitrant legitimacy of many of 
Mandeville’s claims. Nevertheless, in rebutting the latter’s position, his was an attempt 
to accommodate as best he could the patent reality that uninhibited economic progress 
might indeed be necessary should the state wish to fulfil its proper function. What this 
function entailed, precisely, was articulated by Bishop Berkeley over a decade later in 
The Querist (1735-7), when he claimed that it was the aim of every wise State to ‘feed 
the hungry and clothe the naked by promoting an honest industry in its members’, and 
that this was the solemn duty of any decent ‘clergyman, who still thinks himself a 
																																																																			
94 The following summation of Law’s position owes greatly to Nieli, ‘Commercial Society and Christian 
Virtue’. 
95 William Law, Remarks upon a late Book, intitled, The Fable of the Bees [1724] in The Works of the 
Reverend William Law, A.M., 9 Vols, II, (London, 1762), p. 31. 
96 For Young’s treatment of Law in the context of his opposition to Newtonianism, see Religion and 
Enlightenment, pp. 122-36, esp. pp. 132, 134; emphasis added. 
97 Law, Remarks, in Works, II, pp. 6-7. 
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member of the commonwealth’.98 In Waterman’s view, Berkeley’s sentiments here are 
not to be dismissed, for they highlight what he considers to be the three most important 
characteristics of eighteenth-century economic thought: ‘first, that wealth is a good 
thing; secondly, that wealth-creation is always feasible; and, thirdly, that measures to 
increase the wealth of nations are consistent with, and may actually belong to, the 
Christian religion’.99 Aided by these useful delineations we can clearly see, then, that 
though Law was denouncing Mandeville’s scheme in unabashed fashion in the 
Remarks, nevertheless, this work was written in a decidedly pro-commercial vein – an 
approach that was to be developed even further in A Practical Treatise upon Christian 
Perfection (1726), and more vigorously still in A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life 
(1728). 
  
Beginning the former of these two works with the insistence that it was the task of 
ordinary Christians to aspire to a life of holiness, devotion and piety in imitation of 
Jesus Christ, here Law’s main strategy was to map the spirit of apostolic and patristic 
Christianity onto contemporary socio-economic circumstances.100 As such, Law’s main 
intention in Christian Perfection was to assert that all humans of all eras are enjoined by 
the Gospels to pursue a truly Christian way of life – one that is both pure and sanctified. 
As the title of the work further suggests, then, Law speculated that the means to 
achieving this end was to be found in what he called the innate ‘perfection’ of 
Christianity itself. In turn, this points to Law’s wider attempts to draw attention to the 
perceived ill effects of deism and freethinking, the existence of which he firmly 
believed was symptomatic of the fact that the salvific role of Christianity was being 
undermined from within contemporary English commercial life. Since ‘Christianity’, he 
therefore wrote, ‘is a Calling that puts an End to all other Callings’ there is ‘only one 
common Christianity which is to be the common Means of Salvation to all men’.101 
Furthermore, because Law believed that this was to be achieved not merely within a 
cloister but rather via the daily occupations of ordinary life (daily occupations that 																																																																			
98 George Berkeley, The Querist: Containing several queries, proposed to the consideration of the Public 
[1735-7], (Glasgow Ed., 1760), p. iv. 
99 Waterman, Christian Theology and Political Economy, p. 109; emphases added. All of these points 
need to be borne in mind as we continue to chart Law’s ideas, and all the more when we finally turn to 
Butler and Tucker. 
100 This is asserted in Nieli, ‘Commercial Society and Christian Virtue’, p. 599. 
101 Law, A Practical Treatise upon Christian Perfection [1726], in Works, III, pp. 1, 2, 67; emphasis 
added.  
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increasingly revolved around commercial transaction), the Christian way of life, he 
writes, ‘does not consist in any singular state or condition of life, nor in any particular 
set of duties, but [rather] in the holy and religious conduct of ourselves in every state of 
life’, i.e., the type of conduct Law placed at the very centre of all earthy endeavour.102  
  
Law’s general scheme of Christian Perfection was taken even further into economic 
territory in A Serious Call. Accepting that most occupations of ordinary life are morally 
permissible if approached with a ‘heavenly temper’, here Law proposed that any 
‘serious’ attempt at reconciling the life of ‘worldly business’ with that of ‘holiness, 
devotion and piety’ meant adhering to the example of the devout individual who 
dedicated their life to the pursuance of moral perfection. For according to Law, ‘Most of 
the employments of Life’ were in fact ‘in their own nature lawful’ and ‘may [therefore] 
be made a substantial part of our duty to God’ if engaged ‘for such ends, as are suitable 
to beings that are to live above the world’. Hence, Law’s main strategy in A Serious 
Call was thus to demonstrate how it might be possible for the tradesman to go about his 
daily business without serving Mammon over God. 103 According to Law, in order to 
achieve this end, all the tradesman had to do was to hold fast to the impeccable moral 
standards of his faith, so that he would surely be considered ‘a saint in [God’s] shop … 
wise and reasonable and holy’. Conversely, however, if the tradesman chose to labour 
‘under other masters’ in pursuit of ‘riches and glory’, he could expect to receive no ‘title 
to a reward from God’. As far as Law was concerned, then, to ‘sell such things as are 
innocent and useful in life’ was, in essence, ‘agreeable to the will of God’; for it was by 
these means, Law contented, that ‘both himself, and others’ might be reasonably 
supported. However, if the tradesman ingratiated themselves in commerce from the 
motive of pure self-interest, and with the intention of retiring ‘from business to idleness 
and luxury’, he and his trade would lose ‘all its innocency’: a sin that was ‘so far from 
being an acceptable service to God, that it is only a more plausible course of [i.e., 
smokescreen for] covetousness, self-love and ambition’.104 As Law noted in conclusion, 
then, in an overt appeal to Pauline Soteriology that Mandeville would surely have 
lambasted: ‘Whether we eat or drink, or whatsoever we do, we must do all to the glory 
of God [1 Corinthians 10: 31]’. To which he also added that: 																																																																			
102 Ibid.  
103 Law, A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life [1728], in Works, IV, pp. 20, 52. 
104 Ibid.,  p. 54. 
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This passage sufficiently shews, that all Christians are to live wholly unto God in every state 
and condition … as unto the Lord, surely men of other employments and conditions, must be 
much obliged to go through their business … not as pleasing their own minds, not as 
gratifying their own worldly passions, but as the servants of God in all that they have to 
do.105  
 
VI. Concluding Remarks: Christian Virtue or Commercial Society? 
 
Beginning with the ‘orthodox-heterodox’ controversy and ending with the Mandeville-
Law dispute, the purpose of this chapter has been to chart some of the major 
controversies, both historical and historiographical, which plagued and continue to 
complicate our understanding of the eighteenth century Anglican Church.  Having done 
so, there are a few main points that require highlighting before proceeding. The first of 
these regards the clear doctrinal and theological ambiguity within the Georgian Church, 
which was in large part a consequence of the nebulous origins of the English 
Reformation itself, and which continued to pockmark the eighteenth century religio-
political landscape. Secondly, then, with the onset of modern forms of commerce at the 
turn of the eighteenth-century, we have shown how the competing interests and claims 
of the establishment and dissent were drawn inexorably towards, and ultimately became 
deeply tangled within, the widening parameters of what Pocock has labelled the early 
eighteenth-century ‘debate over land, trade and credit’, the ‘rapidly developing style of 
political economy … the dominant mode of Augustan political thought’.106 By these 
means, it has next been possible to show how in the early-eighteenth-century, classically 
Anglican/Episcopalian notions of ‘the social’ metamorphisised into ‘Whiggish’, neo-
Stoic and Shaftsburian defences of commercial modernity – in spite of the fact that 
Shaftesbury was himself a freethinker, and certainly no Anglican. And lastly, therefore, 
in the guise of the freethinking Mandeville, we have shown how the broader early-
modern confrontation between Stoics, Epicureans and Augustinians continued to thrive 
in the context of eighteenth-century British society – such that Mandeville’s powerful 
critique of the burgeoning Whig commercial order undermined establishment attempts 
to conjoin the neo-Stoic virtues of reason, benevolence and politeness amongst others 
with the new-fangled fiscal operations of the state. 																																																																			
105 Ibid., pp. 58-9. 
106 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 426. See Pocock’s Virtue, passim., for the eighteenth-century 
development of this ‘transitional’ or ‘transformative’ narrative. 
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In conclusion we return to William Law’s response to Mandeville, in an attempt to 
highlight the significance of his ideas in relation to Butler and Tucker. By marking the 
clear boundary-lines of acceptable behaviour for those partaking in commercial activity, 
Law’s central message across the above-cited works was to stress that the temporal 
pursuit of wealth was only permissible on the grounds that the tradesman was prepared 
to safeguard his own soul by denying himself the lure of his baser passions. Considered 
in isolation, this is an incredibly important point, since this was indeed the ostensibly 
neo-Stoic position that Butler and Tucker would also go on to adopt in their economic 
ideas – albeit with some major qualifications. The first of these concerns the fact that 
Law’s opposition to Mandeville emerged from a specifically High Church standpoint, 
meaning that it was not necessarily in harmony with the Low Church, or Whig 
latitudinarianism, of Butler and Tucker, or indeed a thinker such as Berkeley.107 On the 
one hand, then, this underscores the complex religio-political divisions from within the 
Anglican Church, as Young points out, let alone from without. Yet on the other, and 
perhaps the more significant, by the early eighteenth century Law’s nonjuring stance 
was clearly no longer taken to be that of the establishment, thereby resulting in a 
profound contrast between Law’s economic ideas and Butler-Tucker’s, in which the 
latter clergymen placed far greater emphasis on what Nieli calls ‘an ethic of 
productivity and economic dynamism’ (and which Nieli further contends Law 
singularly failed to do).108 Unsurprisingly, this divergence between Law and Tucker-
Butler was rooted above all in their contrasting conceptions of what they considered to 
be the ‘true’ Christian faith, hearkening back in turn to their respective interpretations of 
the English Reformation. As we shall go on to discuss in Chapter Four, then, many of 
Law’s ideas, couched as they were in Augustinian-rigorist (and arguably Calvinist as 
opposed to Arminian) terms, would go on to inspire the early Methodists; a point that is 
once more significant, in that Butler and Tucker’s opposition to Whitefieldian and 
Wesleyan evangelism contributed enormously to the development of their own 																																																																			
107 Phillipson notes, for example, that Addison and Steele’s Whiggish tracts were written primarily as 
repudiations of High Church criticisms of the Revolution and of the ‘new’ establishment, in ‘Politeness 
and politics’, Pocock et al. (eds.), Varieties of British Political Thought: 1600-1800, pp. 224-7. Cf. 
Goldsmith, ‘Liberty, luxury and the pursuit of happiness’, in Pagden (ed.), Languages of Political Theory 
in Early Modern Europe, pp. 240-2. 
108 Nieli ‘Commercial Society and Christian Virtue’, p. 607. In the context of discussion on ‘moderate’ 
Christian thinkers such as Berkeley and Hutcheson, Hont equates ‘an ethic of productivity and economic 
dynamism’ to the simple ‘idea of economic growth without luxury’, in ‘The early Enlightenment debate 
on commerce and luxury’, Cambridge Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, pp. 401-3.  
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idiosyncratic brand of establishment orthodoxy, out of which, it shall be argued, 
Tucker’s political economy finally emerged.109  
  
A last point of considerable interest with regard to the relevance of Law is the fact that 
some scholars have considered the Remarks to be ‘the ablest of all the replies to 
Mandeville’, thereby suggesting, in light of Hundert and Waterman’s alternative claim 
that it was Butler’s response that was the more ‘important’ or ‘powerful’, that he and 
Butler were in fact rivals for the accolade.110 It is not in the interests of the present 
author to pit one against the other by speculating on whether one was the more potent, 
or indeed the more successful. Rather, the point requiring emphasis in conclusion here 
is that, whilst it is certainly true that there are palpable similarities between Law and 
Butler in terms of their shared neo-Stoic appeal to ‘higher principles’, and in terms of 
their success in divorcing Christian tradition from what Nieli calls ‘ancient and 
medieval economic prejudices’, nevertheless, in the final analysis the differences 
between the pair are far more notable once one accepts that Law’s message was 
buttressed in an overt type of Augustinian asceticism that Butler, and thereby Tucker, 
tended to avoid.111 Turning to Nieli for a final time, then, whilst Law’s appeal to 
‘Christian perfectionism’ clearly pitted the Anglican divine against the more ‘realistic’ 
(which is Nieli’s synonym for ‘secular’) social analyses of Mandeville, by doing so, 
Law essentially played into the latter’s hands by appealing to the reverse side of the 
same neo-Augustinian coin.112  
  
It is with these various observations, then, that we finally arrive at Butler himself, who, 																																																																			
109 See esp. Chapter Four, Sections III-VII. 
110 This is of course a value judgment, although useful to note in terms of historical posterity. For Hundert 
and Waterman’s claim, see p. 75 above. For the view that Law’s was the more important, see Mandeville, 
Fable, Kaye (ed.), II, p. 401. For a more recent reiteration of Kaye’s stance, see Young,  ‘Christianity, 
Commerce and the Canon’, pp. 386-7. 
111 Nieli, ‘Commercial Society and Christian Virtue’, p. 607. For further claims to neo-Stoicism within 
the context of Law’s anti-Mandevillean scheme, see pp. 581, 588, 595, 603-4, 606; also, Young,  
‘Christianity, Commerce and the Canon’, pp. 386-7. Finally, Andrew Starkie observes that in the Remarks 
Law was offering a ‘positive statement of Christian anthropology that portrayed man as consisting of both 
a rational soul and a physical body, but whose distinctive human characteristic as imago dei was 
rationality’ – a clear reformulation of the neo-Stoic position, even if Starkie does not acknowledge it in 
these specific terms. See his ‘William Law and the Fable of the Bees’, Journal of Eighteenth-Century 
Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2009), pp. 307-19, this citation at p. 310.  
112 Nieli ‘Commercial Society and Christian Virtue’, pp. 581, 597, 606. Cf. Young, ‘Christianity, 
Commerce and the Clergy’, pp. 386-7. For discussion of the paradoxical similarities between Mandeville 
and Law’s Augustinian rigorism, see Viner’s introduction to his edition of Mandeville, A Letter to Dion 
[1732], (LA, California, 1953). 
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unlike Law, was far more willing to deal with the potent psychological features of 
Mandeville’s arguments on their own terms. Accordingly, it is to Butler that we now 
turn our attention. 
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Part II. 
 
The ‘Butler-Tucker Axis’. 
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Chapter Three. 
 
Sociability and Self-Love in Joseph Butler’s Fifteen Sermons. 
 
 
In a recent discussion by A. M. C. Waterman, in which Adam Smith’s WN is cleverly 
reinterpreted as a work of Newtonian natural theology, the economist-cum-intellectual 
historian identifies the intellectual and theological origins of the Scot’s enduring 
classic, and thereby of classical political economy, in what he calls the late 
seventeenth and early-eighteenth-century ‘quasi-Augustinian’ debates we have so far 
been documenting within this thesis.1 In the process of doing so, Waterman contends 
that the intellectual gulf between Mandeville on the one side and the Scottish moralists 
Hume and Smith on the other was bridged via the socio-commercial analyses of our 
two main protagonists, Butler and Tucker – both of whom were not ‘deceived’, as Law 
may have been, by Mandeville’s claim that ‘Private Vices’ and ‘Public Benefits’ 
created an inevitable ‘conflict between wealth-creation and Christian morality’.2 For 
on the one hand it was Butler’s ‘shrewd mind’ in Fifteen Sermons, Waterman writes, 
that initially rebuffed Mandeville’s position as an ‘improper construal of self-love as 
“vice”’, thereby making it ‘possible for Hume so to generalise Mandeville as to 
produce the “theory of spontaneous order” now seen as the characteristic contribution 
of the Scottish Enlightenment to social theory’. Whereas on the other, it was Tucker 
who went on to ‘view the unintended but beneficent economic outcomes of 
“interested” action in a purely Butlerian way, as examples of divine Providence and as 
congruent with that Newtonian, natural theology which characterized the Scottish and 
English Enlightenments’.3  
 
Whilst in light of these impressive claims it is incredibly tempting to jump headlong 
into a textual analysis of Fifteen Sermons in anticipation of Tucker’s later economic 																																																																			
1 Waterman, Christian Theology and Political Economy, Chap. 6: ‘Wealth of Nations as Theology’, pp. 
88-106 & Chap. 7: ‘The Sudden Separation of Political Economy’, pp. 107-26. See esp. pp. 104-5, 109-
10 & 211. To reiterate, Waterman draws particular attention to the important role of ‘Anglican social 
thinking’ within this scheme. Cf. Chapter Two, Section II above. 
2 Ibid., p. 109. 
3 Ibid., p. 110, 112. In this, Waterman is deferring to F. A. Hayek’s ‘Competition as a Discovery 
Procedure’, in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, (London: 
Routledge, 1978), at p. 264, & Ronald Hamowy, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of 
Spontaneous Order, (Carbondale, IL, 1987). 
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ideas, it may prove beneficial to exercise some restraint at this juncture. For in order to 
comprehend the full range, subtleties and intricacies of Butler’s thought, first it is 
contended that we must account for where it is his ideas came from. Accordingly, in 
an effort to remain consistent with the ‘orthodox establishment-heterodox radical’ 
model set down in the forgoing chapter, we will instead approach Fifteen Sermons via 
a detailed examination of Butler’s dissenting background; a strategy that is justified on 
the grounds that Butler’s enigmatic, if not simply unhappy, upbringing played a 
definitive role in augmenting his meta-ethical, philosophical and commercial ideas. By 
proceeding in this fashion it is to be hoped, then, that we will deepen our 
understanding of the complex relationship between establishment and dissent in 
Augustan England – and, moreover, of the ways and means in which this impinged 
upon Tucker’s economic ideas in the chapters to come. 
 
I. Introduction: Butler’s Early Life and the Tewkesbury-Leiden Connection. 
 
Joseph Butler was born to a Presbyterian father in Wantage, Hertfordshire, on 18 May 
1692. Since he did not wish to become anything but a minister during his youth, we 
can safely presume that his education was always intended as preparation for a career 
in the Presbyterian, rather than the Anglican, Church.4 Accordingly, Butler was sent to 
Samuel Jones’s (c. 1681-1719) dissenting academy in Gloucester at about the age of 
nineteen, which then moved to Tewkesbury shortly after his arrival. 5  Born in 
Pennsylvania and educated in Wales and then at Shrewsbury Academy, the 
Presbyterian Jones had gone on to pursue his higher education at the University of 
Leiden in the United Provinces in 1706.6 Upon his return in 1712, his wide scholarship 																																																																			
4 For biographical and introductory materials to Butler, see Thomas Bartlett, Memoirs of the life, 
character and writings of Joseph Butler, (London, 1839); Terence Penelhum, Butler, (London, 1985); 
Christopher Cunliffe (ed.), Joseph Butler’s Moral and Religious Thought: Tercentenary Essays, 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992) & Cunliffe’s ODNB article. The interpretation of Butler exhibited 
throughout this study is particularly indebted to the recent Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, 
(2011). 
5 Jones was forced to move from Gloucester to Tewkesbury in September 1712 when an ecclesiastical 
correction court accused him of teaching ‘seditious and antimornarchical principles … very prejudicial 
to the present Establishment in Church and State’. Furthermore, on 20 October 1714 a high church mob 
attacked Jones’s house. See David L. Wykes’s ODNB article: ‘Gloucester RO, GDR B4/1/1056: articles 
presented against Samuel Jones of the Parish of St John the Baptist, Gloucester, 1712’; also cited in 
Ingram, Religion, Reform and Modernity, p. 30. 
6 One example of the many ‘ambitious youth of all countries’ who went there to study, particularly 
during the seventeenth-century – according to Oestreich & Koenigsberger (eds.), Neostoicism and the 
Early-Modern State, p. 66. 
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garnered a correspondingly high reputation: so much so, in fact, that it went on to 
provide an incredibly influential Protestant education for a number of notable 
eighteenth-century English dissenters, such as Samuel Chandler (1693-1766), 
Jeremiah Jones (c. 1693-1724), Isaac Maddox (1697-1759), Andrew Gifford (1700-
84), and Daniel Scott (1694-1759) amongst others. Not insignificantly, alongside 
Maddox, who was made Bishop of St. Asaph in 1738, Butler’s closest friend at 
Tewkesbury, Thomas Secker (1693-1768), would also go on to become a prominent 
Anglican convert: he was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury in 1758.  
  
According to Secker, Samuel Jones was quite the disciplinarian. Students rose every 
day at five and were expected always ‘to speak Latin except … amongst the family’. 
In exchange, Jones’s library was well stocked, ‘composed for the most part of foreign 
books … very well chosen’.7 Crucially, Jones’s curriculum and lecture materials were 
based upon his student notes from Leiden, and included the study of Heereboord’s 
logic, mathematics, geography and the Bible.8 Consequently, Butler was the recipient 
of some of the most advanced Reformed education not only in England but also in the 
wider European Protestant world. We will go on to note, for example, that Butler’s 
dissenting schooling was very much at odds with that of Tucker’s at establishment 
Oxford, and so by far the more eclectic, meaning that he was exposed to ideas and 
concepts from a far wider variety of backgrounds and theological traditions.9 Again, 
this is attributable to Jones’s days spent in Leiden, that notoriously eclectic institution, 
which, from its inception in 1575, had tended to emphasise the importance of classical 
humanism and the liberal arts in tandem with affairs of religion and the state.10 As the 
first Prince of Orange William I (1533-84) had put it at the university’s opening, 
Leiden was to ‘be a firm support and sustenance of freedom and good legal 
administration of the country, not only in matters of religion, but also with regard to 
the general welfare of the people; a ‘good, adequate and celebrated school or 																																																																			
7 Cited in Ingram, Religion, Reform and Modernity, pp. 31, 32. 
8 Taken from Wykes’s ODNB article: ‘Samuel Jones’ in a letter from Secker to Isaac Watts, 18 
November 1711, in J. S. Macauley & R. W. Greaves (ed.), The Autobiography of Thomas Secker, 
Archbishop of Canterbury, (Kansas, 1988), pp. 3-4. 
9 Eventually Butler also ended up at Oxford, much to his chagrin – for more on this see within this 
chapter, pp. 95-7. For Tucker’s early life at Oxford, see also Chapter Four, Section I. As Rivers notes, 
eclecticism was ‘characteristic of much eighteenth-century moral philosophy teaching’ throughout the 
continent, in Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, p. 192. 
10 Willem Otterspeer, ‘The University of Leiden: An Eclectic Institution’, Early Science and Medicine, 
6/4 (2001), pp. 324-33.  
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university’; and a place where young people could come to be educated and trained ‘in 
both the right knowledge of God and all sorts of good, honourable and liberal arts and 
sciences, serving the legal administration of the countries’.11 
 
Merely four years after the founding of Leiden University, the father of early-modern 
neo-Stoicism, Justus Lipsius, was appointed professor of history there; a position he 
held for a period of eleven years during the university’s initial growth and expansion. 
In the immediate context, this is particularly notable because of Lipsius’s influence on 
Grotius and Pufendorf, the famous Dutch natural law jurists and pioneers of modern 
forms of commercial sociability. During the seventeenth century, Grotius and 
Pufendorf had also held distinguished positions at Leiden; the former entering the 
university when he was just eleven years old, and whose father was an early follower 
of Lipsius himself; and the latter spending many years there ruminating on the work of 
his intellectual predecessors, most notably Grotius and Hobbes, following his escape 
from captivity under Charles X of Sweden (1622-60) in the late 1650s.12 As is now 
well known, then, it was Pufendorf who adjoined Hobbes’s intellectual method with 
Grotius’s modernised form of Roman (and particularly Ciceronian) jurisprudence, so 
as to arrive at an explanatory model detailing the reasons why, and how, individuals in 
the state of nature eventually opted to enter into society.13  
 
Recent work by a number of distinguished scholars has convincingly shown the extent 
to which the Grotian and Pufendorfian (as well as Lockean and also somewhat 
antithetically the Hobbesian) natural law and social contractarian traditions contributed 
to the makeup of eighteenth-century British, and particularly ‘north-British’, 
intellectual thought.14 More recently still, however, a relatively small though important 																																																																			
11 Cited in ibid., pp. 324-5. For recent emphasis on the modernising, if not even secularising, themes 
present within Leiden, see Mark Somos, Secularisation and the Leiden Circle, (Leiden: Boston, 2011). 
12 Lipsius had the greater influence on Grotius since the former was still alive, though an old man, when 
the latter was young. See Oestreich & Koenigsberger (eds.), Neostoicism, pp. 36-7, & Tuck, Philosophy 
and Government, Chap. 5.  
13 See esp. Samuel von Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium [Of the Law of Nature and Nations, 
1672], Jean Barbeyrac (ed.), (Amsterdam, 1734); De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem libri 
duo [On The Duty of Man and Citizen According to the Natural Law], (London Ed.,1673). 
14 Pocock, ‘Cambridge paradigms and Scotch philosophers’, in Wealth and Virtue, pp. 235-52, esp. 245-
52; & in the same publication, Winch, ‘Adam Smith’s ‘enduring particular result’’, pp. 235-52. 
Elsewhere, see Tuck, Natural Right Theories; ‘Modern Theory of Natural Law’ in Pagden (ed.), 
Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe, pp. 99-119; Philosophy and Government; The 
Rights of War and Peace; Hont, ‘The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and 
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body of complementary scholarship has remarked upon the important Stoic thread 
within Grotius and Pufendorf’s thought, which, it is commonly argued, had been 
imparted to them by Lipsius.15 The particulars of these findings are beyond the scope 
of the present study to adequately summarise. Yet for our present purposes the main 
point that needs reiterating is that Grotius and Pufendorf embraced the Stoic 
conception of providence, which they then incorporated into their various influential 
political treatises.16 As was suggested in Chapter One, then, it is highly likely that on 
this head, both Butler and Tucker were following if not wholly than at least in part in 
the footsteps of the Dutch natural law jurists; and we can now see that it was the 
Tewkesbury-Leiden connection which proved the initial inlet by which their ideas 
came into Butler’s mind.17  
 
Yet it is not only Grotius and Pufendorf’s influence that we have here to contend with. 
For though still steeped in the neo-Stoic culture both figures had helped to foster 
during their time at Leiden, the tenure of Butler’s teacher, Jones, came a little after 	
the Theoretical Foundations of the “Four-Stages” Theory’, in Jealousy, pp. 159-84; Haakonssen, 
Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, passim., though esp. pp. 26-31, 35-46. 
15 Cf. Chapter One, Section V of the present study, esp. p. 43. The most important resource in terms of 
the neo-Stoic interpretation of Grotius and Pufendorf is Blom & Winkel (eds.), Grotius and the Stoa, 
esp. the following within its pages: Blom & Winkel, ‘Introduction’, pp. 3-20; Brandt, ‘Self-
consciousness and self-care: on the tradition of oikeiosis in the modern age’, pp. 73-91; Brooke, 
‘Stoicism and anti-Stoicism in the seventeenth century’, pp. 93-115; Jon Miller, ‘Innate ideas in 
Stoicism and Grotius’, pp. 157-76; Cairns, ‘Stocism, slavery, and law’, pp. 197-232; Palladini, 
‘Pufendorf and Stoicism’, pp. 245-55 (which downplays the prevalence of Stoicism in Pufendorf); 
Saastamoinen, ‘Pufendorf and the Stoic model of natural law’, p. 257-69; Dickey, ‘Doux-commerce and 
humanitarian values’, pp. 271-317, esp. pp. 279-83. See also Oestreich, Neo-Stoicism, esp. Chap. 2; 
Stewart, ‘The Stoic legacy in the early Scottish enlightenment, in Osler (ed.), Atoms, Pneuma and 
Tranquillity, pp. 272-96; Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, pp. 4, 42; Ford, ‘Preaching 
Propriety to Princes’; Waszink, ‘Lipsius and Grotius: Tacitism’, History of European Ideas, Vol. 39, 
No. 2, (1996), pp. 151-68; Miller, ‘Stoics, Grotius, and Spinoza and Moral Deliberation’, in Hellenistic 
and Early Modern Philosophy, pp. 116-39; Tuck, Rights of War and Peace, pp. 37, 39, 101;  Hont, 
Jealousy, pp. 166, 175; Brooke, Philosophical Pride, esp. ‘Grotius, Stoicism and Oikeosis’, pp. 37-58; 
Blom ‘Sociability and Hugo Grotius’, History of European Ideas, Vol. 41, No. 5, pp. 589-604, esp. pp. 
590-1, 600, 602, 603.  
16 However, T. J. Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, p. 45, counters that ‘though the prospect is 
enticing, there is no evidence to warrant the claims of Oestreich and Krieger that ‘the larger explicit role 
which Natural Law was to play in the unifying scheme in Pufendorf’s later juristic works may be 
considered a probable effect of the Dutch period’. Although it is right’, he continues, ‘to associate neo-
Stoicism with Lipsius’ enduring intellectual legacy to Leiden, yet in none of his numerous 
autobiographical allusions does Pufendorf refer to this period of his intellectual life as formative’. For 
the claims of Oestreich and Krieger, see Oestreich, ‘Justus Lipsius als Theoretiker des neuzeitlichen 
Machtstaates’, Historische Zeit- schrift, 181 (1956), p. 69; L. Krieger, The Politics of Discretion: 
Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law (Chicago, 1965), p. 68. 
17 See again Chapter One, Section V above. Tucker could not have been any more explicit about 
Grotius’s importance than when he placed him alongside Aristotle and Cicero for the ancients and 
Hooker for the moderns as one of the ‘most eminent writers, that perhaps ever lived’, in his Treatise, p. 
400. 
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their time; meaning that he studied instead under the likes of Jacobus Gronovius 
(1645-1716), Jacobus Perizonius (1651-1715) and Hermanus Witsius (1636-1708) – 
scholars who were highly distinguished in their own right. Jones’s Tewkesbury 
lectures indicate that the syllabi of Gronovius, Perizonius and Witsius typically 
accentuated divinity, biblical exegesis and Scriptural history.18 Significantly, then, 
Witsius in particular was a follower, or perhaps even a successor, of Johannes 
Cocceius (1603-69), a German-Dutch theologian of the Reformed Church who had 
also resided in Leiden during the mid-seventeenth century.19 Siding, as Grotius had 
done, with the Arminian contingent in the post-Quinquarticular Controversy, Cocceius 
had been notorious for his opposition to militant predestinarianism, and especially the 
Calvinism of his great rival Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676). Yet despite their doctrinal 
differences, Cocceius begrudgingly admired Voetius, and incorporating traces of the 
latter’s neo-Stoic, humanist scholasticism into his own system of theology, he 
contributed to a branch of Reformed theology which later became known as covenant 
																																																																			
18 See Samuel Jones, ‘Notes on Grotius: De jure belli et pacis’, Bristol Baptist College, G 95 A; 
‘Annotations on Godwin's Hebrew antiquities by the Rev Mr Jones of Tewkesbury’, Bristol Baptist 
College, G 95 b; ‘Andrew Gifford Remains: A collection of historicall sentences & practices, 1693 ...’,  
(2 Vols, vol I, 17th-18th Century), Bristol Baptist College, OS G95 A; ‘Domini Jones Logica Sive ars 
Ratiocinandi De methodo mathematica: The second book of Euclid's elements: nota in strauchii 
breviarium chronologicum: scheme of disciplines digested into aphorisms by Dr Benion’, Bristol 
Baptist College, Ze1; ‘Gronovii nota quadam in Sophoclem: nota in Sophoclis Ajacem’, Bristol Baptist 
College, Ze2; ‘Notae in Godwini Mosen & Aaronem, Bristol Baptist College, Ze3-4; ‘Nota in Grotium 
de jure belli et pacis’, Lib. II & Lib III, Bristol Baptist College, Ze5-6; ‘De geographia 
praecognosconda; critica sacra praecognoscenda’, Bristol Baptist College, Ze7. 
 ‘“NOTAE quaedam Criticae in [ad. versum 488] opera et studio V. C. S[amuelis] J[ones] in usum 
Academiae, Theocicuriensis”’, [Tewkesbury, co. Gloucester], BL, Add MS 23919; ‘“ANNOTATA V. 
C. S[amuelis] Jones, Academiae Theo-cicuriensis [Tewkesbury, co. Gloucester] Praesidis, in [Thomae] 
Godwini Mosen et Aharonem, Anno MDCCXII.”’, BL, Add MSS 23915-23916; "PROLEGOMENON 
ad Observationes Criticas in Vetus Testamentum opera et studio V. Css. Samuelis Jones, in usum 
Academiae Theocicuriensis [Tewkesbury, co. Gloucester] incept. anno MDCCXI." , BL, Add MSS 
23917-23918; ‘“NOTAE in [Thomae] Godwini Mosen et Aaronem,” by Samuel Jones’, BL, Add MSS 
31211-31212; ‘NOTAE in [Thomae] Godwini Mosen et Aaronem [London, 1614, etc.], by Samuel 
Jones, schoolmaster at Tewkesbury’, BL, Add MSS 33774-33776. 
 ‘“Annotationes in Godwini Mosen & Aaronem.” Autore Sam: Jones. 1719’, Congregational Library, 
I.g.1-6; ‘Samuelis Jonesii, Academiae inter Fratres Dissentientes Archididascali, in Godwini Mosen & 
Aaronem, Annotationes; in Duos Tomos divisae’, Dr Williams Library, 24.3, 4; ‘Prolegomena Critica 
sive Apparatus ad S. Scripturae Lectionem. In Usum Juventutis Academicae’, Dr Williams Library, MS 
NCL/L228; ‘Untitled’, Dr Williams Library, MS NCL/L38; ‘Untitled’, Dr Williams Library, MS 
NCL/L54/4/55-56; ‘Untitled’, Dr Williams Library, MS NCL/L54/4/57-60.‘Logica, sive ars 
ratiocinandi, errores Burgersdicii, et Heereboordii investigans, patefaciens, & emendans. Autore S. 
Jones’, Leeds University Library, Special Collections, MS 174; ‘Notae in Dionysium’, University of 
Birmingham, Special Collections, MS 399; ‘Elementa Mathematica’ lectures by Samuel Jones, 
University of Birmingham, Special Collections, MS 400; ‘Praelectiones S. Jones in Godwini’, 
University of Birmingham, Special Collections, MS 401. 
19 Charles Sherwood, The Covenant Theology of Johannes Cocceius,  (Yale, 1956). 
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theology (or confederative or federal theology).20 According to this doctrine, the 
unfolding of biblical history was seen as a series of covenants (i.e., compacts or 
agreements) between God and humankind; firstly under the Covenant of Grace and 
secondly under the Covenant of Works. However, in De oeconomia foederum Dei cum 
hominibus libri quattuor [The Economy of the Covenants Between God and Man] 
(1677), Witsius had introduced the idea of a possible third Covenant of Redemption, 
in reference to God’s salvation of those who were deemed to be members of the 
Godhead.  
 
In the context of current study, it is regrettably beyond the bounds of this study to 
draw out and explain in full the significance of these points. However, it is worth 
pausing for a brief moment to consider that within the reformed tradition, covenant 
theology is often perceived to be in direct opposition to dispensational theology, an 
alternative doctrine which interprets scriptural history on the basis of a putative series 
of dispensations (i.e., exemptions or privileges) that God has bestowed upon 
humankind. In Seventeen Sermons on some of the Most Important Points on Natural 
and Revealed Religion (1776) [henceforth Seventeen Sermons], Tucker exhibits an 
intriguing and eclectic mix of both systems, which the present author has strong reason 
to believe was both appended to and supportive of his economic thought. The 
implication of this, then, is that there runs a reformed (albeit Arminian rather than 
Calvinistic) trajectory from Cocceius and Witsius to Jones, and thereafter a dissenting 
trajectory from Butler to Tucker, that extant scholarship has barely considered, let 
alone accounted for. Again, it is highly regrettable that it will not be possible to pursue 
this intriguing line of enquiry in its entirety at this present juncture. Nevertheless, the 
reader would do well to remain mindful of these points throughout the duration of this 
thesis, in anticipation of future Tucker scholarship – a point we shall briefly return to 
in our concluding remarks to the study as a whole.21 																																																																			
20 Voetius’s neo-Stoicism was not of the same ilk as Lipsius’s. Whereas Lipsius attempted to fuse and 
harmonise classical Stoicism with Christianity, Voetius drew upon Stoical maxims without necessarily 
adhering to or agreeing with them. At times, his tactic was thus to evoke Stoicism as a means to 
emphasise the superiority of Christian Aristotelianism and, hence, reformed Scholasticism. For 
discussion, see J. Martin Bac, Perfect Will Theology: Divine Agency in Reformed Scholasticism against 
Suarez, Episcopius, Descartes, and Spinoza, (Brill, Leiden, 2010), p. 201; Herman Selderhuis (ed.), A 
Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy, (Brill, Leiden, 2013), pp. 38, 43 & Blund, A Short Biography of 
Gisbertus Voetius, (Sep. 2011). Accessed via: http://witsius.wordpress.com/2011/09/17/a-short-
biography-of-gisbertus-voetius-1589-1676/. 
21 See Conclusion, Section IV, pp. 235-6. 
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II. The Butler-Clarke Exchange: Permeable Lines Between Establishment and 
Dissent. 
 
Whilst fully immersing himself in Jones’s ‘Dutch-style’ teaching, Butler was also an 
avid reader of various contemporary English works, such as Locke’s Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Shaftesbury’s ethics, and most 
significantly for our immediate purposes, Samuel Clarke’s Boyle lectures.22 Butler’s 
reading of Clarke is not especially striking, given that he was a towering figure in the 
early eighteenth-century intellectual landscape. A close friend – or, in the words of 
Leslie Stephen, a ‘theological lieutenant’ – of Newton, Clarke was considered to be 
Britain’s leading metaphysician at the time, and was probably the most outstanding 
figure in British philosophy in the generation between Locke and Berkeley.23 What 
certainly is remarkable, then, is that when Butler approached Clarke merely four 
months before the end of his tenure at Tewkesbury, the venerated figure felt moved 
enough to respond to a young dissenter whom he did not know personally. Clearly, 
this speaks volumes of Butler’s latent philosophical acuity; and, indeed, the exchange 
was to prove extremely fruitful to Butler, for it was through their dialogue that Clarke 
was to sponsor his first official appointment of the Rolls Chapel lectureship at 
Chancery Lane in 1719, thereby resulting in the publication of the first edition of 
Fifteen Sermons in 1726. 
 
Again, Clarke was clearly impressed by the precocious twenty-one-year old, for the 
first five letters and replies between them, dating from 4 November 1713 to 8 April 
1714 (i.e., the ‘Tewkesbury correspondence’), he had published in 1716.24 Moreover, 
these letters would also appear alongside the published correspondence between him 																																																																			
22 Which, upon publication in two volumes, were entitled A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes 
of God: more particularly in answer to Mr. Hobbs, Spinoza and their Followers … (London, 1705), & 
A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and 
Certainty of the Christian Revelation, (London, 1706). Re: Locke and Shaftesbury, Brooke argues that 
Shaftesbury fused ‘concepts derived from Stoic theory … into a substantially Lockean epistemological 
and psychological framework … an attractive argumentative strategy’ for early eighteenth-century 
students like Butler, in Philosophical Pride, p. 119. 
23 Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, (London, 1876), I, pp. 119-31. 
24 As an addendum to the fourth edition of Clarke’s Being and Attributes of God. The correspondence 
was entitled Several Letters to the Reverend Dr. Clarke, from a Gentleman in Glocestershire Relating to 
the First Volume of the Foregoing Sermons; … with the Dr's Answers …, (London, 1716). Secker 
posted Butler’s Tewkesbury letters to Clarke personally. 
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and Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) in 1717.25 In light of this, we will treat the Butler-
Clarke exchange as an enlightening demonstration not only of the permeable lines 
between Establishment and Dissent in Augustan England, but also of the intellectual 
camaraderie that clearly existed between the two groups in a broader continental 
context (i.e., via Jones’s Leiden heritage and Clarke’s links with Leibniz).26 This is 
highly significant, in that it results in a muddying of the fault-lines hitherto drawn 
between religious orthodoxy and heterodoxy during the early eighteenth-century, 
despite the wealth of evidence stating otherwise.27 An especially pertinent example of 
this ‘porousness’ is the subtly inferred Arianism of Clarke’s own Scripture-Doctrine 
of the Trinity (1712), the publication of which meant that the Boyle Lecturer was 
seldom free from accusations of heterodoxy himself. As a result, under the relatively 
toothless Blasphemy Act of 1698, the Lower House of Convocation demanded that 
Clark desist from writing on all such matters relating to Trinitarian doctrine in future. 
Clark duly obliged.28  
 
According to orthodox critics of Clarke, such as the High Church leaning Daniel 
Waterland (1683-1740), Clarke’s primary offence was of course to deny – however 
surreptitiously – the legitimacy of Nicene and Athanasian Trinitarianism; the ancient 
foundational doctrines upon which Establishment ecclesiology were based. 29  As 
earlier discussed, this was an extremely sensitive issue in early eighteenth-century 																																																																			
25 Clarke, A Selection of Papers, which passed between the late Learned Mr Leibniz, and Dr. Clarke, In 
the Years 1715 and 1716, (London, 1717). For useful discussion of this exchange, see Nicholls, God 
and Government, pp. 180-4. For Leibniz’s criticism of the neo-Stoic and natural law theories of 
Pufendorf, see Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, pp. 46-9. 
26 It has been shown in Bartlett, Memoirs of Butler, p. 2, that the Presbyterian Butler family rented their 
house from the dean of Windsor, thus exemplifying the civility between Establishment and Dissent in 
Williamite and early-Augustan England. In some respects, this camaraderie ought to be viewed as an 
extension of the channels opened between English and continental Reformation by William Tyndale 
(1494-1536), and later by the Marian Exiles, during the sixteenth-century. For this suggestion, see 
Kelley, ‘Elizabethan political thought’, Pocock, et al. (eds.), Varieties of British Political Thought: 
1600-1800, pp. 56-7 & n. 28. 
27 The definitive statement of the fault-lines existing between establishment and dissent in modern 
scholarship remains Haakonssen (ed.), Enlightenment and Religion. William Gibson’s counter-claim in 
Unity and Accord, p. 1, however, is that establishment prelates and dissenters were not necessarily at 
loggerheads: that they ‘lived in peace with one another [and] in many ways … did not see themselves as 
separate and discrete’. This would seem to support Bartlett’s position from the footnote immediately 
above. 
28 Anon., A Full Account of the Late Proceedings in Convocation Relating to Dr. Clarke’s Writings 
about the Trinity, (London, 1714). See also, J. P. Ferguson, An Eighteenth Century-Heretic: Dr. Samuel 
Clarke, (Kineton, 1976), & L. Stewart, ‘Samuel Clarke, Newtonianism, and the Factions of Post-
Revolutionary England’, JHI 42 (1981), pp. 53-72. 
29 See Chapter Two, Sections I-II. 
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Britain, a time when the catastrophic seventeenth-century breakdown in royal 
sovereignty remained a persistent blot on the establishment landscape and memory.30 
Although the 1689 Toleration Act had finally conceded the dissenting right to ‘privacy 
in silence’,31 nevertheless, this still precluded non-conformists from receiving the full 
privileges of their establishment analogues, including the right to most positions of 
public office, as well as admission into the ancient universities (thus in part accounting 
for the rise of dissenting academies such as Jones’s during the period).32 In light of 
this, Clarke’s brand of latitudinarianism skirted dangerously close towards subverting 
the authority of the civil magistrate, and this was clearly far from welcome at a time 
when a vast array of heterodox thinkers had recently found themselves propelled to a 
level of unprecedented prominence. As Bob Tennant remarks, then, the ‘irony of a 
young Dissenter finding his way into the Church of England through dialogue with a 
priest officially suspected of heresy should not be far from our mind’.33 Indeed, it may 
even be the case that Clarke welcomed and published the overtures of Butler as a 
means of displaying his commitment to religious orthodoxy, and of setting the record 
straight, as it were.34 
 
Whatever Clarke’s predicament, Butler’s decision to move away from Dissent and into 
Establishment Culture was by no means a foregone conclusion, nor one to be taken 
lightly. With this in mind, we must speculate that Butler was in fact experiencing some 
sort of ‘crisis of faith’ in deciding to write to Clarke in the first place, and that this 
may even have been the ‘Occasion’ he was hastily referring to, but did not explicitly 
																																																																			
30 Cf. Pocock, ‘Within the margins: the definitions of orthodoxy’, in Lund (ed.), Margins of Orthodoxy, 
pp. 38, 39: ‘[Eighteenth-century orthodox thinkers] lived with the memory of the civil wars as the 
nightmare from which it was struggling to awake, of if you prefer, to go to sleep again. Its dullest 
complacency was a blanket spread over that memory […] there is hardly anything in the long eighteenth 
century which is not moved by the memory of these disasters and the knowledge that they could occur 
again’. 
31 Pocock et al. (eds.), Varieties of British Political Thought: 1600-1800, p. 270. 
32 Work on the intellectual rise and diffusion of the Dissenting Academies is in its relative infancy, and 
is the subject of ‘The Dissenting Academies Project’ headed by Rivers, David Wykes, Haakonssen & 
Whatmore, see http://www.english.qmul.ac.uk/drwilliams/academies.html.  
33 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 23. 
34 Ibid. Clarke was hardly a solitary figure when it came to holding secretly heterodox views. Newton 
himself was one such further example, as was Locke, and Newton’s heir at Cambridge, William 
Whiston (1667-1752), who was expelled from the Lucian Chair in 1710 on charges of Arianism. For 
Clarke’s influence on later rational dissent, see Miller, Defining the Common Good, pp. 267-8, 330; 
Haakonssen (ed.), Enlightenment and Religion, pp. 26-7. 
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outline, in his unusually informal and candid opening letter.35 By deciding on Clarke, 
Butler’s choice of ‘spiritual guide’ came in the guise of a thinker whose intellectual 
exploits followed in a long line of natural theologian defenders of the faith, stretching 
back to the likes of Thomas Sprat (1635-1713), Richard Bentley (1662-1742) and 
William Derham (1657-1735) – names which are all indicative of the Newtonian, and 
thereby allegedly ‘conservative’ because ‘established’, roots of English 
Enlightenment. 36  By and large, these thinkers were committed to replacing the 
Thomist and Aristotelian scholastic theology of the pre-Reformation period with 
modern forms of scientific empiricism. 37  Moreover, they tended to base their 
arguments for the existence and nature of God on analogy and the design argument.38 
Yet what made Clarke distinctive amongst these various logicians, and which Butler 
clearly admired and was to assimilate into his own thinking, was his unusual attempts 
to introduce a priori metaphysics into his various accounts of the divine nature and the 
makeup of the created universe.39 
																																																																			
35 This is the view of Tennant’s Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 22-3. For Butler’s first letter see 
Clarke, Several Letters, p. 3, Anon. to Clarke, 4 November 1713, where he begins the exchange with 
the following: ‘I suppose you will wonder at the present trouble from one who is to you a perfect 
Stranger, tho’ you are not so to him; but I hope the Occasion will excuse my Boldness’. 
36 For Newton’s perceived influence on English Enlightenment, see Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of 
the Enlightenment [1932], (Princeton Ed., 2009); Hélène Metzger, Attraction universelle et religion 
naturelle chez quelques commentateurs anglais de Newton , (Paris, Hermann & Cie, 1938); Berlin (ed.), 
The Age of the Enlightenment, (New York, 1956); M. C. Jacob, Newtonians and the English Revolution; 
J. R. Jacob, Robert Boyle and the English Revolution, (New York, 1978); Jacob & Jacob, ‘The Anglican 
Origins of Modern Science: The Metaphysical Foundations of the Whig Constitution’, Isis, 71 (2), June 
1980, pp. 251-67; John Gascoigne, Cambridge in the Age of Enlightenment: Science, Religion and 
Politics from the Restoration to the French Revolution, (Cambridge, 1990); Young, ‘Metaphysics 
before Physics: The Cambridge Critique Of Newtonian Religious Apologetic’ in Religion and 
Enlightenment, pp. 83-119.  
37 Sprat maintained that the ‘universal Disposition of the Age’ was ‘bent upon rational religion’, and 
that to undermine the principle was to undermine the very strength of the established Church itself, in 
his History of the Royal Society, for the Improving of Natural Knowledge, (London, 1667), pp. 370-1, 
374. For Sprat’s links to John Wilkins and the early latitudinarians, see Rivers, Reason, Grace, and 
Sentiment, I, pp. 39-40. Appealing to the Baconian method, Derham similarly concluded that ‘the Works 
of the Lord are great’ – a sure sign that He had bestowed ‘Curiosity’, ‘exquisite Workmanship’ and 
‘Skill upon his Creatures … the more expressly to proclaim their great Creator’, in Physico-Theology: 
Or, a Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of GOD, from His Works of Creation, (London, 1713), 
pp. 426-7. 
38 See R. E. Schofield, ‘An evolutionary taxonomy of eighteenth-century Newtonianisms’, Studies in 
Eighteenth Century Culture 7 (1978), pp. 175-92, esp. pp. 177-8; Gascoigne, Cambridge Age of 
Enlightenment, esp. pp. 4, 278, 280-82; Cambridge Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, pp. 53-4, 644, & 
within the same publication see esp. Stewart, ‘Arguments for the Existence of God: The British 
Debate’, pp. 710-30.  
39 Miller, Defining the Common Good, pp. 271, 277-86, 293, where Miller provides an account of the 
Ciceronian, Stoic natural law principles lying behind Clarke’s thought, and moreover of his antagonism 
towards Hobbes’s ideas. See also Young, ‘Metaphysics before Physics’ in Religion and Enlightenment, 
esp. pp. 84-5, 98, 100-3, 106-12, 115, 117.  
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The minutiae of the Butler-Clarke exchange are beyond the scope of the present work 
to explore, and in any case have been painstakingly summarised elsewhere. 40 
Nevertheless, within the letters we can clearly see that though Butler is satisfied with 
Clarke’s intellectual objectives, his primary aim is in fact merely to reach an 
intellectual acceptance of Clarke’s claims. Hence in the first letter, Butler beseeches 
Clarke to explain himself beyond the publication of his Boyle lectures, which thus far 
‘have failed me’, he writes, so that ‘I almost despair’.41 He then cautiously puts to 
Clarke two points concerning the issue of necessity and self-existence and the unity of 
the divine nature, and these two themes play out over the duration of the Tewkesbury 
correspondence.42  
 
For example, when Butler states that ubiquity is not necessarily a quality of existence, 
or that ‘there is a great difference between the order in which things exist, and the 
order in which I prove to my self that they exist’,43 Clarke responds that necessity need 
must ‘operate … everywhere and at all times alike’, since 
 
Determination of a particular Quantity, or particular Time or Place of Existence of any 
thing, cannot arise but from somewhat external to the thing itself … [i.e.,] the Will of an 
Intelligent and Free Agent.44  
 
Likewise, when Butler asks in his previous letter whether necessity is causal, or if, 
contrarily, ‘Affections which belong, and in the order of our Thoughts are antecedently 
necessary, to the Existence of all Things’, Clarke asserts that he ‘apprehends’ space ‘to 
be a Property of the Self-existent Substance [i.e., God]’.45 Thus, with each argument 
that Butler perceptively levels at Clarke (and by necessity we have only very lightly 
touched upon them here), the latter utilises Newtonian physics, i.e., the Newtonian 
conception of space as substance, as an explanatory tool to convince the former that a 
priori concepts such as self-existence and the existence of God are both demonstrable 																																																																			
40 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 19-37. See also Aaron Garrett, ‘Reasoning about 
Morals from Butler to Hume’, in Ruth Savage (ed.), Philosophy and Religion in Enlightenment Britain: 
New Case Studies, (Oxford, 2012), pp. 169-86, at pp. 173-6. 
41 Clarke, Several Letters, [Butler’s first letter] Anon. to Clarke, 4 November 1713, p. 4. 
42 Butler’s caution becomes characteristic of his mature philosophy in that it augments his philosophical 
moderatism. Although far more bellicose than Butler in expressing his views, Tucker was also a 
moderate. For the difference in their linguistic styles, see Chapter Four, pp. 143-4. 
43 Clarke, Several Letters, [Butler’s third letter] Anon. to Clarke, 5 December 1713, p. 18. 
44 Ibid., [Clarke’s third reply] Clarke to [Butler], 10 December 1713, p. 20. 
45 Ibid., [Butler’s second letter] Anon. to Clarke, 23 November 1713, p. 14; [Clarke’s second reply] 
Clarke to [Butler], London, 28 November 1713, p. 17. 
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and accessible.46 Although to the modern reader this no longer remains a plausible 
strategy, in Clarke and Butler’s day empiricism and contingency were often 
‘excitingly’ mapped onto the rational and a priori in such fashion.47 Consequently, 
contrary to existing interpretations of the Butler-Clarke exchange, which claim that 
Butler was largely critical of Clarke’s position,48 it is far likelier that he was in fact 
genuinely satisfied, if not even comforted, by Clarke’s responses. This appears to have 
been confirmed by Butler himself in a letter written three years later: 
 
[Tho’] I did not see ye forces of your Argument for ye Unity of ye Divine Nature when I 
had done writing to you upon the Subject, yet by frequently considering what you have 
offered upon it, I am now fully satisfied that it is conclusive.49  
     
Upon leaving Tewkesbury in February 1714, Butler moved to London and likely 
introduced himself personally to Clarke, thereby solidifying their friendship. In one 
letter dated April 1714 (the only survivor of their ‘London correspondence’), Butler 
even disclosed his recent decision to reject the Presbyterian Ministry, stating that 
‘there is [e]very encouragement (whether one regards interest or usefulness) now a 
days, for any to enter that profession [i.e., the Anglican ministry]; who has not got a 
way of commanding his assent to received opinions without Examination’. 50 
Accordingly, Butler conformed to the Church of England in March 1715 under Bishop 
William Talbot (1658-1730), the father of his second patron besides Clarke, Edward 
Talbot (1693-1720); and he was then admitted at Oriel College on 17 March, 
eventually matriculating on 15 December 1715 under the label of ‘commoner’.51  
 
 																																																																			
46 Clarke is here reiterating some of the main points of his A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable 
Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of Christian Revelation, (London, 1706). 
47 For an account of Butler’s so-called ‘antiquated’ approach to meta-ethics based upon present-day 
standards, see Ralph Wedgwood, ‘Butler on Self-Interest, Virtue, and Human Nature’, in Paul 
Bloomfield (ed.), Moral and Self-Interest, (Oxford, 2008), pp. 177-204. 
48 E.g., Young, Religion and Enlightenment, p. 84. 
49 [Butler’s ninth letter], J Butler to S Clarke, Oriel College, 10 October 1717, BL Add. Mss. 12101 
(13). 
50 [Butler’s sixth letter] BL Add. Mss. 12, 101 (13), J Butler to S Clarke, Hamlin’s Coffee House 
(London), Tuesday morning [approx. 11 or 18 April 1714]. 
51 C. L. Shadwell, Registrum Orielense: An Account of the Members of Oriel College, Oxford, 2 Vols., 
(Oxford, 1902), II, The Commensales, Commoners and Natellers admitted during the years 1701-1900, 
p. 43. The Talbots advanced the Anglican careers of Butler, Martin Benson (1689-1752) and Secker, 
and it was this prospect of patronage that convinced Secker to abandon medicine and conform to the 
ministry in c. 1720-1. See Ingram, Religion, Reform and Modernity, pp. 42, 49-50. 
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Despite Butler’s clear conscience with regard to his own conversion to the established 
Church, the final set of published letters between him and Clarke (i.e., the ‘Oxford 
correspondence’) are highly indicative of the student’s unhappiness at Oriel. Indeed, 
the fact that they were hastily written over a period of only eleven days, from 30 
September to 11 October 1717, suggests that Butler had once again fallen foul of some 
sort of internal, be it intellectual or spiritual, conflict. In one exasperated letter dated 
30 September 1717, for example, Butler wrote of his obligation to ‘mis-spend so much 
time here in attending frivolous lectures and unintelligible disputations, that I am quite 
tired out with such a disagreeable way of trifling’.52 So desperate was he to escape, 
then, that at one point he even considered quitting Oxford for Cambridge to study law, 
under growing pressure from his father. This idea was swiftly rejected, however, on 
account of Butler’s determination to pursue his meta-ethical and theological interests. 
Consequently, his only source of solace during this difficult period – aside, of course, 
from Clarke’s letters – came in the guise of his close friend, Secker, who made 
frequent visitations sandwiched between supposedly intense bouts of correspondence, 
which are now lost. They ‘talked [their] own Talk without controul’, wrote Secker’s 
biographer Bielby Porteus (1731-1809), on Trinitarian doctrine, the ‘Inspiration of the 
Scripture’ and the Thirty-Nine Articles.53 It is highly likely, then, that it was during 
this period Butler convinced Secker to conform.54 
 
Tennant writes that Butler’s typical ‘response to a crisis’ was to use theology and 
philosophy as a means to ‘prepare [himself] for spiritual and career decisions – a 
practice that he was to make central to his account of the conscience’.55 Viewed from 
this perspective, in Butler’s troubled Oxford letters we witness the fledgling 
metaphysician’s earliest attempts to lay down much of the groundwork for his mature 
philosophy and beyond. In the first letter in particular, Butler extends his views on the 																																																																			
52 [Butler’s seventh letter] Butler to Clarke, 30 September [1717]. 
53 Bielby Porteus, A Review of the Life and Character of the Right Rev. Dr. Thomas Secker, (Fifth Ed., 
London, 1797), p. 6; based on Sheffield City Archives, Bagshawe C. 330, f. 4: Secker to Elizabeth 
Secker Milnes, 26 July 1716. 
54 Ingram, Religion, Reform and Modernity, pp. 32-3, 35-6. The influence of Clarke, via Butler, on 
Secker’s thinking during this period was acknowledged by Secker himself. See Autobiography of 
Thomas Secker, p. 4: ‘I studied various Theological subjects with various Fluctuations & changes of 
Mind: particularly the Doctrine of the Trinity, in which for some time I agreed very much with Dr. 
Clarke; the Inspiration of the Scripture, on which I inclined to the Sentimens de quelques Theologiens 
de Holland; & Subscription to the 39 Articles, concerning which I afterwards had a long 
Correspondence with Mr. Butler … who went to Oriel College …’ 
55 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 32. 
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issue of free will and virtue, subjects that were to become central to his wider thought. 
Here he makes three particularly important points that we need to consider before 
finally turning to Fifteen Sermons itself [editorial insertions provided for clarity]: 
 
(1) … That Freedom and Action are Identical ideas, and that Man is [therefore], properly 
speaking, an Agent or a Free Being …; (2) [that] I do not see that it [necessarily] follows 
from thence that it is in our power to act virtuously; because the physical and moral nature 
of an action [come] under quite two different considerations …; (3) [that] Virtue does not 
consist barely in acting, but […] evidently supposes a disposition in our nature to be 
influenced by those motives, which […] like the rest of our affections, seems to proceed 
from our original frame and constitution.56  
  
In this excerpt, Butler is clearly providing a nascent account of his theory of 
conscience, albeit rather clumsily since he has not yet fully mastered the philosophical 
implications of his own thought. However, unlike in the earlier and far cagier 
Tewkesbury correspondence, by this stage Butler finally appears confident enough to 
ascribe a moral function to human nature which he believes is part of what he calls the 
‘original frame and constitution’ of humankind itself.57 Crucially, this means that 
Butler is beginning to propose, in axiomatic terms, that to act immorally is in fact to 
act contrarily to nature (as in the Stoic philosophy), and therefore contrarily to God. 
Put another way, here Butler is speculating that the individual’s sense of ‘cognitive 
unease’ at the first sign of their falling short of acceptable moral behaviour is in fact 
their ‘conscience’ speaking to them. As we shall imminently see, this is a 
fundamentally important principle within Butlerian philosophy which carries through 
all the way to Tucker, in that it comprises the core of his definition of human nature 
itself: i.e., that to follow the course of nature, again in the Stoic sense, is to be a 
‘conscious’ or ‘conscientious’ being. A further implication of this, therefore, is that in 
Butler’s view, freewill is an important, indeed an inherent, component of human moral 
agency.58  
 
																																																																			
56 [Butler’s seventh letter] Butler to Clarke, 30 September [1717].  
57 Prima naturae, as Grotius had earlier remarked in the context of discussion over self-preservation and 
the acquisition of the necessaries of life, in his De jure belli ac pacis [On The Rights of War and Peace], 
(Paris, 1625), ‘Prolegomena’. 
58 This is very much in the Arminian, Grotian, Cocciean, and Witsian vein, and chimes with Miller’s 
Stoic emphasis on ‘choice’ in his ‘Hercules at the Crossroads’, Mouchel & Nativel (eds.), République 
des Lettres, Republique des Arts, pp. 167-92. 
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The importance of Butler’s early ‘oscillation’ between Establishment and Dissent 
cannot be taken for granted. For indeed, there are a number of crucial points within the 
Butler-Clarke dialogue which hint at some of the most important Butlerian concepts 
that would resurface in Tucker’s later intellectual and economic thought: the 
acknowledgement of the importance of metaphysics without over-emphasising its 
influence; the recognition of the limitations of pure empiricism; the epistemic fusion 
of a priori and a posteriori knowledge in a pre-Kantian context; the about-turn 
regarding the usefulness and/or credibility of analogical argumentation (evinced above 
all in Butler’s deployment of analogical argument in The Analogy of Religion);59 the 
philosophical ‘self-restraint’ which leads Butler and Tucker towards moderation as a 
maxim in itself; and finally, that which has been described by Tennant as the 
avoidance of philosophical ‘reification as a means to schematic neatness, even at the 
cost of conceptual fuzziness’.60  
 
III. ‘Conscience’ and ‘Reflection’ in Fifteen Sermons. 
 
Having charted the genesis of Butler’s philosophy in the context of his early life, we 
now finally find ourselves suitably placed to turn to his engagement with the so-called 
‘populariser’ of Hobbes, Mandeville.61 As already noted, Fifteen Sermons has often 
been interpreted as a profound critique of Hobbesian and Mandevellian self-interest, 
and in immediate justification of this, Butler refers explicitly to Hobbes himself ‘and 
this whole set of writers’ in the affixed preface to the second edition of the work.62 																																																																			
59 See Chapter Four, esp. Sections II-III. 
60 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 15, 26, 49, this citation at p. 26. On the final two 
points, we might also suggest that these demonstrate Butler’s ‘Cocceian’ rejection of the overly formal 
and inflexible Voetian brand of Reformed Scholasticism. For the background to this claim, see Charles 
S. McCoy, ‘Johannes Cocceius: Federal Theologian’, Scottish Journal of Theology, 16/04 (Dec. 1963), 
pp. 352-70, esp. pp. 365-6. In final conclusion, note P. N. Miller’s explanation of Clarke’s scheme, 
which, ‘drawing together reason, liberty, community and natural moral law, provided the basis for a 
series of philosophical tracts written over the next three quarters of a century …’ (and not least Fifteen 
Sermons itself), in his Defining the Common Good, p. 284. 
61 James Dean Young, ‘Mandeville: A Popularizer of Hobbes’, Modern Language Notes, 74/1, (Jan., 
1959), pp. 10-13. 
62 Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. viii-ix. Tennant claims that in this passage there are ‘references, explicit or 
implicit, to Clarke, Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Locke, Wollaston, Fénelon, (and possibly Guyon), Bossuet, 
the Epicureans, Rochefoucauld […], Cicero and the Stoics’, in Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 
50-1. Brooke adds that ‘Mandeville’s name was an absent presence on any such list’, Philosophical 
Pride, p. 165. Why Butler does not mention Mandeville here is rather puzzling, given Mandeville’s 
contemporary reputation. It is possible, however, that he was simply attempting to avoid turning Fifteen 
Sermons into a polemical piece, or that he felt that Mandeville was such a Hobbist that a refutation of 
Hobbes himself was sufficient enough. 
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With this in mind, we may suggest that Butler’s initial aim in Fifteen Sermons is in 
fact three-fold: first, to refute Hobbesian realpolitik; second, to undermine the 
assumption that human conduct is universally selfish; and third, to challenge popular 
cynicism of the type that Mandeville so recently and devastatingly employed.  
  
Beyond the flagrant philosophical potency of the first and second of these points, 
Butler is perhaps most concerned with the implications of the third: i.e., that popular 
cynicism offers a tangible excuse for vice that he claims is false and corruptive. 
According to Butler, then, in order to accept that human conduct is universally 
selfish—that is to say that self-interest holds way over all human affections—one is 
forced to admit that humanity is enslaved, in the neo-Epicurean and Augustinian 
sense, by its baser passions. Yet as we have already seen in the Butler-Clarke 
exchange, Butler does not feel able to accept this premise, and instead insists that self-
love is in fact beneficial, since it ‘manifestly prevent[s] numberless Follies and 
Vices’.63 Furthermore, in Butler’s view human selfishness cannot even be described as 
innately vicious, nor strictly speaking ‘immoral’, since no ‘Passion God hath endued 
us with’, he writes, ‘can be in itself Evil’.64 Contrariwise, since Butler believes that 
‘Self-love and Benevolence, Virtue and Interest are not to be opposed’, i.e., should not 
be put in opposition with one another, he writes that ‘Every thing is what it is, and not 
another Thing’ – Butler’s main point essentially being that existence is unitary rather 
than dialectical: 
 
The Goodness or Badness of Actions does not arise from hence, that the Epithet, interested 
or disinterested, may be applied to them; […] but from their being what they are; Namely, 
what becomes [i.e., what is appropriate to] such Creatures as we are, what the state of the 
Case requires, or the contrary.65 
 
Whilst Butler maintains, then, that ‘Benevolence is the great Law of the whole moral 
Creation’, he nevertheless also acknowledges that theorists should ‘take Humane 
Nature as it is’ and not what it might be, meaning that they should avoid speculative 
inquiries, ‘these being Questions which we have not, that I know of, any thing at all to 																																																																			
63 Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. xxxi-xxxii. 
64 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 139; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 140. 
65 Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. xxix; emphases added. Cf. Pufendorf’s similar claim that property and 
society arise naturally in process of time ‘according as the Temper and Condition of Men, the Nature of 
things themselves, and the difference of place required’, in Of the Law of Nature and Nations, IV. IV. 
XIII. 
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do with’.66 In its place, Butler thinks that an alternative query therefore ought to be 
posed: 
 
Why or for what End such a Passion [i.e., self-interest] was given us [by God]: And this 
chiefly, in order to shew, what are the [human] Abuses of it.67  
 
By proposing an inquest such as this, Butler believes that persons will be far better 
placed to understand why it is that they oscillate between virtue and vice – an 
incredibly significant point, since Butler is convinced that it is only when individuals 
abuse, or ‘frequently indulge a Passion in such Ways and Degrees’, that it becomes 
‘quite another thing from what it was originally in our Nature’ [omissions not carried 
over from 1726 struck out, 1729 additions italicised]:68  
 
Every one of our Faculties Passions and Affections hath its natural Stint and Bound, which 
may be easily exceeded; whereas our Enjoyments can possibly be but in a determinate 
Measure or Degree. Therefore such Excess of the Affection, since it cannot procure any 
Enjoyment, must in all Cases be useless … This holds as much with regard to Self-love as 
to all other Affections.69 
 
Judging by the excerpt immediately above, we can clearly see that for Butler the 
underlying conditions for virtue – and specifically Christian virtue – reside not so 
much in human behaviour, but rather in human psychology. As a result, Butler 
suspects that human behaviour is in truth a by-product of human action (or motive), 
rather than it being the other way round, and this revelation prompts him to explore the 
legitimacy of ascribing ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ to actions via what he considers to be 
the limited theoretical bounds of merely (a) ‘interest’ or (b) ‘disinterest’. Hence, when 
Butler points out that ‘we may judge and determine that an Action is morally Good or 
Evil, before we so much as consider, whether it be interested or disinterested’, here he 
is stating quite unequivocally that humans are far more complex and, in a word, 
																																																																			
66 By ‘speculative inquiries’ Butler means pure – or Cartesian – metaphysics. 
67 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 137-9; Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 137-9. 
68 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 139-40; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 140. 
69 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 210; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 212; Butler’s vast editing of the 1729 edition 
demonstrates the continual development of his ideas.  
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rational (again, in the Stoic sense) than the ‘interested-disinterested’ hypothesis would 
appear to suggest.70 
 
We earlier explored Butler’s nascent theory of conscience in his correspondence with 
Clarke. In Fifteen Sermons, however, Butler uses another term in tandem with 
conscience, i.e., ‘Reflection’, and frequently interchanges between the two 
(henceforth, then, we will do likewise). According to Butler, the principle of reflection 
holds ‘natural Authority’ over the others that also comprise human nature, such as the 
passions and the appetites. 71  Thus, although the clergyman readily admits that 
reflection may be usurped by other affections, nevertheless, in his view it can never be 
legitimately overruled. The reason for this is because Butler thinks that reflection is in 
fact an inherently rational and moral faculty within human cognisance: a part of 
humanity’s ‘original frame and constitution’ as he earlier put it to Clarke.72 Because of 
this, Butler suggests that once assisted by the use of reason, reflection or conscience 
mediates between the individual’s private and public persona, and correspondingly, 
between their propensity towards virtue or vice. ‘[T]here is a superior principle of 
Reflection or conscience in every Man’, he therefore writes, ‘which distinguisheth 
between the internal Principles of his Heart, as well as his external Actions; Which 
passes Judgement upon himself and them’.73 Nevertheless, in Butler’s view, reason is 
never sufficient for human action in and of itself: 
 
Reason alone, whatever any one may wish, is not in Reality a sufficient Motive of Virtue in 
such a Creature as Man; but this Reason joined with those Affections which God has 
impress’d upon his Heart: And when these are allowed Scope to exercise themselves, but 
under strict Government and Direction of Reason, then it will act suitably to our Nature, 
and to the Circumstances God has placed us in.74 
 
																																																																			
70 Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. xxix; emphasis added. Hence the following rhetorical question which Butler 
adds in 1729, at p. 219: ‘Is Benevolence less the Temper of Tranquillity and Freedom than Ambition 
and Covetousness?’ 
71 Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. xvi. 
72 [Butler’s seventh letter] Butler to Clarke, 30 September [1717]. Cf. pp. 97, 98 above. 
73 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 35-6; Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 35-6.  
74 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 86; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 88; emphasis added. For more on the role of 
reason and moral judgment in Butler’s thought, see Michael S. Pritchard, ‘Conscience and Reason in 
Butler’s Ethics’, Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 9/3, (Fall, 1978), pp. 39-49 & Sahar Akhtar, 
‘Restoring Joseph Butler’s Conscience’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 14 (4), (2006) 
pp. 581-600. 
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Since Butler admits, then, that human nature is comprised not only of the principle of 
reflection, but also of the passions and appetites (other categories might include 
compassion, resentment, anger, benevolence, self-love and so on), he is convinced that 
it is in the act of balancing or harmonising each of them that we achieve a state of 
good psychological health. 75  Nevertheless, attaining such balance is far from 
straightforward, and in Butler’s view can only be achieved via acceptance of the fact 
that reflection is, in the words of Jonathan Lavery, ‘the key internal relation […] the 
executive principle of the soul’.76 This is incredibly important since, according to 
Butler, reflection is the one principle in human nature that enables us to discover the 
(humanly knowable) conditions for moral duty: 
 
[The] very Constitution of our Nature requires, that we bring our whole Conduct before 
this superior Faculty [i.e., conscience/reflection]; wait its Determination; enforce upon 
ourselves its Authority, and make it the Business of our Lives, as it is absolutely the whole 
Business of a Moral Agent, to conform ourselves to it. This is the true Meaning of that 
ancient Precept, Reverence thy Self. 77  
 
Accordingly, in Butler’s view, acts of vice, which Mandeville had argued was the 
correlate of human nature, only occur when the individual’s conscious is not 
performing its proper function: either because (a) the individual reflects insufficiently 
(i.e., not often enough, or not properly), or because (b) the individual’s faculty of 
reflection has become corrupt (i.e., sophistical, pathological and/or irrational). In order 
to counter this, Fifteen Sermons exhorts the reader to be mindful of the fundamental 
difference between ‘proper’ and ‘counterfeit’ reflection. In Butler’s view, failure to do 
so is dangerous, because a defective conscience inhibits the individual’s innate 
capacity for virtue:  
 																																																																			
75 As we shall see, the emphasis on psychological health becomes characteristic of Butler’s philosophy, 
and is in part symptomatic of his attempts to deal with his privately troubled mind. For example, in later 
years Butler discusses the issue of individual and collective insanity with Tucker in the gardens of 
Bristol Cathedral. For more on this and the issue of Butler’s fragile psychological state, see this chapter, 
n. 103 & Chapter Four, pp. 128-29.  
76  Jonathan Lavery, ‘Reflection and Exhortation in Butler’s Sermons: Practical Deliberation, 
Psychological Health and the Philosophical Sermon’, The European Legacy, Vol. 10, No. 4, (2005),  
pp. 329-48, at p. 335. Cf. Wendell O’ Brian, ‘Butler and the Authority of Conscience’, History of 
Philosophy Quarterly, 8/1, (Jan., 1991), pp. 43-57; emphases added. Regarding Butler’s ‘hierarchical’ 
system, Rivers claims that after the ‘ruling principle’ of conscience, self-love is superior to 
benevolence, in Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, p. 224. However, other scholars such as Lavery and 
Tennant argue that they are in fact equal, and this is the position that the present author concurs with. 
77 Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. xvi-xvii. Butler is likely referring to the Pythagorian maxim in the final 
sentence of this excerpt. 
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Truth, and real good Sense, and thorough Integrity carry along with them a peculiar 
Consciousness of their own Genuineness. There is a Feeling belonging to them, which does 
not accompany their Counterfeits, Error, Folly, Half-Honesty, partial and slight Regards to 
Virtue and Right, so far only as they are consistent with that Course of Gratification which 
Men happen to be set upon.78 
 
As a consequence, Butler’s forceful rebuttal of the psychological egoism associated 
with Hobbes and Mandeville was vested above all in his belief that uninhibited 
selfishness (or pure self-interest) was, in the final analysis, a fallacious hypothesis; a 
theory distinct from and alien to true self-love: a ‘Difference in Nature and in Kind’, 
as he put it at one point. Contrarily, for Butler ‘Reasonable’ and ‘cool’ self-love was 
not tantamount to ‘Selfishness’. Rather, self-love was a naturally and providentially 
endowed principle in humankind, one amongst many others that, though ‘superior’ to 
the passions, was nonetheless subordinated to the primary principle of reflection.79 
Considered in this light, Butler believed that egoistic selfishness—again, the 
unprincipled gratification of the individual’s appetites as in the Epicurean 
philosophy—was a perversion of nature, beyond the bounds of proper human 
reflection. In large part, then, this was Butler’s reasoning behind the individual’s sense 
of ‘cognitive unease’ (as we earlier put it) at the very moment that they acted 
contrarily to nature, i.e., in a purely selfish manner. In modern terms we describe this 
as a sort of mental illness, ‘to which’, as Butler put it, ‘some Men are liable, in the 
same Way as others are to Epilepsie, or any sudden particular Disorder’.80 This being 
the case, for Butler, egoistic selfishness could never be described as a natural 
phenomenon, but rather as a perversion, a self-deception – a sickness. 
 
IV. The Pastoral Function of Fifteen Sermons. 
 
Having described Butler’s philosophical aim in Fifteen Sermons, we need to pause 
momentarily to consider the arrangement, or rather the unifying thread, of the 
publication, and therefore its primary function. This is important because it augments 
the theological potency of Butler’s argumentation, whilst at the same time beginning 																																																																			
78 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 193; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 194. Cf. Lavery, ‘Reflection and Exhortation 
in Butler’s Sermons’, pp. 336-7. 
79 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 39; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 39. According to Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy 
and Ministry, pp. 58-9, for Butler the terms ‘coolness’, ‘cool’, or ‘cool self-interest’ do not denote a sort 
of cold, detached or mechanical rationality, but rather ‘warmth’ (a term which might be overstating the 
case), ‘moderation’, if not even notions of ‘comfort’. 
80  Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 148; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 148. 
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to bridge the gap between his theo-philosophical thought and Tucker’s political 
economy. Turning to the synoptic preface of the second edition, here Butler states that 
the reader should not ‘look for any particular Reason for the Choice of the greatest 
part of these Discourses’ since they are ‘in great Measure accidental’.81 This, however, 
is slightly misleading. Obviously Butler has not plotted the work as a series of 
interconnected developments from start to finish. Yet we can clearly see that there is a 
uniformity of thought and design behind Butler’s choice and arrangement of the 
sermons, indicative in turn of the fact that the clergyman made careful editorial 
decisions regarding which sermons to include for publication, and where to place them 
in the sequence.82 In light of these observations, we must speculate that – in the 
preface at least, but undoubtedly more generally – Butler is deliberately attempting to 
pass off the philosophical complexities of the Fifteen Sermons, in order instead to 
emphasise their role as an extension of his pastoral function.83  
  
This is by no means a moot point. The Rolls Chapel was a place of worship for 
‘masters, clerks and registrars of the Court of Chancery’, and a ‘chapel for the legal 
profession as well as a record repository’.84 Therefore, although its services were open 
to the public, its core congregation was comprised of barristers and other such 
personnel from London’s legal community 85  – individuals Butler undoubtedly 
believed could have a tangible and positive influence on society.86 With this in mind, 
Fifteen Sermons appears be part of a wider project designed by Butler to direct the 
congregation and/or reader towards the path of spiritual health and Christian virtue 
(which are coterminous), especially via recognition of their own moral – and so by 																																																																			
81 Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. xxxiv. 
82 E.g., by grouping Sermons I-III ‘Upon Human Nature’ at the beginning of the work, even though in 
all likelihood they would have been preached separately. 
83 According to Rivers, this is a hallmark of seventeenth-century latitudinarianism, whose adherents 
emphasised the ‘importance of the oral medium of sermons by which their ideas were diffused’. 
Moreover, from the Restoration onwards Rivers states that sermons in London began to be delivered in 
a ‘new, plainer, more simple’ style, as Butler’s work appears to be. Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I, pp. 
43, 49. For the developing ‘didactic function’ of preaching during the seventeenth-century, see also 
Mary Morrissey, ‘Scripture, Style and Persuasion in Seventeenth-Century English Theories of 
Preaching’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol. 53, No. 4, (October 2002), pp. 686-706. 
84 Ben Weinreb, Christopher Hibbert et al. (eds.), The London Encyclopaedia, (Third Ed., London: 
Macmillan, 2008), p. 653; Cunliffe, ODNB article on Butler. 
85 William Stow, Remarks on London, (London, 1722), pp. 121-2. Garrett also makes this point, noting 
that Butler received his BCL in Oxford in 1721, meaning that he was trained in law as well as theology. 
See his ‘Reasoning about Morals from Butler to Hume’, in Savage (ed.), Philosophy and Religion in 
Enlightenment Britain, p. 178.  
86 Again, this chimes with Rivers’ remark that seventeenth-century latitudinarians preached to ‘learned, 
wealthy, and politically important audiences’, Reason, Grace and Sentiment, I, p. 50. 
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extension rational and reflective – agency. As Lavery puts it, then, the sermons are 
expressly aimed at ‘every thoughtful Anglican who seeks a deeper understanding of 
the life their faith admonishes them to lead’, and Butler’s ‘authorial posture’ within 
this scheme is therefore that of a ‘guide and a teacher in this search’.87 
  
Here we must assert that the Rolls Chapel audience were far from learned specialists, 
but rather a relatively newly educated – we might also cautiously say ‘gentrified’ – 
class of thoughtful parishioners.88 Consequently, Butler’s professional duty to them 
was to adopt a pastoral role that centred on persuasion rather than coercion – an 
approach that became increasingly synonymous with the eighteenth-century 
established Church, as we have seen.89 Seen in this context, Butler’s sermons appear to 
be part-theoretical and part-exegetical: the former concerned with Butler’s 
explanations of human nature as outlined in our previous section (i.e., human motives, 
conduct, behaviour, etc.), and the latter concerned with Butler’s personal reading of 
Scripture, and how he believes this impinges upon ethical life within modern 
commercial society.90 Naturally, these two elements coincide so as to form a powerful 
critique of Hobbesian and Mandevillean self-interest. Yet above all, Butler utilises 
both tools as a means of emphasising the defining Christian principles of 
‘Benevolence’, ‘Neighbourly Love’ and ‘Love of God’, which he believes is 
particularly important in light of commercial modernity’s increasingly complex, 																																																																			
87 Lavery, ‘Reflection and Exhortation in Butler’s Sermons’, p. 333. Rivers has discussed how 
freethinkers tended to deploy a two-fold method of ‘irony, equivocation and esotericism’ on the one 
side (i.e., truths which can only be told to the philosophic) and exotericism on the other (i.e., contenting 
the vulgar with ‘traditional lies’), so as to half-shield and half-proclaim their heterodox views – the act 
of hiding in plain sight, as it were; see Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II. pp. 31-50. The present author 
speculates that Butler is here attempting to negate that distinction; to draw esoteric, exoteric, 
philosophic and vulgar together, so as to place them under an open, transparent and above all Christian 
framework, whilst simultaneously challenging the freethinker’s methods and aims. 
88 However, Garrett notes that the Rolls congregation were comprised of ‘the most philosophical 
lawyers in England’ dealing not in common law but in equity. Interestingly, this meant that their 
‘standard of judgment’ in legal matters ‘invoked, historically… conscience’, whether that be in terms of 
the conscience of the ‘decent person’, or the ‘King’s conscience’, both of which were seen as compasses 
by which to guide the judge’s verdicts. See ‘Reasoning about Morals from Butler to Hume’, Savage 
(ed.), Philosophy and Religion in Enlightenment Britain, pp. 178-80. 
89 See Walsh et al. (eds.), The Church of England c. 1689-1833, ‘Introduction’, p. 16; cf. Chapter Two, 
p. 60. As Wilkins put it in the preface to a later edition of the seventeenth-century latitudinarian 
‘handbook’, Ecclesiastes [1645], (London, 1675): ‘The great End of Preaching, being either to inform 
or perswade; This may be most effectually done by such rational ways of Explication and Confirmation, 
as are most fit and proper to satisfie mens judgements and consciences’.  
90 E.g., in Sermon X. Butler cites the story of Nathan and David (II Samuel xii, 7) in order to emphasise 
the importance of theoretical detachment (i.e., ‘coolness’) for genuine reflection, while in Sermon XI, 
he appeals to the ‘golden rule’ of Romans xiii, 9, further developing this theme in Sermon XII, and so 
on. 
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ephemeral and yet irrevocable nature; of its status as a new and unforeseen ‘historical 
force’, as Pocock has often described it.91  
  
It is by these means, then, that Butler couples (a) his meta-ethics and pastoral duty to 
the laity with (b) existing structures in Church and State – most notably, by expatiating 
on the Christian way of life: 
 
[Unreasonable] Behaviour of Men towards each other … prevents their applying to 
themselves those Reproofs and Instructions, which they meet with either in Scripture or 
religious Discourses, though exactly suitable to the State of their own Mind, and the 
Course of their Behaviour. […] Whoever will consider the whole Commerce of Humane 
Life, will see that a great Part, perhaps the greatest Part, of the Intercourse between 
Mankind, cannot be fixed to determinate Rules.92 
 […] Therefore the Scripture, not being a Book of Theory and Speculation, but a 
plain Rule of Life for Mankind, has with the utmost possible Propriety put the principle of 
Virtue upon the Love of our Neighbour; which is that Part of the Universe, that Part of 
Mankind, that Part of our Country, which comes under our immediate Notice, 
Acquaintance, and Influence, and with which we have to do.93 
 
Nevertheless, although Butler appears here to be concurring with (or perhaps even 
acting as a spokesperson for) the prevailing Whiggish ideology of sociability and 
politeness, his reference to the impossibility of fixing human conduct to ‘determinate 
Rules’ moves the clergyman beyond Shaftesbury’s aristocratic notion of virtue, 
conceived as inherent balance and harmony, and instead towards a psychoanalytical 
explanation of the human condition which recognises that individuals seek balance and 
harmony via their conscience.94 In large part, this is the wellspring of Butler’s 
antagonism towards that which he calls the ‘material deficiency’ in Shaftesbury’s 
broader definition of virtue: Butler’s argument essentially being that Shaftesbury fails 
to take ‘into Consideration [that] Authority, which is implied in the Idea of Reflex 
																																																																			
91 E.g., Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, esp. Chap. 14 & pp. 467, 497, 499, 503, 512, 543; Virtue, pp. 
48, 105, 133, 274 & Barbarism and Religion, 5 Vols., passim., esp. I., pp. 102-3.  
92 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 188-9, 190; Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 188-9, 190; emphases added. 
93 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 229-30; Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 235-6; emphasis added. Here, the 
appeal to the Stoic conception of oikeiosis, and of it being placed on equal parity with the authority of 
Scripture, is striking. 
94 Tennant also calls this ‘a democratic ethics’ in Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 73. The present 
author acknowledges the plausibility of this view, but remains hesitant to go so far as to describe Butler 
as a democrat, or democratic. For Shaftesbury’s Stoic espousal of aristocratic republicanism on the 
other hand, see J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, (Cambridge, 1998), p. 295 & Brooke, 
Philosophical Pride, pp. 119-20, 163, 202. Cf. Miller, ‘Hercules at the Crossroads …’. 
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Approbation or Disapprobation’ – or in other words, inward reflection.95 Hence 
although, as we know, like Butler Shaftesbury also attempted to challenge the 
Hobbesian/Epicurean-Augustinian selfish hypothesis along Stoic lines, nevertheless, 
for Butler the elevation of conscience, unlike Shaftesbury, constituted the very 
seedbed of virtue – a God-given faculty of the mind. As Rivers points out, then, it is 
this side of the clergyman that was at pains to ‘redefine’ contemporary terminology so 
as ‘to give religious meaning to words that [had] been corrupted through 
misapplication to a temporal and material level’. In this sense, Rivers argues further, 
Butler was clearly following ‘in the path of the seventeenth-century latitudinarian 
divines, particularly Wilkins, who devoted much energy to arguing that the religious 
life is profitable, advantageous, and in man's best interest’.96  
  
We shall return to Butler’s conceptual and theological opposition to Shaftesbury, and 
freethinking more generally, in an examination of The Analogy of Religion (1736) in 
the follow chapter. Nevertheless, here we may briefly note that within The Analogy, 
where Butler states that natural religion may be the ‘Foundation and principal Part of 
Christianity’, but that it is not ‘in any Sense the whole of it’, Butler’s main point is to 
stress that the apparent disparity between revealed religion and natural man is simply 
not to be resolved in this life.97 Moreover, since Butler thinks that religious scepticism 
breeds immoderation, and likewise, since he believes that individuals who adhere to 
this way of thinking lack the self-discipline (i.e., the reason and/or reflective will) to 
temper their own belief system, Fifteen Sermons emerges as an extremely potent 
endorsement of the orthodox practice of the Anglican faith, in the very literal sense 
that Butler considers the ritualistic, legal, liturgical and ceremonial customs of the 
Thirty-Nine Articles and Prayer Book to be a ‘buttress of good mental health’.98  																																																																			
95  Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. xvii. Elsewhere, Butler has this to say of Shaftesbury’s perceived 
inconsistency: ‘What a wonderful Incongruity it is for a Man to see the Doubtfulness in which things 
are involved, & yet be impatient out of Action or vehement in it. Say a Man is a Sceptick, & add, what 
was said of Brutus quicquid vult valde vult [whatever Brutus willed, he willed intensely], and you say, 
there is the greatest Contrariety between his Understanding & his Temper that can be express’d in 
words’. BM Add. MS 9815 (26).  
96 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, pp. 224-5; cf. I, pp. 39-40, 44, 85-7. For further discussion 
of Butler’s ‘Laodicean Rationalism’, or latitudinarianism, see Chapter Four, Section VII.  
97 The Analogy, p. 144; emphases added. For a deeper analysis of these points, and The Analogy more 
generally, see Chapter Four, Sections II-III. 
98 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 57. Walsh and Taylor, in concurrence with Waterman, 
claim that much of the devotional literature of the eighteenth-century was based on the Prayer Book, 
‘which was itself used not merely as a service book, but also as a manual for family and private 
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It is via these channels, then, that Butler displays his utter commitment to the Anglican 
Church and its canonical doctrines.99 For there is a ‘Temper of Mind’, he writes, 
‘made up of, or which follows from all three, Fear, Hope, Love; namely, Resignation 
to the Divine Will, which ought to be the habitual Frame of our Mind and Heart, and 
to be exercised at proper Seasons more distinctly, in Acts of Devotion’. 100 
Accordingly, it is not difficult to see why Butler continues to assert within Fifteen 
Sermons the importance of rigorous self-examination and genuine reflection as the 
primary means to salvation. For even the ‘wisest and most knowing’, he claims, 
‘cannot comprehend the Works of God, the Methods and Designs of his Providence in 
the Creation and Government of the World. Creation is absolutely and intirely out of 
our Depth, and beyond the Extent of our utmost Reach’.101 Convinced, therefore, of 
the primacy of Scripture and of Revelation (which The Analogy goes on to state even 
more compellingly, as we shall see), Butler insists that it is incumbent upon us to 
accept the ‘Incumbrances’ and ‘Inconveniencies’ of this life, and to hope for better in 
the one that is to come: 
 
Fear, Resentment, Compassion and others; of which there could be no such Occasion or 
Use in a perfect State: But in the present we should be exposed to greater Inconveniences 
without them … They are Incumbrances indeed, but such as we are obliged to carry about 
with us, through this various Journey of Life.102 
 
V. Towards a Conception of Society: Butler on Anger, Empathy and Friendship. 
 
Butler’s embracement and subsequent promotion of Anglicanism in Fifteen Sermons is 
a veritable keystone in his wider thought, since it indicates just how far he was willing 
to distance himself, intellectually speaking, from Old Dissent. Once again recalling 
Butler’s troubled Tewkesbury and Oxford years, for example, here we witnessed the 	
devotions’, in Walsh et al. (eds.), The Church of England c. 1689-1833, ‘Introduction’, p. 25. Butler 
would have likely encouraged this viewpoint, trusting that his sermons contributed to the spiritual 
wellbeing of the laity in similar fashion. 
99 E.g., in his appeals to the books of Revelation and Ecclesiasticus, which despite being non-canonical 
were also used in the Prayer Book. Butler quotes Ecclesiasticus at the end of Sermons IV & V, and 
Revelation at the end of Sermons VII & XV.  
100 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 274; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 280; emphasis added. The phrase ‘Temper 
of Mind’ is revisited by Butler, and becomes an important axiomatic premise of Butlerian orthodoxy. 
See esp. Chapter Four, Section V for more on this. 
101 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 294-5; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 301. 
102 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 155-6; Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 155-6; emphases added. 
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young student’s internal mental and spiritual breakdown, which ultimately manifested 
itself in his decision to approach Clarke and convert to the established Church. 
Tellingly, however, the present author contends that this theme continued to resonate 
strongly in the homiletic, instructional and devotional Fifteen Sermons, particularly via 
Butler’s efforts to convey his personal insight to those of his congregation who may be 
suffering similar pangs of doubt and distress to those which frequently troubled his 
own life.103 No sermon illustrates this more effectively than Sermon VIII ‘Upon 
Resentment’ – probably the most startling of the sermons in that it accepts, if not even 
encourages, the principle of anger as a key component in Butlerian meta-ethics.104  
  
In order to comprehend Butler’s sensitive handling of the principle of anger, first we 
must remind ourselves of the fact that part of Butler’s ‘pastoral function’ was to act as 
a spiritual guide to those who were perhaps lost, angry or disdainful about their 
position in life; their position in relation to others (within an historically adolescent 
commercial society); and/or finally their relationship to God. Hence, in a rare salutary 
nod to Hobbes (and we must also be mindful of Pufendorf’s influence here), Butler’s 
moral philosophy acknowledges—and is perhaps even grounded in the assumption—
that life is precarious and burdensome, that the human condition is ultimately one of 
‘chronic stress’.105 This is precisely what Butler constantly alludes to, then, via his 
frequent concessions that human existence is often punctuated by moments of 
immoderation (i.e., intemperance, temptation, indolence, dejection, pride, etc.).106 
Considered in this light, Butler accepts that, whilst anger is never condonable, on the 
very specific grounds of self-preservation and/or self-defence, it is at the very least 
understandable107 – a phenomenon is exemplified in Butler’s eyes, for example, by the 
case of the injured individual who, in a state of anger, immediately declares fault in 																																																																			
103 There is some evidence to suggest that Butler continued to suffer bouts of depression and isolation 
throughout his life. Tennant cites, e.g., his avoidance of Hume and Kames in 1737 and after (see 
following chapter), alongside the fact that he never made a speech in the House of Lords, as possible 
demonstrations of the ‘reserve of the shy and the maladroitness of the insecure’. Elsewhere Butler is 
described as ‘shy and un-self-confident’, ‘probably a lonely, disturbed and not very likeable man’, and 
that there was a certain ‘darkness and loneliness’ to his ‘inner life’, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, 
pp. 2, 124, 125, 142, 143.  
104 As Tennant puts it, whilst ‘Butler is acutely aware of human anger … as a theologian, [he] is not 
afraid of it’. Ibid., p. 55. 
105 Ibid., p. 58. Interestingly, this might be a rare case of Butler adopting a fragment of what 
Haakonssen & Whatmore call the ‘empirical Epicurean line, arguing from people’s lack of control over 
their world’, in ‘Commerce and Enlightenment’, p. 301.  
106 E.g., Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 22, 94, 125-6, 150, 220-1, 233-4. 
107 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 141; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 141.  
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the injurious, even though they may simply be exaggerating the latter’s so-called 
defect: 
 
Anger … or Hatred may be considered as another false Medium of viewing things, which 
always represents Characters and Actions much worse than they really are … [In such] 
Cases of Offence and Enmity, the whole Character and Behaviour is considered with an 
Eye to that particular Part which has offended us, and the whole Man appears monstrous, 
without any thing right or human in him. [However,] Resentment should surely at least be 
confined to that particular Part of the Behaviour which gave Offence; since the other Parts 
of a Man’s Life and Character stand just the same as they did before.108  
 
Because of situations such as these, then – situations that arise naturally in a naturally 
imperfect world – Butler thinks that even anger has its rightful place within the full 
range of affections requiring mediation through the conscience: 
 
It cannot be imagined, that we are required to love [our enemies] with any peculiar Kind of 
Affection … [But nevertheless, the injured party] ought to be affected towards the injurious 
Person in the same Way any good Men, uninterested in the Case, would be; if they had the 
same just Sense, which we have supposed the injured Person to have, of the Fault: After 
which there will yet remain real Good-will towards the Offender.109 
 
Hence, Butler thinks that anger plays the essential role of acting as a sort of aid to 
deliberation, so long as it does not manifest itself in any way ‘contrary to the Religion 
we profess, and to the Nature and Reason of the thing itself’.110 Furthermore, in 
Butler’s view, anger ought to be viewed as ‘a good Effect, notwithstanding it were 
much to be wished that Men would act from a better Principle, Reason and cool 
Reflection’.111 For if correctly channelled, Butler states that anger produces ‘Fellow-
feelings’ in humankind, which is one of those ‘common Bonds, by which Society is 
held together’.112  
 
A clear anti-Hobbesian statement, in essence, Butler’s point here is that in order for 
feelings of benevolence to predominate in any given society, first the individual’s 
cognition requires an antagonistic (though not dialectical, as we earlier noted) marker 																																																																			
108 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 171; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 171. In modern terms we tend to describe 
this as a kind of ‘defence mechanism’. 
109 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 168; Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 153, 169; emphases added. 
110 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 139; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 140. 
111 Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 153. 
112 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 144; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 144; emphasis added. This anticipates 
Tucker’s treatment of self-love. See esp. Chapter Five, Sections I & V. 
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against which to pit itself, and so as to become inherently perceptible. Hence, in the 
following cyclical example, Butler states that ‘anger’ which is mediated by 
‘benevolence’ (via the conscience) creates friendship and empathy within the 
individual [first stage]; which in turn transforms into legitimate anger when, for 
example, a desperate friend’s plight is seen as precarious, frustrating or unjust [second 
stage]; thus precipitating ‘fellow-feelings’/empathy within humankind [third stage]; 
and so the process begins anew again [first stage], and so on.113 Because of this, in 
typical fashion, Butler attempts to accommodate both the theological and 
psychological in his analysis of anger, by placing it within the Christian framework: 
‘… the Precepts to forgive, and to love our Enemies’, he claims, ‘do not relate to that 
general Indignation against Injury and the Authors of it, but [rather] to [fellow-
feelings]  … when raised by private or personal Injury’.114 Moreover, by doing so, 
Butler goes on to deny the very existence of intrinsic hatred since, again, for him the 
prospect of hatred (including self-hatred) is merely a self-deception – a type of 
sociopathy borne out of misapplied or defective inward reflection:  
 
[That] Mankind have ungoverned Passions which they will gratifie at any Rate, as well to 
the Injury of Others, as in Contradiction to known private Interest: But that as there is no 
such thing as Self-hatred, so neither is there any such thing as Ill-will in one Man towards 
another.115  
 
It is in this way, then, that Butler’s utilisation of anger becomes what is essentially the 
catalyst for his belief that friendship forms both the basis and core of modern 
commercial society, albeit somewhat counter-intuitively [omissions not carried over 
from 1726 struck out, 1729 additions italicised]:  
 
We … feel the same Kind of Satisfaction and Enjoyment (whatever would be the Degree of 
it) from this higher Acquaintance and Friendship, as we feel from common Friendships 
ones; the Intercourse being real, and the Persons equally present, in both Cases. We should 
have a more ardent Desire to be approved by his better Judgement, and a higher 
Satisfaction in that Approbation, than any thing of this Sort which could of the same Sort 
with what would be felt in respect to common Persons, or be wrought in us by their 
																																																																			
113 Once again, Tennant’s Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry has proven invaluable in clarifying Butler’s 
position on this matter, esp. pp. 58-9.  
114 Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 157; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 157; emphases added. This is a direct 
reference to Rom. Xiii. 9: ‘Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self’. 
115 Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 18-9; emphasis added.  
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Presence … remembering still that [God] is perfectly Good, and our Friend as well as our 
Governour.116  
 
Here, Butler’s emphasis on the fact that God is ‘our friend’ is an especially important 
addition to the 1729 edition, for it denotes that ‘friendship’ is both a temporal and 
eternal virtue; the ‘intercourse’ being equally ‘real’ and ‘eternally present’.117 In 
substantive terms, the implication of this is that Butler is extending a conception of 
Christianity that is at once inclusive, reciprocal and egalitarian; in a word, 
‘commercial’.118 This is one of the most striking features of Fifteen Sermons in that it 
relates to Butler’s broader theory that the complex (and by this Butler means 
something akin to the ‘messiness’ or ‘disorderliness’) of human affections are so 
numerous and so imperceptible within any given individual—and likewise again, but 
on a much larger scale when speaking of society—that from such ‘Uncertainty’, he 
concludes, ‘it cannot but be, that there will be different Opinions concerning Mankind, 
or more or less governed by Interest’.119 Indeed, this is precisely what Butler is 
referring to in the above-cited passage regarding God’s friendship when he speaks in 
terms of the ‘Degree’ of ‘Satisfaction and Enjoyment’ we each receive when 
contracting ‘higher Acquaintance[s] and Friendship[s]’ – Butler’s main point being 
that we are only obliged to give and receive in direct proportion to that which we are 
capable of giving and receiving, based upon the natural ‘Stint and Bound’120 of our 
individual (private) and collective (public) affections: 
 
[The] whole System, as I may speak, of Affections (including Rationality) which constitute 
the Heart, as this Word is used in Scripture and on moral Subjects, are each and all of them 
stronger in some [persons] than in others [… Therefore] The Case is here as in Scales: It is 
not one Weight, considered in itself, which determines whether the Scale shall ascend or 
descend; but this depends on the Proportion, which that one Weight hath to the other.121 
 
																																																																			
116 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 264-5; Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 270-1. 
117 Butler’s emphasis on the friendship between God and Man is an important extension of Cocceian 
and Witsian covenant theology. 
118 These terms may be considered as bywords for a type of ‘ethical democracy’ attributed to Butler by 
Tennant, in Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 73, 78, 106. Again, this is possibly a step too far.  
119 Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. xxvii. 
120 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 210; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 212. 
121 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 236-7; Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 242-3. Cf. Pufendorf’s utilisation of the 
scale argument with reference to the disparity between ‘Self-love and the other Passions …’ in Of the 
Law of Nature, II. III. XIII, & II. III. X. For the notion of proportional reciprocity between rich and poor 
in the context of Butler and Tucker’s espousal of charity, see also Conclusion, Sections I-II. 
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Consequently, Butler’s distinctive brand of commercial sociability is grounded in a 
fundamentally important analogy between, on the one side, social friendship amongst 
humans (closest perhaps to Grotius’s appetitus societatis, or Pufendorf’s ‘sociality’), 
and on the other the daily practice of loving God (αγαπη/love/agape); and once again 
we must stress that Butler’s emphasis here is on humanity’s ‘original frame and 
constitution’ (freewill), which is at liberty to express (outward persona) and/or 
entertain (inward persona) the full range and complex of social affections.122 Indeed it 
is this, Butler concludes, that makes us fully conscious, conscientious, rational, moral 
and ‘accountable’ agents. For though ‘A Machine’ may be ‘inanimate and passive’ he 
writes, on the other hand ‘we are Agents’: 
 
Our Constitution is put in our own Power. We are charged with it: and therefore are 
accountable for any Disorder or Violation of it … And … this our Nature, i.e. Constitution 
is adapted to Virtue, as from the Idea of a Watch it appears, that its Nature, i.e. Constitution 
of System, is adapted to measure Time.123 
 
Hence in Butler’s scheme, we see that the Christian precepts of ‘love of God’ and 
‘love of neighbour’ are deemed to be self-evidently coterminous, whilst benevolence 
acts as the prime reflective principle by which to unify the two – though, of course, 
always under the direction of reason and conscience. Hence, when Butler states that 
the Christian religion ‘does not demand new Affections, but only claims the Direction 
of those you already have, those Affections you daily feel’, here he is claiming that it 
is in fact the orthodox Anglican faith that is the literal embodiment of the Church 
militant here in earth. 124  To put it yet another way, Butler insists that in an 
increasingly complex, metropolitan and commercialised world, the role of the 
established Church is to accept that ‘friendship’, i.e., the extension and fulfilment of 
‘Mankind acting … suitably to their Nature’, is the interconnecting basis for a 
flourishing society.125 In tandem, then, with his friend Bishop Berkeley, Butler insists 																																																																			
122 As we shall see, this notion of a ‘complex’ of affections resurfaces in Butler’s Lockean-based 
dissertation Of Personal Identity, appended to The Analogy, and in Tucker’s later observation that there 
are a ‘great Difference of Talents’ and a ‘wonderful Variety of Strata in the human Mind’, which he 
then goes on to claim is part-epiphenomenal and part-facilitative of economic activity itself. See Four 
Tracts, Two Sermons (1776), p. 67. For a reiteration of the ‘sociality-agape’ formula, again in the 
context of Butler and Tucker’s espousal of the Christian virtue of Caritas, see Conclusion, Sections I-II. 
123 Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. x. 
124 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 269; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 276. The ‘Church militant here in earth’ is 
the opening phrase to the Intercession in the Communion Service of the Prayer Book. 
125 Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. xv. As Butler later puts it in The Analogy, pp. 316-7: ‘Examples of 
Gratitude, and the Cultivation of Friendship, [is] of general Good to the World’.  
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that it is in the interests of the Church, if not even the Church’s fundamental clerical 
duty, to foster this state of affairs.126  
 
VI. Concluding Remarks: The ‘Cements of Society’. 
 
Having charted the background to and development of Butler’s philosophy in this 
chapter, we can clearly see that religion, and more specifically the Anglican religion, 
becomes an indispensible component of, if not even a prerequisite for, the Butlerian 
conception of commercial society. By accepting that commercial society is a reality of 
modern existence, and yet by also acknowledging and utilising 
Hobbesian/Mandevillean terminology whilst at the same time attempting to turn it on 
its head, Butler was endeavouring to reformulate the ‘interested-
disinterested/sociability-self-love’ conundrum in such a way that it was consistent with 
the tenets of the Anglican faith. Accordingly, within Butler’s scheme, even 
traditionally ‘unchristian’ principles such as anger and resentment have an important 
role to play in contributing to the fabric of society, in the sense that they assist humans 
in their drive towards what we now refer to as a form of  ‘social consensus’.127 
Bearing this in mind, one of Butler’s most important claims in Fifteen Sermons is to 
insist that the apparent disparity between sociability and self-love, self-interest and 
benevolence, is not some sort of vast vacuous no man’s land. Rather, it was a 
conceptual space mediated by the God-given faculty of conscience, and thereby fully 
consistent with the principles of the Christian religion – ‘it being evident’, Butler 
reiterates once again in Sermon XII ‘Upon the Love of Our Neighbour’, ‘that the Love 
of Others, which includes in it all Virtues, must necessarily be in due Proportion to the 
																																																																			
126 Butler’s view that the Church is the prime institution responsible for promoting and nurturing 
friendship within commercial society is what sets him apart from the Scottish moralists, who are far less 
inclined to emphasise, or in most cases even acknowledge, the role of Christianity in this scheme. See, 
e.g., Allan Silver, ‘Friendship in Commercial Society: Eighteenth-Century Social Theory and Modern 
Sociology’, American Journal of Sociology, 95/6, (May, 1990), pp. 1474-1504, esp. pp. 1479-1485; 
Lisa Hill & Peter McCarthy, ‘Hume, Smith and Ferguson: Friendship in commercial society’, Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2/4, (1999), pp. 33-49. For Berkeley’s similar 
emphasis on fostering commercial friendship, see Scott Breuninger, Recovering Bishop Berkeley: Virtue 
and Society in the Anglo-Irish Context, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), Chaps. 3, 5, 7. Cf. Chapter Two, p. 
74, & below, p. 116, n. 135. 
127 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 144; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 144: ‘anger is by no means Malice. No, it is 
Resentment against Vice and Wickedness … it is one of the common Bonds, by which Society is held 
together’; emphasis added.  
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Love of ourselves’.128  
  
As we have seen, then, although in Butler’s view self-love and sociability may appear 
to be opposites, in truth they are never in direct opposition with one another  (or 
dialectical). 129  Consequently, Butler considers each to be equally important 
components of the fully integrated, and therefore ethical and rational, human being: 
i.e., of the individual who is fully aware, firstly, of the importance of the conscience, 
secondly of practicing proper reflection, and thirdly of mediating between their private 
and public persona. In consequence, for Butler, to be ethically good is simply to be a 
social creature – not necessarily in relation to any overt scale of utility, à la 
Mandeville or in the case of the later classical economists, but rather simply because it 
innately is, as the ‘state of the Case requires’ of it.130 Conversely, to live in solipsistic 
isolation and in a constant state of selfishness is to exist in a state of desolation, 
beyond the ethical sphere itself:  
 
Thus, when Benevolence is said to be the Sum of Virtue, it is not spoken of as a blind 
Propension, but as a Principle in reasonable Creatures … to be directed by their Reason: 
For Reason and Reflection come into our Notion of a moral Agent … It will teach us, that 
the Care of some Persons … is particularly committed to our Charge by Nature and 
Providence; that there are other Circumstances … which require that we do good to some, 
preferably to others. Reason, considered meerly as subservient to Benevolence, as assisting 
to produce the greatest Good, will teach us to have particular Regard to these Relations and 
Circumstances; because it is plainly for the Good of the World that they should be 
regarded.131  
 
																																																																			
128 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 239. 
129 There is a strong case to be made here that Butler’s formula is of Pufendorfian origin. Cf., The Law 
of Nature and of Nations, II, III, § xvi: ‘Self-love and Sociableness ought by no means to be made 
opposites’. 
130 Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. xxix. As we have seen, the irony here is that Butler was often a 
melancholic, isolated figure, much like Shaftesbury, although surely not a selfish man. However, during 
the 1740s when he and Secker grew more distant, Secker claimed that Butler was indeed selfish. See 
Autobiography of Thomas Secker, p. 22 & Ingram, Religion, Reform and Modernity, p. 53: ‘[Butler] 
was a serious, & in Matters of Money a generous Man: but in other respects too selfish … expecting 
everyone to befriend & serve Him; but seldom thinking himself qualified or obliged to serve others. 
And that selfish disregard increased in him greatly from his time of frequenting the Court. This 
Coldness of his produced a considerable Degree of it in me also towards Him’.  
131 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 246-7; Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 253-4. Butler’s appeal to ‘the greatest 
Good’ hints at his espousal of utility, and probably leans more towards the Ciceronian relationship 
between honestum and utile (the good and the useful), which is then taken up and developed more fully 
in Tucker’s economic thought. It is possible too that Butler was borrowing here from Hutcheson’s 
statement that ‘That Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the Greatest Numbers’, in 
An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue [1725] (4th Ed., London, 1738), p. 181.  
However, for Butler, utility is always of secondary importance within his overall scheme. 
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As we noted earlier, according to Butler the communalism of society was best 
symbolised by the tenets of the established Church, in that he believed them to be the 
literal embodiments of the Church militant here in earth. It is by these means, then, 
that Butler attempted to bridge the gap between the temporal and the divine, so as to 
ensure that ‘love of thyself’ and ‘love of others’ naturally followed, although was 
clearly ancillary to, ‘love of God’:  
 
As the whole Attention of Life should be to obey [God’s] Commands, so the highest 
Enjoyment of it must arrive from the Contemplation of [His] Character, and our Relation to 
it, from a Consciousness of his Favour and Approbation, and from the Exercise of those 
Affections towards Him which could not but be raised from his Presence.132 
 
This, then, is Butler’s tripartite apparatus of human conscience, leading the complex of 
individuals and all their affections inexorably towards feelings of ‘Joy, Gratitude, 
Reverence, Love, Trust and [mutual] Dependence’; in turn augmenting Butler’s notion 
of empathy or ‘Fellow-feeling’ within humankind, which ‘each individual has in 
behalf of the whole Species, as well as of himself’, so as to render the notion of 
‘society’—indeed commercial society—inherently possible.133  
  
According to Butler, then, the practices of the Christian faith –  ‘from whence arises 
our strongest Obligation to Benevolence’ – clearly trumped the immediate concerns of 
self-love.134 Rather, in Butler’s scheme, ‘self-love’ and ‘love of others’ naturally 
coincided, so as to form what he coined ‘the Cements of Society’.135 This metaphor—
perhaps the most vigorously Stoic, and therefore anti-Hobbesian and anti-																																																																			
132 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 266; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 272. 
133 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 144; Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 144. 
134 Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 288. 
135 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 18; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 17. Jon Elster has come across the phrase, 
using it as the title for his The Cement of Society: A Survey of Social Order, (Cambridge, 1989); 
however, he does not appear to acknowledge Butler within its pages. Contemporaneously, the work 
most similar in sentiment to Butler’s ‘Cements of Society’ is Berkeley’s originally untitled essay, 
written thirteen-years prior to Butler’s sermons as a contribution to Steele’s short-lived The Guardian 
(London, 1713), and subsequently titled ‘The Bond of Society’, in A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (eds.), 
The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, Vol. 7, (NY, 1948-56). Similarly steeped in 
Newtonianism and neo-Stoicism, in this essay Berkeley seeks to explain the natural affinity and 
‘gravitational attraction’ between the natural and moral, material and social, worlds. It is here, then, that 
we discern a possible influence on Butler’s ‘anger-empathy-friendship’ formula, since it is likely he was 
fully aware of Berkeley’s work. For further discussion, see David E. Leary, ‘Berkeley’s Social Theory: 
Context and Development, in Journal of the History of Ideas, 38/4, (Oct-Dec 1977), pp. 635-49; 
Breuninger, Recovering Bishop Berkeley, Chap 3: ‘Science and Sociability: Berkeley’s “Bonds of 
Society”, pp. 35-52; with references to Berkeley’s neo-Stoic incorporation of oikeiosis at pp. 39, 40, 44, 
45, 46, 47, 49.  
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Mandevillean statement housed within the entirety of Fifteen Sermons—is a 
cumulative representation of Butler’s meta-ethical thinking from the earliest days of 
his educative youth right down to the publication of his first major systematic work of 
philosophy.136 Replete within the phrase are the Butlerian reformulations of the Stoic 
conceptions of benevolence, sociability, oikeiosis and cosmopolitan providence; and 
as we argued in our opening chapter, this adds weightier dimensions to the present 
study in that it repositions Butler – and even more so Tucker, as we shall see  – away 
from the fringes of contemporary intellectual history discourse, and instead towards 
the epicentre of a nexus of scholarship that is incredibly vast, though as yet 
underdeveloped.137  
  
As we shall see in the chapters to come, these themes were to be developed by 
Butler’s followers, and not the least by Tucker himself, in ways that Butler ultimately 
did not live to see. This having being said, it is incumbent upon us to turn now to an 
examination of Butler’s initial influence among his contemporaries and thence to his 
introduction to Tucker, so that we may begin to gauge the extent of the latter’s 
indebtedness to the former.  The novel suggestion we wish to make at this stage, 
however, and which is to be borne in mind throughout the remainder of this study, is 
that Butler’s important phrase, the ‘Cements of Society’, was essentially a conceptual 
prototype of, if not even a euphemism for, Tucker’s political economy.  	
																																																																			
136 As Lindberg writes in ‘Stoicism in Political Humanism and Natural Law’, (Un)masking the Realities 
of Power, p. 73: ‘… Stoic self-control combined with Christian humbleness functioned in wider circles 
as social cement, providing discipline as well as comfort’. 
137 This is not intended as a statement of criticism, but rather of recognising potential. The vast corpora 
of literature on these themes are summarised in Chapter One, with a statement of Butler and Tucker’s 
importance in the concluding remarks, Section VI.  
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Chapter Four: 
 
In Defence of Orthodoxy: The Analogy of Religion and the 
Methodist Controversy. 
 
 
In Fifteen Sermons, Butler’s rechristening of Mandevillean phraseology facilitated a 
paradigmatic shift in the language of eighteenth-century moral discourse. With 
Mandeville standing at one end of the spectrum and Law at the other, Butler’s line of 
Anglican ‘middling’ reasoning came to influence a number of important thinkers who 
did not necessarily hold a firm foothold in either camp. As intimated earlier, one of the 
most important early admirers of Butler was the neo-Stoic Francis Hutcheson.1 A 
thinker who, like Butler, came from Presbyterian stock and who had also corresponded 
with Clarke during his student days,2 throughout his youth Hutcheson had likewise been 
influenced by the natural law theories of Grotius and Pufendorf, though he also took a 
keen interest in that pioneer of eighteenth-century Scottish jurisprudence, Gershom 
Carmichael (1672-1729). 3  Yet despite these various influences and connections, 
Hutcheson was above all a self-proclaimed Shaftesburian, and though he clearly 
regretted Shaftesbury’s defamations of the Christian faith, Hutcheson nevertheless 
declared that the Lord’s ethics ought to be ‘esteemed while any Reflection remains 
among Men’. 4 In fact, so widely-known was Hutcheson’s devotion to Shaftesbury that 
the Irish Protestant and anti-Deist, Philip Skelton (1707-87) later accused the former of 
merely ‘refining’ on the latter’s ideas. 5  ‘My Lord Shaftesbury, and his imitator 
Hutcheson,’ Skelton noted scornfully in The Candid Reader (1741), ‘have the present 
Generation of Obscurists entirely to themselves’.6  																																																																			
1 See Chapter One, p. 40. 
2 For Hutcheson’s letters to Clarke see William Leechman’s (1706-85) preface to Hutcheson’s A System 
of Moral Philosophy, 2 vols., (London, 1755), I, p. v; the originals have not survived. 
3 See Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, Chap 2: ‘Natural law and moral realism: The 
civic humanist synthesis in Francis Hutcheson and George Turnbull’, pp. 63-99. For Carmichael – who 
was a predecessor of Hutcheson on the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, a position created in 1727, 
and which Adam Smith would eventually hold – consult James Moore & Michael Silverstone, ‘Gershom 
Carmichael and the natural jurisprudential tradition in eighteenth-century Scotland’, in Hont & Ignatieff 
(eds.), Wealth and Virtue, pp. 73-87 & Robertson, Case for Enlightenment, pp. 145-5, where Robertson 
notes that it was Carmichael who originally attempted to supress, as best he could, the Augustinian-
Epicurean-Baylean-Mandevillean synthesis.  
4 Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, ‘Preface’, p. xix.  
5 Philip Skelton, Deism Revealed, 2 Vols., [1749] (2nd Ed., London, 1751), II, p. 234. 
6 Skelton, The Candid Reader, (Dublin, 1744), p. 28. 
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As we shall see, Skelton was certainly not alone in drawing parallels between 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Yet having read the first edition of Fifteen Sermons in 
1726, Hutcheson felt compelled to modify a selection of his ideas first propounded in 
the Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), particularly his 
belief in the supremacy of feeling, instinct and benevolence above all other human 
faculties.7  Consequently, in Hutcheson’s ensuing accounts of human nature, he began 
instead to elevate the role of conscience within his scheme, praising Butler by declaring 
that the clergyman’s enterprise was allied to his own. ‘[It] is a good omen of something 
still better on this Subject to be expected in the learned World’, he wrote in An Essay on 
the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections (1728), ‘that Mr. Butler, in his 
Sermons at the Rolls Chapel, has done so much justice to the wise and good Order of 
our Nature, [so] that … Gentlemen … seem convinc’d of a moral Sense’.8 Indeed, so 
impressed was Hutcheson with Butler that in after years he and the Anglican clergyman 
are rarely mentioned in isolation from one another. As Hutcheson’s biographer put it 
regarding the affinities between and widespread appeal of the two thinkers: 
‘Hutcheson’s influence passed directly into men; [whereas] Butler’s remained in his 
books’.9 Nevertheless it is also important to note, as Rivers has done, that ‘[Hutcheson] 
faded in the second half of the nineteenth-century, whereas [Butler] continued to grow 
right through the nineteenth’.10 
  
Whatever the precise relationship between Butler and Hutcheson (and we shall touch 
upon this subject again towards the end of this chapter), Hutcheson’s decision to praise 
the Anglican clergyman prompted a flurry of likeminded endorsements from a number 
of intellectuals based in Scotland. Consequently, from the 1730s onwards three 
important figures largely disassociated from the Anglican Church took a keen interest in 
Butler’s ideas: namely, Henry Home Lord Kames, David Hume and Adam Smith.11 Of 
the three, Hume was (and remains) notorious for his religious scepticism, thereby 																																																																			
7 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, p. 163. 
8 Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with illustrations upon 
the Moral Sense, (London, 1728), p. xix. 
9  William Robert Smith, Francis Hutcheson: His Life, Teaching, and Position in the History of 
Philosophy, (Bristol, 1992; facsimile of 1st Ed., 1900), p. 148. Cf. Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, 
II, pp. 163-4. 
10 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, p. 164. 
11 Smith was still in his teenage years during most of the 1730s and the early 1740s – his interest in Butler 
came later then, as we shall shortly see. 
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securing his reputation for being an atheist or infidel. Conversely, Kames and Smith 
were far more sympathetic of the view that theo-philosophical speculation and ethics 
were intertwined (which is also known as the ‘double-truth’). 12  As a trio, each 
concurred in various degrees with Butler’s psychologically-orientated analyses of 
human nature, whilst at the same time approving of the clergyman’s disavowal of the 
overly-prescriptive, casuistic and Augustinian arguments which characterised 
Mandeville’s and Law’s views.13 Indeed, so convinced was Hume that he and Butler’s 
philosophies were in some ways akin that in the build up to the publication of his first 
major work, the Treatise of Human Nature in 1739, he sought introductions to the 
clergyman over a period of several years, albeit unsuccessfully.14 Likewise, when in 
1737 Home (who did not become Lord Kames until 1752) wrote to Butler ‘from an 
earnest desire … to have some doubts removed … [about] the Evidences of Natural and 
Revealed Religion’, 
 
Dr Butler … answered his letter with utmost politeness, and endeavoured, as far as he could, 
by writing, to satisfy Mr. Home’s inquiries, but modestly declined a personal meeting, on the 
score of his own natural diffidence and reserve, his being unaccustomed to oral controversy, 
and his fear that the cause of truth might thence suffer from the unskillfulness of its 
advocate.15  
 
Although both Hume and Home appeared to have been thwarted, then, in their private 
overtures, this did not prevent the pair from acknowledging Butler’s importance in 
public – just as Hutcheson had done. In the Essays on the Principles of Morality and 
Natural Religion (1751), for example, Home described ‘DOCTOR Butler’ as a ‘manly 
and acute writer’, who ‘hath gone farther than any other, to assign a just foundation for 																																																																			
12 For an account of the difficulties regarding the sceptical unbelief of Hume on the one side and Kames 
and Smith on the other, see Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, pp. 257-62. Cf. Winch, Riches and 
Poverty, Chap. 2, where Winch discusses Smith’s reluctance to publish Hume’s more incendiary works 
after the latter’s death. 
13 For Law’s ‘mystical’ opposition to the ‘rational’ Newtonianism of Butler’s mentor, Clarke, and thence 
to Butler himself, see Young, Religion and Enlightenment, pp. 133-4. This resurfaces in Wesley’s 
disagreements with Butler, see esp. Sections V & VII of this chapter below. 
14 Beiser, Sovereignty of Reason, p. xi, states that the ‘publication of Hume’s Treatise … marks the close 
of the English Enlightenment in its early classical phase’.  
15 Bartlett, Memoirs of Butler, pp. 80-1. Here, Bartlett dates the correspondence between Hume and 
Kames regarding Butler as follows: 2 December 1737; 4 March 1738; 13 February 1738, and 13 June 
1742. This account conflicts with Ian Simpson Ross’s view that Butler did in fact meet Kames in London 
in 1737, see his Lord Kames and the Scotland of his Day, (Oxford; Clarendon, 1972), p. 35. Cf. Rivers, 
Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, p. 243. Nevertheless, even if this were the case, Butler would surely 
have agreed to a meeting only very reluctantly, which, either way, is yet another example of his 
‘evasiveness and reticence’ discussed in our previous chapter, p. 109. n. 103. Cf. also Tennant, Butler’s 
Philosophy and Ministry, p. 124; Robertson, Case for Enlightenment, p. 302. 
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moral duty’.16 Likewise, in the Sketches of the History of Man (1774), published over 
two decades after Butler’s death, Kames redeployed the Butlerian phrase ‘Cements of 
Society’, and declared it to be a collective noun for the foundational laws of nature:  
 
The final cause that presents itself first to view respects man considered as an accountable 
being … This branch of our nature is the corner-stone of the criminal law … a strong cement 
to society. If we were not accountable to beings, those connected by blood or by country, 
would be no less shy and reserved, than if they were mere strangers to each other.17  
 
Similarly in the case of Hume, in a famous and oft-quoted line from the introduction to 
the Treatise of Human Nature, he placed Butler alongside Mandeville, Locke, 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson as one of those ‘late philosophers in England who have 
begun to put the science of man on a new footing’. Again, then, as Rivers has shown, 
Hume was particularly keen to impress both Hutcheson and Butler, ‘the two most 
important living philosophers in his youth’, meaning that during the early stages of his 
career he constantly invoked their work as a basis for his own developing view that a 
‘science of politics’ was necessary and, moreover, beneficial to society and humanity at 
large.18  
  
Alongside Kames and Hume, it is well to note at this stage Smith’s likeminded 
recognition and endorsement of Butler, particularly in the first of his two major works, 
TMS, published in 1758. Simultaneously praising and lambasting Mandeville as a 
‘lively and humorous’ though ‘coarse and rustic’ writer,19 Smith complimented Butler 
as a ‘late ingenious and subtle philosopher’ (TMS was first published six-years after 
Butler’s death), and, in a section entitled ‘Of licentious systems’, he went on to 
reformulate the ‘Mandeville-Butler dispute’ in terms of ‘partiality-impartiality’, thereby 																																																																			
16 Henry Home, Lord Kames, Essays on the principles of morality and natural religion. In two parts, 
(Edinburgh, 1751), p. 61. Cf. Carey, Locke, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, p. 195, n. 143. 
17 Kames, Sketches of the History of Man, 4 Vols., (Dublin Ed., 1774-5), IV., VI. ‘FINAL CAUSES of the 
forgoing Laws of Nature’, p. 39; emphasis added. Besides Kames’ Essays, this work follows Butler in 
placing the source of human knowledge in something akin to conscience rather than reason, which Kames 
calls the ‘sense’; furthermore, Kames believes this to be consistent with natural religion since, for him, 
morality is derived from nature.  
18E.g., Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals [1751], (New York, Prometheus, 2004), p. 
139: ‘I esteem the man whose self-love, by whatever means, is so directed as to give him concern for 
others, and render him serviceable to society’. Cf. ‘Appendix II: Of Self-love’, pp. 137-145. For Rivers’ 
useful narrative, see Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, pp. 241-3. Another indispensible account of 
Hume’s admiration for Butler during this period is Garrett’s ‘Reasoning about Morals from Butler to 
Hume’, in Savage (ed.), Philosophy and Religion in Enlightenment Britain, pp. 169-86.  
19 Leslie Stephen and Russell Nieli describe Mandeville as a ‘prurient’ writer in this context. See Stephen, 
History of English Thought, II, p. 28; Nieli, ‘Commercial Society and Christian Virtue’, p. 604. 
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utilising the philosophical contrast between the two terms as a basis for his own 
system. 20  Put very briefly, here Smith’s strategy was to describe Mandeville’s 
‘licentious system’ as that which fashioned the ‘indulgent and partial spectator’: i.e., the 
individual who only yielded to the governance of a higher political authority because 
their vanity had been appealed to. Conversely, however, Smith’s Butler-inspired 
‘impartial spectator’, the individual of genuine ‘self-command’ who was capable of 
looking beyond their narrow self-interest and instead towards the public good, was the 
figure truly worthy of emulation.21 As the most recent editor of TMS Knud Haakonssen 
notes, then, Smith’s conception of the ‘impartial spectator’ in this, and in other sections 
of the work, positioned the Scotch philosopher ‘very close to … Butler’s account of 
conscience’. Furthermore, in Haakonssen’s estimation this can be evinced above all in 
the following passage which, though lengthy, is worth citing in full because it 
accentuates the remarkable overlap between both thinkers [interpolations and 
italicisations provided for clarity and emphasis]: 
 
Upon whatever we suppose that our moral faculties are founded, whether upon a certain 
modification of reason, upon an original instinct, called a moral sense, or upon some other 
principle of our nature [i.e., the Butlerian notion of conscience], it cannot be doubted, that 
they were given us [i.e., by the deity] for the direction of our conduct in this life. They carry 
along with them the most evident badges of this authority, which denote that they were set 
up within us to be the supreme arbiters of all our actions, to superintend all our senses, 
passions, and appetites, and to judge how far each of them was either to be indulged or 
restrained … No other faculty or principle of action judges of any other. Love does not 
judge of resentment, nor resentment of love. Those two passions may be opposite to one 
another, but cannot, with any propriety, be said to approve or disapprove of one another [i.e., 
a reiteration of the Butlerian suggestion that existence is unitary rather than dialectical]22 … 
Every sense is supreme over its own objects … Each of those senses judges in the last resort 
of its own objects … The very essence of each of those qualities consists in its being fitted to 
please the sense to which it is addressed [i.e., ‘Every thing is what it is, and not another 
Thing … what the state of the Case Requires’]23. It belongs to our moral faculties … how far 
every other principle of our nature ought either to be indulged or restrained. What is 
agreeable to our moral faculties, is fit, and right, and proper to be done; the contrary wrong, 
unfit, and improper [i.e., ‘The Goodness or Badness of Actions does not arise from hence, 																																																																			
20 Smith, TMS [1758], Haakonssen (ed.), pp. 53, 363-4. Cf. Chapter One, p. 42. 
21 Ibid., VI. II. IV: ‘Of licentious systems’, pp. 361-71; Cf. Waterman, Christian Theology and Political 
Economy, p. 112: ‘the ‘final (1790) recension of TMS remains consistent with Butler’s treatment of self-
love, and differ chiefly in omitting any reference to Dominical command’. Deferring once again to 
Rivers, she claims that Smith follows Marcus Aurelius, ‘Shaftesbury, Butler, and Kames in developing 
the role of the impartial spectator’, in Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, pp. 260, 305. The neo-Stoic 
inferences here are stark, for ‘the impartial spectator’ surely corresponds in part with the Stoic notion of 
apatheia, i.e., ‘things indifferent’ or ‘equanimity’ – a point advanced, to be sure, in Miller, ‘Hercules at 
the Crossroads …’, pp. 186-9; cf. Chapter One, pp. 42-3. 
22 Cf. Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. xxix, & Chapter Three, p. 99. 
23 Cf. Ibid. 
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that the Epithet, interested or disinterested, may be applied to them’]24 … The very words, 
right, wrong, fit, improper, graceful, unbecoming, mean only what pleases or displeases 
those faculties.25 
 
 
As can be seen, then, the examples of Hutcheson, Kames, Hume and Smith are 
extremely instructive in that they provide telling reflections of the transposition of 
Mandevillean and Butlerian themes into what would later become Scottish (and 
supposedly secularising) tools of eighteenth-century moral theory and political 
economy. Yet if we briefly recall the introduction to this study, there we touched upon 
the fact that Tucker was well acquainted with the Scottish moralists in his own right, 
since Smith housed many of Tucker’s tracts within his private library;26 and yet even 
perhaps more significantly, Hume and Kames were to become correspondents of Tucker 
in the years following Butler’s death. 
   
In light of all that has been discussed in the intervening period, the suggestion we wish 
to make at the outset of this chapter is that it is entirely plausible, indeed entirely likely, 
that Tucker’s economic ideas were taken seriously among the Scottish moralists 
precisely because of his earlier connections with the vaunted bishop. In doing so, the 
present author concurs with B. W. Young’s observation that examples of intellectual 
exchange such as these constitute important microcosmic demonstrations of what he 
calls the ‘simultaneous kinship and distance’ existing between English and Scottish 
varieties of enlightenment.27  Yet where this study attempts to build on Young’s 
statement, and to contribute to extant scholarship in the process, is to demonstrate the 
fact that it was in fact Butler’s authority—however reluctant he was to provide it, and in 
spite of the fact that he did not live to witness his own far-reaching influence—that was 
fundamentally important to this particular exchange.  
  
Having advanced these claims, the purpose of the present chapter is essentially two-																																																																			
24 Cf. Ibid. 
25 Smith, TMS, Haakonssen (ed.), pp. 191-2. For Haakonssen’s suggestion regarding Butler’s influence on 
Smith, see p. 191 n. 54, where he claims that the present excerpt mirrors, above all, Sermon II ‘Upon 
Human Nature’ of Fifteen Sermons. For the historical context to the publication and reception of TMS, 
see Haakonssen’s useful editorial introduction. Cf. Viner’s Role of Providence in the Social Order, pp. 
77-85, which also treats Smith’s TMS along similarly Stoic lines, although no mention is made of Butler. 
26 See Introduction, p. 13 above. For a comprehensive list of Tucker’s works that Smith owned see 
Mizuta, Smith’s Library, pp. 147-8.  
27 Young, ‘Christianity, Commerce and the Canon’, p. 395. 
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fold, then. Firstly, it intends to build upon the previous chapter’s account of Fifteen 
Sermons by surveying the enlargement and development of Butler’s theo-philosophical 
thought in The Analogy (1736), wherein his focus shifts towards a more refined and yet 
forceful iteration of the Anglican faith, and of the relationship between natural and 
revealed religion. Crucially, then, the second strategy of this chapter is to utilise both 
Butlerian texts as a means of drawing Tucker’s theology into discussion, demonstrating 
above all that Tucker’s understanding and expressions of the Christian faith were 
shaped by Butler in such a way that he became, in effect, the bishop’s most faithful 
follower.28 To this end, we begin with a biographical introduction to Tucker’s early life 
up until his initial meeting with Butler in 1739, before turning to discussion of The 
Analogy itself. Thereafter, our focus shifts to Butler and Tucker’s brushes with the 
earliest manifestations of Methodism in the late 1730s and early 1740, which is treated 
in four distinct stages. Firstly, via an examination of Tucker’s public dispute with 
George Whitefield in 1739; secondly, via Butler’s private meetings with John Wesley 
later in the same year; thirdly, via an account of Tucker’s Principles of Methodism 
published in 1742; and lastly, via discussion of the historical connotations surrounding 
the clash between ‘mystical’ evangelism and ‘rational’ latitudinarianism in the 
eighteenth century. Having done this, the chapter comes to a close with a compelling 
summation of Butler’s theological influence over Tucker – which it is to be hoped will 
act as suitable preparation for a fuller investigation of Tucker’s economics proper in 
Chapter Five and beyond; at which point some of the important arguments and 
influences of the Scottish Enlightenment will be reincorporated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																																			
28 In doing so, the present study attempts to go a step further than Waterman, and to a lesser extent 
Tucker’s biographers, who acknowledge but do not sufficiently develop the argument that Tucker 
adopted a ‘Butlerian view of the human condition’, which he subsequently ‘employed in specifically 
economic discourse’; this citation in Waterman, Political Economy and Christian Theology, pp. 111-2. 
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I. Introduction: Tucker’s Early Life and Meeting With Butler. 
 
Most biographical sketches and obituary notices claim that Tucker was born in 1712. It 
was however on 28th November 1713 that he came into the world, a child of Welsh 
peasant stock in the small town of Laugharne, Carmarthenshire.29 Tucker spoke little of 
his boyhood years, at one point confessing that he despised genealogical lore as a result 
of his maiden aunt repeatedly foisting it upon him during his youth.30 Nevertheless, it is 
possible that Tucker’s permanent hostility towards Jacobitism may have been fashioned 
during this early period of his life, for the inhabitants of Aberystwith, Cardiganshire, 
whence his family moved when he was still very young, were bitterly divided between 
the House of Stuart and the House of Hanover. In adulthood Tucker was to ally himself 
with the latter.31  
  
By all accounts, Tucker’s father was extremely conscious of his son’s well being. 
Accordingly, Josiah Tucker senior ensured that the younger Tucker received an 
extremely good education. Upon coming of age, he was initially sent to school in 
Ruthin, Denbighshire, north-eastern Wales, where he displayed a particular aptitude for 
the classics. He then matriculated at St. John’s College, Oxford in January 1733, under 
the category of ‘pleb’ according to the Alumni Oxonienses.32 There Tucker received his 
Bachelor of Arts in 1736, Master of Arts in 1739 and Doctor of Divinity in 1755. 
Contemporary admirers noted that he was an individual of robust health, for some 
accounts have comes down to us, perhaps apocryphally, claiming that he walked the one 
hundred and fifty mile journey annually from his home in Wales to Oxford. Apparently, 
when in one year his father attempted to provide him with the family’s only horse, the 
young Tucker refused it. Having ensured that the beast was ‘accordingly returned’, 
noted the author of Public Characters in 1799, the year of Tucker’s death, ‘our student, 
																																																																			
29 In Gloucester Public Library, in a letter to [Dr. William] Adams [c. 1706-89], Nov. 14, 1776, Tucker 
writes that that he will be sixty-three years old, i.e., complete his ‘grand-climacteric’, on the 28th of that 
month, meaning that he must have been born in 1713. For a full list of biographical sources on Tucker’s 
life and works, see Introduction, p. 12, n. 1. 
30 Gloucester Public Library, ‘Tucker Letters’, Tucker to Dr. Adams, 6 June 1779. 
31 Biography Mirrour, (London, 1789), pp. 47-8. 
32 It is interesting to note that Tucker was an ‘establishment pleb’, whilst Butler a ‘dissenting commoner’, 
perhaps indicative of the era’s increasing ‘social mobility’. This emphasis on the period’s social mobility 
has been noted by Anthony Russell, The Clerical Profession, (London, SPCK, 1980), p. 31 & Geoffrey 
Holmes, Augustan England: Professions, State and Society, 1680-1730, (London, 1982), pp. 15-8. 
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for the remainder of the time he continued at the University, actually trudged backwards 
and forwards, with his baggage at his back!’33  
  
Unfortunately, there is little reliable information to go on regarding Tucker’s time at 
Oxford. His steadfastness must have served him well, however, for a number of reputed 
individuals, ranging from Secker and Smith to Edward Gibbon (1737-94), and, as we 
have already seen, Butler himself amongst others, remarked that it was an intellectually 
redundant, dull and lifeless institution.34 In Book V of WN, for example, Smith wrote of 
his Oxford tenure that ‘the greater part of the publick professors have, for these many 
years, given up altogether even the pretence of teaching’, and in the corresponding view 
of the Oxford historian C. E. Mallet, eighteenth-century Oxford was a ‘world of drab 
ideals … where scholars disinclined for study encountered teachers as indifferent as 
themselves […] dreamers found enthusiasm discouraged, education deadened’.35 Tucker 
probably would have agreed with some, if not all, of these sentiments. For in order to 
combat this rumoured educative lethargy, many years later he proposed donating fifty 
pounds annually for the rest of his life as a prize to the most gifted graduate students.36 
Nevertheless, there are also two further points worth mentioning here with regard to 
Tucker’s Oxford education. The first of these relates to Rivers’ claim that within the 
English universities, the study of reason was elevated above the moral teaching that was 
far more prevalent in Scotland and in the dissenting academies. A corollary of this, then, 
is the extent to which Shaftesburian and/or Hutchesonian thought may or may not be 
said to have infiltrated the Oxford syllabus. And yet since Rivers claims that their 
influence was only ‘of a limited kind’, the important implication of this is that Tucker’s 
																																																																			
33 Alexander Stephens, Public Characters of 1798-9, (London, 2nd Ed., 1799), p. 170. 
34 For Butler’s opinion on Oxford, see [Butler’s seventh letter] Butler to Clarke, 30 September [1717], 
cited in Chapter Three, p. 96 above. Secker also lamented that the tutors in Oxford and Cambridge ‘sadly 
neglected instructing their pupils in Theological knowledge …’, cited in Ingram, Religion, Reform and 
Modernity, p. 80. For treatment of Gibbon’s views, see Pocock, Barbarism, I, ‘Gibbon at Oxford: A 
Crisis in Authority’, pp. 43-9. 
35 Smith, WN, V., I. III. II [Glasgow Ed., (Oxford University Press, 1976)], Vol. 2, p. 761; Cf. Rivers, 
Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, pp. 258-9; C. E. Mallet, A History of the University of Oxford, (Oxford, 
1927), III, p. 133. 
36 Tucker, Reflections on the Present Matters in Dispute between Great Britain and Ireland [henceforth 
Britain & Ireland], (London, 1785), APPENDIX: pp. 35-41. £30 was to be given as first prize and £20 as 
second prize, and likewise again for the most gifted students at Cambridge. Further to this, Tucker 
proposed similar though smaller incentivisations for students in the ancient Scottish universities, at pp. 
40-1.  
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brand of neo-Stoicism must have been fostered almost exclusively via his later 
association with, and close reading of, Butler.37 
  
Having taken holy orders in 1735 at the age of 22, Tucker entered the Church two years 
later when he received a curacy at St. Stephen’s, Bristol. Later in the same year a minor 
canonry of Bristol Cathedral was also conferred upon him. Tucker’s arrival in Bristol 
marked something of a turning point in the young clergyman’s life, for at that time it 
had only very recently overtaken Norwich as the second city of Great Britain. A 
burgeoning metropolitan centre in its own right, Bristol’s success was owing to the fact 
that it boasted large deposits of coal at nearby Kingswood, and that it had many newly 
built and therefore easily navigable roads. As a consequence, the Bristol market dealt in 
an abundance of domestic foodstuffs such as wheat, butter, milk and eggs, as well as 
raw industrial materials like timber, wool and iron. Even more importantly, however, 
because of its favourable geographic location, and particularly its close proximity to the 
sea, the city became an increasingly important hub for not only domestic but also 
foreign commerce – as its steady upturn in seaborne trade from 19,878 tonnes in 1700 to 
76,000 in 1791 attests.38 As Defoe put it in his 1724 Tour:  
 
The Merchants of this City not only have the greatest Trade, but they trade with a more 
entire Independency upon London, than any other Town in Britain. And ‘tis evident in this 
particular; viz., That whatsoever Exportations they make to any Part of the world, they are 
able to bring the full Returns back to their own Port, and can dispose of it there.39 
 
Clearly, then, the hustle and bustle of city-life in Bristol, which would have been 
completely at odds with the experiences of a young man who grew up in rural Wales, 
and who studied at Oxford, must have left an indelible mark on Tucker – one that must 
surely have influenced his economic ideas. As Shelton notes, the fact that Bristol’s 
commerce suffered markedly during the many periods of global conflict that marred the 
eighteenth century also goes some way towards explaining Tucker’s consistent aversion 
to war. Examples of this include the fact that the city’s volume of trade fell dramatically 
at the height of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-8), i.e., between 1744 and 
1747, and once again plummeted during the Seven Years’ War (1756-63). Thereafter, 																																																																			
37 See Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, pp. 190, 195-99. 
38 Shelton, Dean Tucker, pp. 18-19. 
39 Daniel Defoe, A Tour Through the Whole Island of Great Britain [1724-27], Vol. II, (7th Ed., London, 
1769), p. 306. 
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owing to American non-importation agreements in the aftermath of the Treaty of Paris 
in 1763, recovery was once again extremely slow, and this pattern of persistent 
economic downturn during times of war continued throughout the American and French 
Revolutions, with the debilitating effects of falling trade often resulting in even swifter 
declarations of bankruptcy.40 
  
In 1739, two years after his arrival in Bristol, Tucker was made rector of All Saint’s 
Church, and it was here that he elicited the attentions of Butler, who subsequently chose 
him to serve as his private chaplain. Unsurprisingly given the nature of this thesis, this 
association was to have a profound and lasting impact on the young clergyman; and the 
two figures became steadfast friends, which remained the case until Butler’s untimely 
death in 1752. Indeed, so impressed was Butler with Tucker that it was under the 
former’s direction that the latter continued to rise within the Church. Tucker’s next 
promotion came about through his bishop’s recommendation, for instance, when, in 
1749, he returned to St. Stephen’s as its rector. Similarly, merely three years later a 
prebendal stall was granted to Tucker at St. David’s in April 1752, and still again at 
Bristol Cathedral in October 1756. Finally, then, in July 1758, merely four years after 
Butler’s death, Tucker undertook the office of Dean of the Cathedral of Gloucester. This 
was a position he was to hold for a remarkable forty-one years until his death in 1799. 
  
During the thirteen years that they knew each other, Tucker and Butler spent a large 
amount of time ‘discussing metaphysical and theological subjects’.41 Clearly, then, the 
former looked up to the latter, who was more than twenty-years his senior, as a spiritual 
mentor and guide.42 In fact, probably the most widely known anecdote of their shared 
time together comes from Tucker himself, in a tract written many years after the 
bishop’s death. Here, Tucker remarked upon the fact that Butler used to enjoy many an 																																																																			
40 All of Tucker’s biographers note the influence of Bristol on the clergyman’s economic thought. See 
Clark, Josiah Tucker, pp. 18-21, 172; Shuyler, Josiah Tucker, pp. 10-11; Shelton, Dean Tucker, pp. 19-
21. Note too Emma Rothschild’s ‘Global Commerce and the Question of Sovereignty in the Eighteenth-
Century Provinces’, Modern Intellectual History, 1/ 01, (April 2004), pp. 3-25, esp. pp. 5-6, in which she 
explains that many of the most notable economic theorists of the eighteenth-century were provincials, 
including the likes of Turgot and Smith, and that this had an important bearing on the development of 
their ideas. In our context, this point is furthered by Pocock’s observation that nearly all of Tucker’s 
works were printed in Gloucester rather than in London, meaning that he ‘wrote unsupported by any party 
connection’. See Pocock, ‘Josiah Tucker on Burke, Locke, and Price’, Virtue, p. 160. 
41 Stephens, Public Characters, p. 171. 
42 This recalls Clarke’s filial treatment of Butler during his earlier years, though there is no evidence to 
suggest that Tucker suffered any crises of faith as Butler had done. 
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evening stroll in the gardens of Bristol cathedral, with his young chaplain at his side.  
On one such occasion when Butler stopped suddenly with something clearly troubling 
him, he asked: ‘What security is there against the Insanity of Individuals? The 
Physicians know of none: and as to Divines, we have no Data either from Scripture, or 
Reason to go upon Relative to this Affair.’ And yet when after a short while, Tucker 
realised that he could think of no fitting answer to the query, Butler replied that it must 
be possible, then, for ‘whole Communities and public Bodies [to] be seized with Fits of 
Insanity, as well as Individuals.’43 Evidently, Butler’s presence of mind in this exchange 
left a significant impression on Tucker, for he was to recall the incident on numerous 
occasions thereafter in public, drawing parallels between Butler’s musings and, as he 
saw it, the madness of war.44 Nevertheless, it is also notable in two fundamentally 
important respects. First, in that it is the only example of direct dialogue between the 
pair that has been preserved, meaning that in some respects the connections between 
them have to be inferred rather than boldly pronounced.45 And second, in that it is a 
curious demonstration of Butler’s sensitivity to the question of psychological health in 
day-to-day life and deliberation – a practical and pastoral extension of Butler’s meta-
ethical thought, which Butler continually encouraged and Tucker went on to embrace. 
 
II. Analogy of Religion I. Probability and Provability. 
 
When Tucker was first introduced to Butler, Butler was by then an extremely well 
respected figure in the Church of England. He had been ordained Bishop of Bristol a 
year previously in 1738, and the work for which he was most famous in his own 
lifetime, The Analogy, had also been published antecedent to that in 1736.46 At this 
stage an examination of The Analogy is desirable, then, since it is a work which 																																																																			
43 Again, all of Tucker’s main biographers remark upon this episode, see Clarke, Josiah Tucker, p. 25; 
Schuyler, Josiah Tucker, pp. 7-9; Shelton, Dean Tucker, pp. 14-16. 
44 See, e.g., An Humble Address and Earnest Appeal to Those Respectable Personages in Great Britain 
and Ireland, (Gloucester, 1775) [henceforth Humble Address], pp. 20-1 n., & Cui Bono?, Letter III, p. 32; 
Letter V, pp. 80-1. 
45 Upon his death Butler had his manuscripts burned; had they survived, there may have been further 
correspondence between he and Tucker for us to ruminate on. See codicil to Butler’s will, Durham 
University Library, MS SGD 35/12. 
46 As a consequence of reading The Analogy, the philosophically literate Queen Caroline (1683-1737) 
appointed Butler clerk of the closet. Upon her deathbed merely a year later, she recommended Butler to 
John Potter (c. 1674-1747), then Archbishop of Canterbury, thus precipitating Butler’s ordination as 
Bishop. Butler would also go on to become clerk of the closet to George II (1683-1760) in 1746 until his 
own death in 1752. 
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heightens our perception of Butler’s Anglicanism, thereby acting as a further connecting 
bridge between his meta-ethics and Tucker’s political economy. Additionally, as a 
major (if not the major) work of eighteenth-century Christian apologetic, The Analogy 
also assists us in situating the ‘Butler-Tucker axis’ within the context of broader 
contemporary defences of the clerical establishment, involving a wide array of orthodox 
and largely latitudinarian thinkers, such as White ‘Weathercock’ Kennett (1660-1728), 
Edward Chandler (c. 1668-1750) and Benjamin Hoadly (1676-1761) to name but a very 
small few.47 In regards to this point, a figure of particular important to Tucker in later 
years was the pugnacious William Warburton (1698-1779), Tucker’s Bishop of 
Gloucester from 1760 until Warburton’s death. Warburton’s two behemoths of orthodox 
scholarship, the Alliance between Church and State (1736) and The Divine Legation of 
Moses (1737-41) were extremely influential and contentious in their day, and remained 
so throughout the eighteenth century; and it is in these works, then, that we may detect 
some major discrepancies between Warburton’s particular brand of orthodoxy and 
Butler and Tucker’s – ultimately bringing Warburton and Tucker into conflict.48 Though 
it is not possible to explore the particulars of this intriguing line of enquiry within the 
confines of this present study, nonetheless, it will be incumbent upon us to comment in 
our conclusion on some of the major implications of this exchange regarding the 
prospect of future Tucker scholarship. 49 For the present, however, we will have to 
content ourselves by pausing for a brief moment to consider that all four of Butler’s 
Fifteen Sermons and The Analogy, and Warburton’s Church and State and The Divine 
Legation, were published under the auspices of James and John Knapton, the so-called 
‘leading publishers of Whig churchmen in the earlier eighteenth century’. This is an 
incredibly intriguing point since, by implication, the Knaptons also acted as co-
facilitators of what has been tentatively described by Tennant as ‘Whiggish 
Enlightenment’.50  																																																																			
47 Miller, Defining the Common Good, p. 279, writes that the analogical method was ‘an inherently 
conservative device, legitimating the status quo’. Furthermore, Ingram, Religion, Reform and Modernity, 
p. 27, notes that after the lapse of the Licensing Act in 1695 ‘freethinking of all sorts … was not thought 
to be successfully refuted by the orthodox until the mid 1730s’ – his inference being until the publication 
of The Analogy. 
48 Pocock has described The Divine Legation as one of the two axiomatic works of conservative English 
enlightenment, alongside Gibbon’s Decline and Fall, in ‘Clergy and Commerce …’, Ajello et al. (eds.), 
L’eta` dei lumi, I, pp. 523–62. Cf. Young, Religion and Enlightenment, p. 174. 
49 See Conclusion, Section IV. 
50 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 42-3. The small list of Anglican figures briefly listed 
above were also published under the auspices of the Knaptons; to which can also be added the names of 
Samuel Clarke and his brother John (1682-1757); John Jackson (1686-1763); Butler’s replacement as 
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Butler’s ‘Advertisement’ to The Analogy is steeped in Augustan and Shaftesburian 
irony, immediately reminding us, and indeed Butler’s readers, of who it is he is 
addressing within its pages: i.e., those freethinkers, deists and general critics of the 
established Church whom we explored in Chapter Two.51 Butler begins therefore with 
the following observation:  
 
Christianity is … discovered to be fictitious among all People of Discernment … to set it up 
as a principle Subject of Mirth and Ridicule, as it were, by Way of Reprisals, for its having 
so long interrupted the Pleasures of the World … 
 
And, in a later passage, he also adds the following clause, which is directly related:  
 
Those Persons appear to forget, that Revelation is to be considered, as informing us of 
somewhat New, in the State of Mankind, and in the Government of the World; as acquainted 
us with some Relations we stand in, which could not otherwise have been known.52  
 
As Lori Branch puts it, then, and as Butler’s own wording suggests, one of the central 
messages of The Analogy is to highlight Butler’s ‘despondency’ over the era’s ‘zeal for 
negation’ in all religious matters.53  
  
In the introduction Butler begins his counter-offensive by listing his line of 
argumentation for the whole of The Analogy in one incredibly long, though remarkably 
succinct, sentence: 
 
That Mankind is appointed to live in a future State [i]; That There, every one shall be 
rewarded or punished [ii]; … for all that Behaviour Here, which [signifies] Virtuous or 
Vitious, morally good or evil [iii]: That our present Life is a Probation, a State of Trial [iv], 
and of Discipline [v], for that future one; Notwithstanding the objection … against there 
being any such moral Plan as this at all [vi]; … as it stands so imperfectly made known to us 
at present [vii]: That this World being in a State of Apostacy and Wickedness … this gave 
occasion for an additional Dispensation of Providence … [Part II. i]; proved by Miracles [ii]; 
but containing in it many things … not to have been expected [iii]; a Dispensation of 	
Bishop of Bristol, John Conybeare (1692-1755); Edward Stillingfleet (1636-99), and John Sharp (c. 
1644/5-1714). Furthermore, continuing our theme of the camaraderie that existed between British and 
European Protestantism, the Knaptons also released important translations of Grotius, Leibniz and the 
French Cartesian Jacques Rohault (1618-72), as well as a dictionary of all current religions. 
51 Esp. Collins and Tindal, according to Rivers, who also states that The Analogy was ‘the most long-lived 
of the main attacks on the principles of freethinking’, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, p. 17. 
52 The Analogy, ‘Advertisement’, p. 153. 
53 Lori Branch, ‘Bishop Butler’, in Andrew Hass, David Jasper & Elisabeth Jay (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of English Literature and Theology, (Oxford, 2007), pp. 591-99, at p. 597. 
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Providence, which is a … System of things [iv]; carried on by the Mediation of a divine 
Person … in order to the Recovery of the World [v]; yet not revealed to all Men, nor proved 
with the strongest possible Evidence to all those to whom it is revealed; but only to such a 
Part of Mankind, and with such particular Evidence as the Wisdom of God thought fit [vi, 
viii].54 
 
Here we immediately perceive Butler’s main aim in The Analogy, which is essentially to 
argue (as he had done in part in Fifteen Sermons) the limits of human knowledge and 
reason.55 This is fundamentally important, because within The Analogy Butler’s overall 
scheme is premised on two main points: (a) that just because we exist within the 
framework of the (ostensibly ‘empirically-knowable’) world, does not necessarily 
suppose that (b) we have the (cap)ability to comprehensively account for it. As a 
consequence, The Analogy makes two crucial counterpoints: (1) that the sufficiency of 
human knowledge should not necessarily be placed in terms of its approximation to 
empirical truth; but rather that (2) the sufficiency of human knowledge ought to be 
based just as legitimately on (the adequacy of) its relation to Christian revelation. To put 
it another way, here Butler is essentially arguing that it is impossible to arrive at any 
sort of systematic account of the natural world, including natural religion, in spite of 
what many ‘modern philosophers’ increasingly suppose –clearly ‘a dagger in the heart 
of the European Enlightenment’, according to Tennant.56  
 
With these points in mind, Butler makes it immediately clear his intention to present 
The Analogy as a thoroughly anti-systematic work:  
 
It is not my Design to enquire further into the Nature, the Foundation, and Measure of 
Probability; or whence it proceeds that Likeness should beget that Presumption, Opinion, and 
full Conviction, which the human Mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does 
necessarily produce in every one; or to guard against the Errors to which, Reasoning from 
Analogy is liable. [For this] belongs to the Subject of Logick …57 
 
Rather, in The Analogy Butler concerns himself with basing ontological investigation on 
analogical argumentation, thereby recalling much of his earliest correspondence with 
																																																																			
54 The Analogy, pp. ix-x. The helpful editorial insertions are Tennant’s, in Butler’s Philosophy and 
Ministry, pp. 77-8. 
55 Clearly, this is in part a continuation of the seventeenth-century latitudinarian tradition of the ‘self-
imposed limits’ of rationalism. See Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I, p. 48. 
56 Ibid., p. 78. 
57 The Analogy, pp. iii, iv. 
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Clarke.58 However, in order to navigate the intricacies of this proposed scheme, Butler 
first inquires into the meaning of the word ‘probable’, which in the mid-eighteenth-
century still meant something closer to its etymological root, ‘provable’. This having 
been established, we can now see that in The Analogy, Butler is in fact attempting to 
account for the proof, or perhaps more pertinently the lack thereof, behind Christian 
accounts of the Revelation:  
 
… the Proof of Religion is said to be involved in such inextricable Difficulties, as to render it 
doubtful; and … left [standing] upon doubtful Evidence. [… However] it is according to the 
Conduct and Character of the Author of Nature, to appoint [how] we should act upon 
Evidence [identical] to That, which this Argument presumes He cannot be supposed to 
appoint [how] we should act upon [… Therefore] as the Force of this Answer, lies merely in 
the Parallel which there is, between the Evidence for Religion and for our temporal Conduct; 
the Answer is equally just and conclusive, whether the Parallel be made out, by shewing, the 
Evidence of the former to be higher, or the Evidence of the latter to be lower.59 
 
Although the above excerpt is taken from the last chapter of The Analogy proper,60 even 
in the very first sentence of its introduction, Butler posits a similar – to him an 
axiomatic – observation: i.e., that 
 
Probable Evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this, that it admits of 
Degrees; and of all Variety of them from the highest moral Certainty to the very lowest 
Presumption. 61  
 
Because of this, Butler’s line of reasoning throughout the entirety of The Analogy is 
premised on the fundamentally important belief that, contrary to the spurious claims of 
the possibility of empirical certainty (especially via, and not in spite of the 
contemporaneous celebration of the Baconian Method), ‘evidence’ can never be truly 																																																																			
58 See Chapter Three, Section II. 
59 The Analogy, p. 279; emphases added. 
60 The Analogy, II. VII: ‘Of the Objections which may be made against arguing, from the Analogy of 
Nature, to Religion’, pp. 275-88. 
61 The intellectual climate in which The Analogy was conceived and published can be set against the 
orthodox Peter Browne’s (1665-1735) critique of Locke in The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human 
Understanding (London, 1728), and his complimentary Things Divine and Supernatural Conceived by 
Analogy with Things Natural and Human, (London, 1733), the latter of which refutes the deistic 
conclusions that can be drawn from Locke’s theory of knowledge. For useful discussion, see Tennant, 
Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 82-6, where he also highlights the influence of Berkeley’s 
Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher. In Seven Dialogues … Containing an Apology for the Christian 
Religion, against those who are called Free-thinkers, 2 vols., (London, 1732) & more generally, Nicholas 
Malebranche (1638-1715). Cf. Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, pp. 62-5 where she notes Bishop 
William King’s (1659-1720) analogical Divine Predestination and Fore-knowledg, consistent with the 
Freedom of Man’s Will (Dublin; London, 1709). Typical contemporary refutations of Cartesianism are 
also worth mentioning here.  
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absolute, since, according to Butler, notions of ‘truth’ are inherently bound by that 
which temporal society deems to be ‘appropriate’ and/or ‘acceptable’.62  
  
To put it yet another way, in The Analogy Butler’s main strategy is thus to point out that 
in a society comprised of individuals who are inherently lacking in knowledge – for 
such is always the case with earthly creatures – ‘evidence’ and so-called ‘truth’ are 
always insufficient. Contrariwise, Butler posits that evidence or experience is in fact 
relative: for ‘Probable Evidence’, he writes, ‘affords but an imperfect kind of 
Information; and is to be considered as relative only to Beings of limited Capacities’ – 
again, such as humans inevitably are.63 By implication, throughout The Analogy Butler 
continually states that though probabilistic argumentation may be an extremely useful 
guide for human conduct, nevertheless, it can never be a truly adequate substitute for 
true knowledge. This is because, according to Butler, full or complete knowledge is 
simply impossible to obtain in this present life: 
 
[Nothing] which is the possible object of Knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be 
probable to an infinite Intelligence [i.e., to God]; since it cannot but be discerned absolutely 
as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But, to Us [i.e., lesser finite beings], 
Probability is the very Guide of Life.64 
 
III. Analogy of Religion II: Faith and Doubt. 
 
With The Analogy’s initial premise put in place, Butler proceeds with an explanation of 
what it is he intends to achieve by it. ‘[Instead of] … forming imaginary Models of a 
World, and Schemes of governing it’, he therefore declares in overtly anti-Cartesian 
tone, ‘[let us instead] turn our Thoughts to what we experience to be the Conduct of 
Nature with respect to intelligent Creatures’.65 Viewed from this perspective, the crux of 
The Analogy – similar to Fifteen Sermons in this respect – is to remind the reader of the 
sufficiency of faith and trust in God. For it is in the realm of ethics, Butler insists, rather 
than in the dichotomous conflict between dogmatic metaphysicians on the one side and 
																																																																			
62 The Analogy, p. i. 
63 The Analogy, p. iii; emphases added. 
64 The Analogy, p. iii. 
65 The Analogy, p. viii. Note here that Butler describes humans as ‘intelligent’ (i.e., ‘rational’) creatures in 
a neo-Stoic vein, despite the fact that true knowledge is, in his view, unobtainable in this life. 
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uncompromising empiricists on the other, that human conduct ought truly to be based.66 
Furthermore, and crucially, since Butler argues that human reliance on ‘probability’ is 
frequently subjected to cases of ‘anomaly’ (which is analogous to Fifteen Sermons’ 
contention that existence is punctuated by moments of ‘immoderation’),67 Butler claims 
that acceptance of doubt is in fact a practical necessity in day-to-day experience: a 
naturally-endowed corollary of our partial ignorance, despite the fact that there may be 
probabilities ‘so low as to leave the mind in very great doubt which is the Truth’.68 As 
Tennant summarises, then, for ‘Beings of limited Capacities [again, such are human 
beings] all epistemological and inductive mental capacity is probabilistic’; and it is this 
very point that Butler is attempting to advance within The Analogy, even at the cost of 
turning his back on certain elements of his Newtonian and Clarkean heritage:69  
 
It is … but an exceeding little Way, and in but a very few Respects, that we can trace up the 
natural Course of things before us, to general Laws. [Therefore] it is only from Analogy, that 
we conclude, the Whole of it to be capable of being reduced into them; only from our seeing, 
that Part is so. It is from our finding, that the Course of Nature, in some Respects and so far, 
goes on by general Laws, that we conclude this of the Whole.70  
 
In setting up the argument of The Analogy in such fashion, above all Butler is 
endeavouring to refute even the most dogged religious sceptic by admitting, again, (a) 
the limits of human knowledge, but that (b), based upon this very standard the 
probability of the existence of God, miracles and of the Christian Revelation simply 
cannot be refuted easily – that is to say, cannot be refuted with any degree of certainty. 
In effect, this is the full depth (or rather simplicity) of Butler’s argumentation when he 
insists, as we saw in our previous chapter, that even ‘though natural Religion is the 																																																																			
66 In other words, Butler is stating that the claims of empiricists or rationalists are equally indemonstrable 
when considered in terms of the totality of this and the afterlife.  
67 E.g., Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 22, 94, 125-6, 150, 220-1, 233-4. Cf. Chapter Three, p. 108. 
68 The Analogy, p. iii.  
69 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 95; emphasis added. 
70 The Analogy, p. 189. Note Butler’s denial here that even Newton’s laws contain within them the full 
scope of reasonably inferable knowledge. Here we must acknowledge that Sermon XV of Fifteen 
Sermons was entitled ‘Upon the Ignorance of Man’, demonstrating in turn that Butler’s forceful and 
expressive defence of Anglican orthodoxy in The Analogy was in fact an extension of an enterprise begun 
(unbeknownst to him at the time) in the first of his letters to Clarke, continued and developed in the first 
and second editions of Fifteen Sermons, and so brought through to successful completion in the latest of 
his works. In fact, Tennant argues that many of the chapters in The Analogy were reworked sermons that 
did not make it into the final publication of Fifteen Sermons itself, particularly the appended dissertation 
Of the Nature of Virtue. Consequently, although the language of The Analogy is palpably more esoteric 
than that of Fifteen Sermons, Butler is nevertheless constantly attempting to ground it in such a way that it 
remains consistent with his pastoral function – and duty – to the laity, just as his earlier work had done. 
For further discussion, see Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 79-82, 113.  
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Foundation and principal Part of Christianity, it is not in any Sense the whole of it’.71 
To which we may now also add the following clarification of Butler’s viewpoint: 
 
Christianity is a Republication of natural Religion … It instructs Mankind in the moral 
System of the World … it teaches Natural Religion, in its genuine Simplicity; free from 
those Superstitions, with which, it was totally corrupted [i.e., by Roman Catholicism] … 
Revelation is farther, an authoritative Publication of natural Religion, and so affords the 
Evidence of Testimony for the Truth of it.72 
 
This being the case, in The Analogy Butler claims that the two kingdoms of heaven and 
earth are equally relevant, in the sense that, again, both cannot be reduced to general 
laws:  
 
God’s miraculous Interpositions may have been, all along in like manner, by general Laws 
of Wisdom … Unknown indeed to us: but no more unknown, than the Laws from whence it 
is, that Some die as soon as they are born, and Others live to extream Old-age … which … 
we cannot reduce to any Laws or Rules at all, though it is taken for granted, that they are as 
much reduceable to general ones, as Gravitation.73  
 
In essence, then, this is what Butler meant in Fifteen Sermons when he alluded to the 
daily practice of loving God – since, simply put, for Butler both the temporal and divine 
are considered as one.74 This is elaborated upon even further in The Analogy via 
Butler’s continued insistence that true Christianity is in fact an everyday – and by this, 
																																																																			
71 Cf. Chapter Three, p. 108. 
72 The Analogy, p. 144; emphases added. This excerpt ‘originate[s] in a relatively recent sermon aimed at 
Tindal’ according to Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 80. Interestingly, William Law’s 
contemporaneous refutation of Tindal in The Case of Reason, Or Natural Religion, Fairly and Fully 
Stated. In Answer to a Book entitl’d, Christianity as Old as the Creation, (London, 1731) also bears some 
similarity to The Analogy. This is intriguing, given that Law and Butler are usually placed at opposite 
ends of the ‘mystical-rational scale’ in eighteenth-century study. For discussion see Young, Religion and 
Enlightenment, pp. 127-9. Essentially, Law argues that Tindal overestimates the primacy of reason as the 
correlate of nature/natural religion. For the similarities between Law and Hume’s critiques of reason, 
although clearly in differing contexts from each other, see also p. 129, n. 26. Cf. Rivers, Reason, Grace, 
and Sentiment, II, pp. 82-3 n. 301 & p. 289. 
73 The Analogy, p. 190. In Butler’s use of the analogy of gravitation, here we discern once again his 
Newtonian influences. Nevertheless, as Christopher Cunliffe’s ODNB article explains, Butler ‘constantly 
directs attention to the way that we ordinarily think and insists that we cannot and should not proceed 
differently in matters of religion. In religion as in ordinary life what is needed for reasonable belief is not 
certainty but enough probability to warrant action’. Likewise, Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, 
p. 87, states that Butler ‘proposes’ in The Analogy that we look ‘at the world not through a telescope or 
microscope but at a normal, human level of magnification’ – and again, there are clear parallels here with 
Butler’s concern for the laity in Fifteen Sermons, who constitute said ‘normal, human level of 
magnification’. 
74 Cf. Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 269; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 276; Chapter Three above, p. 114. 
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he means a sort of routine – ‘determinate Course of Life’; a ‘practical’ religion, he 
insists, albeit a ‘Scheme imperfectly comprehended’:75 
 
Persons who speak of the Evidence of a Religion as doubtful, and of this supposed 
Doubtfulness as a positive Argument against it, should be put upon considering what That 
Evidence indeed is, which they act upon with regard to their temporal Interests. For, it is … 
in many Cases, absolutely impossible, to balance Pleasure and Pain, Satisfaction and 
Uneasiness, so as to be able to say, on which Side the Overplus is …76 
 
These are also the means, then, by which Butler refutes the claims of arguably the most 
influential deist, Shaftesbury, alongside his most fulsome intellectual heirs. For quite 
apart from disliking Shaftesbury and his ethics on a personal level, Butler insists that 
deists and freethinkers of his ilk misunderstand nature, thereby rendering the type of 
philosophy and ethics they deploy as manifestly unsound, and overly presumptive.77 
Hence, although Butler acknowledges that such thinkers may dismiss the plausibility of 
the central Christian narrative, describing it as ‘a long Series of intricate Means’, 
‘round-about Ways’ and ‘many perplext Contrivances’, nevertheless, he also turns the 
argument on its head once again (a favourite tactic of his, judging by his earlier 
treatment of Hobbes and Mandeville) by observing that ‘Mystery is as great in Nature, 
as in Christianity’:  
 
The Change of Seasons, the Ripening of the Fruits of the Earth, the very History of a Flower, 
is an instance of this [mystery]: And so is human Life […] Men are impatient and for 
precipitating things: but the Author of Nature appears deliberate throughout his Operations; 
accomplishing his natural Ends, by slow successive Steps. And there is a Plan of things 																																																																			
75 The Analogy, p. 278 &, e.g., I. IV: ‘Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, 
imperfectly comprehended’, pp. 185-93.  
76 The Analogy, pp. 215-6. Butler’s reference to ‘practical religion’ is probably an allusion to Archbishop 
Thomas Tenison’s (1636-1715) call for Anglicans to devote themselves to the practical uses of religion 
rather than political partisanship. Since Ingram claims, e.g., that Archbishop Secker used Tenison as his 
archiepiscopal model, it is not unreasonable to suggest that this approach might also have been adopted 
by Butler. See Ingram, Religion, Reform and Modernity, p. 115 & n. 6. 
77 In his private notes Shaftesbury called orthodox Christianity a ‘vulgar religion … that sordid, shameful 
nauseous idea of Deity’, see Rand (ed.), Life, Unpublished Letters and Philosophical Regimen of … 
Shaftesbury, p. 24. See also, e.g., Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 120-1: ‘Whereas Butler 
opposes Hobbes’s doctrine, we have noted several times … a dislike of Shaftesbury which is more 
personal. Shaftesbury’s influence was all-pervasive in the culture of the early eighteenth-century … 
[which Butler thinks has a] corrosive effect [because of its] aristocratic and narcissistic thinking. The 
concept of doubt is not only alien to [Shaftesbury] and his followers [such as Hutcheson and the 
deists/freethinkers], but is theoretically impossible: doubt would be an ugly denial of the ‘lovely rules’’. 
As Brooke further notes in Philosophical Pride, p. 119, Shaftesbury argues that humanity’s propensity 
towards virtue is based on eudemonism – which Butler (and later Kant) denies. In this, Butler may have 
been following Clark’s observation in his Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of 
Natural Religion, p. 171, that ‘He who Dies for the sake of Virtue, is [not] really any more Happy, than 
he that dies for any fond Opinion or any unreasonable Humour or Obstinancy whatsoever’. 
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beforehand laid out, which, from the Nature of it, requires various Systems of Means, as well 
as Length of Time, in order to [carry on] its several Parts into Execution.78 
 
Put another way, here Butler insists that human existence in the material world, which is 
to say the food, clothing and shelter we seek; the affection and friendship we crave; if 
not the very air we breathe, is contingent upon faith, because without faith, humans are 
subject to the whims and fancies of fortuna.79  
 
Whilst Butler admits alongside freethinkers, then, that the ancient philosophers (the 
‘Bulk of Mankind in the heathen World’, as Butler puts it) may have had legitimate 
access to natural religion, nevertheless, Butler also insists that the contemporary deist 
insistence on the sufficiency of their wisdom is completely erroneous.80 Indeed, since 
the ancients lacked what Butler calls the ‘positive Institutions’ of Christianity, 
consequently it is only ‘in Scripture’, he insists in a tellingly Trinitarian passage, that 
‘are revealed the Relations, which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in to us […] the 
general Duty to be paid to the Son and holy Ghost … the religious Regards of 
Reverence, Honour, Love, Trust, Gratitude, Fear, Hope’.81 By extension, Butler is 
therefore claiming that it is only via the reinforcing habits and customs of Christian 
orthodoxy that the implications of natural religion fully reveal themselves.82 Even more 
interestingly, Butler goes on to state that the human affections, mediated by the 
conscience, are essentially ‘the means of drawing’ what he calls ‘revealed religion into 
the ordinary practices of daily life’ – meaning in turn, according to Tennant, that in 
Butler’s thought, the City of God metaphor is ‘applied to the mind as well as the 
Church’.83 This claim is further supported by The Analogy’s reiteration of perhaps 
Fifteen Sermons’ central claim: i.e., the notion that ethical consciousness can and ought 
to be realised via sociability between humans on the one side (human nature), and 																																																																			
78 The Analogy, pp. 191, 2. 
79 These are noticeably Tuckerian expressions, particularly with regard to the human ‘necessaries of life’, 
such as food, raiment and dwelling. See Tucker’s Elements, pp. 41-2, discussed in Chapter Five below, p. 
192. 
80 The Analogy, pp. 147-8. For the full context to this debate, see Rivers’ treatment in Reason, Grace, and 
Sentiment, II, Chap. 1: ‘The true religion of nature: the freethinkers and their opponents’, pp. 7-84.  
81 The Analogy, pp. 151, 152; emphasis added. Cf. Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 144; Fifteen Sermons 1729, 
pp. 144.  
82 See Tucker’s similar observation in Seventeen Sermons, p. 16: ‘The like Observation may be made with 
Respect to Natural Religion, and the Powers and Light of Reason. For, not only in particular men, but 
whole Nations and Countries have been for several Ages past, and many are at this Day in the grossest 
Ignorance of the most important Points of moral Duties’. 
83 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 119.  
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between humankind and God on the other (revelation). For as we have seen, though 
Fifteen Sermons deals predominantly, though not exclusively, with the former of these 
two points, conversely, in The Analogy Butler devotes his full attention to the latter, 
thereby connected the two works, and ensuring that they are closely akin.  
  
This complex interplay between the social relationship between God and humanity on 
the one side (i.e., the main concern of Fifteen Sermons), and the attendant issue of the 
clash between religious orthodoxy and heterodoxy, and of natural and revealed religion, 
on the other (i.e., the main concern of The Analogy), is fundamentally important, and 
one that was to have a profound influence on Tucker’s thought. Yet as we alluded to at 
the outset of discussion of The Analogy, there are a number of fundamental 
idiosyncrasies within Butler’s brand of orthodoxy which placed him at odds not only 
with contemporary non-believers or non-conformists, but also with other Anglican 
defenders of the establishment who were writing similarly during this period; 
particularly in our case, Warburton.84 Again, it is regrettable that we will only be able to 
hint at the importance of the relationship between the three clergymen in our concluding 
remarks to the whole. This being the case, we are forced to end our examination of The 
Analogy at this juncture with a final observation regarding Butler’s ultimate purpose in 
publishing the work, encapsulated in the following query. If, according to Butler, the 
search for absolute empirical certainty or true knowledge (be it religious or secular) is 
both a theoretical and practical impossibility, what authority, he asks, do deists, sceptics 
and freethinkers have ‘to deny religion the right to occupy space in civil society’?85 
Butler’s answer to this rhetorical question is, of course, that they do not have that right; 
and in making such a statement as this, essentially the bishop reduces his entire theo-
philosophical system to the following: that the apparent disparity between natural and 
revealed religion presupposes doubt, and that because rather than in spite of the fact that 
we are rational beings (once again in the Stoic sense), presupposing doubt necessarily 
presupposes a commensurate measure of faith: 
 
[There] may be People who will not accept of such imperfect Information from Scripture. 
Some too have not Integrity and Regard enough to Truth, to attend to Evidence, which keeps 
the Mind in Doubt, perhaps Perplexity, and which is much of a different Sort from what they 																																																																			
84 This lends credence to Young’s central claim that contemporary debate and disagreement flowered 
within the walls of the established Church, in his Religion and Enlightenment, passim. 
85 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 121-2. 
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expected. And it plainly requires a Degree of Modesty and Fairness, beyond what every one 
had, for a Man to say, not to the World, but to Himself, that there is a real Appearance of 
somewhat of great Weight in this Matter, though he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself 
about it … It is much more easy, and more falls in with the Negligence Presumption and 
Willfulness of the Generality, to determine at once, with a decisive Air, There is nothing in 
it. The Prejudices arising from that absolute Contempt and Scorn, with which this Evidence 
is treated in the World, I do not mention. For what indeed can be said to Persons, who are 
weak enough in their Understanding, to think This any Presumption against it; or, if they do 
not, are yet weak enough in their Temper to be influenced, by such Prejudices, upon such a 
Subject [?]86 
 
As we shall imminently see, such pious thinking was to impress itself firmly upon the 
mind of his young chaplain. 
 
IV. The Methodist Controversy I: Tucker, Whitefield and the ‘Marks of the New 
Birth’. 
 
Having explored Fifteen Sermons and The Analogy, we are now possessed of a nuanced 
account of Butler’s theological schema, and particularly the ways in which his 
orthodoxy, meta-ethics and moral philosophy are tightly interwoven. Although 
laborious, such a piecemeal examination of Butler’s ideas and texts has been necessary, 
for in this and in the following chapters, we will go on to note the remarkable extent of 
his theological reach into the core of Tucker’s political economy. Before embarking on 
this path, however, we return to Tucker at this stage, in an effort to garner a clearer idea 
of his own theology, alongside the ways in which it coalesced with Butler’s independent 
of his later economic concerns (admittedly they were rarely, if ever, independent; yet 
for the sake of thematic clarity, we will keep his economics and theology separate for 
the present). As already alluded to, this we will approach via Butler and Tucker’s 
important relationship with George Whitefield and John Wesley, the leaders of what 
Rivers has called the ‘most significant challenge’ to Anglican orthodoxy in the mid-
eighteenth-century – Methodism – and one that was significant precisely because it did 
not emerge from the typically hostile climes of deism or dissent.87  
  
																																																																			
86 The Analogy, pp. 255-6. Shelton, Dean Tucker, p. 14, dismisses Butler’s scheme as a ‘rather feeble 
resort to equal probability’, but this surely says more about the sensibilities of the late twentieth-century 
mind as opposed to those of Butler’s era.  
87 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I, p. 205.  
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Also referred to as the Evangelical Revival, the most significant feature of the 
Methodist movement was John Wesley (1703-91) and George Whitefield’s (1714-70) 
insistence on ‘reinterpreting’ the Reformation doctrines of justification and 
regeneration, and of ‘rechristening’ them as the spontaneous and internal ‘Marks of the 
New Birth’. For, in turn, Whitefield and Wesley emphasised that which they believed to 
be the invisible operations of the Spirit, meaning that they repudiated works as a 
condition (rather than a necessary outcome) of justification, and attempted instead to 
bring ‘feeling’ and ‘emotion’ to the forefront of religion.88 Taken together, these 
elements constitute what Rivers describes as the ‘complex and subtle attempt to resolve 
the problem that dominated English thought from the time of the Reformation, the 
relationship between religion and ethics’.89 Furthermore, in the case of Wesley in 
particular, she claims that throughout his adult life he felt that true religion was 
increasingly under attack from ‘two distinct quarters’: first from those who ‘laid too 
much stress on faith, feeling, experience and inward religion’; and second, from the 
propagators of the ‘religion of reason’, typically and familiarly including deists and 
freethinkers, but more especially those clerical moralists who ‘overvalued reason’ and 
‘insidiously undermined Scripture from within by misinterpreting and misapplying it’.90  
  
Of the two groups, it can be argued (and indeed it was argued among certain 
contemporaries) that the likes of Tucker and Butler belonged to the latter category 
(particularly in light of Butler’s appeals to ‘cool reason’ and rational agency in Fifteen 
Sermons). For as the anti-Butlerian and quasi-Arian Archdeacon Francis Blackburne 
(1705-87) was to later put it in mocking tones, those who overemphasised reason in 
their religion risked reducing the role of revelation to ‘no higher office than holding the 
																																																																			
88 See esp. Wesley, Sermon 18. ‘The Marks of the New Birth’ in The Works of John Wesley, F. Baker et 
al. (eds.), Vol. I, Sermons, A. C. Outler (ed.), p. 418. 
89 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I, Chap. 5, this citation at p. 207. For further scholarship on 
eighteenth-century Methodism see Rupert Davies, Methodism, (Harmondsworth, 1963); J. D. Walsh, 
‘Origins of the Evangelical Revival’, in Bennett & Walsh (eds.), Essays in modern English Church 
History, (A. & C. Black, 1966); ‘Methodism at the End of the Eighteenth Century’ in Davies & Gordon 
Rupp (eds.), A History of the Methodist Church in Great Britain, Vol 1., (London, Epworth Press, 1965); 
Alan C. Clifford, Atonement and Justification: English Evangelical Theory 1640-1790: An Evaluation, 
(Oxford, 1990), esp. Chaps. 4, 5, 10; Gregory, Restoration, Reformation, and Reform, 1660-1828, ‘The 
Church and Methodism’, pp. 223-32.  
90 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I, p. 207. We shall return to this second point in Section VII 
below. 
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candle to it’.91 This, then, was what Blackburne was clearly insinuating regarding 
Butler’s brand of orthodoxy, and it is worth pausing briefly to consider here that 
Tucker’s Apology for the Present Church of England … Occasioned by a Petition … 
Abolishing Subscriptions (1772) [henceforth Apology] was written in riposte to 
Blackburne, the architect of said petition. In any event, Rivers details the three major 
phases in the genesis of (predominantly Wesleyan) Methodism: firstly, its origins in 
Oxford from c. 1725-35; secondly, Wesley’s visit to the German Moravians in 1738, 
sandwiched between his voyage to and settlement in Georgia from 1735-7, and his 
return to England and arrival in Bristol in 1739; and lastly, the longer period from the 
1740s until Wesley’s death in 1791, comprised of his initial breach with the Moravians 
and the Calvinists in the 1740s, and thereafter his repeated repudiations of antinomian 
and establishment criticisms of his theology.92 By necessity, our present examination 
brings us into contact with the second and beginning of the third of these stages, 
particularly from 1739 to 1742, when Methodism was still very much in its infancy. It 
should clearly go without saying, however, that it is chiefly Butler and Tucker, rather 
than Wesley and Whitefield, whom we are concerned with in the pages that follow; and 
that it is merely owing to the fact that the latters’ ideas serve to accentuate the formers’ 
that we are able to utilise them here.  
  
As we have just mentioned, by 1739 Whitefield was a resident of Bristol. Shortly 
returned from his missionary work in America, it was at this time that he began his 
infamous evangelising activities in Butler’s diocese. Whitefield was becoming 
particularly well known for preaching unorthodox field sermons in an increasingly 
zealous manner, and in one letter dated April 1739, he even described his pulpit style as 
that of a ‘madman’.93 Two months previously, on 15 February 1739, Whitefield had 
begun a correspondence with Butler requesting the bishop’s permission to preach at St 
Mary, Redcliffe.94 Treating Whitefield ‘with the utmost civility’ according to Wesley’s 
journal, Butler was surprisingly lenient regarding Whitefield’s admitted breaches of 																																																																			
91 Francis Blackburne, Works, Theological and Miscellaneous, 7 Vols., (Cambridge, 1805),  
I, cxx, 315, lxxxiv.  
92 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I, pp. 208-9. 
93 Letters of George Whitefield for the Period 1734-42, (Edinburgh, 1776), Whitefield to Wesley, 3 April, 
1739, p. 405. 
94 The approach was initially rebuffed by the president of Bristol Cathedral, Carew Reynell, who 
threatened Whitefield with excommunication. See Whitefield, Journals, (Edinburgh Ed., 1960), p. 214 & 
his A Continuation [of the Journal], (London, 1739), p. 25. 
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canon law, on account of the charitable activity he felt Whitefield was promoting in his 
diocese in spite of his infelicities.95 Yet whereas Butler reserved most of his attention 
for Wesley (the subject of the following section), perhaps because of their earlier 
Oxford connection, Tucker was far less willing to let Whitefield off as lightly. 
Consequently, in two issues of the Gentleman’s Magazine dated May-June 1739, 
Tucker’s first known appearance in public, he queried Whitefield regarding his 
controversial style of proselytization – an exchange that is worth examining at length 
for its demonstration of Tucker’s ‘initiation’ of sorts into late-Augustan, Whig ‘print-
culture’.96  
  
The dispute between Tucker and Whitefield had its roots in Whitefield’s claim that 
during his university days he had read the Scottish Episcopalian Henry Scougal’s (1650-
78) The Life of God in the Soul of Man; ‘a Book worth its Weight in Gold’ as Whitfield 
had put it, and one which had immediately opened his eyes to the prospect of ‘rapturous 
conversion’.97 Years later, when Whitefield had settled among Butler’s parishioners, 
this prompted Tucker to respond in a broadsheet dated 16 April 1739 with the 
following: 
 
This abstract of the life of Mr. Whitefield with his tenets of the new birth and principles of 
religion (being the substance of what he was endeavouring to propagate in private, and instill 
into some of my parishioners) was told me by a gentleman present at [a recent] conversation 
…  The contents I afterwards carried to Mr. Whitefield to know from his own mouth, if he 
did maintain such positions; who acknowledg’d them to be his doctrine, and set his hand to 
the paper of which this is a true copy.98 
 
Leaving aside the immediate subject at hand for a brief moment, in this first public 
appearance by Tucker’s hand we discern a far more animated, confrontational and 																																																																			
95 Whitefield, Journals, p. 276. As we shall see in our Conclusion, the emphasis on charity is an important 
lynchpin of the Butler-Tucker axis. 
96 Gentleman’s Magazine, Vol. IX (1739), [May issue] pp. 238-43; [June issue] pp. 292-7. Tucker dates 
his entry for the second installment as 14 June 1739. Tucker’s dealings with Methodism have been dealt 
with rather glibly in both Clark, Dean Tucker, p. 52 & Schuyler, Josiah Tucker, pp. 8-9. However, 
Shelton’s Dean Tucker devotes more energy to the episode – see Chap. 2: ‘Bristol and the Methodist 
Controversy’, pp. 17-36 – and accordingly, the present author has cited from this source where 
appropriate. 
97 Gentleman’s Magazine, Vol. IX, pp. 238-9. For Wesley’s edition of Scougal’s work, see Rivers (ed.), 
Books and their Readers in 18th Century England, (Leicester, 1982), p. 156. For the importance of 
Scougal’s work over a period of 150 years, see also her ‘Scougal’s The Life of God in the soul of man: 
The fortunes of a book, 1676-1830’ in Savage (ed.), Philosophy and Religion in Enlightenment Britain, 
pp. 29-55. 
98 Cited in Shelton, Dean Tucker, p. 23 & p. 274 n. 8, where Shelton states that a copy of the broadsheet 
may be found among Secker’s papers at Lambeth Palace. 
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disputative style compared to that of his bishop. In part, this is attributable to the fact 
that Butler tended to avoid polemics in a way that Tucker curiously took to. Yet more 
than that, this is also indicative of Butler’s tendency towards calculated restraint in 
philosophical and religious matters, traceable back to his earliest and cagiest letters to 
Clarke. Ultimately, then, it is this bellicosity which takes Tucker away from Butler’s far 
more systematic, cautious, and subtle approach, thereby providing Tucker with a 
distinct voice of his own, particularly from the economic tracts onwards (see following 
chapter). And indeed, whilst on the one hand this may simply reveal the differences in 
their respective temperaments, on the other, it might also be an important marker of 
Tucker’s confident establishment upbringing, as opposed to Butler’s self-conscious and 
‘awkward’ dissenting heritage. On this matter, readers are left to judge for themselves. 
Nevertheless, regarding Tucker’s own opinion of his writing style, many years later 
when the Blue Stockings Society poet Hannah More (1745-1833) suggested that he 
might polish it, Tucker responded with something to the effect that it was substance 
over style that he most coveted. ‘Oh, no, they don’t expect a fine style from me’, he 
reportedly told her. ‘All that I care for are the authenticity of my facts, and the truth of 
my principles’.99 
 
In the related article entitled ‘QUERIES to Mr. Whitefield, by the Rev. Mr T-CK-R, 
Minister of All Saints, Bristol; not answer’d’, Tucker next asks Whitefield to respond 
and expand upon three questions put to him regarding the nascent Methodist conception 
of the ‘new birth’ – as follows [editorial insertions provided for clarity]: 
 
I. What are those Principles, Doctrines, Articles of Faith, Motives, &c., which this 
extraordinary Light reveals; … and by what Mark … [do] you distinguish them from 
the Delusions of Fancy, or worse Temptations? 
II. What are those particular Duties you are enabled to perform … [that enable you] An 
Extraordinary Intercourse with the Deity?  
III. If I am mistaken in my Conjectures … be so kind as to mention in a particular and 
determinate Manner … to what Purposes you apply it, or it applies you …?100 
 																																																																			
99 William Roberts, Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of Mrs. Hannah More, 4 vols., (2nd Ed., 
London, 1834), I, p. 210. This may be a sly dig at Shaftesbury or Hutcheson’s more pleasing styles, but 
there is no evidence to support the claim. In any case, we ought to contrast Tucker’s self-assured response 
here with Butler’s more reticent personality: recall, e.g., Butler’s reluctance to deal with Kames and 
Hume on the score that the ‘cause of truth might thence suffer from the unskillfulness of its advocate’, see 
above, p. 121. 
100 Gentleman’s Magazine, IX, pp. 242-3. 
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However, in the following June issue of the Gentleman’s Magazine, Tucker notes that 
Whitefield neglected to respond, and that he had even gone so far as to ‘[prevent] the 
printing of them’ in the Bristol Journal.101 Nevertheless, Tucker next claims that one of 
Whitefield’s supporters appeared in public shortly thereafter, accusing Tucker of being 
worse than the ‘most arrant Deist’ for having ‘no manner or Notion of Divine 
Revelation … to the great Dishonour of your Ministerial Character’.102 
  
Unsurprisingly, Tucker’s response to this attack was stoical. He defended his motives 
and pastoral integrity with a latitudinarian castigation of Whitefield’s enthusiasm, 
likening his ‘extraordinary Illuminations’ to ‘a Flame of Fire, Hot Water, or the 
Motions of the Foetus in the Womb’ – all of which Tucker claimed were ‘blasphemous 
and enthusiastical Notions’. Here, of course, Tucker was upholding the moderatism of 
the established Church. But more than that, his accusations also placed Whitefield 
directly at variance with the explicitly Butlerian conceptions of ‘coolness’, 
‘deliberation’ and ‘reasonableness’ – terms we explored in our previous chapter.103 With 
still greater urgency, Tucker notes that Whitefield’s ‘Notions’ are being ‘propagated 
with too much Success, amongst several well-meaning, but ill-judged People’: in other 
words a laity similar to, though far less sophisticated than, say, those in attendance at 
the Rolls Chapel, and so all the more susceptible to impressionability. This being the 
case, Tucker feels that it is his ‘Duty as a Clergyman, and a Christian, to prevent  … the 
spreading of such dangerous Principles, which strike at the Root of all Religion, and 
make it the Jest of those who sit in the Seat of the Scornful.’104 With this final 
expression it should be noted that Tucker is here undoubtedly echoing Butler’s earlier 
description in The Analogy of those who make religion the ‘Subject of Mirth and 
Ridicule’.105 In light of this, we can clearly see Butler already at work in the young 
clergyman, who besides defending the establishment Church in the conventional 
manner, is also stating that in terms of the Methodist ‘disconnect’ from the tenets of the 
established faith (and contrarily, then, to the claims of Whitefield’s anonymous 																																																																			
101 Ibid., p. 294. There is no further evidence to confirm or disprove Tucker’s claim. 
102 Ibid., pp. 292-4; Life of George Whitefield, pp. 36-41, at p. 37. From this point onwards parts of the 
exchange are reprinted in both the Gentleman’s Magazine and Life of George Whitefield; henceforth, 
then, we will cite from both where applicable. Shelton, Dean Tucker, p. 26, speculates that this individual 
may have been a close friend of Whitefield’s, a certain Rev Mr Hutchins, about whom we know nothing. 
103 See Chapter Three, pp. 104. n. 79, 106, n. 90. 
104 Gentleman’s Magazine, IX, p. 294; Life of George Whitefield, p. 42. 
105 The Analogy, ‘Advertisement’. 
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supporter), it is in fact Whitefield’s position rather than his own that bears the greater 
resemblance to those who call themselves deists or freethinkers.106  
  
Following on from this exchange, Tucker informs us that he was ‘reviled and insulted’ 
in the street by a number of Whitefield’s supporters who labelled him ‘an enemy of God 
and His religion’ – the first, though by no means the last, time Tucker was to be 
subjected to bouts of violence for expressing his views in public.107 Nevertheless, 
Tucker’s answer to a direct query made by Whitefield’s anonymous supporter, 
regarding his own position on the issue of regeneration and rebirth, is put it in such a 
way that it is unmistakably modelled on Butler: 
 
That there is an ordinary, constant, and regular Operation or Providence of the Deity, 
concurring with, and aiding our weak Endeavours, checking evil Thoughts, and inspiring 
good and virtuous, is a Fundamental Principle of all Religion, natural and revealed …  
 
To which Tucker adds that those fortunate enough to have been baptised in the Christian 
faith are always able to call upon divine assistance in order to progressively cast off 
their original corruption [interpolations provided for clarity]: 
 
… Nay, every Orthodox Christian will affirm farther, that this … is promised in a greater 
Degree to all within the Pale of the Church, provided they improve their ten Talents [Matt 
25: 14-30], proportionably, than to those who are Strangers to the Covenant of Grace […] 
The Person therefore who is baptiz’d into the Christian Faith … recommends himself by 
these Means to a divine Favour and Assistance, [and] is enabled to go on from Strength to 
Strength, to cast off by Degrees [the] Original Corruption of his Nature, and so, 
progressively, according to the Nature of Free Agents, and probationary Creatures, has his 
inward Constitution (All the Faculties and Powers of his Mind …) thus recover’d, rectify’d 
and improv’d. And this great Change, or rather this changing State, commencing in at our 
Baptism, and gradually encreasing with our own Endeavours, is, by a figurative Way of 
Expression, very frequent in the holy Scriptures, call’d Regeneration, or a New Birth.108 
 
Here the original dispute ends with a final reply from Whitefield’s supporter, in which 
Tucker is advised to ‘meddle no more with Controversy’ since he does not have ‘a Head 
																																																																			
106 In Life of George Whitefield, p. 48, Tucker claims that the ‘Deists seem strongly inclined to favour 
[Whitefield’s] Cause, and [therefore] foment the Division [within the established Church]’. 
107 Shelton, Dean Tucker, p. 26. This is something that Butler’s diffidence and reserve appears to have 
protected him from. 
108 Gentleman’s Magazine, IX, p. 296; Life of George Whitefield, pp. 49-50. Note Tucker’s reference to 
Covenantalism, as in the ‘Covenant of Grace’. 
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turned for the Management of a Dispute’.109 As Shelton notes, ‘no advice has been so 
thoroughly rejected by anyone’, for this was merely Tucker’s ‘opening barrage in a 
lifetime devoted to controversial writing’.110 Yet in more substantive terms, Tucker’s 
involvement in this early debate is extremely important that it points to a developing 
orthodox mind that, though youthful, is nonetheless filled with intellectual vigour, and 
equally draws inspiration from Butler at a time when the contemporaneous dispute 
between religious heterodoxy and orthodoxy was at its height. Indeed, at the very point 
where Tucker speaks of the ‘Fundamental Principle[s] of all Religion, natural and 
revealed’, he provides a footnote comprised of a list of influential contemporary 
orthodox works by the likes of William Wollaston (1659-1724), Conybeare, and of 
course Butler himself; all of whom Tucker thinks corroborate his view of the 
established faith.111 Nevertheless, in Whitefield’s so-called obstinacy, Tucker reports 
that the Methodist retorted in person that these were all merely ‘Defences of the 
outward, or Historical Part of Religion; and that the Authors knew nothing of the internal 
and saving Faith’.112 From Tucker’s perspective, then, Whitefield appeared evermore 
determined to differentiate himself from the established Church – seemingly by any 
means, as we shall see in Section VI below. 
 
V. The Methodist Controversy II: Butler, Wesley and the ‘Virtuous Temper of 
Mind’. 
  
The reason why Tucker deemed it so important to catechise Whitefield and to request an 
account of his theology was because of his clear concern regarding the vigour of 
Whitefield’s potentially unorthodox views.113 Moreover, since the founding Methodist 
was known to be a powerful orator, there is also a sense in which Tucker identified 
Whitefield with the mischiefs of demagoguery, a general concern of his that became 																																																																			
109 Printed only in Life of George Whitefield, under the title ‘An Answer to Mr. Tucker’s Defense of His 
Queries: In a Second Letter to that Gentleman’, at p. 58.  
110 Shelton, Dean Tucker, p. 28. 
111 The works Tucker cites are William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated (London, 1722) 
(whose Stoicism Butler had referred to in Fifteen Sermons); The Cure of Deism: Or, The Mediatorial 
Scheme by Jesus Christ The Only True Religion (London, 1736), by Elisha Smith (perhaps the 
pseudonym of an unknown author); John Conybeare, Defence of Reveal’d Religion (London, 1732); a 
‘Sermon on the Harmony of Natural and Revealed Religion’ by a Mr. Hart; and finally Butler’s Analogy, 
perhaps saving the most influential for last. 
112 Gentleman’s Magazine, IX, p. 296, n.; Life of George Whitefield, p. 49, n.  
113 On the importance of catechising in the established Church, see Gerald Bray, Anglican Canons, 1527-
1947, (Woodbridge, 1998), p. 349 & Ingram, Religion, Reform and Modernity, p.  81. 
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evermore engrained as the eighteenth century progressed. In this, Tucker thought 
similarly to Butler’s old friend Secker, by then a long time Anglican convert and at that 
time Bishop of Oxford.114 In a letter dated September 1739, for example, Secker 
complained to his brother that the Methodists, and ‘particularly Mr Whitefield, seem 
blown up with a vanity which I fear hath and will lead them into mighty wrong 
behaviour’; and in the following year he and Whitefield continued to exchange icy 
letters.115 Above all, however, as Anglican prelates, the likes of Tucker, Secker and 
Butler – and of course Whitefield and Wesley themselves – were obliged to uphold the 
legal and administrative obligations of the established Church, comprised not only of 
the Prayer Book and the Thirty-Nine Articles, but also the Homilies, statute law and the 
Church’s canons, many of which the two latter clergymen appeared to be abjuring. It 
was this, then, more than anything that troubled the established Church regarding the 
growing popularity of the Methodists, and, again, as we shall see in the following 
section, Tucker’s Principles of Methodism (1742) was the first orthodox account of the 
burgeoning sect deemed necessary precisely on this account.  
  
Before detailing the contents of Tucker’s publication, however, we turn at this stage to 
the parallel exchange between Butler and Wesley, in an effort to bring the matters we 
are discussing in this chapter into even sharper focus. Like Whitefield, Wesley arrived 
in Bristol from America in April 1739, and immediately took to the former’s style of 
open air preaching.116 Unsurprisingly, this meant that he too soon came into contact 
with the Bristol authorities. Consequently, Wesley and Butler agreed to meet on 
numerous occasions in the summer of 1739 to discuss Wesley’s theology, in much the 																																																																			
114 Secker probably conformed in 1720 or 1721, according to Porteus, Life and Character of Secker, pp. 
4-5, 7 & Ingram, Religion, Reform and Modernity, pp. 37-8, which would support the claim that Butler 
convinced him of the equanimity of the established Church while at Oxford in the mid-to-late-1710s. 
Secker remained close with Butler until their relationship soured in the 1740s, before reconciling shortly 
before Butler’s death in 1752. Indeed, it was Secker who had recommended his old friend to Queen 
Caroline as early as 1732, and who had also helped to edit both Fifteen Sermons and The Analogy. 
Regarding the former, Secker wrote: ‘I took much Pains in making [Butler’s] meaning easier to be 
apprehended. Yet they were called obscure’. As for the latter, Secker stated: ‘I was somewhat serviceable 
to [Butler] in the Method & Thoughts of this Book; but very much in making the Language of it more 
accurate & intelligible, which cost me a great deal of time & pains’. See Autobiography of Thomas 
Secker, pp. 10, 16 & again, Ingram, Religion, Reform and Modernity, pp. 52-3. This corresponds with 
Tucker’s description of Butler five years after the bishop’s death as ‘that deep, sagacious Author’ who 
would probably be even more popular ‘were his manner of Writing a little more pleasing and alluring’, in 
Instructions (1757-8), p. 6. 
115 LPL, MS 1719, f. 15: Secker to George Secker, sr., 11 Sept [1739]; LPL, MS 1123/I, ff. 132–43. Cited 
in Ingram, Religion, Reform and Modernity, pp. 223-4. 
116 Although older than Whitefield, Wesley was considered his protégé, and was presented as such at this 
stage. 
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same way that Tucker had attempted with Whitefield, though on these occasions in 
private. In one such meeting dated to 18 August 1739, for example, a formal 
examination of Wesley took place regarding a recent accusation he had made, to the 
effect that Tucker was doctrinally heterodox.117 Nevertheless, it is in fact a meeting held 
two days previously on 16 August that is of immediate concern to us, for it was here 
that Butler uttered his famous and oft-quoted admonishment of Whitefield: ‘Sir, the 
pretending to extraordinary revelation and gifts of the Holy Ghost is a horrid thing, a 
very horrid thing!’118  
  
Waterman has suggested that with this comment, Butler was chiding Wesley on the very 
specific grounds that he appeared to be undermining Articles VI, VIII, XVII, XIX, XX, 
XXI, XXII and XXVIII of the faith.119 While this may very well have been the case, 
Tennant qualifies this position by noting that Butler actually ‘approached the problem 
[of Wesley] as primarily political’ rather than theological, in the sense that he was 
inclined to raise only those ‘questions which were covered by specific statute law as 
well as by the canons’. In other words, here Tennant speculates that a ‘pedantic or 
aggressive’ Butler might have chosen to examine Wesley more stringently than he did, 
and that he was possibly exercising deliberate discretion in light of his own emergence 
from Old Dissent (incidentally, this might also explain why contrarily, Tucker was far 
terser with Whitefield). Consequently, even if Butler was ‘faced with rebellion from 
within the Church itself’, Tennant argues that it was a conscious decision on the part of 
Butler to act ‘professionally disapproving but not intentionally punitive’, meaning in 
turn that he was not expressly ‘disapprov[ing] of mystical experience’ per se, but rather 
of Wesley’s broader ‘ecclesiastical presumption’. 120  Further to this, it is entirely 
plausible that Butler’s subsequent advice to Wesley that he should ‘go hence [from this 																																																																			
117 We shall return to this at pp. 154-5 below.  
118 R. P. Heitzenrater, The Elusive Mr. Wesley, John Wesley His Own Biographer, 2 vols., (Nashville: 
Abington, 1984), Vol. I, p. 114. Wesley himself also recorded accounts of his meetings with Butler, see 
his Works, Thomas Jackson (ed.), (Third Ed., London, 1831), Vol. XIII, pp. 499-501. 
119 Waterman, Christian Theology and Political Economy, p. 28: ‘It is “horrid” because it undermines 
several of the thirty-nine Articles of Religion … to which Whitefield and Wesley had assented … It is 
“very horrid” because it blasphemes the uniqueness and sufficiency of the revelation of God in Christ’. 
120 This corresponds with Lori Branch’s view that Butler’s Analogy espouses tolerance, in the sense that 
Butler maintains that true religion should not be dealt with in dogmatic ‘either or’ dichotomies. 
Additionally, Branch claims that Butler therefore rejects the idea that faith is purely ‘rational or 
irrational’, or completely ‘logical or mystical’ – for as we saw in Chapter Three, in Butler’s view 
existence is unitary rather than dialectical. See Branch, ‘Bishop Butler’ in Hass et al. (eds.), Oxford 
English Literature and Theology, p. 591. 
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diocese]’ was not spoken in terms of a reprimand on theological grounds, as is typically 
believed, but rather as a warning that he was ‘chiefly at risk from statute law’.121 
  
If what Tennant calls the ‘constitutional’ aspect of Butler and Wesley’s meeting 
demonstrates the former’s tolerance of the latter, on the other hand, their ensuing 
discussion on specifically theological issues brings the Butlerian conception of 
Christianity, as opposed to the Wesleyan,  overwhelmingly to the fore. The altercation is 
a first-hand account taken from Wesley’s own hand, and so is worth citing in full: 
  
Butler: Why, Sir, our faith itself is a good work; it is a virtuous temper of mind. Wesley: My 
Lord, whatever faith is, our Church asserts, we are justified by faith alone [sola fide]. But 
how it can be called a good work, I see not: It is the gift of God; and a gift that presupposes 
nothing in us, but sin and misery. Butler: How, Sir? Then you make God a tyrannical Being, 
if he justifies some without any goodness in them preceding, and does not justify all. If these 
are not justified on account of some moral goodness in them, why are not these justified too? 
Wesley: Because, my Lord, they “resist his Spirit,” because they suffer Him not to “work in 
them both to will and to do.” They cannot be saved, because they will not believe. Butler: 
Sir, what do you mean by faith? Wesley: My Lord, by justifying faith I mean, a conviction 
wrought in a man by the Holy Ghost, that Christ hath loved him, and given himself for him; 
and that, through Christ, his sins are forgiven. Butler: I believe some good men have this, but 
not all. But how do you prove this to be the justifying faith taught by our Church? Wesley: 
My Lord, from her Homily on Salvation, where she describes it thus: “A sure trust and 
confidence which a man hath in God, that through the merits of Christ his sins are forgiven, 
and he reconciled to the favour of God.” Butler: Why, Sir, this is quite another thing. Wesley: 
My Lord, I conceive it to be the very same.122 
 
Within this dialogue can be seen the clear attempts made by Butler to remain 
scrupulously faithful to, and consistent with, both the tone and message of Fifteen 
Sermons and The Analogy. In particular, the opening statement that the Anglican faith is 
analogous to a ‘virtuous temper of mind’ (in other words, that it is a ‘psychologically-
oriented’ religion) is absolutely key, since it is here that Butler replicates the earlier 
claim made in Fifteen Sermons that the religious ‘Temper of Mind’ is analogous to 
‘Resignation to the Divine Will … the habitual Frame of our Mind and Heart … in Acts 
of Devotion’.123 For, by likening faith to both ‘good works’ and ‘temper of mind’ in 
such fashion, Butler is reiterating in an overtly theological context the central theme of 																																																																			
121 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 132-3, 134-5. Tennant lists the canons Wesley was in 
possible breach of as: ‘[re 1640] numbers 1.1 and 1.2 A (the monarch’s supremacy over the Church); 4 
(doctrinal orthodoxy); 5.1 (schism and sectaries); 5.3 (conventicles); 6 (subscription); 8 (orthodox 
preaching)’; [& re 1603] numbers ‘50 (preaching unlicensed); 71 (private preaching); 72 (casting out 
devils); 73 (private conventicles of ministers)’. 
122 Wesley, Works, Jackson (ed.), Vol. XIII, pp. 499-501. 
123 Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 274; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 280. Cf. p. 109, above. 
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Fifteen Sermons more generally – i.e., that faith resides both ‘inwardly’ (temper of 
mind; self-interest; private sphere) and ‘outwardly’ (good works; sociability; public 
sphere). Consequently, here Butler is repeating the claim that the Christian faith, and 
thereby meta-ethics in a broader sense, implies the mediation of the private and social 
relations of humankind.124 Viewed from this perspective, then, Butler’s conversation 
with Wesley can and ought be read as a further pronunciation of the overall Butlerian 
scheme, in that the bishop now posits in his maturity that faith itself is dualistic-unitary, 
and furthermore, that both ‘temper of mind/inward faith’ and ‘good works/outward 
faith’ share the same ontological value. In Tennant’s view, this therefore results in a 
peculiarly Butlerian (re)-formulation of the Ecclesia Anglicana as via media; one that 
proves ‘equal to meeting the test of doctrinal orthodoxy, even if, as [apologetic, it is not 
a classic formulation] of it’.125  
  
In tandem, then, with Tucker’s earlier Butlerian criticism of Whitefield, it is plain to see 
that these various exchanges place the orthodox pair squarely at odds with the 
Methodist insistence that salvation consists in a one-off conversion experience. For as 
we saw in the The Analogy, although Butler accepts that it is faith and not reason that 
constitutes the basis for human ethics, as an aside, Butler also insists that faith, whilst 
presupposing doubt, happens to be the product of both ‘good work’ and ‘temper of 
mind’, in the very specific sense that faith rests on good moral conduct sustained by 
frequent religious practice. In substantive terms, this clearly entails deferring to 
orthodox Church liturgy, the Thirty-Nine Articles and the Prayer Book on all points, 
because Butler (and so by extension Tucker) believes that the Church is the legitimate 
body that has been put in place by God to assist individuals in their personal and social 
journey of faith. Unsurprisingly, therefore, this problematises Wesley and Whitefield’s 
various claims because, according to both Butler and Tucker, the tenets of Methodism, 
and particularly the ‘rapturous conversion’ synonymous with it, happen to undermine 
the very validity of the structural and institutional support of the established Church 
																																																																			
124 Nevertheless, as the closing passage of Fifteen Sermons makes clear, this always involves ‘implicit 
submission’ to God: ‘… in all Lowliness of Mind we set lightly by Ourselves: That we form our Temper 
to an implicit Submission to Divine Majesty; beget within ourselves an absolute Resignation to all the 
Methods of his Providence in his Dealings with the Children of Men: That in the deepest Humility of our 
Soul we prostrate ourselves before Him … FINIS’, Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 312; Fifteen Sermons 1729, 
p. 318; emphasis added. 
125 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 137-8. 
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itself.126 Put another way, Tucker and Butler insist that Methodism is what we now call 
‘anti-social’ precisely because, in the words of Shelton, Wesley threatens to cause ‘with 
one pass of his wand the Church of England to disappear like a phantasm’;127 and if we 
recall, according to Butler’s Fifteen Sermons, the Anglican Church is coterminous with 
the societal aspects of human existence, thereby rendering it the church militant here in 
earth. Conversely, however, Wesley takes ‘the whole world as his parish’.128 
  
Hence, although Butler does not deny that rapturous conversion may be legitimate, or at 
least suited to some men (since he concedes that it may be their personal understanding 
of faith), nevertheless, Butler also insists that he has little to no personal experience of 
it, and that in his opinion, it is far more appropriate to teach that salvation consists in 
‘process’ rather than ‘event’ – a clear reiteration of The Analogy’s insistence that God 
‘appears deliberate throughout his Operations; accomplishing his natural Ends, by slow 
successive Steps’.129 What is more, this position is fully consistent with Tucker’s earlier 
claim, made in the Gentleman’s Magazine regarding the issue of regeneration and 
rebirth, where he highlights the established Church’s role in imparting ‘divine Favour 
and Assistance’ on those who desire to ‘progressively’ ‘cast off by Degrees’ their 
‘Original Corruption’.130 Even more significantly, this is a position that Tucker would 
go on to clarify in Sermon IV of Seventeen Sermons (1776), which in all likelihood was 
an anti-Methodist homily preached at or around this time: 
 
… nevertheless, as the Notion of Sudden and Instantaneous Conversions, and the Pangs of 
the New-Birth, has been, and may still be held by some well-meaning Christians, to be a 
Doctrine of the Gospel [...] if it be necessary, or at least expedient, that some Sort of Men 
should be wrought on by quick Impulses, or sudden Shocks, it is equally certain, that others 
may be converted by more gentle Methods, and gradual Convictions: Examples of which are 
plentifully recorded in the Scriptures.131 
 																																																																			
126 This chimes with Tucker’s later claim that the established Church is a ‘venerable Structure’, and that it 
ought not to be pulled down on account of a few creeds and articles being less than perfect, in Apology, p. 
55. Cf. Young, Religion and Enlightenment, pp. 69-70. 
127 Shelton, Dean Tucker, p. 30.  
128 Rivers, in Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, p. 4 – a modification of Wesley’s phrase in his journal 
dated to 11 June 1739 ‘I look upon all the world as my parish’. 
129, The Analogy, p. 192; emphasis added. 
130 Gentleman’s Magazine, IX (1739), p. 296.  
131 Seventeen Sermons, Sermon IV: I John iii. 7 and 8: ‘‘Let no Man deceive you: He, that doeth 
Righteousness, is righteous, even as he is righteous:---He, that commiteth Sin, is of the Devil’, pp. 63-78, 
this citation at pp. 67, 71. Butler and Tucker’s appeal to ‘gradation’ is also consistent with the Hookerian 
model of Episcopalian polity; cf. Hooker, Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie, McGrade (ed.), VIII, 2.1, p. 
139 & Chapter Two, p. 64. 
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It has been suggested by Tennant that the final meeting between Butler and Wesley, 
which took place two days later on 18 August 1739 and in which Wesley accused 
Tucker of doctrinal heterodoxy, may have been called in ‘retaliation’ for the recent 
publication of Tucker’s Life of George Whitefield.132 Yet whilst it is highly unlikely that 
Butler contributed to the composition of that particular text, it is probable that he 
assisted Tucker on another work on Methodism alongside the sermon which so offended 
Wesley, on account of its supposedly heretical views regarding atonement for original 
sin (both of which remain unpublished). 133  Yet since on this occasion Wesley’s 
complaint was deemed to be a formal one, this necessitated an official Church response, 
with attendant procedures. Therefore, unlike in the informal meeting of 16 August, on 
this occasion Wesley was faced by a panel consisting not only of Butler and Tucker, but 
also the president of Bristol Cathedral Carew Reynell (c. 1693/4-1745) and a minor 
canon John Sutton.  
  
As befitting the occasion, Butler’s tone was far more authoritative, if not even hostile. 
Here for example, he clearly demarcates Wesley (‘you’) from the established Church 
(‘my clergy’), his point essentially being that Wesley is acting in isolation (self-
interest), outside the acceptable bounds of the Anglican community (sociability): 
 
Nay, Mr Wesley, you did bring it as a matter of complaint. For when I said, ‘You have no 
right to make complaint against my clergy,’ you said you ‘thought everyone had a right to 
complain against those who taught false doctrine’.134 
 
Thereafter, then, Butler proceeded to defend the integrity of Tucker (clearly indicative 
of the former’s personal regard for the latter given that the two had only shortly met), on 
the very specific grounds that Wesley appeared ‘guilty of great want of candour and 
Christian charity’; these being two characteristics that the bishop was clearly unwilling, 
or unable, to overlook. In any case, since by his own admission Wesley could not be 
‘exact as to the [offending] words’ in Tucker’s sermon, he was eventually driven to 
retract his complaint, and thereafter the matter came to rest. However, since Butler 																																																																			
132 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 138-9. The contents of this meeting remained 
unpublished until the appearance of Baker’s ‘John Wesley and Bishop Joseph Butler: A Fragment of John 
Wesley’s Manuscript Journal 16th to 24th August 1739’, Proceedings of the Wesley Historical Society, 
Vol. XLII (May 1980), pp. 93-100. 
133 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 139. Butler’s influence on the publication of Principles 
of Methodism is fully acknowledged by Tucker himself, as we shall shortly see. 
134 Baker, ‘John Wesley and Bishop Joseph Butler: A Fragment …’, p. 99; emphases added. 
	 154	
chose not to pursue the matter any further regardless of the fact that Wesley ‘was clearly 
neither in the right nor a loyal Whig’, in Tennant’s view, this showed considerable 
‘forbearance’ on the bishop’s part. This is by no means an insignificant point, for as we 
shall see, meaningful and practicable demonstrations of ‘Whig toleration’ such as these, 
rather than mere tokenistic gestures, were to become a further defining characteristic of 
the ‘Butler-Tucker axis’.135 
  
VI. The Methodist Controversy III: Principles of Methodism. 
 
‘As is so often the fate with sectarian movements’, Shelton notes, ‘Methodism began to 
suffer from schism very soon after its birth’.136 Indeed, late in 1739, merely a few 
months after his meetings with Butler, Wesley finally broke away from the Moravians 
at the Fetter Lane Society and formed the first official Methodist Society in Moorgate, 
known as the Foundery. For with the publication of Wesley’s sermon entitled Free 
Grace earlier in the same year, he had finally begun to challenge Whitefield’s 
admittedly moderate but increasingly Calvinistic tendencies, claiming that they both 
discouraged holiness and encouraged fatalism.137 As Rivers notes, this position ‘was to 
remain the essence of [Wesley’s] primarily practical objection to Calvinism’,138 and the 
resulting exchange between the two clergymen – clearly mirroring the dispute between 
Calvinists and Remonstrants during the Synod of Dort (1618-9) – resulted in the 
irrevocable split between the one-time brothers-in-arms.139 Although in ensuing years 
attempts at reconciliation were frequently made between the pair, the fact that their 
followers displayed far more partisanship than they meant that their differences could 
never be reconciled. Nevertheless, both men remained on civil terms, and shortly before 
his death in 1770 Whitefield requested that his old friend and adversary provide his 
funeral sermon – a request that was obliged.140 Yet however that may be, in the early 
1740s, when the divisions between Whitefield, Wesley and their disciples remained 
inconclusive, this provided the established Church with the perfect opportunity to 																																																																			
135 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 140. 
136 Shelton, Dean Tucker, p. 30. 
137 Wesley, Sermons, Outler (ed.), II, pp. 341-3. 
138 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I, p.  
139 Ibid., Chap. 1, & esp. pp. 9-12, provides a useful summary of the consequences of the clash between 
Calvinism and Arminianism, particularly on the religious language of educated seventeenth and 
eighteenth-century Britons. 
140 Cf. Ibid., p. 212. 
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document their travails – thereby resulting in the publication of Tucker’s Principles of 
Methodism in 1742. 
  
Tucker begins the preface to Principles of Methodism with an apology for the tract 
appearing ‘so late, and as it were, at the close of the Controversy’ (since the tracts 
appeared three years after Wesley and Whitefield’s initial split), and he then proceeds 
with a recital of the events leading to its publication. A year previously in 1742, he 
writes, the archbishop of Armagh Hugh Boulter (1672-1742) had requested that an 
‘eminent Person’ draw up ‘an authentick account of the divisions and quarrels of the 
Methodists’. That ‘eminent person’ being none other than Butler, based upon his 
dealings with Whitefield and Wesley, alongside the publication of the Life of George 
Whitefield in 1739, Tucker notes that his bishop was ‘pleased to think favourably of me, 
as being a person well acquainted with their principles and proceedings, and therefore 
the better qualified to make an Essay towards giving a Satisfactory Answer to his 
Grace’s Inquiries’.141 Whether Tucker was in truth the better qualified of the two is 
debateable, yet this is beside the point. Clearly the bishop was here advancing his 
chaplain’s interests in the capacity of a senior figure assisting a young protégé in the 
early stages of their career – a particularly useful demonstration of Butler’s charitable 
and benevolent disposition, and, moreover, of the necessary extrusion of his moral 
philosophy into daily life and professional conduct. 
  
As Tucker notes in the preface, the main purpose of Principles of Methodism is to 
document the discrepancies between the Methodists, and to account for the ‘divisions 
and quarrels’ then afflicting them. He therefore begins the work by attempting to 
delineate the various theological ‘strands’ from which Methodism itself is ‘woven’.142 
Noting that Wesley had expressly acknowledged the High-Church enemy of Mandeville 
and Tindal, William Law, as Methodism’s influential ‘schoolmaster to bring them unto 
Christ’, from the outset Tucker states that this was the first of the Methodist’s 
mistakes.143 For Law’s theology, he claims, some of which we have discussed in 																																																																			
141 Principles of Methodism, ‘Preface’. 
142 Shelton, Dean Tucker, p. 31. 
143 For Law’s influence on Methodism see Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I, p. 218 & cf. this 
study, Chapter Two, p. 81. As we touched on there, it was Law’s mystical allusion to Christian 
‘perfectionism’ that the Methodists found so appealing; hence Young describes him as the ‘supreme 
representative’ of eighteenth-century mysticism in Religion and Enlightenment, p. 122. 
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Chapter Two, is little more than a ‘crude mixture’ of those ‘two famous Systems’, 
Calvinism and Arminianism; the former for Law’s acceptance of total depravity, and the 
latter for his concession that humankind is bestowed with the ‘Paradisiacal state still 
subsisting; by virtue of which’, Tucker goes on to explain, ‘we can co-operate with the 
Grace of God’. From both schemes, Tucker writes, Law ‘builds up a new one of his 
own, borrowing such materials from each that he approved of, and rejecting the Rest … 
sometimes lean[ing] towards the Calvinists, and sometimes towards the Arminians, 
without directly falling in with either’.144 Yet in the process of doing so, Tucker pins the 
Butlerian conception of Christianity firmly to the Arminian mast, since, he points out, 
the Arminian account of ‘restor’d Grace’ coincides with such Butlerian concepts as 
‘Conscience’ (reflection); ‘infused Habit’ (good works); the ‘beginnings of virtue in the 
mind’ (temper of mind), and finally the ‘seeds of religion’ (which is the established 
Church): 
 
Therefore this … Inward Gospel, or Christ within us, This principle of Holiness, Capacity of 
obtaining Salvation, Instinct of Goodness, This moral Sense, taste, or relish, Conscience, 
new Creation, infused Habit … is strictly and truly the beginnings of virtue in the mind, the 
seeds of religion, which are afterwards left to us to cultivate and improve, or a substratum 
left for us to build upon.145 
 
Next, Tucker turns to the transposition of Law’s ‘crude and undigested notion of a 
system’ on to Whitefield and Wesley’s ‘medley of principles’.146 In particular, Tucker 
draws attention to Whitefield’s earliest preaching of the doctrine of the ‘new birth’, 
which, he writes, elicited mixed responses upon first being heard. For example, when 
critics thought that Whitefield was teaching ‘a branch of the Calvinistical System 
revived’, here Tucker notes that ‘the poor man was in a maze’, for he ‘knew nothing of 
Calvinism nor could he tell how to support his own side independently of it’. 
Conversely, when Calvinists defended him on this very same point, Tucker writes that 
Whitefield was so ‘glad to find his expressions countenanced by so many great men’ 
that it encouraged him to read further into the tenets of Calvinism itself. In consequence, 
‘through a Blunder on his side, and a Mistake of the Question on all sides, Mr 
Whitefield fell in love with the Calvinistical party’, without becoming an ‘Adept’ at their 																																																																			
144 Principles of Methodism, pp. 7-9, 12. 
145 Principles of Methodism, p. 11. Note once again Tucker’s allusion to the structural integrity of the 
Church of England, which it is ‘left for us to build upon’. Cf. n. 127 of this chapter, above. 
146 Principles of Methodism, p. 12. 
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theology, and neither at the expense of his original allegiance to Law.147 This meant, 
therefore, that upon his arrival in America, Whitefield once again became confused 
when the Pennsylvanian Presbyterians challenged the Arminian traits in his system.148 
Nevertheless, Tucker ends the opening sections of Principles of Methodism with a pert 
summary of Whitefield’s theological schema: ‘excepting the particular of the inherent, 
or inward Christ’, he writes dismissively, ‘he [Whitefield] is now, in all other [four] 
points, a thorough paced Calvinist’.149 
  
Having explained Whitefield’s position rather glibly,150 Tucker’s attention – and indeed 
the bulk of the tract – switches to Wesley’s historical trajectory; much of which is now 
well known, of course, even if this was not necessarily the case in 1742. Here Tucker 
explains that upon his arrival in Georgia in 1735, Wesley had ‘met with some Moravian 
Teachers, who infused some strange particularities into him about the Assurances of 
Grace and Justification’. Returning to England two years later, Tucker next alleges that 
it was the German-born Moravian Peter Böhler (1712-75) who was thereby responsible 
for convincing Wesley that ‘conversion was an instantaneous work’, and that ‘faith … 
alone justifies’.151 Detailing thereafter the origins of the Moravians themselves, Tucker 
notes that they ‘are nothing more than a small number of Peasants’ located at Herrnhut, 
Saxony, under their ‘Count’, ‘Bishop’ and ‘Temporal Lord’, Nicolaus Zinzendorf 
(1700-60) – the inference clearly being that they are a strange and rustic minority 
sect.152 He then proceeds to cite liberally from Wesley’s Journal regarding the many 
influences from his travels that the clergyman has retained for his own system, the many 
																																																																			
147 Principles of Methodism, pp. 12-3. 
148 In a tract entitled An Extract of Sundry Passages taken out of Mr Whitefield’s Printed Sermons, 
Journals and Letters together with some Scruples proposed in proper Queries rais’d on each Remark, 
(London, 1741). 
149 Principles of Methodism, pp. 16-21; at pp. 18-9, Tucker draws particular attention to Whitefield’s 
confusion between Law’s ideas and Quakerism.  
150 It is probable that Tucker neglected to linger over Whitefield because he had already published the 
detailed Life of George Whitefield three years previously. 
151 Principles of Methodism, pp. 21-2. Wesley confirms the veracity of this claim in the second part of his 
Journal, esp. the entries for 18 February, 4 March & 24 May, The Journal of the Rev. John Wesley, A. M., 
N. Curnock (ed.), (London, 1909-16), I, pp. 440, 442, 465; Cf. Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I., 
p. 209. 
152 Principles of Methodism, p. 24. 
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inconsistencies existing between each of them, and of course the many inconsistencies 
that Wesley’s theology bears as a direct result:153  
  
This is the Sound and orthodox Divinity Mr Wesley so much longed after, and took such 
Pains to acquire,---And were it necessary, I believe an hundred other Absurdities might be 
fully and fairly made out, by deducing one article from another, and comparing them 
together. But what is already done, I suppose is enough for a sample of these Discordia 
Semina Rerum. --- Only let me observe, that upon his return from Germany he seemed to 
improve in the Spirit of Inconsistency.154 
 
In an effort to remain fair and judicious, Tucker does acknowledge, however, Wesley’s 
attempts at ‘reconciling these jarring Elements, and reducing them into some kind of 
order and uniformity’. Yet because Tucker does not accept that Wesley has succeeded 
in this endeavour, he therefore reduces (in the pejorative sense) the latter’s theology to 
the following three-stage system: 
 
I. Before Justification; In which state we may be said to be unable to do anything 
acceptable to God: Because then we can do nothing, but come to Christ … 
II. After Justification; The moment a man comes to Christ, then he is justified, and born 
again … in an imperfect sense … He has Christ with him, but not Christ in him … But 
being exposed to various temptations, he may, and will fall again from this condition, 
and be unjustified again, if he doth not attain to a more excellent Gift. viz.  
III. Sanctification; the last highest state of Perfection in this Life. --- For then are the 
faithful born again in the full and perfect Sense. --- Then have they the indwelling … 
Spirit. --- Then is there given unto them a new and clean Heart. [For] They have 
obtained a compleat Victory … the time of their Probation is ended.155 
 
Here, Tucker’s delineation of the third stage in Wesley’s scheme is especially 
important, since it is perhaps the earliest orthodox definition of the Wesleyan appeal to 
Christian perfection; a doctrine which, borrowing heavily from William Law, stressed 
that the fulfilment of perfection in God’s love was readily obtainable here on earth.156 In 																																																																			
153 Principles of Methodism, pp. 25-34. Tucker’s list includes Böhler and Zizendorf, and the German 
Moravians Michael Linner (1692-1760), David Nitschman (c. 1694/5-1772), Albinus Theodorus Feder 
and the brothers Augustine and Zarcharius Neuffer. 
154 Principles of Methodism, p. 35. 
155 Principles of Methodism, pp. 36-7. Cf. Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I, p. 234, where she 
states similarly that the Wesleyan pursuit of perfection can be identified in the stages of ‘[1] repentance, 
faith, justification (i.e. the individual’s pardon and acceptance by God, assurance (his recognition that he 
is justified), [2] the new birth (the beginning of sanctification), and [3] sanctification, otherwise holiness 
or perfection’. 
156 Thereby rendering it the most controversial doctrine of the Methodist movement itself, according to 
Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I, pp. 244-50. For Wesley’s specific sermons on ‘Christian 
perfection’, see his Christian Perfection, (London, 1741); Farther Thoughts Upon Christian Perfection, 
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this way, Tucker’s tract can therefore be seen to anticipate the century-long Methodist 
controversy, especially via his insistence that the notion of Christian perfection is 
simply ‘pushing matters to an extreme one way, as the Calvinists do another [i.e., via 
the latter’s doctrine of total depravity]’: 
 
These words, and indeed the constant tenor of their preaching, and writing do certainly 
imply, as if such a Perfection was attainable, and ought to be attained by every one in this 
Life, before he can be received to happiness in the next, as is free, not only from wilful Sins, 
from sins of deliberation and choice … but also from all moral frailties, weaknesses and 
imperfections i.e. from such slips and failings in our duty, arising from surprize, hurry of 
temptation, or any other pitiable circumstance, that are really and properly Sins of 
Infirmity.157  
 
In other words, here we see Tucker once again expounding the general moderatism of 
the establishment, whilst also adhering to the view that human existence in the material 
world is one of toil, immoderation or anomaly – a world full of ‘Incumbrances indeed’, 
as Butler had written in Fifteen Sermons, ‘but such as we are obliged to carry about with 
us, through this various Journey of Life’.158  
  
Although like Butler, then, Tucker is far more disposed towards the optimism of 
Arminianism as opposed to the pessimism of Calvinism (recall, for example, Tucker’s 
description of humans as ‘free agents’ and ‘probationary’, rather than predestined, 
creatures in the Gentleman’s Magazine and Life of George Whitefield), nevertheless, 
according to Tucker, to move beyond optimism towards fanaticism or enthusiasm is, as 
we know, the resounding fallacy of any upholder of the eighteenth-century political and 
religious establishment.159 Worse still, if such enthusiasm has been arrived at via a 
mixture of unsound and unstudied maxims, Tucker thinks that a ‘civil war’ must 
necessarily ensue; and this is precisely his explanation as to the dispute then presiding 
between Whitefield, Wesley and their followers. For, according to Tucker, since Wesley 
in particular never ‘renounced Mr Law’s system’ but also went on to embrace the 
‘Moravian reveries’, he claims that Wesley thereby constructed a theology whereby ‘Mr 
Law laid the groundwork, and the Brethren at Hernhuth raised the superstructure’ – both 	
(London, 1763) & A Plain Account of Christian Perfection, As Believed and Taught by the Rev. Mr. John 
Wesley, From the Year 1725, to the Year 1765, (Bristol, 1766). For Law’s Christian perfectionism, see 
Chapter Two, Section V. 
157 Principles of Methodism, pp. 38-9. 
158 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 155-6; Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 155-6. 
159 Gentleman’s Magazine, IX, p. 296; Life of George Whitefield, pp. 49-50. 
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of which were utterly incompatible with one another.160 Consequently, Tucker is certain 
that ‘the divisions and separations of the Methodists is a thing which all people of 
coolness, and a moderate penetration [i.e., the orthodox thinker] did foresee, and expect 
would come to pass’: 
 
For indeed they had on both sides, such a medley of all sorts of principles (Calvinism, 
Arminianism, Quakerism, Quietism, Montanism, all thrown together) that each had room 
enough to please his own fancy, and had enough besides to hold in common with the rest of 
his brethren. – And thus they might have run on, at least for a longer space of time (and 
especially had they been persecuted) in a continual round of rapture and inconsistency, 
without ever discovering whether they agreed, or disagreed with each other.161 
 
With these points in mind, Tucker brings Principles of Methodism to a close with a 
final, definitive account of the Wesleyan and Whitefieldian schism, and more 
importantly, of the position of the established Church in relation to both churchmen. 
Moreover, by doing so, Tucker reiterates the Butlerian account of Christian orthodoxy, 
involving scrupulous adherence to Scripture in tandem with Church liturgy, canon law, 
the Prayer Book and the Thirty-Nine Articles: 
 
If there are no Conditions, or Qualifications required previous to Justification, if we may 
soon be justified, without having attended to the means of Grace … as by attending to them, 
to what use, or purpose can they further serve? … Or what advantage are we to receive from 
the performance of them? […]  
 [Either Wesley] must give up the Doctrine of imputed Righteousness, and make 
Gospel Holiness to be a necessary Qualification antecedent to Justification; or else, if he 
holds to Imputation, he must strike of the Necessity of any Religious performances as 
previous and requisite to attain it. In short, there is no holding, or mixing both together; they 
are so incompatible, and contradictory to each other.162 
 
To which Tucker finally concludes with reference to his and Butler’s earlier episodes 
with Whitefield and Wesley: 
 																																																																			
160 As Young puts it in Religion and Enlightenment, p. 151: ‘Any attempt at characterizing John Wesley’s 
thought has to confront its essential feature—its eclecticism’. 
161 Principles of Methodism, p. 39; emphases added. Note once again the deployment of Butlerian 
terminology, as in ‘coolness’ and ‘moderate penetration’. Interestingly, in stating here that events would 
have ‘run on’ had the Methodists ‘been persecuted’, Tucker is in fact making two related points. First, 
that the Methodist quarrel was analogous, albeit on a microcosmic scale, to the previous century’s wars of 
religion (since Tucker believed that both phenomena bred religious enmity, violence, and the prospect of 
non-resolution). And secondly, that since the eighteenth-century established Church was benevolent 
enough not to condone persecution, Tucker believed that this was example enough of its moral and 
theological supremacy over the minority sects. 
162 Principles of Methodism, pp. 45, 46-7. 
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This, I hope, is a plain, uniform, and consistent Scheme; and yet the Substance of this 
Doctrine I have endeavoured to explain over and over in my Conversation with the 
Methodists; but either I am very unhappy and obscure in my Expressions, or they are 
strangely presupposed by a wrong Association of Ideas, which they could not sever from 
each other; for so it was, that they seldom understood me, or could be made Sensible of my 
Meaning.163 
 
VII. Laodicean Rationalism. 
 
As we steadily approach the conclusion to this chapter, it is worth briefly turning at this 
stage to Wesley’s reply to Tucker, published towards the end of 1742 and entitled The 
Principles of a Methodist. Here Wesley’s tone is far more conciliatory, referring to 
Tucker in the preface as ‘a Brother who is my own Soul’, and that he ‘Desire[s] … in 
every Word I say, to look upon Mr. Tucker as in his Place; and to speak no Tittle 
concerning the one in any other Spirit, than I wou’d speak concerning the other’. 164 A 
far cry, then, from having accused Butler’s young chaplain of doctrinal heterodoxy 
merely three years previously, Shelton speculates that Wesley’s tract ‘disagrees very 
little’ with what Tucker had to say about the Methodists, and in some respects this is 
indeed accurate. 165  For instance, regarding Tucker’s three-stage definition of the 
burgeoning sect,166 Wesley willingly declares that he desires ‘not a more Consistent 
Account of my Principles, than [Tucker] has himself given’. Likewise, in Part I of 
Wesley’s Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion (1745), alongside a later 
sermon entitled ‘The Scripture Way of Salvation’ (1765), Wesley goes on to give 
similar accounts of his theology to that which Tucker provided in 1742.167 Yet be that as 
it may, upon closer inspection it is plain to see that Shelton’s points do not go far 
enough, and that there are in fact some rather stark differences in their respective 
positions. An initial example of this concerns Tucker’s charge regarding William Law’s 
influence on the Methodists – an influence Tucker disavows based upon his belief in the 
impossibility of temporal Christian perfectionism – to which Wesley responds that in 
any case, the influence itself ‘is not proved’. ‘I had been Eight Years at Oxford’, he 
writes, ‘before I read any of Mr. Law’s Writings: And when I did, I was so far from 																																																																			
163 Principles of Methodism, p. 51. 
164 John Wesley, The Principles of a Methodist. Occasion’d by a late Pamphlet intitled, A Brief History of 
the Principles of METHODISM, (Bristol, 1742), ‘Preface’. 
165 Shelton, Dean Tucker, p. 35. 
166 Principles of Methodism, pp. 36-7, which we listed above at p. 159. 
167 Wesley, Principles of a Methodist, p. 29. For A Farther Appeal and ‘The Scripture Way’, see Works, 
XI, The Appeals to Men of Reason and Religion, Cragg (ed.), (Oxford, 1975).  
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making them my Creed, that I had Objections to almost every Page’.168 Likewise, then, 
concerning the Moravians, Hernhuth and Böhler, Wesley refutes the semantics of 
Tucker’s various accusations, drawing evidence from his journals as proof of the 
chronological veracity of his conversion experience(s).169  
  
By far the most significant example of the dissimilarities between Tucker and 
Whitefield can be seen, however, in the first section of Principles of a Methodist, which 
Wesley dedicates to a staunch defence of his belief in sinless Christian perfection, and 
the doctrine of sola fide. There, for example, he writes that 
 
the true Christian Faith, is not only to believe the Holy Scriptures and the Articles of our 
Faith are true; but also, To have a sure Trust and Confidence to be saved from everlasting 
Damnation by CHRIST, whereof doth follow a Loving Heart, to obey his Commandments.  
 
In Wesley’s eyes, then, to ‘be a Perfect Man [i.e., to achieve Christian perfection]’ is to 
be ‘sanctified throughout, created anew in JESUS CHRIST: Even to have a Heart so 
All-flaming with the LOVE OF GOD’. Moreover, in continuing his defence against 
charges of doctrinal heterodoxy (which was something Wesley had to grapple with for 
the rest of his life), Wesley concludes with a rather half-hearted attempt at establishment 
moderatism: ‘If there be any Thing Unscriptural in these Words, any Thing Wild or 
Extravagant, any Thing contrary to the Analogy of Faith or the Experience of Adult 
Christians, let them smite me friendly and reprove me’:170  
 
[That] I may say many Things which have been said before, and perhaps by Calvin or 
Arminius, by Montanus or Barclay, or the Archbishop of Cambray, is highly probable. But it 
cannot thence be infer’d, That I hold a “a Medley of all their Principles” … 
 [Perhaps], when I shall have receiv’d farther Light, I may be convinced that “Gospel-
Holiness (as Mr. Tucker believes) is a Necessary Qualification, antecedent to Justification 
…” … [But until then] I will endeavour, impartially, to consider, what shall be advanced in 
Defence of it.171 
 
The most important point to glean from Wesley’s various responses here is his denial of 
the claim that his theology is contrary to the ‘Analogy of Faith’ – a clear allusion, we 
may suggest, not only to Romans 12: 6 or more pertinently still the Westminster 																																																																			
168 Wesley, Principles of a Methodist, p. 14. 
169 Ibid., pp. 16-9. 
170 Ibid., pp. 1-13; these citations at pp. 7, 12, 13. 
171 Ibid., pp. 31-2. 
	 163	
Confession, but also Butler’s Analogy.172 This is both interesting and significant in that 
despite Wesley’s affirmations to the contrary, in an entry from his Journal written 
shortly after the publication of The Analogy itself, he had criticised Butler’s work by 
claiming that it was too difficult for the layperson to understand – precisely those 
members of society who Wesley believed were most in need of spiritual aid:  
 
I doubt [The Analogy] too hard for most of those for whom it is chiefly intended. For 
Freethinkers, so called, are seldom close thinkers. They will not be at the pains of reading 
such a book as this. One that would profit them must dilute his sense, or they will neither 
swallow nor digest it.173  
 
As we can see, then, in spite of the fact that both clergymen clearly attempted to bridge 
the gap between Church and laity, learned and unlearned, in their own respective ways, 
Wesley’s rather overt censure of Butler’s Analogy only serves to accentuate the 
differences between their doctrinal positions.174  
 
Here we are to remind ourselves of the overriding Wesleyan scheme: i.e., to bring 
inward emotion—or as Wesley himself calls it, the ‘Heart so all-flaming’—to the 
forefront of religion: ‘ad populam’, he writes elsewhere,  
 
to the bulk of mankind – to those who neither relish nor understand the art of speaking, but 
who notwithstanding are competent judges of those truths which are necessary to present and 
future happiness.175  
 
Above all, in doing so, Wesley is mistrustful of what he calls those ‘fair pictures’ of 
human nature, which elevate reason and rationality at the expense of the spirit, and 
which have become so pervasive ‘it is now quite unfashionable to talk otherwise, to say 
any thing to [their] disparagement’.176 According to Rivers, such ‘fair pictures are 
seductive and dangerous’. For if, as Wesley later puts it in The Arminian (1790), 
‘mankind are faultless by nature, naturally endued with light to see all necessary truth, 
and with strength to follow it’, revelation is but a ‘mere fable; one that we can do 																																																																			
172 Ibid., p. 7.  
173 Journal of Wesley, Curnock (ed.), V, p. 265. 
174 For Butler’s strategy, see esp. Chapter Three, Section IV. The remainder of discussion on Wesley in 
this section is heavily indebted to Rivers’, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I, Chap. 5: ‘John Wesley and 
the language of Scripture, reason, and experience’, pp. 205-53. 
175 Wesley, Sermons, Outler (ed.), ‘Preface’, I, pp. 103-4; emphasis added. 
176 Ibid., II, Sermon 44: ‘Original Sin’, pp. 172-3; Cf.  Sermon 128: ‘The Deceitfulness of the Human 
Heart’ (1792), IV, esp. p. 151. 
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perfectly well without’.177 Once again, then, it is this position which pits the Wesleyan 
scheme squarely against the Butlerian, albeit somewhat paradoxically. For quite aside 
from the differences between them in their earlier Bristol meetings, here we discern 
Wesley’s attempts to rally against those he believes tend towards atheism, rather than 
atheists themselves – Butler potentially, if not extraordinarily, numbered among them.  
  
This is fundamentally important, because whilst on the one hand Wesley does not think 
it possible for there to be many, if any, true atheists in existence (even among those who 
call themselves deists and freethinkers),178 on the other, by implication, his scheme is 
directed towards those moralists who he believes undermine Christianity from within, 
either wantonly or unwittingly, thereby rendering them little better, if not even more 
dangerous, than any atheist could ever be.179 With this general observation, Wesley is 
not explicitly pointing his finger at Butler per se, but rather at the likes of Butler’s 
fellow neo-Stoic, Hutcheson, whom Wesley at one point describes as that ‘smooth-
tongued orator of Glasgow, one of the most pleasing writers of the age!’180 According to 
Wesley, Hutcheson is particularly dangerous because he paints a picture of humankind 
that is at once prelapsarian and Shaftesburian, and yet masquerading as Christian. 
Hence, although he admits in his journal that Hutcheson ‘is a beautiful writer’, 
nevertheless, 
 
… his scheme cannot stand unless the Bible falls. I know both from Scripture, reason, and 
experience that … [it] is not true that no man is capable of malice, or delight in giving pain; 
much less that every man is virtuous, and remains so long as he lives; nor does the Scripture 
allow that any action is good which is done without any design to please God.181 
 
Furthermore, as a consequence of the type of influence Hutcheson, and of course 
Shaftesbury, appeared to be exerting on the eighteenth-century intellect, Wesley states 
that ‘almost all men of letters’ throughout contemporary Europe (and in one of his final 
sermons he referred explicitly to ‘the great triumvirate, Rousseau, Voltaire and David 
Hume’) have constructed a ‘fashionable’ religion that stands ‘on its own foundation, 																																																																			
177 Wesley, Works, Jackson (ed.) Cf. Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, II, pp. 229-30. 
178 Wesley, Sermons, Outler (ed.), IV, Sermon 130: ‘On Living without God’ [1790], p. 171. This is no 
doubt symptomatic of the fact that open admissions of atheism were rare. See Rivers, Reason, Grace, and 
Sentiment, I, p. 44. 
179 We noted this above at p. 142. 
180 Ibid., III, Sermon 106: ‘On Faith’ [1788], p. 499. 
181 Journal of Wesley, Curnock (ed.), V, pp. 492-5. 
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independent of revelation whatever’. Whether it is called ‘‘humanity’, ‘virtue’, 
‘morality’, or what you please’, he concludes, ‘it is neither better nor worse than 
atheism’.182 
  
We must tread extremely carefully here. Clearly, Butler was neither a sceptic nor an 
unbeliever in the mould of Shaftesbury, Voltaire, Hume or the like, and neither did 
Wesley believe him to be so. Yet however that may be, as in the case of the professedly 
Christian Hutcheson, what Wesley was ultimately wary of was that which could be 
inferred from the Butlerian method: specifically, its neo-Stoic elevation of reason and 
rationality, alongside its concomitant basis in Newtonian physico-theology. 183 
Essentially, then, Wesley’s position with regard to Butler rested on his general, though 
deep, mistrust of the contemporary overestimation of reason, which, in spite of our 
claims to the contrary in our examination of Fifteen Sermons and The Analogy above, 
Wesley believes Butler espouses over and above the Christian mysteries; and which, if 
correct or justified, renders the doctrine of the fall obsolete.184 It is by these means, then, 
that Wesley continued to tread Law’s Augustinian-rigorist (and thereby arguably 
Calvinist) path, by insisting that reason could never be sufficient to restrain the 
passions.185 For indeed, according to Wesley, the frequent overreach of humanity’s 
passions was simply unavoidable because of the fall: ‘a plain, glaring, apparent 
condition of human kind’, he wrote.186  
  
It is in the context of the Butler-Wesley debate, then, that Clifford Johnson once 
referred to bishop Butler as a ‘Laodicean Rationalist’; Laodicean being a synonym for 
‘latitudinarian’, as John Gascoigne reliably informs us, and a pejorative one among 
many contemporaries at that.187 One of the early centres of the primitive church, 																																																																			
182 Wesley, Sermons, Outler (ed.), IV, Sermon 120: ‘The Unity of the Divine Being’ [1790], pp. 68-9. As 
Rivers puts it, although Wesley concedes that the ‘majority recognise that religion consists of two parts, 
duty to both God and our neighbour’, nevertheless as far as he is concerned the problem arises when ‘they 
forget the first and put the second for the whole duty of man’. Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I, p. 230. 
183 In this, we are to recall Christopher Brooke’s central thesis that early-modern neo-Stoics were 
frequently scorned as a set of prideful, if not arrogant, writers ‘insofar as [they denied] human 
dependence on God’, Philosophical Pride, p. 10 & passim. 
184 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, draws sustained attention to Butler’s reputation for 
rationalism over Christian mysticism – not all of which is entirely warranted. 
185 E.g., Wesley, Sermons, Outler (ed.), II, Sermon 62, ‘The End of Christ’s Coming’ [1781]. 
186 Wesley, Works, Jackson (ed.), p. 234. 
187 Clifford Johnson, ‘Joseph Butler, Laodicean Rationalist?’, Modern Language Studies, Vol 4, No. 2 
(Autumn, 1974), pp. 78-85; Gascoigne, Cambridge Age of Enlightenment, p. 248.  
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Laodicea on the Lycus was established during the Apostolic Age (c. 33-100 AD), and it 
was one of the Seven Churches of Asia addressed by name in Rev. 3. 14-22, to whom 
John wrote at the behest of Christ:  
 
I know thy works, that thou art neither cold nor hot: I would thou wert cold or hot. So then 
because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spue thee out of my mouth. 
 
In this passage, the suggestion behind John’s words was that the Laodiceans, being 
‘neither cold nor hot’, lacked the necessary zeal to be proper Christians. In short, this 
explains why the term ‘Laodicean’ was so often used by religious enthusiasts during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century to criticise the latitudinarians, particularly those 
within the Great Tew Circle and the so-called Cambridge Platonists, who had stressed 
the role of reason, and had argued along suspiciously Stoic lines that Christianity was 
above all a ‘social, practical and moral’ religion.188 As Patrick Müller has recently put 
it, then: 
 
[The] latitudinarian emphasis on the divine residue in Man [contained] a self-reflective 
moment, reminiscent of the Golden rule. In men’s commerce with their fellow humans, 
empathy [was] the key to proper conduct … The Latitudinarians’ psychology was [therefore] 
shrewd enough to discern that fellow-feeling [could not] be durably imparted without 
appeals to experience and self-interest.189 
 
Here, then, is a remarkably concise summary of Butler’s position, in profound 
contradistinction to Wesley’s view that a latitudinarian was ‘one that fancies all 
religions are saving’,190 and that speculative latitudinarianism itself was ‘an indifference 
to all opinions’ – the ‘spawn of hell’.191  
   
 
 
 
 
																																																																			
188 Pocock, Barbarism, I, p. 21. 
189 Patrick Müller, Latitudinarianism and Didacticism in Eighteenth-Century Literature: Moral Theology 
in Fielding, Sterne and Goldsmith, (Zugl., Münster, 2009), p. 105. For Butler’s espousal of the ‘Golden 
Rule’ and its applicability to modern forms of commercial sociability, see Chapter Three, p. 106, n. 90. 
190 Wesley, Complete English Dictionary, (London, 1753). 
191 Wesley, Sermons, Outler (ed.), II, p. 92, No. 39, ‘Catholic Spirit’ [1755]. 
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VIII. A Brief and Dispassionate View of the Trinitarian, Arian and Socinian Systems. 
 
At this late stage, it is well for us to turn once again to Tucker, and to demonstrate his 
unwavering allegiance to Butlerian ‘rational religion’ in a non-economic context. This is 
evinced above all, at least in overtly theological terms, in Tucker’s account of the 
makeup of eighteenth-century British Protestant sectarianism, presented in TASS 
(1774). 192  In this pamphlet written in the aftermath of the 1772 Subscription 
Controversy, Tucker’s main concern is to ‘reason analogically’ (a euphemism for the 
Butlerian method) so as to systematise the differences between Trinitarians, Arians and 
Socinians, and to point out the sufficiency of the former as opposed to the faults of the 
latter two. Clearly, then, in this respect we are adding very little to what we already 
know regarding Tucker’s commitment to the established Church. What certainly is of 
interest, however, is the manner in which he shows this commitment.  
  
Initially we may take note, at the beginning of the work, of Tucker’s reference to 
Butler’s dissertation On Personal Identity, which was appended to The Analogy. There, 
Butler had incorporated elements of Berkeleian mathematics in order to refute the 
Lockean conception of the self, which Locke had argued was dependent upon a 
posteriori consciousness (experiential memory) as opposed to a priori substance (body 
or soul).193 Reiterating his commitment to Clarke’s ‘immaterial substance’ theory, 
which we briefly explored in Chapter Three,194 Butler aligned himself with the second 
explanation. Therefore, ‘When it is asked’, he wrote, ‘wherein personal Identity 
consists, the Answer should be the same, as if it were asked, wherein consists Similitude 
or Equality; that all Attempts to define, would but perplex it’.195 For, 
 
																																																																			
192 The full title reads A Brief and Dispassionate View of the Difficulties Attending the Trinitarian, Arian, 
and Socinian Systems, (Gloucester, 1774). It is a tract which receives short-shrift in Clark, Josiah Tucker, 
p. 54; Shelton, Dean Tucker, p. 180, and is completely ignored by Schuyler. 
193 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (London, 1690), II. XXVII: ‘On Identity 
and Diversity’. For the importance of Locke’s formula on what has been described as the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth-century ‘hermeneutics of heresy’, see Starkie, Bangorian Controversy, Chap. 6, esp. 
pp. 126-7. For further discussion of Locke on self-identity in terms of the background to Hume’s 
philosophical reading of Berkeley, consult Talia Mae Bettcher, ‘Berkeley and Hume on Self and Self-
Consciousness’, in Jon Miller (ed.), Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind, (Springer, 2009), pp. 
193-222, at pp. 195-9.  
194 See Chapter Three, Section II. 
195 The Analogy: Of Personal Identity, p. 301. 
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though Consciousness does thus ascertain our personal Identity to Ourselves, yet to say, that 
Consciousness makes personal Identity, or is necessary to our being the same Persons, is to 
say, that a Person had not existed a single Moment, nor done one Action, but what he can 
remember … Consciousness of personal Identity presupposes, and therefore cannot 
constitute, personal Identity, any more than Knowledge in any other Case, can constitute 
Truth, which it presupposes.196 
 
In simplified terms, Butler’s main argument here is that consciousness presupposes 
identity, and not the other way round, as Locke assumes. Nevertheless, again, it is not 
the bishop’s proposition that is of most importance to us per se, but rather Tucker’s 
unstinting acceptance and assimilation of it in TASS. Although Tucker begins this short 
work with the requisite Protestant emphasis on sola scriptura (i.e., by advising that the 
reader should look no further than the ‘Proofs from various Passages of Scripture, in 
Favour of a Trinity of Persons, in the undivided Essence of the Godhead’), 197 
nevertheless, he immediately concedes that to ‘proceed a Step farther’ beyond Holy 
Writ it is to necessarily ‘embark’ on ‘endless Difficulties and Perplexities’. Hence – and 
here we must bear in mind that the following excerpt is a direct reference to Butler’s On 
Self-Identity argument – Tucker writes that  
 
We cannot, for instance, conceive, much less define, what is the Cause of personal Identity,--
-or what is Essence: And therefore we cannot by any Powers of Reason hitherto discovered, 
pretend to say, whether such a Trinity of co-equal Personalities, or personal Identities, can 
co-exist in one undivided Essence, or not.  
 
It is precisely in light of these inherent ‘difficulties and perplexities’, then, that Tucker 
next draws upon Butler’s earlier refutation of Locke, so as to demonstrate, in explicit 
terms, where he himself stands on the matter: 
 
Indeed, Mr. Lock once attempted to assign the Cause or Substratum of personal Identity; but 
failed most egregiously, by mistaking the Effect for the Cause  [And it is here that Tucker 
refers the reader to Butler’s Of Personal Identity, in a footnote] … Self-Consciousness, the 
Cause assigned by Mr. Lock may be allowed to be a good Proof of Personal Identity; but it 
cannot possibly be the Cause of it; inasmuch as it is itself on the Effect, or Operation of some 
other Cause, hitherto undiscovered. In short, I must exist, but I can be conscious of my 
Existence. And therefore Self-Consciousness can be nothing more than the Effect of some 
hidden Cause.198 
 																																																																			
196 The Analogy: Of Personal Identity, p. 302. 
197 TASS, p. 3. To which Tucker also recommends Archbishop William Wake’s (1657-1737) The 
Principles of the Christian Religion Explained: In a Brief Commentary Upon the Church Catechism, 
(London, 1699). Tucker reprints Section IX of this work at the end of TASS for the reader’s benefit. 
198 TASS, p. 4. 
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To reiterate, what is of interest to us here is not so much the veracity or falsity of the 
argument itself, but rather the extent to which Tucker defers to Butler’s authority on the 
matter, and the extent to which he takes for granted the legitimacy of his late bishop’s 
claim.199 This is of fundamental importance as we move forward, for two related 
reasons. Firstly, because Tucker was clearly not as capable a metaphysician as Butler;200 
and that secondly, as a consequence, throughout his works Tucker was content to secure 
his epistemology in Butler – almost without fail. Indeed, as for the present case of 
TASS, although Tucker readily admits that the dispute about self-identity ‘encrease[s] 
our Difficulties’ regarding proof of the Trinity, as opposed to ‘removing them’, 
interestingly and surprisingly, in Tucker’s view, it is in fact Butler’s position rather than 
Locke’s which complicates matters – and rightly so. Accordingly, in TASS Tucker is 
happy to defer to the ‘Butlerian-analogical’ (or ‘probability-provability’) method, which 
is repeated time and again throughout his works, though in various guises. Hence, 
‘when we come to reason analogically on each of these Heads’, Tucker resolves in 
reference to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, ‘we find, either that our usual Rules of 
reasoning are all inadequate to this Purpose, and cannot assist us’.201 Again, then, just as 
in The Analogy, Tucker accepts as axiomatic that presupposing a measure of doubt 
necessarily presupposes a commensurate degree of faith, and it is on this footing that the 
main argument of TASS proceeds.  
  
Beginning with the orthodox Trinitarian position, in a quasi-Socratic and familiarly 
Butlerian confession of ignorance, Tucker immediately concedes that it is precisely 
because all the ‘primary Attributes of God are absolutely above the Reach of our Mental 
Powers’ that the Trinitarian 
 
judges it to be wiser and more prudent, as well as the more modest Part, to accept the 
Doctrine in the gross, without entering into any curious Disquisitions about it, or pretending 
to fathom such bottomless Depths by the short Line of his scanty, imperfect Reason. 
 
																																																																			
199 By 1774 (if not earlier) Tucker was very much politically opposed to Locke, and it may well be that 
this played a motivational role in him acting so one-sidedly here. 
200 An example of this is Tucker’s claim that he is not ‘metaphysician enough to comprehend what 
INFINITY really means’, a point made in recollection of a discussion he had with Hume in the context of 
the ‘Rich Country-Poor Debate’ (which is in itself an extension of Butlerian metaphysics). See Four 
Tracts, Together with Two Sermons, On Political and Commercial Subjects, (Gloucester, 1774), p. 41. 
201 TASS, pp. 4-5. 
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Once again, then, just as Butler had earlier proposed, here Tucker states that it is 
precisely because humans are limited, finite creatures that they must necessarily ‘fail, 
and become unserviceable, to a great Degree’, especially when attempting to explain 
such weighty matters as ‘the Existence, Powers, and Distinctions … the infinite and 
incomprehensible Source of all Things’. Moreover, no matter how advanced humans 
may believe themselves to be in terms of rational enquiry, their ‘usual Rules of 
reasoning’—and by this Tucker means any reasoning based on nature—will always 
remain ‘inadequate’ to the task; even more so if said task is to elucidate the ‘exact 
Meaning, or [ascertain] the precise [Idea]’ of something as inherently mysterious as the 
Trinity. Because of this, Tucker concludes that the Trinitarian can and ought to be 
defended on Butler’s ‘equal-probability’ basis, since it is God’s prerogative to reveal the 
true nature of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, when, or indeed if, He deems the time is 
right or necessary: 
 
… from the Instance of Antipodes here brought, it may at least be deemed possible, That the 
Doctrine of the Trinity of co-equal Persons in one undivided Essence may become, in some 
future Period of our Existence, as intelligible to us all, as that of the Antipodes is at present 
to Men of Letters.202 
  
Having defended the Trinitarian position, Tucker moves swiftly on to criticism of the 
Arian and Socinian systems – and, as ever, on Butlerian terms. Beginning with the 
Arian System, Tucker insists that an adherent of this creed harbours the following ‘Bias 
on his Mind’: i.e., that because he attempts to reason away the doctrine of the Trinity 
according to ‘the common Course of other Things [again, the laws of nature]’, he 
immediately concludes that there simply ‘cannot be that Co-equality, and Co-eternity of 
Persons in the Trinity’. Because of these frustrations, the Arian therefore ‘resolves to 
examine all those Texts over again, which are usually brought in Support of Trinitarian 
doctrine’, 
 
and then by the Help of Subtile Criticisms, strained, and farfetched Comments and Glosses, 
he at last discovers, or fancies that he discovers, that these Texts may be so understood as to 
imply a Supremacy of the first Person over the second and the third,---not only in Point of 																																																																			
202 TASS, ‘The Trinitarian System’, pp. 5-8. Cf. Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 309: ‘Other Orders and 
Creatures may perhaps be let into the secret Counsels of Heaven, and have the Designs and Methods of 
Providence in the Creation and Government of the World communicated to them; but this does not belong 
to our Rank or Condition. The Fear of the Lord, and to depart from Evil, is the only Wisdom which Man 
should aspire after, as His Work and Business’. 
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Order and Oeconomy, but also of Self Existence,---Omnipresence,---Omniscience,---
Eternity, and the like.  
 
‘[H]aving proceeded thus far’, however, Tucker insists that the Arian’s ‘Labours are … 
far from being at an End’. ‘For every Step he advances presents him with fresh 
Difficulties, and new Embarrassments’; and the more that this happens, the more he 
‘must in his Turn act on the defensive Side’. Hence, by taking the Butlerian conception 
of the self for his model yet again, Tucker proposes the following. According to the 
logic of the Arian, how is it possible, he asks, for the ‘second Person in the Trinity’ to 
be both the ‘Heavenly Father’ and ‘but a mere Creature’? – a notion that 
 
not only strains the Scripture-Expressions to his Senses, which they do not naturally convey; 
but also involves himself in such Intricacies … as even on the Footing of Human Reason, 
would render his Scheme not a Jot more eligible than the other.  
 
What is more, ‘by representing our Lord in so inferior a Character, as that of a Deputy-
Divinity’, Tucker concludes that the Arian evidently saps the Foundation of the whole 
Doctrine of Redemption, Satisfaction, and Atonement’.203 Here, then, we witness 
Tucker’s attempts to rehabilitate, and not merely criticise, those deistic tendencies 
within the broad church, which Butler had also targeted specifically in The Analogy.204  
  
Finally, we see the Butlerian method at work yet again in Tucker’s definition of the 
Socinian system. The Socinian ‘seems to be a disinterested Spectator on both Sides’, he 
writes, notwithstanding the fact that he feels the ‘Weight of the Objections’ on either 
end. However, since the inclination of the Socinian is not to be temperate or moderate, 
unlike the Trinitarian, Tucker insists that he tends to presume ‘weakly, perhaps 
arrogantly … that he can devise a third [scheme], which is encumbered with no 
Difficulties at all’. Consequently, according to Tucker, the Socinian ‘boldly pronounces 
the Holy Spirit to be no distinct Person, but only a mere Quality, Emanation, or 
Attribute of the Diety’, to the apparent defamation of Revelation. For if the Socinian 
system ‘be really true’, Tucker posits, ‘the Scriptures of Course must be false’, meaning 
that ‘Christ and his Apostles [ought to] be ranked among the greatest Hypocrites and 
Imposters that ever appeared on Earth’. Crucially, then, since Tucker cannot 																																																																			
203 TASS, ‘The Arian System’, pp. 8-10. 
204 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 15. 
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countenance a notion such as this, and likewise, since he claims that the Socinian ought 
not to either, he concludes that it is surely the Trinitarian System which should prevail. 
For while the ‘Trinitarian System hath confessedly great Difficulties, which human 
Reason cannot pretend to master’, nevertheless, the ‘Arian hath full as great’, worsened 
by the distortion of ‘several very plain Passages of Scripture from their natural and 
genuine Signification’. As for Socinianism, ‘it not only strips the Christian Believer of 
all Hopes and Comforts in a Covenant of Grace founded in Christ’s proper Atonement, 
but also sinks the Gospel into a System of mere [human] Morality’. To which Tucker 
summarises and concludes, once more in overtly Butlerian tones: 
 
What then is a rational, a modest, and a pious Man to do in such Cases as these, where 
Dangers and Difficulties surround him on every Side? Undoubtedly he will reject the 
Socinian System, if he chuses to retain the Essentials of the Christian Covenant, and to avoid 
representing the Author of it, as no better than an infamous Imposter. Moreover with Respect 
to the Arian, he will weigh deliberately, and consider well, Whether this System, with all its 
Boastings, has any real and solid Advantages over the Trinitarian […] Therefore, if this 
should prove to be the case … he is justifiable … in adhering to his former Persuasion or 
Belief of a Trinity in Unity; notwithstanding all the Cavils which have been or may be raised 
against it. Nay, in Respect to those very Mysteries, about which such loud Clamours have 
been excited, he will cooly reflect, that … it would be difficult for him to shew a just 
Reason, why he should reject the like Mysteries, when coming from Revelation … [As] he is 
sensible that his Abilities are limited, he will not attempt to push his Enquiries, either in this, 
or any other Respect, farther than such confined Abilities can safely carry him. […] we 
believe enough for our present State and Condition,---because this alone is able to make us 
wise unto Salvation.205 
 
IX. Concluding Remarks: The ‘Butler-Tucker Axis’.  
 
Throughout this chapter, we have attempted to chart the development of Butler’s brand 
of establishment orthodoxy from Fifteen Sermons to The Analogy, and Tucker’s 
subsequent adoption of it in his earliest religious and polemical writings (aside, latterly, 
from TASS). Based upon what little evidence survives from their direct dealings with 
one another, in light of all that we have discussed in the forgoing pages, nevertheless, it 
is surely not too difficult to speculate upon the content of the ‘metaphysical and 
theological subjects’ they discussed during their frequent turns about the gardens of 
Bristol Cathedral.206 For it seems clear to the present author that, much like Butler and 
Secker’s earlier ruminations in Oxford during their respective youths, Butler and Tucker 																																																																			
205 TASS, ‘The Socinian System’, pp. 11-14. 
206 Stephens, Public Characters, p. 171. 
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must also have ‘talked their own talk without controul’ on Trinitarian doctrine, the 
‘inspiration of the Scripture’ and the Thirty-Nine Articles – in other words, on the 
sufficiency and suitability of orthodox Christology.207 It is for these very reasons, then, 
that Butler and Tucker’s various confrontations with Whitefield and Wesley are 
particularly fascinating; which, though already treated separately in extant scholarship, 
have never before been explored in tandem. For when considered as thematically 
similar and complimentary episodes, it is plain to see that the doctrinal wrangling 
between the two sets of Churchmen constituted the initial ‘fertile ground’ by which the 
Butlerian-Tuckerian brand of Christian orthodoxy was able to take root and flourish: a 
specific type of establishment Anglican moderatism which went well beyond the 
prevailing Whiggish ideology of politeness, as shall be argued subsequently.  
  
This having been asserted, it is fitting to end the present chapter with Wesley’s later 
concession, set down in a private letter dated 1778, that though the established Church 
was by no means evangelical, to its supposed detriment, nevertheless, at the very least it 
was not ‘anti-evangelical’ – as in the case of Calvinism:  
 
Calvinism is not the gospel; nay, it is farther from it than most of the sermons I hear at [the 
established] church. These are frequently un-evangelical; but those are anti-evangelical … 
Nay, I find more profit in sermons on either good temper or good works than in what are 
vulgarly called gospel sermons.208  
 
For here we witness, quite remarkably, Wesley’s re-articulation of the Butlerian ‘temper 
of mind-good works’ formula in somewhat conciliatory terms, thereby hinting at the 
considerable influence Butler must surely have exerted on broader eighteenth (and 
indeed nineteenth) century conceptions concerning Anglican self-identity – our 
inference being, once again, that given the nature of the relationship between the pair, 
Tucker’s political economy must have been a further extension of this.209  
  
																																																																			
207 Porteus, Life and Character of Secker, p. 6; Cf. Ingram, Religion, Reform and Modernity, pp. 32-3, 35-
6 & this study, Chapter Three p. 97. 
208 The Letters of the Rev. John Wesley, A. M., J. Telford (ed.), 8 vols, (London, 1930), VI, p. 326; 
emphasis added. 
209 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 174, goes so far as to state that by the late-eighteenth-
century, even ‘at national and local levels voluntary societies were increasingly united in adopting 
Butler’s voice’. 
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In light of this tentative suggestion, then, it is incumbent upon us shift our immediate 
attention to Tucker’s economic tracts, in an effort to explore the plausibility of a type of 
political economy that was curiously Anglican in origin. In the forthcoming and final 
chapter, then, we focus predominantly on Tucker over Butler; notwithstanding the fact 
that Butler’s ideas remained an ever-present influence on his young protégé’s mind.210 					
																																																																			
210 E.g., Instructions, p. 6: ‘As to Bishop Butler himself, he certainly pursues a Method the fittest in the 
World to put to silence the superficial, licentious Extravagancies of modern Times; were his manner of 
Writing a little more pleasing and alluring. For by demonstrating, that there is a System actually carrying 
on by the Author of the Universe, both in the natural and moral World, he confutes the Sceptics on one 
Extreme; and by proving how imperfectly this System is yet comprehended by us, he checks that 
Arrogance, and Self-sufficiency on the other, which are too natural to young Minds, just tinctured with a 
Smattering of Knowledge.’ 
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Part III. 
 
Tuckerian Political Economy. 
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Chapter Five. 
 
The Economic Tracts. 
 
 
By and large, Tucker’s writings were far less methodical than Butler’s, which is 
unsurprising, perhaps, given that he lived for longer and wrote on a far wider variety of 
subjects than did his mentor. The inherent difficulty with this, however, is that in many 
respects Tucker’s works appear to lack coherence, meaning that his ideas have remained 
notoriously difficult to interpret and/or comprehend – a point advanced in the 
introduction to this study.1 The phrase Tennant deploys in order to describe certain 
elements of Butler’s philosophy, i.e., ‘conceptual fuzziness’, is particularly useful in this 
context, although the present author speculates that Tucker displayed this characteristic 
far more overtly than did his bishop – at least on the surface.2 Though it is impossible to 
dispel these difficulties in their entirety in what remains of this study, a start can at least 
be made via a detailed examination of Tucker’s purely economic tracts, the Essay 
(1749) and the Elements (1755), which proved to be important exceptions to the rule in 
that they were undoubtedly far more methodical than the vast majority of his writings. 
 
Before proceeding, there are a two important points we need to reconsider regarding the 
present-day reception of Tucker’s economic thought. Invariably, these revolve around 
the relationship between him and Adam Smith, and, synchronously, the prevalence of 
teleological ‘Whiggish’ histories of political economy, ‘of which’, according to Young, 
‘the secular canon of the late-18th and early-19th centuries is the inevitable conclusion’.3 
Firstly, then, it is important to note that Tucker was not writing in ‘anticipation’ or 
‘foreshadowing’ of Smith, whom he would scarcely have known in the 1740s and 1750s 
when the economic tracts were formulated and written. If anything, Smith’s reluctance 
to acknowledge Tucker’s influence reveals far more about the dissimilarities in their 
																																																																			
1 See Introduction, pp. 13-5. Noted too in Semmel, Free Trade Imperialism, p. 15. 
2 For Tennant’s description, see Chapter Three, p. 99. 
3 Young, ‘Christianity, Commerce and the Canon’, p. 395.  
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personalities as opposed to their similarities as economic theorists. 4 Yet whilst it is true 
that Smith owned many of Tucker’s publications, and that consequently there are many 
resemblances which can (and indeed frequently are) drawn between them, so far as is 
possible, this study resists the temptation to follow suit, on the grounds that the present 
author does not believe this to be the most fertile means of gauging Tucker’s historical 
significance. In a scathing review of Shuyler’s introductory biography to Josiah Tucker 
in 1931, Viner alluded to much the same himself when he claimed that it was a ‘stab in 
the dark’ to exaggerate Tucker’s influence on Smith ‘without lending plausibility to it 
by concrete and detailed evidence’.5 This being the case, we will do well to heed 
Viner’s words, and only mention Smith when absolutely warranted.6  
 
A second matter very much aligned to the former, and which is essentially a reiteration 
of this thesis’ opening statement, is that, since Tucker’s economic ideas have so often 
been crudely mapped onto those of Smith, this has resulted in a chronic lack of 
engagement with the clergyman’s providentialism. A significant example of this 
problem can be discerned even in the work of Waterman, whose ideas we have cited 
liberally and justifiably throughout this study. For though, as we saw in Chapter Three, 
Waterman acknowledges the role of providence within the broader Butlerian-Tuckerian 
scheme,7  at the same time, even he appears to downplay the true extent of its 
significance by remarking that the Essay houses ‘no … trace of theological language; 
less indeed than in the WN’ – the inference clearly being that Tucker’s ideas are largely 
dependent on Smith’s for their significance:  
 
																																																																			
4 This is in stark contrast to Tucker’s willingness to acknowledge his intellectual debts. See, e.g., 
Instructions, pp. 5-9, where, interestingly in our context, Tucker lists a number of thinkers whose 
‘Reasoning is, for the most Part, grounded on Bishop Butler’s Analogy …’ 
5 Viner, ‘Review of Schuyler’s Josiah Tucker’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 40, No. 3, (Jun., 
1932), pp. 416-8. 
6 Having said this we must equally bear in mind Butler’s demonstrable influence over Smith’s TMS 
(evidence presented in Chapter Four, pp. 122-4 above), and that it is therefore this Butlerian component 
of Tucker’s thought which might also have influenced Smith. For a tentative yet valuable statement of the 
possible overlap, then, between Tucker’s Elements and Smith’s TMS, published merely three years later, 
and for the suggestion that Smith may therefore have managed to procure a copy of the Elements (even if 
not listed in Mizuta’s Adam Smith’s Library) see Waterman, ‘The Changing Theological Context of 
Economic Analysis since the Eighteenth Century’, History of Political Economy, 40/5, (2008), pp. 121-
42, at pp. 129-30.  
7 See Chapter Three, p. 84 
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Much is made of the fact that there is no mention in WN of “Jesus”, or “Christ”, or ‘the son’, 
and no direct reference to ‘God’ or ‘Providence’. But in truth there is little difference 
between Smith’s language of social explanation and that of Josiah Tucker.8  
 
Though it is to be conceded that Waterman’s stance is somewhat mitigated by his 
attempt to redefine WN as a work of Newtonian natural theology, thereby bridging the 
theological gap between Tucker and Smith to a larger extent than most, the present 
author contends that he simply does not go far enough in this direction. This being said, 
the main purpose of this chapter is to prompt a comprehensive revisionist account of 
Tucker’s economic thought – one that places far greater emphasis on its basis in 
Butlerian Anglicanism as opposed to its alleged expectation of classical economics.9 To 
this end, the chapter begins with a brief biographical account of the circumstances 
leading to the publication of the economic tracts, followed by a detailed summation of 
Tucker’s adoption and reformulation of the Butlerian conceptions of sociability, self-
love and benevolence. At this point, it turns to a piecemeal examination of the various 
proposals and polities housed within the Essay and Elements themselves in support of 
this interpretation; whereupon its focus shifts towards what is perhaps the most 
important feature of Tucker’s wider economic thought: his views on the relationship 
between self-interest and monopolisation. This having been asserted, the chapter is 
brought to a close via discussion of the economic tracts in wider historical and 
historiographical context. 
 
I. Introduction: Appetites, Affections and Rational Agency. 
 
Throughout the 1740s, Tucker moved away from anti-Methodist polemic and began 
instead to turn his attention towards economics – doubtless on Butler’s encouragement, 
according to Tennant.10 The initial fruit of Tucker’s labour was the publication of the 
Essay on Trade in 1749, a tract that ran through numerous editions, thereby winning its 
author an unparalleled reputation for assiduity and learning in all matters relating to 
trade and commerce. When, for example, a shortened version of the work was published 																																																																			
8 As earlier noted in Chapter One, Section IV. For Waterman’s muddied suggestions, see Political 
Economy and Christian Theology, pp. 112, 113, 265, n. 50; these citations are taken from a variation of 
this chapter published as ‘‘The beginning of ‘boundaries’: The sudden separation of economics from 
Christian theology’, in Guido Erreygers (ed.), Economics and Interdisciplinary Exchange, (London, 
Routledge, 2001), pp. 41-63. 
9 This is not to say that Tucker’s economics had no bearing on classical economics, but merely that in 
order to properly understand them, it makes little sense to read him backwards from Smith et al. 
10 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 146-7. 
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in French in 1754, it swiftly reached the eyes of François Quesnay (1694-1774), thus 
accounting for Tucker’s initial influence among the Physiocrats.11 Indeed, sixteen years 
later Turgot would write personally to Tucker to remark upon the intellectual solidarity 
he felt existed between their respective enterprises. ‘I find in your works’, Turgot 
exclaimed, ‘that our principles on liberty and on the main objects of political economy 
are much in accord’,  
 
I confess I cannot help being astonished that, in a nation enjoying the liberty of the press, 
you should be almost the only author who has known and felt the advantages of a free 
commerce, and who has not been seduced by the puerile and suicidal allusion of a commerce 
fettered and exclusive.12  
 
As Turgot’s sentiments suggest, the chief characteristic of the Essay lay in the multitude 
of social and political reforms Tucker felt were necessary in order to secure Britain’s 
commercial interests. So intriguing were these ideas that upon reading them, Bishop 
Thomas Hayter (1702-62) inquired as to the possibility of eliciting further instruction 
for his royal pupil, no less than the Prince of Wales and future King George III (1738-
1820). Subsequently, Bishop Conybeare advised Hayter that Tucker was indeed the 
leading authority on the subject, and the resulting project which came of this 
recommendation was begun in 1752 at the latest. Showing far greater promise than the 
Essay, and potentially outstripping its predecessor in terms of length, depth and breadth 
of vision, according to Shelton the Elements of Commerce (1755) was intended to be 
Tucker’s ‘great work’.13 Yet since it never progressed beyond its second part (which 
itself remained incomplete), unfortunately, it was impossible to publish it in any official 
capacity.14 Nevertheless, in 1755 Tucker ensured that sixty to seventy copies of it were 
drawn up in its partially completed state, set with wide margins for commenting from 
friends.15  
 																																																																			
11 The translator was Plumard d’Angeul writing under the pseudonym of Sir John Nicholls, and was 
entitled Remarques sur les avantages et les désavantages de la France et la Grande Bretagne par rapport 
au commerce, (Leyden, 1754). 
12 W. Walker Stephens, The Life and Writings of Turgot, (New York, 1971), ‘Turgot to Tucker, 12 Sep 
1770’, pp. 291-2. 
13 See Shelton, Dean Tucker, Chap. 6: ‘The ‘Great Work’’. 
14 Tucker to Lord Townshend, April 5, 1752, in The Manuscripts of the Marquess Townshend, Hist. MSS. 
Comm., Eleventh Report, Appendix, Part IV, p. 374: ‘… if I can finish a task which is now set me; viz. to 
write a treatise upon the principles of commerce for the use of the Prince of Wales, and to be entitled, The 
Elements of Commerce and Theory of Taxes’.                                                                                                                      
15 Some sections of the Elements would also appear in Instructions, and The Case of Going to War 
(Gloucester, 1763). 
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One such figure whom Tucker presented with an original copy was Hume, who was to 
act, in fact, as the primary intermediary between Tucker and Turgot in the 1760s. Hume 
obviously considered the Elements to be an enterprise of great merit, for in a letter to the 
aforementioned Physiocrat dated to 1768, he wrote that he was ‘sorry’ to find that 
Tucker had ‘little intention of finishing and giving to the public this valuable work’ – 
before revealing Tucker’s reasons for abandoning the project: 
 
He [Tucker] was extremely discouraged with the bad reception given to this pamphlet 
against War [i.e., Causes of the Poor (1760), intended to be a section of the Elements], of 
which he sends you two copies. There was not fifty copies sold; tho’ surely it merited a 
much better fate. But it was wrote, as I told him, when the public were intoxicated with their 
foolish success [i.e., during the Seven Years’ War]; and a pamphlet, if it does not take during 
the first moment, falls soon into oblivion, and very often indeed, tho’ it does take. But this is 
not the case with a greater work to which the public sooner or later does justice.16 
 
Unfortunately for Tucker, Hume’s confidence with regard to the inevitable success of 
the Elements was misguided. As of today only three physical copies of the work are 
now known to be in existence. However, as Schuyler notes, there can be little doubt that 
if the Elements had been finished and distributed in its entirety, Tucker’s name would 
be far more recognisable today as one of the most important founders of the modern 
science of economics.17  
  
By far the most important section to begin with in terms of both economic tracts is the 
‘Preliminary Discourse’ to the Elements, in which Tucker lays out what can only be 
described as a general synopsis of his entire socio-political and economic thought. 
Moreover, here we also acquire a real sense of the clergyman’s pioneering treatment of 
political economy as a burgeoning science – or, more precisely, the Butlerian variant of 
that which Hume had recently begun to call the ‘science of man’. 18 Beginning along 
noticeably Pufendorfian lines, Tucker states that mankind ‘hath the Appetites of an 
Animal’. However, as rational agents, Tucker insists that humans also have ‘the Temper 																																																																			
16 J. Y. T. Greig (ed.), The Letters of David Hume, (Oxford, 1932), II, p. 183, Hume to Turgot, 8 July 
1768. In this, Hume may have been casting a wistful eye back to his own personal travails in attempting 
to publish the Treatise of Human Nature in the late-1730s, which was not immediately popular. For 
further suggestions as to why Tucker didn’t complete the Elements, see also Tucker’s Four Tracts, pp. ix-
xi, & Scottish Records Office, Tucker to Kames, 18 Oct 1761: ‘War, conquests and colonies are our 
present military system and mine is just the opposite. Were I to publish [the Elements] at this juncture, the 
best treatment I could receive is to be taken for a knave or a madman’.  
17 Schuyler, Josiah Tucker, p. 4. 
18 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature [1739], L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), 
p. xxi. Cf. Chapter Four, p. 121. 
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and Affections’ of social beings.19 By the ‘gracious Contrivance of the Author of 
Nature’, Tucker states (in unmistakably Stoic terms) that providence has so ordained 
that humans require mutual assistance in life so that they may procure ‘Improvements’ 
within society. This is important to them, because just as nature intends that we seek 
food in order to appease our appetite of hunger, so too does it intend that we seek to 
better the society in which we live in order to ‘gratify’ our corresponding ‘social 
Instincts’. Tucker calls this our ‘Prerogative’ – that is to say, our ‘Set of social and 
benevolent Affections’ – and what is more he insists that it is this characteristic which 
most distinguishes us from the beasts.20  
  
With these opening lines it is clear, then, that Tucker is making a forthright allusion to 
Butler’s insistence in Fifteen Sermons that the prospect of society is a fortuitous 
outcome of unintended consequences. As we saw in conclusion to Chapter Three, 
Butler’s phrase for this sequence of events was termed the ‘Cements of Society’ – a 
product, no less, of the will of Divine Providence itself: 
 
[As] Persons without any Conviction from Reason of the desirableness of Life, would yet of 
Course preserve it merely from the Appetite of Hunger; so by acting merely from Regard 
(suppose) to Reputation, without any Consideration of the Good of others, Men often 
contribute to publick Good: In … these Instances they are plainly Instruments in the Hands 
of another, in the Hands of Providence, to carry on Ends, the Preservation of the Individual 
and Good of Society, which they themselves have not in their View or Intention.21  
 […] Men are so much one Body, that in a peculiar Manner they feel for each other, 
Shame, sudden Danger, Resentment, Honour, Prosperity, Distress … from the social Nature 
in general, from Benevolence, upon the Occasion of natural Relation, Acquaintance, 
Protection, Dependance, each of these being distinct Cements of Society.22  
 
However, in the Elements Tucker both qualifies and furthers Butler’s initial premise by 
admitting far more readily than does his mentor that society is potentially the chief 
cause of all our woes, and therefore a double-edged sword. For though society may be 
the ‘best Means of procuring a Supply for [our] animal or natural Wants’, so too, 
Tucker insists, does it entice us towards the path of our desirous, passionate and 																																																																			
19 Note Tucker’s specific identification of human sociability with the Butlerian ‘Temper of Mind’. 
20 Elements, ‘A Preliminary Discourse, Setting Forth The natural Disposition, or instinctive Inclination of 
Mankind towards Commerce’, pp. 1-13, at pp. 1-2, 6. For Pufendorf’s similar treatment of the disparities 
and similarities between animal and human nature, see Of the Law of Nature and Nations, II.I.III, & 
II.I.VI. Cf. Hont, Jealousy, pp. 169-70. 
21 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 12; Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 12; emphasis added. Cf. Chapter Three, 
Section VI. As we know, Force refers explicitly to this as a variant of ‘neo-Stoic providentialism’, citing 
this very passage in Self-Interest Before Adam Smith, pp. 81-2. 
22 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 17-8; Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 16-17. 
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multitudinous ‘artificial Needs’ – and here it must be stressed that Tucker is equating 
human artifice with the Butlerian concept of ‘defective conscience’: a direct offspring of 
our own and others’ misdirected self-love.23 In Tucker’s view, self-love is ‘narrow and 
confined in its Views’, and if left with no ‘Direction or Controll’ it will eventually 
‘defeat its own Ends’ until ‘even Self-interest is a Loser’.24 However, if directed into its 
proper channels, he insists that it will serve the public good in ways which far exceed 
individual enterprise [interpolations for clarity]:25  
 
[The] first … Wants of Mankind [are] much better supplied by dividing the general Labour 
into different Branches, than if each Individual depended on himself alone for the Supply of 
[them.] And this Portioning out of Labour [gives] rise to different Trades and Manufactures 
… the Rudiments of Commerce [… Therefore] as our present secular Happiness appears to 
arise from the Enjoyment of superior Wealth, Power, Honour, Pleasure, or Preferment, 
SELF-LOVE, the great mover of created Beings, determines each Individual to aspire after 
these social Goods, and to use the most probable Means of obtaining them.26 
 
Clearly, then, this is a specifically Butlerian-Tuckerian variant of the division of labour, 
which up until the mid-eighteenth century had had numerous historical precedents 
ranging all the way from Plato to Petty. However, in the modern world it has come to be 
associated almost exclusively with Smith’s WN – as, for example, when Smith famously 
writes that ‘[by] pursuing his own interest [the individual] frequently promotes that of 
the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it’.27 
  
As far as Tucker is concerned, then, the real question is not whether self-love is 
immoral or amoral, or interior or anterior to society à la Mandeville, but rather: in what 
ways can it be manipulated or coerced into serving the public good? Unsurprisingly, 
Tucker calls upon the Butlerian tempering agents of ‘REASON and REFLECTION’ in 																																																																			
23 For Butler’s notion of ‘defective conscience’, see Chapter Three, pp. 103-4, 112. There is also a case to 
be made here for Tucker incorporating, firstly, (via Butler) Pufendorf’s notions of natura, indignentia and 
cultura: i.e., the processes by which humankind creates ever-renewing needs and wants, in his Of the Law 
of Nature, II.II.II., & De officio hominis … [Of the Duty of Man…], II. I. IV. And secondly, we may also 
note elements of Hume’s conception of artifice, in the sense that Hume sees ‘artificial’ virtues or vices 
(e.g., justice and injustice) as necessary to, and in part epiphenomenal of, those social circles which lie 
either beyond the family, or even within intimate friendships – in other words to society at large. See esp. 
Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, III. II. II, & for further discussion, Haakonssen, Natural Law and 
Moral Philosophy, p. 104-10, 198. 
24 Elements, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, pp. 7-8.  
25 This echoes Butler’s insistence that once correctly channelled, anger is one of those ‘common Bonds, 
by which Society is held together’, Fifteen Sermons 1726, p. 144; Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. 144. Cf. 
Chapter Three, p. 111. 
26 Elements, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, pp. 5-6.  
27 Smith, WN, IV.II. xi, [Glasgow Ed., (Oxford, 1976)], Vol. 1, p. 456. 
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order to help solve this riddle, by which means he concludes that the responsibility of 
wise government is not to extinguish self-love—for this would be counter-intuitive, if 
not even ‘impossible’—but rather to encourage it: for ‘the very Being of Government 
and Commerce depend upon the right Exertion of this vigorous and active Principle’.28 
Hence, by diverting the pursuits of self-love from ‘vicious or improper Objects’ and 
instead towards those that are ‘commendable and virtuous’, Tucker maintains that the 
state will eventually be ‘blessed with Plenty’ and ‘abound in Commerce’, since the 
several ‘Pursuits, Interests and Happiness’ of all its members will duly coincide.29 Most 
importantly of all, however, Tucker is convinced that this ‘System’, as he calls it, will 
function with superior efficacy if, and when, populated by ‘good Christians’: 
 
Now this politic Direction of the Pursuits of various Individuals in one common End, the 
Study of Philosophers, and the Aim of every wise Legislature, will be found to be nothing 
more than a strict and scrupulous Observance of Christian Morality. For this truly Social 
System furnishes us with the strongest Motives towards restraining inordinate Self-Love, 
having so linked our Duty and Interest with that of the Community ... [so that] a Man cannot 
act the Part of a good Christian without being good and useful, and a public Blessing, in 
every other Relation of Life.30 
 
It is both interesting and significant to note here Tucker’s continuing identification of 
Christianity with the societal aspects of earthly existence. For it is by these means, we 
may suggest, that he continues to refute the rigorist neo-Augustinianism (and quasi-
Calvinism) of Mandeville and Law, just as Butler had done. For though, again, on the 
one hand Mandeville had concerned himself with chastising the ‘good Christian’ as one 
that simply had no purpose within modern commercial society, whilst Law urged much 
the same but from an utterly divergent standpoint, by contrast, in Butler and Tucker’s 
view, Christianity was the very lynchpin of a successful commercial society itself.31 Yet 
what was it, precisely, that constituted the ‘good Christian’ in Tucker’s eyes, thereby 
rendering him an active and productive member of a virtuous, Christian commercial 
polity? Was it something akin to the Addisonian City?32 Or was it, in the words of 
																																																																			
28 Elements, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, p. 8. Note here how Tucker takes for granted that Commerce and 
Government are interrelated, if not indistinguishable. 
29 Elements, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, pp. 9-10. 
30 Elements, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, p. 8. ‘Inordinate self-love’ is an overtly Butlerian phrase, e.g., 
Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 209-10: ‘Immoderate Self-love does very ill consult its own Interests; and, 
how much soever a Paradox it may appear, it is certainly true, that even from Self-love we should 
endeavour to get over all inordinate Regard to, and Consideration of ourselves’; emphasis added. 
31 For Mandeville and Law, see Chapter Two, Sections IV-VI. 
32 See Chapter Two, pp. 72-3, 75. 
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Laurence Dickey, a peculiarly Tuckerian appeal to ‘religious incentive’?33 In order to 
answer such important questions as these, we are required to turn now to a revisionist 
examination of the Essay and Elements in tandem.34 
 
II. ‘That Noble and Interesting Science’. 
 
From the outset The Essay had a two-fold aim. In the first instance, Tucker utilised it as 
a means by which to voice his strong concerns regarding the critical European balance 
of power, in stridently economic terms (more on this in Section VI). In this way, it was 
a tract highly indicative of the fact that Tucker recognised the era to be one dominated 
by competitive commercial monarchies, in which, as he put it, ‘the Politicks of Princes 
are ever fluctuating and changing’.35 Yet more than that, the Essay was also Tucker’s 
opportunity to set down an empirically based scientific exposé of the inner-workings of 
political economy, the like of which had never before existed. 36  Hence, in its 
introduction he beseeched men of ‘a liberal and learned education’ to ‘engage in the 
Study’ of political economy as if it were a ‘noble and interesting Science’.37 This was 
clearly important to him, since he believed the future ‘Riches ... Strength ... Glory ... 
Morals and Freedom’ of Britain to be dependent upon it.38 More significantly still, 
however, Tucker remained convinced that in a complex and antagonistic – dare we say 
Hobbesian – world (a world of ‘chronic stress’ as we described it in Chapter Three),39 
																																																																			
33 Dickey, ‘Doux-commerce and humanitarian values’, in Grotius and the Stoa, p. 315. 
34 With a modest number of interpolations from the likes of NFP I & II, Instructions, Causes of the Poor 
and others, since they cover similar ground. In fact, the Instructions was explicitly intended to be a 
section of the Elements, and only appeared publically in a Dublin edition dated 1758, while the present 
author argues that other tracts mentioned are clearly auxiliary to the economic tracts. For the most useful, 
if somewhat linear, extant accounts of the Essay and the Elements, see Shelton, Dean Tucker, Chaps. 4 & 
6. 
35 Essay, p. 93.  
36 Cf. Clark, Josiah Tucker, pp. 73-4; Schuyler, Josiah Tucker, p. 13. It should be noted that Tucker 
nowhere defines or labels this ‘new’ science ‘political economy’, while Waterman in Political Economy 
and Christian Theology, p. 107, states that the ‘origin of “political economy” as a distinct inquiry, clearly 
to be demarcated from Christian theology, is the publication of Malthus’s first Essay on Population of 
1798’. Nevertheless, we are also to be reminded that Winch dates the emergence of economics as a 
science to about 1750 in his ‘The emergence of economics as a science, 1750-1870’, Cipolla (ed.), 
Fontana Economic History of Europe, Vol. 3, pp. 507-73 – the Essay being first published in 1749. 
37 Essay, ‘The Introduction’, pp. i-xii, at pp. iv-vi. Again, here we must stress that Tucker’s identification 
of political economy as a science is very much in the Butlerian vein. 
38 Essay, p. iv. 
39 Chapter Three, p. 110. 
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political economy would prove to be of immeasurable remedial benefit to humankind, 
particularly when supervised by those at the ‘Helm of government’:40 
 
Providence having intended that there should be a mutual Dependence and Connection 
between Mankind in general, we find it almost impossible for any particular People to live, 
with tolerable Comfort, and in a civilized State, independent of all their Neighbours.41 
 
The central line of reasoning Tucker attempted to convey in the Essay was his belief 
that Britain had by far the greater economic potential as compared to France, her most 
significant continental rival, but that as things stood the latter was in by far the more 
advantageous position. 42  This was because France, Tucker claimed, had taken 
advantage of the orderliness of her ‘excellent Roads … navigable Rivers and Canals’; 
of her close proximity to the kingdom of Spain; of her willingness to incorporate 
foreigners, specifically merchants and manufacturers, and because of her ability to reap 
the rewards of failed English monopolies such as the Turkey Company.43 Yet in spite of 
all this, Tucker was not entirely pessimistic in his outlook. He remained confident that 
Britain lacked only the nous rather than the capacity to improve and develop her 
economic capabilities. Before any practicable diagnoses could be made, however, 
Britain first had to recognise her many shortcomings: chief among them, in the 
clergyman’s view, being Britain’s failure to replicate the French subordination of the 
lower ranks of her society, so as to procure a large population of good, honest workers:  
 
If [the lower class] are subject to little or no Controll, they will run into Vice, Expense ... 
Poverty and Disease; and so they become a loathsome Burden to the Publick […] Nothing is 
more visible, than the great difference between the Morals and Industry of the 
manufacturing Poor in France, and in England. In the former, they are sober, frugal, and 																																																																			
40 This reference to political economy’s ‘remedial benefit’ is intimately linked to Butler’s broader notion 
of psychological health or sickness. Accordingly, we shall note Tucker and Butler’s adoption of medical 
metaphors in our Conclusion, Section II. 
41 Essay, p. ii, viii. This is a clear reiteration of the Stoic assertion made, e.g., by Libanius of Antioch (c. 
314-92), who suggested that God had ‘distributed his gifts over different regions’ so that ‘men might 
cultivate a social relationship [when] one would have need of the help of another’. Cited in Viner, Role of 
Providence in the Social Order, p. 36, where Viner continues that Libanius’s ‘emphasis on the universal 
brotherhood of man reveal[s] a late Stoic influence’ which ‘contributed to Christian theology [the] idea … 
that God intended commerce to operate as a unifying factor for all mankind’.  
42 For more on the rivalry between Britain and France during the long-eighteenth-century, see Section VI. 
below. Cf. also NFP II, pp. 30-1, SECTION XIV: The Birth-right of an Englishman, where, citing from 
The Examiner, No. XXV. Jan. 25, 1710, Tucker writes: ‘WHAT is the Birth-right of an Englishman?—Is 
it a Right or Privilege to be poor and miserable, while his Neighbours are increasing in Wealth and 
Commerce? […] WHO are the Persons that would attempt to deprive Englishmen of their Birth-right?—
Such who propose to make England rich and flourishing, the Center of Trade, and a Magazine for other 
Nations? 
43 Essay, pp. 13-22. Cf. Reflections on Turkey (1753). 
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laborious: They marry, and have Flocks of Children, whom they bring up to Labour. In the 
latter, they are given up to Drunkenness and Debauchery: The Streets swarm with 
Prostitutes, who spread the Infection, till they are carried to an Hospital, or their Grave.44 
   
Here, Tucker’s sentiments bring us neatly on to an important and recurrent theme in his 
economic thought: his espousal of a large, virtuous and industrious population.45 So 
important was this subject to Tucker that the whole of Part I of the Elements was 
dedicated to the pursuance of the subject.46 Although the significance of a thriving 
population had already been recognised by some seventeenth-century mercantilists, 
such as Philipp von Hörnigk (1640–1714), what made Tucker especially unique on this 
head was his insistence that a sizeable population was compatible with, or moreover 
contingent upon, the principles of the Christian religion.47  In a roundabout way, 
evidence of this can be gathered in the very first chapter of the Elements, in which 
Tucker states that marriage is the ‘express Appointment of Divine Providence’, and that 
it should therefore be encouraged at all costs (or made ‘more fashionable’ as he puts 
it).48 In doing so, Tucker believes that this will have the twofold effect of increasing the 
nation’s population whilst reinforcing the Christian emphasis on the sanctity of 
marriage – a point stated rather more brusquely in the Essay:  
 
The Marriage State ... is not sufficiently encouraged among Us: and ten Thousand common 
Whores are not so fruitful (setting aside the Sin of the Parents, the Diseases of the few 
Children that are born, and their want of a proper and virtuous Education) … as fifty healthy 
young married Women, that are honest and virtuous: By which Means, the State is defrauded 
of the Increase of upwards of 199 Subjects out of 200, every year.49 																																																																			
44 Essay, pp. 14, 36-7. In the context of discussion over extra-European colonisation, Miller, Defining the 
Common Good, pp. 156-7, notes that though eighteenth-century Britons still ‘feared the French’ they 
nonetheless could not help but look ‘to her with some admiration’ for her tendency towards ‘efficient and 
strict’ management, as Tucker clearly does so here. 
45 Cf. NFP II, p. 19: ‘WHAT are the Riches of a Country?—Land? Money? or Labour? What is the Value 
of Land, but in Proportion to the Numbers of People? What is Money, but a Common Measure, Tally, or 
Counter, to set forth or denominate the Price of Labour in the several Transfers of it?’; pp. 23-4: 
‘SECTION X. The Improvements of Lands depend upon the Increase of People. 
46 Elements, I., ‘Containing certain Polities for Increasing the Number of People’, pp. 11-40. The most 
notorious argument against a larger population is of course Malthus’s An Essay on the Principle of 
Population, (First Ed., London, 1798). 
47 See, e.g., the third of Hörnigk’s nine points in his Österreich Über Alles, Wenn Sie Nur [Austria Over 
All, If She Only Will], (1684):  ‘There will be need of people, both for producing and cultivating the raw 
materials, and for working them up … attention should be given to the population, that it may be as large 
as the country can support’, cited & trans. in Arthur Eli Monroe (ed.), Early Economic Thought: Selected 
Writings from Aristotle to Hume [1924], (NY, Dover Ed., 2006), pp. 223-43. It is unclear whether or not 
Tucker was familiar with Hörnigk. 
48 Elements, pp. 16, 28. 
49 Essay, pp. 90-1; Cf., Instructions, p. 29. It is worth noting here that Butler bore no children, and that he 
also took no wife. Conversely, Tucker married more than once; firstly to Ruth Woodward, and secondly 
to Mrs Crow, whom he married in 1781. Tucker’s union with Woodward, which would have occurred at 
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Hence, in the remainder of Elements I. I., Tucker sets forth numerous suggestions aimed 
at discouraging bachelorhood, whilst simultaneously privileging those who are 
married.50 The last of these, entitled ‘That all Men for the first twelve Calendar Months 
after Marriage, shall be exempted from serving any Offices … [and be] freed from 
paying all personal Duties and Taxes Whatsoever’, is particularly noteworthy in our 
context, since Tucker bases its legitimacy on the ancient Jewish constitution – a 
typically Butlerian appeal to Scripture that resurfaces in his mature thought.  
 
In regard to this [point], be it remembered, That it is a Transcript of a Part of that admirable 
Polity which Moses introduced by Divine Command into the Hebrew Constitution; whereby 
the little Territory of Palestine (not much larger than the Principality of Wales) became the 
most populous and the best cultivated Country on the Face of the Globe.51  
 
In Elements, I. II, then, Tucker continues his account of the importance of a thriving 
population, though in the differing context of his support for the ‘Admission of Wealthy 
and Industrious Foreigners’ on the grounds that they promote greater industry and 
‘more Imployment for the Natives’.52 This concurs with an earlier section of the Essay 
listing the ‘principle disadvantages’ to Britain’s trade, in which Tucker states that by 
working ‘cheaper or better’ than the natives, foreigners ensure that the public is the 	
some point in the late-1730s or early-1740s, is something of a mystery, since Tucker never spoke of her 
in any correspondence, unlike in the case of Mrs. Crow, whom he was very affectionate towards. What 
we do know, however, is that Woodward was seventeen years Tucker’s senior, that she died on 17 
November 1771, and that Tucker acted as stepfather and educator to her son, the future Bishop of Cloyne, 
Richard Woodward (1726-94); a pastor who, according to Wesley, was ‘one of the most easy, natural 
preachers’ he ever heard, in Wesley’s Journal, III, (London Ed., 1827), p. 422. 
50 E.g., Elements, I. I. ‘A Law … That no Persons shall either elect, or be elected to any Post of Honour or 
Profit throughout the Kingdom, but those who either are, or have been married’, p. 17;  
I. IV. ‘That married Men shall be free, not only to work as Journeymen, but also to set up all Sorts of 
mechanic Trades in every City and corporate place whatever, without Fee …’, pp. 19; I. VI. ‘That Men 
shall not be allowed to work at, to set up, or carry on certain Trades, which properly belong to Women—
unless they marry, and so may be considered as Assistants to their Wives’, p. 12.  
 Shelton, Dean Tucker, p. 95, contends that Tucker’s views on marriage and bachelorhood present the 
clergyman ‘at his most meddlesome’; that ‘to take away the bachelor’s franchise is an example of how 
Tucker’s vein of common-sense ran out in the enthusiasm of the moment’; and that there may have been 
some sort of ‘psychological connection’ between Tucker’s interest in marriage and the fact that he was 
‘never able’ to father children – in spite of there being no evidence to suggest that Tucker longed for 
children of his own. This being said, the present author is not convinced by this at all. Surely it is far 
likelier that these views on marriage and children were simply important components of the overall 
Tuckerian scheme, in the sense that the etymological root of the word ‘economics’ is, of course, 
oeconomia/oikonomia, the management of the household (of which oikeiosis is also a derivative), wherein 
the relationship between male and female, mother and father, daughter and son, plays a definitive role. 
This hearkens back to Aristotle’s Politics and Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, as well more recently in 
Tucker’s time, Lipsius and Grotius. 
51 Elements, I. VI., p. 22.  
52 Elements, pp. 30-1. 
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‘Gainer’, the ‘Price of Labour is continually beat down, Industry … encouraged, and an 
Emulation excited’.53 In yet another later section of the Essay, Tucker makes particular 
reference to the case of the French Huguenots who had ‘fled the Persecution of Lewis 
XIV [1638-1715], and taken refuge in England’ in the wake of the Edict of 
Fontainebleau in 1685. Although Tucker notes that there was a great ‘Outcry against 
them’ at the time amongst the English, subsequent events had since conspired to 
disprove British fears: ‘These Huguenots, have been so far from being a Disservice to 
the Nation that they have partly got, and partly saved, in the Space of fifty Years, a 
Balance in our Favour of, at least, FIFTY MILLIONS sterling’.54  
  
In fact, according to Tucker, this impressive figure demonstrated that the greatest 
hindrance to French commercial interests actually resided in her ‘arbitrary and 
despotick’ government – in other words her militant Gallicanism, which had ‘added to 
[her] many other Absurdities, a Spirit of Cruelty and Persecution so repugnant to the 
Scope and Tendency of the Gospel’.55 Conversely, Tucker believed that the British had 
by far the greater advantage in this respect, because of her ‘free Government’ and 
‘Liberty of Conscience’ in all religious matters, meaning that ‘Every Man is permitted to 
worship GOD in the Way he thinks the right and true, without Fear or Reserve’.56 If, 
for example, the Roman Catholics of Britain were necessarily placed ‘under some legal 
Discouragements’, this was only because the Legislature considered them to be a 
political rather than religious sect. Furthermore, under the presiding moderate Whig 
government of Henry Pelham (1696-1754), Tucker stated that they were now in fact 
‘free’ to ‘Exercise their Religion’, so long as they give ‘no Disturbance to the State in 
Civil Affairs, by siding with its Enemies’. ‘This, surely’, Tucker writes, ‘is but a 
reasonable Demand: And here the Matter seems to rest’.57  
 
																																																																			
53 Essay, p. 42. Cf. NFP II, pp. 33, 43: ‘WHAT is the Publick Good? Is it not, for the most Part, the 
Result of Emulation among the Members of the same Society? And what would become of Industry, 
Temperance, Frugality, and the Desire of Excelling, if there were no Emulation? […] And is not the 
raising of Emulation a much more humane and gentle Method, more agreeable to the Genius of a free 
People, and in all Respects most conducive to the Publick Good?’ 
54 Essay, pp. 88-9. 
55 Essay, pp. 23-4. 
56 Given all that we have discussed in previous chapters, whenever Tucker refers to ‘conscience’ 
throughout his various works, as in the phrase ‘Liberty of Conscience’ in the present example, he is doing 
so with an eye fixed firmly on the Butlerian conception of the term.  
57 Essay, pp. 33-4. 
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Tucker’s allusion here to the Roman Catholics being a political rather than religious sect 
is both interesting and significant in that it suggests that he was moving well beyond the 
pervasive Whig latitudinarianism of his day, which, though relatively lenient towards 
the Protestant minorities, still remained largely hostile towards Catholics.58 In this, 
Tucker was undoubtedly deferring to Butler’s view (explored in the Bristol meetings 
with Wesley in Chapter Four) that Whig toleration was not merely a matter of 
perfunctory gesture, but was intended rather to be universal in scope.59 Indeed, in the 
Durham charge of 1751 Butler went even further in this direction when he defended 
those ‘external’ forms of religion deemed by the vast majority of contemporaries to be 
synonymous with Papalism, ancient Paganism and even Islam: 
 
That which men have accounted Religion in several Countries of the World, generally 
speaking, has had a great and conspicuous Part in all Publick Appearances, and the Face of it 
been kept up with great Reverence throughout all Ranks, from the highest to the lowest; not 
only upon occasional Solemnities, but also in the daily Course of Behaviour. In the Heathen 
world, their Superstition was the chief Subject of Statuary, Sculpture, Painting, and Poetry. It 
mixt itself with Business, Civil Forms, Diversions, Domestick Entertainments, and every 
Part of common Life. The Mahometans are obliged to short Devotions five Times between 
Morning and Evening. In Roman-catholick Countries, People cannot pass a Day without 
having Religion recalled to their Thoughts, by some or other Memorial of it; by some 
Ceremony or public religious Form occurring in their Way: Besides their frequent Holidays, 
the Short Prayers they are daily called to, and the occasional Devotions injoyned by 
Confessors. By these Means their Superstition sinks deep into the Minds of the People, and 
their Religion also into the Minds of such among them as are serious and well-disposed.60 
 
In the above-cited, Butler’s main point is to stress his dissatisfaction at the original 
Reformer’s reduction of the liturgy to its bare essentials, thereby removing the most 
visible aspects of religion from the daily lives of the laity – meaning furthermore, as 
Butler put it, that the people had ‘no customary Admonition, no public Call to recollect 
the Thoughts of GOD and RELIGION from one Sunday to another’.61 Unsurprisingly, 
this apparent sympathy for Romanism’s ‘promotional’ or ‘outward’ displays of faith, 
which Butler felt Anglicanism ought to adopt more extensively in order to promote ‘the 																																																																			
58 See Martin Fitzpatrick, ‘Latitudinarianism at the parting of the ways: a suggestion’, in Walsh et al. 
(eds.), The Church of England c. 1689-1833, pp. 209-27, at pp. 209-10; Colin Hayden, Anti-Catholicism 
in eighteenth-century England, c. 1714-80: A political and social study, (Manchester, 1993), pp. 180-94; 
Miller, Defining the Common Good, pp. 305, 321-2; Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, I, pp. 47-8. 
59 See Chapter Four, Section IV. This is a particularly forthright example, we may suggest, of a 
convergence between Stoic universalism and eighteenth-century Whiggism, which is yet to be explored in 
extant scholarship. 
60 Butler, A Charge Deliver’d to the Clergy, at the Primary Visitation of the Diocese of Durham, 
(Durham, 1751), pp. 14-5. 
61 Ibid., p. 15. 
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reality and power’ of true religion, caused public outrage: so much so that in the wake 
of his death, Archdeacon Blackburne and the dissenting minister Caleb Fleming (1698-
1779) accused Butler of having died a Roman Catholic.62 Disregarding, as we ought to, 
Blackburne and Fleming’s rather spurious accusation of Butler’s crypto-Catholicism, 
there is nonetheless an important point worth gleaning from this exchange – and that is 
the boldness and openness with which Butler’s admits that some religious customs from 
traditionally ‘hostile’ cultures ought to be incorporated and acculturated into the 
Anglican liturgy based upon their intrinsic worth and merit.  
  
Why so important in regards to Tucker’s economic tracts? The answer lies in the subtle 
parallel that might be drawn here between Butler’s emphasis on ‘ecclesiastical 
acculturation’ on the one side, and Tucker’s inclusive views on immigration and 
religious toleration (both Catholic and ‘antinomian’) on the other. For in the present 
author’s estimation, this is further validation of the forthright moderatism and toleration 
that set the orthodox pair apart from many of their establishment (and at times even 
dissenting) analogues. To be sure, continuing in this vein, Tucker was to develop his 
ideas on the interrelated subjects of religious toleration, naturalisation and population in 
far greater detail in such tracts as NFP I & II, and A Letter to a Friend concerning 
Naturalizations, all of which were written at the height of controversy surrounding the 
proposed 1751 Naturalization Bill and the Jew Bill of 1753. Once again, it is regrettably 
beyond the bounds of the present study to explore these works in any level of detail. 
Suffice it to say in the context of present discussion, however, that within each of these 
tracts, Tucker implores the British public to treat foreign Protestants and Jews on the 
same footing as dissenters and Roman Catholics: that is to say, with forbearance and 
due consideration. Furthermore, in a later tract entitled Religious Intolerance No Part of 
the General Plan (1774), Tucker would go on to develop a still more sophisticated 
analysis of the virtues of toleration by way of detailed and critical scriptural exegesis: 
 
Now the Question before us is plainly this; whether Force, Violence, or Compulsion of any 
Kind, are prescribed in the Scriptures, as proper Means to be used by the Worshippers of the 																																																																			
62 Secker vehemently defended the memory and reputation of his old friend against these charges, in his 
Autobiography, pp. 58, 61, 178. For a detailed summary of this controversy, see Samuel Hallifax (ed.), 
The Works of Joseph Butler D.C.L., late Bishop of Durham, (NY, 1860), pp.  xliv-xlvii. In wider context, 
see also Young, ‘A history of variations …’, in Claydon & Mcbride (eds.), Protestantism and National 
Identity, pp. 116, 117; Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 144-5; Ingram, Religion, Reform 
and Modernity, p. 108.  
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true God, either for the original Propagation, or for the subsequent Defence and Preservation 
of true Religion? […] 
 
But there is not an Instance to be produced in the Annals of the World, of any State having 
been weakened, much less destroyed, by annexing a general a universal Toleration to the 
civil Establishment of Religion. 
 The Inference from all this is plain and cogent: The Religion of the Gospel is a 
Religion of Peace and Love; and those, who think otherwise, know not what Manner of 
Spirit they are of. Sound policy, and a Regard for the Interest both of Church and State, all 
unite in this Point: And to crown all, we have no other Method of proving, that we love God, 
than by first demonstrating, that we love one another. For he that loveth not his Brother 
whom he hath seen […] how can he love God, whom he hath not seen? This Command 
therefore have we from above, That he who loveth God, love his Brother also.63  
 
III. Judicious Polities. 
 
In Elements II. I. Tucker persists with his comparative analysis of the form of 
government most conducive to a thriving commercial polity. Here for example he 
observes that in free countries, commerce and industry can best be fostered by the 
establishment of a ‘JUDICIOUS POLITY’, whilst conversely in their despotic 
equivalent, stunting ‘PENAL LAWS’ are arbitrarily enforced. Predictably, Tucker 
rejects the latter because he believes they bring with them an incontrovertible necessity 
for absolute power ‘too great a Trust to be reposed in Man’. Contrariwise, only ‘in the 
Hands of that Great Being whose Wisdom and Goodness are over all his Works’, can 
they be truly and wisely imposed.64 Further to this, Tucker suggests that since the 
business of penal laws is not to ‘incline and incourage’, as in the case of judicious 
polities, but rather to ‘terrify or punish’, the one, he writes, is ‘to deter the multitude 
from offending’, the other to lead them ‘by their own free choice to virtuous Industry’.65 
‘This being the Case’, he remarks, ‘it is easy to see which Method deserves the 
Preference’.66  
  																																																																			
63 Religious Intolerance, pp. 13, 42-3. 
64 Elements, p. 10. This is yet another clear reference to Butler’s insistence that humans are creatures of 
limited capacities, and that human government ought therefore to be based on supernatural sanction. 
65 Note Tucker’s reference to the Arminian, Witsian and Butlerian notion of freewill/choice here. 
66 Elements, p. 10. Cf. Causes of the Poor, p. 6, 17: ‘The Taxes themselves for the Support of the Poor are 
not founded upon a right, judicious Principle: Nor doth the Legislature seem to have had any other End in 
View in laying them on, than just to raise as much Money as the Case required. […] to aid and assist the 
good Intentions of the Legislature … operate more effectually towards the Good of the community than 
mere penal Laws, Informations and Prosecutions, from long Experience, are known to do. And what is 
laid in relation to this particular Head, is applicable to all others of a like Nature’. 
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Unsurprisingly, Tucker is not the least bit reticent when it comes to proffering his own 
ideas about what constitutes a judicious polity. Most of these centre upon the ways and 
means to improve the relationship between the landed and merchant interest, thereby 
ensuring that the prosperity of both is mutual and interlinked.67 This point is perhaps 
one of the most important when it comes to understanding Tucker’s ‘microeconomic’ 
ideas. For since, according to Tucker, the prospect of commercial employment is always 
divisible into two main categories, husbandry and manufacturing, the ‘immediate Object 
of the one’, he insists, is to ‘provide Food’ and of the other to ‘procure Raiment’ and 
‘Dwelling’. Consequently, it is ‘from the CONCURRENCE of three’, Tucker argues, 
that ‘every other Trade, Calling, or Profession derives its Origin and Support’.68 Again, 
the broader significance of these points cannot be overemphasised. For contrary to 
historical, and indeed contemporary (predominantly Fénelonian and general Augustan) 
perceptions regarding the historical ambiguity and even hostility between merchant and 
landowner, as far is Tucker is concerned, the self-interest of both cannot be but mutually 
intertwined.69 As he had earlier put it in the introduction to the Essay, then, such 
‘supposed Distinctions’ were ‘the most idle and silly, as well as false and injurious, that 
ever divided Mankind’.70  
  
Proceeding on this footing, Tucker’s expansive list of polities within Elements, I. II. 
ranged from turning tithes into glebes,71 to increasing the production and output of raw 
materials such as timber,72 to registering the title deeds of houses and landed estates.73 
																																																																			
67 Cf. NFP II, p. 25: ‘SECTION XI. The Landed and the Commercial Interests of the Kingdom center in 
the same Point’. 
68 Elements, pp. 41-2; emphasis added. Cf. Chapter Four, pp. 137-8 & n. 79, where we noted Butler’s 
belief in the unavoidable relationship between human faith and the necessaries of life. A typical example 
might simply be the case of the husbandman who hopes for a high yield at harvest time. 
69 See Hont, ‘Enlightenment debate on commerce and luxury’, in Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, 
esp. ‘Fénelon’, pp. 383-7. For more on the topic of ‘money versus land’ in the specific context of post-
1688 England and Britain, see Klein, ‘Property and politeness in the early eighteenth-century Whig 
moralists. The case of the Spectator’, in Brewer & Susan Staves (ed.), Early Modern Conceptions of 
Property, (Routledge, NY, 1996), pp. 221-33. Also, Brooke, Philosophical Pride, p. 154, deepens our 
understanding of Tucker’s ‘anti-Fénelonian’ stance by equating Fénelon’s reforms with Jacobite politics, 
which, to all intents and purposes, would require the ‘powers of an absolute monarch’ – something that 
Tucker rejected. 
70 Essay, pp. ix, xi. Clearly, then, Tucker’s aspirations for economic reform necessitated a substantial 
about-turn on this deeply divisive head. 
71 Elements, ‘A Polity for changing Tithes into Glebes’, pp. 56-62. Tucker’s various appeals to the 
Mosaic Law are striking in this section. For more on the contemporary context regarding tithes, see 
Gregory, Restoration, Reformation, and Reform, 1660-1828, ‘Tithes’, pp. 147-59. 
72 Elements, ‘A Polity for increasing Buildings in low, fenny or marshy Grounds, and rendering them 
healthy’, pp. 62-8. 
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In the context of current study, however, there are two among them which are of 
particular importance. The first, entitled ‘A Polity for dividing large Estates’, was an 
extension of Tucker’s belief (as well most recognisably as Smith’s in WN) that 
primogeniture had outlasted its usefulness in a post-feudal age.74 Alternatively, Tucker 
suggested that land should be divided equally between all children; or, failing that, that 
the eldest son should receive half of the estate, with the remainder being divided equally 
among the rest of the siblings. In Tucker’s view, this would result in the preservation of 
what he called the ‘comparative Dignity of the Family’, whilst also encouraging ‘the 
eldest Sons, or Representatives of great Families, to study Frugality and Oeconomy 
more than they do at present’. Even more significantly, however, Tucker believed that, 
given time, the emergence of several smaller estates would ensure the better cultivation 
of land, in turn increasing the number of landowners and equalising property holdings. 
Consequently, Tucker hoped that this would raise a ‘respectable number of independent 
Families’ throughout the kingdom, who would then go on to stimulate further economic 
growth on a national scale.75  
  
In the general tone of these views, Tucker was presumably echoing Kames’s recently 
published Essays upon Several Subjects concerning British Antiquities (1747), wherein 
Kames had claimed that hereditary succession was contrary to the laws of nature.76 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting here that Kames and Tucker were hardly unique in 
propounding these ideas. For indeed, opposition to feudal and patriarchal property rights 
had long been in the air by the time the economic tracts were compiled, not least most 
famously in Locke’s Two Treatises, as James Tully has shown.77 Alongside the present 
example of the Two Treatises, then, and – as ever – Smith’s WN, it is worth pausing 
momentarily here to note Smith’s important Glasgow Lectures on Jurisprudence (1762-
3) which would also go on to reiterate many of Tucker’s thoughts on this matter78 – as 	
73 Elements, ‘A Polity for creating Plenty of Timber’, pp. 68-77; VI. ‘A Polity for Registering the Title 
Deeds of Houses and Landed Estates’, p. 77. 
74 Cf. Smith, WN, III. II, esp. [Glasgow Ed., (Oxford, 1976)], Vol. 1, pp. 381-5. 
75 Elements II. I. I., pp. 44-7. Cf., Instructions, pp. 29-30. 
76 Kames, Essays upon Several Subjects concerning British Antiquities, (Edinburgh, 1747), p. 193. For 
commentary, see Moore, ‘Natural rights in the Scottish Enlightenment’, in Cambridge Eighteenth-
Century Political Thought, pp. 291-316, esp. pp. 305, 313. 
77 James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his adversaries, (Cambridge, 1980), esp. pp. 
134, 143, 146, 169. 
78 See Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence [1762] in R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael & P. G. Stein (eds.), The 
Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, 7 Vols., (Oxford, 1978), V, pp. 49, 
70. See also Winch, Adam Smith’s Politics, pp. 67, 141. 
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would too, though with far greater adherence to the ‘doctrine of proportionality’ (i.e., 
the emphasis on the balance between investment and consumption), Thomas Malthus.79 
It is in citing such examples as these then, that Tucker may be described with some 
justification as an important progenitor of classical economic theory – even if it is all 
too easy to overstate the influence. 
 
The second polity of the Elements which is of particular significance to us, entitled ‘A 
polity for inclosing Commons and Common Fields’, was essentially Tucker’s plea for 
common wastelands to be treated, improved and put to better use.80 Whilst at first 
glance this appears to be a relatively elementary point, it is in truth an exceptionally 
important one, since it was here that Tucker first set down in explicit terms the maxim 
that territorial acquisition could never constitute a jus ad bellum, either on political or 
theological (i.e., Augustinian and/or Thomistic natural law) grounds. ‘What need is 
there for any State or Kingdom [to] engage in OFFENSIVE WARS, to inlarge their 
Dominions’, Tucker asserts, ‘while so great a Part of what they already possess, remains 
uncultivated and unimproved?’81 Similarly to his views, then, on the importance of a 
thriving population, within the immediate context of the clergyman’s anti-militarism, 
Tucker’s paramount concern here for resource allocation and land cultivation is yet 
another crucial indicator of the clergyman’s Butler-inspired, neo-Stoic concern for the 
interconnections between humanity and nature; of the spatiotemporal and metaphysical 
environment lying between the two, and, moreover, of humanity’s ethical improvement 
which ought to result from rational inquiry into it.82  
  
With regard to the issue of war on a general level, and not merely the conditions 
necessary for a just war, it should also be noted in conclusion to the present section that 
Tucker’s position in the above-cited resonates even more strongly in light of the fact 
that the Elements was published on the eve of the Seven Years’ War – a conflict in 
which, according to the likes of David Armitage and Peter N. Miller, long-standing 
																																																																			
79 Malthus, Principles of Political Economy, (London Ed., 1820), VII. VII. For the secondary literature on 
Malthus in an intellectual history context, see Winch, Malthus, (Oxford, 1987) [for the ‘doctrine of 
proportionality’, see esp. pp. 18, 55, 107], & Stefan Collini, John Burrow & Winch, That Noble Science 
of Politics, (Cambridge, 1983), p. 83.  
80 Elements, ‘A Polity for inclosing Commons and Common Fields', pp. 47-55. 
81 Elements, p. 55. 
82 For discussion of these specific neo-Stoic themes in a broader eighteenth-century context, see Force, 
Self-Interest Before Adam Smith, pp. 73-4, 80, 83-4, 232.  
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debates surrounding the issue of global empire came spectacularly to a head.83 As if to 
emphasise the point, in the advertisement to the complimentary Causes of the Poor 
(1760) Tucker would reiterate his abhorrence for the Seven Years’ War, and for armed 
conflict more generally, by identifying the enterprise with the vagaries of 
monopolisation:84 
 
[The] Arts of Peace are but little attended to, and less understood in Times of War […] to 
excite that Man (who perhaps is called your Enemy) to greater Industry and Sobriety, to 
consider him as a Customer to you, and yourself as a Customer to him, so that the richer 
both of you are the better it may be for each other; and, in Short to promote a mutual Trade 
to mutual Benefit—this is the kind of reasoning which is as unintelligible at present, as the 
notion of the Antipodes at the time of Galileo.85 
 
As we shall see, both this anti-war and anti-monopolistic stance remained a definitive 
component of the broader Tuckerian scheme, as an eighteenth-century Europe 
seemingly addicted to war showed little sign of abating.86 
 
IV. Certain Proposals. 
 
Just as Tucker set out an exhaustive list of polities in the Elements, so too did he earlier 
conceive of a number of important proposals within the Essay, individually and 
collectively designed to heighten productivity, limit wasteful expenditure, and to 
eradicate what he called the ‘shock’ and ‘scandal’ of the most ‘unparalleled Lewdness 
and Debauchery reining among Us’.87 The more perfunctory among these included a 
proposal for setting up woollen and silk manufacturers in the west and south-west of 																																																																			
83 This is described as the transition from Britain’s ‘first’ to its ‘second Empire’ in Armitage, Ideological 
Origins of the British Empire, pp. 171, 193-4. Miller also claims that the ‘Seven Years War brought to a 
close the early-modern phase of European expansion’ which appeared in ‘retrospect as the high-water 
mark of reason of state economics. The policy of national aggrandizement based on transmarine colonies, 
commercial expansion and naval support had, seemingly, been vindicated and confirmed’, he concludes, 
in Defining the Common Good, p. 170 & Chap. 3 passim. In other words, Miller labels this the age of 
‘colonial crisis’, esp. at pp. 18, n. 165, 63, 202, 353, n. 6, 354, 415. 
84 For more on monopolisation, see Section V below. 
85 Causes of the Poor, p. iv. A variant of this passage is reprinted in Four Tracts, p. 97 & Case of Going 
to War, p. 58. Note Tucker’s Butlerian allusion to the antipodes in reference to humankind’s limited 
capacities (and, by extension, that war is an unnecessary by-product of such ignorance). The antipodes 
metaphor is repeated in the context of Tucker’s defence of Establishment Trinitarianism in TASS (1774), 
p. 8, as we saw in Chapter Four, p. 170. 
86As Ingram puts it in Religion, Reform and Modernity, p. 17: ‘[The eighteenth-century was] a world 
defined by God and by war … far more than any –ism or –isation, war transformed eighteenth-century 
England’. In virtually all of his mature writings, Tucker continually describes those who are enthusiastic 
for war and conquest as ‘mock-patriots’. 
87 Essay, ‘CERTAIN PROPOSALS For remedying many of the above-mentioned INCONVENIENCES 
and encreasing the TRADE and CREDIT of GREAT BRITAIN’, pp. 50-139, citation at p. 130. 
	 196	
England in an effort to rival the French;88 a proposal for encouraging trade between 
Britain’s plantations in the colonies and the mother country, to the mutual benefit of 
both;89 the creation of new roads and canals between Britain’s major cities for the 
efficient transportation of manufactured goods;90 the employment of public inspectors to 
review the quality and quantity of such goods;91 and finally, numerous sumptuary laws 
and taxes intended to counter the ill-effects of luxury, vice, extravagance, bachelorhood 
and childless widows.92 
  
Yet again, however, just as in the case of the Elements, there are a number of specific 
proposals housed within the Essay which are especially pertinent to this study. The first 
of these relates to what Tucker calls the ‘prodigious Expence of Electioneering’, in 
anticipation of Tucker’s prominent role in the political campaigns of Bristol during the 
general election of 1754. 93  Essentially, this was Tucker’s proposal to alter the 
qualification of voting to the forty-shilling freehold that had been established during the 
reign of Henry VI (1421-71).94 By ensuring that this figure would become the ‘requisite 
Sum of a Freeholder’, and likewise a £200 stock in trade in order to qualify tradesmen 
to vote, Tucker argued that the ‘Manufacturing Part’ of the nation (i.e., the industrious 
poor) would be left undisturbed from their work, as opposed to their running ‘roving’ 
during election time.95 Moreover, by doing so, Tucker hoped that the prestige of voting 																																																																			
88 Essay, ‘To set up Woollen and Silk Manufactures in the West of England, and South-West of Ireland 
… in order to rival the French’, pp. 63-5. 
89 Essay, ‘To encourage a Trade with our own Plantations, in all such Articles as shall make for the 
mutual Benefit of the Mother Country and her Colonies’, pp. 92-105. 
90 Essay, ‘To cut some Canals between our great Towns of Trade, for the Conveniency and Cheapness of 
Carriage’, pp. 116-8. 
91 Essay, ‘To have publick inspectors into all our Manufactures’, pp. 121-2. 
92 Essay, ‘To lay certain Taxes on the following Articles of Luxury, Vice, or Extravagance; which Taxes 
shall be applied to the general Improvement of Commerce’, pp. 127-39.  
 With regard to this last proposal, cf. Causes of the Poor, IV, pp. 16-24. Another particularly interesting 
proposal was Tucker’s plea to establish ‘a POLICE for the Prevention of Smuggling’, which pre-empted 
the creation of the first official policing body in Britain, the Thames River Police, by nearly half a 
century. See Essay, pp. 105-11. The Thames River Police was formed by Patrick Colquhoun (1745-1820) 
and the mariner John Harriot (1745-1817) in 1798; see Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Commerce and 
Police of the River Thames … suggesting Means for preventing the Depredations thereon, by a 
Legislative System of River Police, (London, 1800)].  
 Other ‘modernising’ polities in the Essay include ‘To raise a Fishery in the Northern Coast of Scotland, 
by giving a DOUBLE PREMIUM for some Years, till the Trade is sufficiently established …’, pp. 118-9; 
‘To establish Civil Governments at Gibraltar and Port-Mahone, and make them Free Ports’, pp. 120-1; 
‘To alter the Method of collecting our Duties upon particular Sorts of Goods imported’, pp. 122-7. 
93 See esp., Shelton, Dean Tucker, Chap. 6. 
94 In 1749 Tucker calculated this to be the equivalent of £20 per annum, allowing for the decline in the 
value of money. 
95 Cf. Causes of the Poor, p. 7: ‘THE Affair of Electioneering … and the Qualifications for voting … 
have a fatal Tendency towards increasing the Numbers of the Poor; both as they introduce Idleness, 
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itself would increase to such an extent that it would become a ‘Matter of Honour’ and 
‘Reputation’, if not ‘even a ‘Privilege’, impervious to ‘Bribery and Corruption’. By 
these means, Tucker felt that the ‘Spirit of Emulation and Industry’ would be raised 
within the specifically republican portion of the mixed constitution, rather than exalting 
what he called the ‘bad Purposes of influencing’ – a democratic and/or demagogic 
characteristic that Tucker ever mistrusted.96  
  
The next proposal of interest to us is Tucker’s suggestion for courts to be erected 
throughout Britain’s manufacturing regions, each to be supplemented with guardians 
responsible for the ‘Morals of the manufacturing Poor’: an explicit reiteration of 
Tucker’s belief that the labouring classes required direction from a higher authority.97 In 
order to qualify as a guardian, Tucker advised that members would be required to 
possess no fewer than twenty employees each; to subscribe approximately two guineas 
or more annually for the maintenance of said court; and that guardians would be 
expected to marry in order to set a good example to their workers. In return, guardians 
would perform the important role of limiting the number of alehouses within their 
district, of punishing those who arranged leisure activities such as cock fighting and 
cudgel playing, of removing women suspected of bad Character; in short, of disciplining 
those who brought any ‘Temptations to draw People together’.98 Nevertheless, in order 
to encourage what he called ‘Industry, Probity and practical Religion’ among the 
workers, whilst also reiterating that he did not ordinarily endorse penal decrees, Tucker 
put forward two further roles for the guardians which he believed were by far the more 
important.99 Firstly, that they would be obliged to incentivise young prospective couples 
to marry with a nominal fiscal reward, to be paid a full year and a day after marriage. 
And second, that they would be expected to reward the ‘remarkably diligent and 
industrious’ with a copy of the Bible, neatly bounded and gilded; or other such suitable 
	
Extravagance, and Dissoluteness in the lowest Class of People … they destroy, or weaken that Power, 
which the Laws of every Country ought to have for correcting or punishing such Evils’. 
96 Essay, pp. 37-8, 50-3; cf. Instructions, p. 48. 
97 Essay, ‘To erect certain Courts in all manufacturing Places of the Kingdom, where the chief Dealers 
themselves shall petition for them, with the Title of GUARDIANS of the Morals of the manufacturing 
Poor’, pp. 53-8. 
98 Cf. Causes of the Poor, pp. 18-20. 
99 As we have suggested, the appeal to ‘practical Religion’ is possibly of Tenisonian, and definitely of 
Butlerian, origin. Cf. Chapter Four, p. 137, n. 76. 
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(that is to say ecumenical) theological works, such as Bishop Francis Gastrell’s (1662-
1725) Christian Institutes (1707).100  
  
In this last point, Tucker was evidently deferring to Butler’s insistence in his Charity 
Schools (1745) sermon that the poor deserved the right to (a predominantly Christian) 
education, specifically by ‘keeping up’ what Butler had called ‘a Sense of Religion in 
the lower Rank’ via the distribution of ‘religious Books’.101 Indeed, Tucker later 
elaborated on this theme himself in a number of supplementary tracts published in the 
1750s and 1760s dealing almost exclusively with domestic social and political reform; 
most notably his Butlerian identikit Sermon Preached in the Parish-Church of Christ-
Church … [for] the Yearly Meeting of the … Charity Schools, (1766) [henceforth 
SPCK] and Causes of the Poor. The latter of these works should be immediately 
familiar to the reader, since it was here that Tucker returned to the idea of those 
‘hereditary, legal, and perpetual Guardians of the Poor’ who were to reside within such 
proposed charity ‘Districts’ (explored immediately above). 102 We shall be obliged to 
return in part to these tracts amongst others, alongside Tucker and Butler’s broader 
views on the poor, their right to education, and the Christian emphasis on charity, in our 
Conclusion.103  
  
The final two proposals of the Essay which concern us relate to Tucker’s views on the 
Irish Question: the first, a scheme to incorporate the British Isles together into one 
kingdom ‘as to Parliament, Trade and Taxes’; and the second to extend taxation upon 
Ireland herself in order to relieve the English, after some five years, of at least one third 
of the burden.104 As far as Tucker was concerned, the benefits of this scheme were 
obvious:  
 
This Proposal of Incorporation has long been the Wish of every generous disinterested 
Patriot of both Kingdoms. And indeed, inexpressibly great would be the Benefit on both 
Sides. The Irish would share in their Advantages of our Trade, and we in theirs […] 																																																																			
100 Cf. Causes of the Poor, pp. 34-5. To be more precise, in this pamphlet Tucker proposes that poor 
houses and charity schools should be furnished with ‘four copies’ of Gastrel’s Christian Institutes, 
amongst others. Note, furthermore, Tucker’s espousal of incentivisation alongside his deployment of 
reward mechanisms, clearly pointing to his optimistic outlook when it came to socio-economic policy. 
101 Charity Schools, pp. 13, 15, 20. 
102 In Causes of the Poor, esp. p.12. 
103 See esp. Conclusion, Sections I-II. 
104 Essay, ‘To incorporate both the British Isles together, and to make One Kingdom in all Respects, as to 
Parliament, Trade and Taxes’, pp. 58-62; ‘To lay by Degrees the English Taxes upon Ireland’, p. 62. 
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[Therefore by] this mutual Benefit, neither Kingdom would be looked on as Foreign to the 
other … [rather] all that unnatural War between the Commerce of the two Nations would be 
at an End.105 
 
As for the prejudicial objections of those whose self-interest blinded them to the 
advantages of such a scheme, Tucker adopted the analogy of partitioning parts of 
England into commercially hostile regions (for example, a north-south divide upon the 
River Thames), stating that though the ‘private Interest’ of each would almost certainly 
breed mistrust, suspicion and antipathy as to the other side’s motives, nevertheless, 
when it came to the ‘upright’ individual who placed the ‘Welfare of the Community 
truly at Heart’, no such fear would ever be necessary. ‘One Thing is plain and obvious’, 
he therefore wrote, ‘… Self-Interest, the Bane of all Publick Good, is driven to hard 
Shifts, in order to cover such Views as she dare not openly avow’.106 Nevertheless, even 
‘here, methinks’, Tucker reiterates, ‘I hear SELF-INTEREST making an Outcry, “They 
would run away with our Trade.” But pray, let me calmly ask, Who would run away 
with it? Or where would they run to? Why truly to our own People, our own 
Countrymen’.107 Hence, in a final plea to common sense Tucker insists that since the 
two kingdoms of Britain and Ireland are, to all intents and purposes, already as one, it is 
only right and proper to treat them accordingly:  
 
Is Ireland to be looked upon as a distinct Kingdom?’—more is the Pity: For as the two 
Kingdoms have but one common Head,—one common Interest both in Church and State,—
the same Friends,—and the same Enemies; they ought to have been long since consolidated 
together.108 
 
As we can see, then, large swathes of Tucker’s socio-political and economic reforms 
were well before their time, not least when it came to the issue of Anglo-Irish relations. 
Yet it was not until the younger Pitt called upon Tucker’s services in the 1780s that the 
clergyman would write again in any detail upon this particular subject in his final 
published work, Britain and Ireland (1785). Nevertheless even as early as the Essay of 
1749, Tucker’s position with regard to the worthiness of the so-called ‘Celtic fringe’ 
was incredibly consistent with his wider neo-Stoic, cosmopolitan ideals; a subject we 
touched on earlier in this chapter in the parallel context of Tucker’s outlook on the dual-																																																																			
105 Essay, pp. 58-9. 
106 Essay, p. 61. 
107 Essay, pp. 59-60. 
108 Essay, p. 60. 
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issues of toleration and naturalisation.109 Indeed, two further proposals housed within 
the Essay briefly aforementioned – one to encourage the naturalisation of all Protestants 
irrespective of place of birth, and the other to invite distinguished foreigners to travel at 
their leisure within the kingdom – is yet further evidence of Tucker’s inclusive stance 
on this matter.110 As for the judicious polities and certain proposals of the economic 
tracts, however, in the previous sections we have demonstrated time and again that 
Tucker tended to offer pragmatic solutions to what he considered to be straightforward 
obstacles. This is yet another important Tuckerian characteristic, discernable throughout 
(and indeed beyond) his economic writings, and which was arguably present even in his 
earlier treatment of Whitefield and the Methodists. In this respect, there is possibly 
(though merely anecdotally at this stage) something of the Ciceronian sensus communis 
in Tucker’s wider thought; a term which resonates strongly in the Stoically-inclined 
philosophies of Shaftesbury and (to a lesser extent) Kant, as well as Tucker’s immediate 
British contemporary Thomas Reid (1710-96).111 As Tucker would later put it himself, 
then, in response to the poet and philanthropist Hannah More’s declaration that the 
subjects upon which he wrote went far beyond her comprehension: ‘Pish! No such 
thing! Common sense will ever appeal to common sense’.112 
 
V. ‘That Watchful Dragon’: Tucker on the Relationship Between Self-Interest and 
Monopolisation. 
 
On account of both economic tracts, Tucker placed by far the greatest emphasis on the 
important issue of the improvidence of large monopolies, public companies and 
corporate charters. Even as early as the first edition of the Essay, for example, he 
persistently remarked upon the subject, at one point redefining the trio as ‘the Bane and 																																																																			
109 Cf. pp. 191-2. For early-modern English subjugation of the Celtic fringe as the possible harbinger of 
later notions of British Empire, see Armitage, Ideological Origins of the British Empire, Chap. 1, pp. 1-
23, explicitly at p. 6. 
110  Essay, ‘To encourage Foreign Merchants and Tradesmen to settle among Us, by a general 
Naturalization Act for all Protestants’, pp. 84-92; ‘To invite Foreigners of Distinction to travel among 
Us’, pp. 111-5. Cf. NFP I & II, Instructions. 
111 See, e.g., Shaftesbury, Sensus Communis: An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour, (London, 
1709), reprinted in Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. In Three Volumes. Vol. I, 
(London, 1711); Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, 
(London, 1764); Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft [Critique of the Power of Judgement, 1790], I. II. 
§ 40, ‘On taste as a kind of sensus communis’, in Paul Guyer (ed.), Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews (tr.), The 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, (Cambridge, 2000). For discussion, see also Sophia 
Rosenfield, Common Sense: A Political Philosophy, (Harvard, 2011), esp. Chaps 1, 2, 6. 
112 Roberts, Memoirs of Hannah More, I, p. 210. 
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Destruction of a Free Trade’, at another as ‘a Prostitution of the Trade and Welfare of 
the Publick to the merciless Ravages of greedy Individuals’.113 As ever, Tucker believed 
that misplaced self-interest, ‘that watchful Dragon’ as he described it, was responsible 
for this state of affairs: and ‘nothing I can say’, he remarked, ‘will have Charm enough 
to lay him asleep’.114 Ultimately, then, Tucker’s views on the relationship between self-
love and monopolisation play an essential role in acquiring a wider understanding of the 
clergyman’s economic ideas, since it was on this subject more than any other that he 
defined his vision for a truly freer trade. Once again, it is our prerogative to argue that 
this too was steeped in Butlerian epistemology: as can be seen, for example, in the very 
opening pages of the Essay, where Tucker reiterates Butler’s ‘sociability-self-love’ 
formula as applied to the domestic market: 
 
[As] the private interest of the Landed Gentleman arises from the General Commerce of the 
Place [i.e., London, and the kingdom as a whole], he can have no partial Views in relation to 
Trade, nor can reap any Advantage from Monopolies, Exclusive Companies, or such like 
destructive Artifices. The more Persons there are employed in every Branch of Business, the 
more there will be to consume the Produce of his Estate: so that he will have no Temptations 
to complain, That the Trade is over stocked, or wish the Promotion of this Trade, in order to 
the Declension of that. In short, his own Interest is connected with the Good of the Whole; so 
that he cannot but be extremely well qualified to understand and promote it, if he will please 
to make Use of the Advantages he is happily possessed of.115 
 
It is on this Butlerian footing, then, that Tucker proceeds with each and every one of his 
anti-monopolisation arguments. The rich, Tucker argues, procuring monopolies on 
account of their greed and selfishness, continue to drive the price of labour up, thereby 
denying the poor (their right to) access to employment.116 In Tucker’s eyes this is a 
disastrous situation to be in, because it exposes the lower ranks to the familiar vices of 
idleness, licentiousness and debauchery, and thereby amounting to little more than an 
immense drain on the resources (and patience) of the nation.117 Customarily, Tucker’s 
solution to this problem lay in bringing about ‘Examples of Industry and the good 
Effects of it, before their Eyes’. Only by enlarging trade, he insisted, thereby 																																																																			
113 Essay, pp. 40-1, 73-4. Cf. NFP II, p. 26: ‘[If] all Fetters and Shackles upon Trade are taken off, if there 
be a brisker Circulation and a surer Market, where will these Advantages terminate but upon the Landed 
Interest? […] And are they not the Dupes of those monopolizing Tradesmen, who have set up a low, 
personal Interest of their own in Opposition to that of the Publick?’ 
114 Essay, p. 66. 
115 Essay, p. xii. 
116 If we recall, in Butler’s view, greed and selfishness were affections lying beyond the ethical sphere. 
E.g., Fifteen Sermons 1729, p. xxix; cf., Chapter Three p. 116. 
117 Essay, p. 53 n.: ‘The Complaints against the Morals of the manufacturing Poor become louder every 
Day and certainly demand, if any Thing doth, the serious Attention of the Legislator’. 
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transforming commercial activity into a truly inclusive and dynamic enterprise, could 
this downward spiral be abated, and the ‘deep-rooted’ and ‘habitual Laziness of a 
People’ finally conquered.118 Hence was it imperative, he argued, to ‘lay open and 
extend our narrow and restrained Companies, which hurt the Trade of Great Britain 
more essentially with respect to France, than any other Company can do’.119  
  
In order to strengthen his case against monopolies, in both economic tracts Tucker paid 
particular attention to Britain’s three main powerhouses of global trade, the Turkey 
Trade, the Hudson’s Bay and the East India Companies.120 Describing the first of the 
three as outmoded in light of the fact that the Hanseatic League was no longer in 
operation, Tucker declared that the Turkey company had ‘excluded’ British subjects 
‘from having any Commerce with the whole Turkish Empire’, to the nation’s obvious 
detriment. Likewise, defending the ‘Virtue of a free Trade’ in the supplementary 
Reflections on Turkey (1753), here he explained in no uncertain terms that the aims of 
the Turkey Company were completely at variance with those of the ‘welfare of the 
publick’:  
 
The Turky Company is a Monopoly in every Sense,—as no private member is allow’d to fit 
out a ship when he pleases, or to export and import what Quantities of Goods he would 
chuse, – As the Trade is confin’d to the single expensive Port of London, – as the Freedom of 
the Company is limited to Merchants by Profession, and has been obstructed under frivolous 
Pretences, – and as the Members themselves are fetter’d with By-laws.121 
 																																																																			
118 Essay, p. 67. One ought to be mindful here of Tucker’s adoption of Butler’s ‘inclusive’ and 
‘reciprocal’ brand of Christian commercial sociability, discussed in Chapter Three above, esp. pp. 113. 
119 Essay, pp. 40-1, 65-6. Tucker’s main concern was that, since the aim of all exclusive companies was to 
undersell the individual to the point of ‘breaking’ them (whether this be in a free trade scenario or not), 
though this meant that the individual ‘Engrosser’ might one day retire, Tucker was nevertheless adamant 
that the company itself would continue mulcting the public indefinitely, see Essay pp. 70-4, with the 
following citation at pp. 70-1: ‘In the 1st Place’, these exclusive companies cannot trade, if they were 
inclined, upon so easy terms, as private adventurers would do, were the Trade laid open […] For [the] 
Reason [that] it has been always found, that if private adventurers … shall be permitted to engage in the 
same trade, they will infallibly carry it away from the Company’. 
120 See esp. Essay, pp. 65-84 & Elements, II. II. I. ‘A Polity for opening such Exclusive Companies, as 
relate to our Home-Trade, or Domestic Commerce’, pp. 79-93 & II. ‘A Polity for opening those Exclusive 
Companies, which relate to Foreign Trade’, pp. 93-135. Cf. ‘Appendix’ to the Elements, pp. 135-168. 
121 Reflections on Turkey, pp. 4, 5-6: ‘… the Interest of private Adventurers is to sell as cheap as possible, 
in order to get Custom by rivaling each other. Thus the Publick is benefitted by Emulation, as it promotes 
the Circulation of Labour and universal Plenty; – but is hurt by Monopolists, who are a Check to Industry, 
to the Circulation of Labour at home, and the Exportation of it abroad; and whose only View, whatever 
may be pretended, is to sacrifice the general Interest of the Kingdom to that of a few Individuals’. In the 
Appendix to the second edition of this pamphlet, Tucker notes the first edition’s success among free 
traders, and its subsequent vilification by the monopolists who called it ‘a lie from beginning to end’, at p. 
21.   
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Similarly, again, in the case of the Hudson’s Bay Company (which had already been the 
subject of a parliamentary inquest in 1748), Tucker lamented the fact that ‘the Interest’ 
of so many Britons was being ‘sacrificed … for the Sake of a single One’.122 Yet even 
more interestingly and significantly, Tucker went on to admonish the Hudson’s Bay 
Company’s ill treatment of the natives, who, as ‘savage as they are’, Tucker explained, 
still ‘have the NATURAL LOGICK of feeling when they are well or ill used’. In fact, 
Tucker continued, the natives were not so different from the Europeans in a great many 
other respects too:  
 
[The] Indians are an idle, lazy Race of People; and having no artificial Wants to gratify, 
have no Ambition to spur them on to take more Pains. It is true, They have no such artificial 
Wants as We have; They do not want sumptuous Houses and Gardens, rich Furniture, or 
Coaches and Chairs:—But they [do] want Beads, Bells, little Looking-Glasses, Rings, and 
such Trinkets; (besides many Articles of their Cloathing, Bedding, Hunting, Fishing, and 
Fowling) and are as Impatient to be gratified in these Respects as we can be in ours. In these 
Things, therefore, they are as covetous and ambitious as the Rest of Mankind.123 
 
In this passage, Tucker’s main point is to stress that it is precisely because the Indians 
are not as civilised as their European counterparts that they do not have – as yet – many 
artificial wants. This is a double-edged term in that, whilst on the one hand this 
indicates Tucker’s endorsement of what Smith would later call ‘the paradox of 
commercial society’ (i.e., the idea that the labouring poor of richer nations enjoyed 
conditions of ease and plenty that the kings of savage nations could only dream of), yet 
on the other, the price of this was that civilised societies were far more susceptible to 
corruption precisely because they depended upon the multiplication of their 
population’s artificial wants in order to increase in wealth and prosperity.124 (And if we 
recall, if left unchecked Tucker equated the artificial wants of mankind with the 
Butlerian notions of (a) misdirected self-love and (b) defective conscience).125 This is 																																																																			
122 Essay, p. 41. 
123 Essay, pp. 79-80. 
124 Cf. Elements, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, p. 6: ‘… artificial Needs are more or less extensive according 
to the several Ranks and Stations in Society, the different Improvements, Customs, Education and other 
Qualities of Mankind’. For a detailed continuation of these themes, see discussion in Conclusion, Sections 
III-IV below. For Smith’s formulation, see e.g., WN, I. I., [Glasgow Ed., (Oxford, 1976)], Vol. 1, pp. 23-
4. 
125 For Butler’s views on this, see Chapter Three, pp. 103-4, 112; for Tucker’s reiteration see this chapter, 
Section I. Perhaps the earliest statement of Tucker’s ‘artificial wants’ theory is provided in a footnote to 
NFP II (1753), p. 10: ‘THE natural Wants of Mankind can be but few […] as far as would answer the 
Purposes of Animal Life. But as such a State would be little different from that of the Brutes, most of 
those moral Obligations, which now constitute social Virtue, or relative Duty, would have been 
unknown,—If therefore it was the Wisdom of Providence, that there should be Relations and 
Subordinations in Society, the artificial Wants of Mankind will ever be found to be relative to their 
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highly significant, in that it is in this context that we discern Tucker’s nascent 
engagement with (or perhaps more accurately, influence upon) eighteenth-century—
predominantly Scottish—conjectural history, about which much more will have to be 
determined in future Tucker scholarship.126 Suffice it to say for now, however, that in 
the parallel context of dialogue over the vitiations of the East India Company, Tucker 
reiterates his views on this matter by refuting the recent claim made by Montesquieu, 
who had claimed that the Indians simply had no interest in European goods; Tucker 
arguing instead that they were just as likely to buy items if they were cheap, in the same 
way that Europeans did.127 A further consequence of this, therefore, is Tucker’s view 
that the spirit of monopolisation, which tended to block channels of free trade between 
richer and poorer nations, continued to inhibit global economic development via the 
stultification of a swathe of potential markets left untapped throughout the known 
world.128  
 
Beyond that which we have shortly documented, the minutiae of Tucker’s objections to 
the Turkey, Hudson’s Bay and East India Companies are dealt with in informative – 
though at times rather perfunctory – fashion in Clark and Shelton’s respective 
biographies, such that we need not elaborate on them here.129 As should by now be clear 
to the reader, however, what is of most concern to us as we steadily approach the 
conclusion to this chapter is the theo-philosophical content which lay behind Tucker’s 
stance. In order to proceed, then, we return at this stage to the ‘Preliminary Discourse’ 
to the Elements, particularly the section in which Tucker spoke in terms of self-love 
being both ‘narrow’ and ‘confined’ in its views, such that if left with no ‘Direction or 
Controll’ it would eventually ‘defeat’ itself until ‘even Self-interest is a Loser’.130 For as 
we have just noted, in the section of the Essay in which Tucker advises that Britain 
ought to extend her ‘narrow and restrained Companies’ as a matter of national interest, 	
Stations; and the better any Person discharges the Duties of that Sphere of Life he belongs to, the more he 
will be enabled to contribute to the present Happiness of Society, by promoting a regular and permanent 
Circulation of Industry and Labour, though the several Ranks he is connected with. This is an essential 
Point, in which Mankind differ from the Brute Creation’. 
126 Briefly touched on in our Conclusion, pp. 233-5. 
127 Essay, pp. 80-1. Cf. Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois [Spirit of the 
Laws], (Geneva, 1748), XXI. I. 
128 E.g., Reflections on Turkey, p. 3: ‘Many of those Countries, Spain in particular, which used to admit 
great Quantities of English Merchandise, are now setting up Manufactures of their own, and laying 
Burdens on ours, to prevent their Introduction: So that it is become more expedient than ever, to seek out 
as many new markets as we can’. 
129 Esp. Clark, Josiah Tucker, pp. 132-3; Shelton, Dean Tucker, pp. 20, 61-3, 66. 
130 Elements, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, pp. 7-8.  
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two virtually identical adjectives are also utilised in the context of the clergyman’s 
opposition to monopolies.131  
  
The implication of this is absolutely clear. In Tucker’s view, unbridled self-love and 
monopolisation are direct correlates – the latter being dependent upon the former for its 
existence.132 Returning once more and crucially, then, to the Elements’ ‘Preliminary 
Discourse’, here we note yet again an explicit statement of the Tuckerian link between 
self-love and monopolisation, i.e., that ‘Self-Love is narrow and confined in its Views’; 
to which we may now add Tucker’s farther observation that self-love ‘admits of no 
Sharers or Competitors, where-ever it can Exclude them’: 
 
Therefore, when you see a set of Individuals forming Combinations and exclusive Societies 
… the Members of this exclusive Company are still Rivals and Competitors among 
themselves  … [for] the Mass of Mankind … as far as they have Power … will always 
regard the present Moment, and be blind in respect to distant Consequences. Hence it is, that 
Monopolies are formed, and Charters granted, under the ridiculous and absurd Pretence of 
the Public Good, when, in Fact, private Advantage is the only Point aimed at. Hence it is, 
that unjust Combinations are sanctified by positive Laws, and those very Exclusions are 
stiled RIGHTS and LIBERTIES, by which other Men have their Rights taken from them, 
and are denied the Liberty of being useful to themselves, and serviceable to their Country.133 
 
Here Tucker speaks in relatively disparaging terms of the ‘Mass of Mankind’, which 
can and ought to be contrasted with Butler’s far more affable analogue ‘Cements of 
Society’.134 Extrapolating from this, in Tucker’s view, the practicable transition from 
humanity understood as a mass of individuals (or in contemporaneous parlance the pre-
societal ‘state of nature’) towards a collection of ‘inclusive, reciprocal and egalitarian’ 
personalities (as we earlier described it in the context of Butler’s ideas in Chapter 
Three) is a particularly troublesome one to make.135 In this, we are to be reminded that 
																																																																			
131 Essay, pp. 65-6.  
132 Dickey, ‘Doux-Commerce and Humanitarian Values’, in Grotius and the Stoa, p. 312. 
133 Elements, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, p. 6. Tucker intends to juxtapose this passage with another set 
down two paragraphs prior, at pp. 5-6: ‘[The] first … Wants of Mankind [are] much better supplied by 
dividing the general Labour into different Branches, than if each Individual depended on himself alone 
for the Supply of [them] And this Portioning out of Labour [gives] rise to different Trades and 
Manufactures … the Rudiments of Commerce’. 
134 Cf. Causes of the Poor, p. 8: ‘For the Mass of Mankind are every-where more attached to old Customs 
than to the Truth and Reason, or the Usefulness of Things’. The apparent tensions between Tucker’s 
‘Mass of Mankind’ phrase and Butler’s ‘Cements of Society’ will be reconciled in the Conclusion 
following.  
135 Chapter Three, p. 112. This was a position that even the normally phlegmatic Smith began to lament 
towards the end of his life. See, e.g., the sixth edition of TMS [first ed. 1758] (1790), Haakonssen (ed.), I. 
III. III., p. 73, in which Smith replaces a discussion on stoicism with a chapter on ‘the corruption of our 
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Tucker was clearly far more aware, or perhaps willing to admit the ferocity, of the 
compulsions of self-love – a perception clearly heightened by the fact that he lived in a 
far more material and metropolitan world than the one even Butler grew up in, merely a 
generation prior. Consequently, Tucker was undoubtedly far more at pains to emphasise 
the destructive, and certainly powerful, force that self-love evidently was/is: 
 
INDEED I grant, that the Social Instinct of Benevolence is some Check upon this selfish 
monopolizing Principle; but it is so very feeble, that it would be quite ineffectual to prevent 
the Mischiefs arising from inordinate Self-Love, were there no stronger Curb to rein it in: 
For the Love of Self is implanted in Mankind much more strongly than the Love of 
Benevolence; according to the English Proverb, Self knows no Fellow.136 
 
Significantly, then, it is in this very specific respect that Tucker’s conception of self-
love edged away from the ‘harmonious’ Stoicism of Butler and instead towards the 
Epicurean-Augustinianism of Mandeville – for whom as we know, and in the words of 
Hundert, socio-commercial activity was merely the outcome of ‘the reciprocal features 
of the dynamics of self-regard’.137 For indeed, in keeping with one of the central tenets 
of the Augustinian tradition, according to the likes of Mandeville, the affection of self-
love was deemed to comprise – in effect – the entirety of human nature; meaning in 
turn, as Force summarises, that ‘the first principle of human behaviour is [invariably] a 
boundless and tyrannical desire for universal domination’.138  
 
On initial observation, then, this stark description does indeed appear to be remarkably 
consistent with Tucker’s ‘self-love à monopolisation’ formula; and indeed, Tucker’s 
acknowledgement that self-love accounted for most, if not all, human/earthly conduct 
remained unchanged well into his mature writings, as is evinced in the Seventeen 
Sermons (1776): 
 
Now all earthly Masters want the Assistance of their Servants in One Degree or other … 
Profit, you see, Profit, and Advantage to themselves are their chief Aim; and Self-Interest 
their ruling Motive---But can this be the Case in regard to God? … Surely no!139 
 	
moral sentiments’, claiming that the ‘wise’ and virtuous’ were but a ‘small party’ compared to ‘the great 
mob of mankind’. 
136 Elements, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, p. 7.  
137 Hundert, ‘Sociability and self-love in the theatre of moral sentiments’, Collini et al. (eds.), Economy, 
Polity, and Society, p. 43. 
138 Force, Self-Interest Before Adam Smith, p. 46.  
139 Seventeen Sermons, pp. 56-7. 
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However, as we hone in on our conclusion to this chapter (and the study as a whole), it 
is worth recalling here Pufendorf’s likeminded concession to Hobbes of the primacy of 
individual self-preservation, such that the Dutch jurist was forced to invert the 
Hobbesian scheme by declaring that it was God who willed humans to seek their own 
safety within society.140 For in doing so, the suggestion we wish to make at this closing 
juncture is that the Grotian-Hobbesian-Pufendorfian (and thereby the Augustinian-
Epicurean-Stoic) conundrum played itself out once again in the guise of the economic 
tracts, and more particularly still in the form of the Butler-Mandeville-Tucker dynamic. 
For whilst Tucker was forced to acknowledge the primacy of Mandevillean self-love, 
just as in the case of Pufendorf and the Hobbesian ‘self-interested’ variant in the 
seventeenth century, likewise did Tucker turn ever towards the Butlerian neo-Stoic 
scheme for guidance – again, just as Pufendorf did so with Grotius.  
 
In contradistinction to Mandevillean pessimism, then, which placed self-interest at the 
core of all earthly endeavour, the point requiring emphasis here is that the Butlerian 
conception of self-love—though a powerful and necessary component of human nature, 
granted—remained but one component of the plurality of the affections as a whole, 
always subordinated to reason and reflection/conscience.141 Moreover, it was precisely 
this conception that Tucker went on to embrace within his economic thought. Hence it 
is that it is ‘REASON AND REFLECTION’, writes Tucker, must be called upon to 
‘Aid the social and benevolent Principle’; thereby returning him swiftly and decisively 
to the naturalistic Stoic model of rational order:142 
 
… when the auxiliary [i.e., supporting or assisting] Motives of Reason are called in Aid of 
social Love, or diffusive Benevolence, this latter becomes, in a good degree, a Counter-
Agent to inordinate Self-Love. So that the Circulation of Commerce may be conceived to 
proceed from the Impulse of two distinct Principles of Action in Society, analogous to the 
centrifugal and centripetal Powers in the Planetary System.143 
 
Therefore, whether the spirit of monopoly be at best in the guise of individual 
acquisitiveness in the form of pure self-interest; a company swallowing the trade of its 
potential competitors so as to halt (whether intentionally or innocuously) the circulation 
of produce, labour or money; or, at worst, neo-Machiavellian imperialism in the form of 																																																																			
140 See Chapter One, Sections V-VI. 
141 Asserted in Chapter Three, pp. 102-3, 113. 
142 Elements, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, p. 7. 
143 Elements, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, p. 8. 
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economic aggrandisement under the pretence of national self-defence,144 as far as 
Tucker was concerned, in essence monopolisation was deemed to be the very 
embodiment of unfettered self-love writ large in the globalised commercial sphere. This 
being said by way of conclusion, perhaps the central task of the economic tracts was to 
offer the practicable means by which to purge self-love of its far-reaching, and 
potentially catastrophic, consequences: 
   
[It] might be questioned whether it would be right to attempt even to diminish [self-love]: 
For all Arts and Sciences, and the very Being of Government and Commerce, depend upon 
the right Exertion of this vigorous and active Principle. And were it once restrained, or 
greatly weakened, human Nature would make but feeble Efforts towards any thing great or 
good. Nay, in such a Case, the social Temper itself would want a Spur; and all the 
benevolent Affections being destitute of their proper Incitement, would be very faint and 
languid in their Operations. Consequently, the main point to be aimed at, is neither to 
extinguish nor enfeeble Self-Love, but to give it such a Direction, that it may promote the 
public Interest by pursuing its own: And then the Spirit of Monopoly will operate for the 
good of the Whole … And if this is the proper Business of Reason, consider’d in the 
Abstract; the Reason or public Wisdom of a State, or Community is particularly called upon 
to pursue such a Plan … Divert therefore the Pursuits of Self-Love from vicious or improper 
Objects, to those that are commendable and virtuous; Grant no Privileges to Indolence and 
Ignorance; Give no Assistance to the ingrossing Schemes of Monopolists; but raise a general 
Emulation among all Ranks and Professions in things relating to the public Good; and let 
superior Industry and Skill, Integrity and Virtue, receive all your Incouragement, because 
they alone deserve it.145 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks: The Economic Tracts in Context. 
  
Shelton correctly notes that Tucker ‘nowhere explains’ why he chose the ‘particular 
format’ of a comparative analysis between Britain and France when attempting to 
promulgate his economic ideas.146 Equipped, however, with over three decades of 
scholarship which has come to light since the publication of Shelton’s biography in 
1981, today Tucker’s tracts emerge as stridently economic commentaries, and indeed 
by-products, of the eighteenth-century European states-system – specifically, the system 
that arose as a result of the decisive Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. For Pocock in particular, 
Utrecht is deemed to be an important marker in the process of European enlightenment. 
For it was at this time, he argues, that various contemporaries began to conceive of 
Europe as a ‘confederation, or polity of independent sovereign states … held together 																																																																			
144 Hont, ‘Free Trade and the Economic Limits to National Politics: Neo-Machiavellian Political 
Economy Reconsidered’, in Jealousy, pp. 185-266. 
145 Elements, ‘Prefatory Discourse’, p. 7. 
146 Shelton, Dean Tucker, p. 51. 
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by the ties of common commerce’. Considered in this light, ‘Utrecht Enlightenment’ is 
thus taken to be one important component of a broader ‘Pocockean’ narrative which 
sees the long eighteenth-century as a period of profound intellectual crisis, encapsulated 
above all by the ideological clash between ancients and moderns, and set amidst the 
constant threat of international and commercial war:147 
 
The ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘European’ character of ‘Enlightenment’ thus pluralised … is 
complicated, by an intensification of the patterns of exchange and interaction which it is 
shown to have contained … [enabling us to distinguish amongst others] … Utrecht 
Enlightenment, consisting in a reorganisation of the European states system, ideologically 
aimed at superseding universal monarchy, wars of religion and papal supremacy, in a 
historical series extending so far back as a supersession of the ancient by the modern and 
forming the grand narrative of Enlightened historiography …148  
 
It is very much against this revised historiographical backdrop, then, that Tucker’s full 
choice of title for the Essay—A Brief Essay on the Advantages and Disadvantages 
Which respectively attend Britain and France With Regard to Trade—takes on a 
singular clarity. For the central discursive narrative to have emerged in the wake of 
Utrecht was that of the unlikely ascent of England/Britain at the expense of her 
traditionally superior Gallic rival, during what is increasingly labelled a ‘Second 
Hundred Years War’.149 As discussed in Chapter Two, the Anglo-Dutch Union of 1688-
9 played a crucial role in fostering this state of affairs. For it was precisely as a result of 
the religio-political machinations of that union that the (hitherto largely peripheral) 
British Isles had been propelled to a level of unprecedented prominence in international 
affairs. As is now well known, then, in substantive terms England/Britain’s rise rested 
on two significantly Dutch imports: firstly, her experiment with mixed monarchy; and 
secondly (and perhaps more significantly) on that which Addison famously eulogised as 
																																																																			
147 An excellent summary of the eighteenth-century ‘ancients versus moderns’ debate, and the influence it 
has exerted on the theory and practice of contemporary intellectual history, can be found in Whatmore, 
‘Intellectual History and the History of Political Thought’, in Whatmore & Young (eds.), Palgrave 
Advances in Intellectual History, pp. 109-129. 
148 Pocock, Barbarism, I, pp. 138-9; emphasis added. Cf. Machiavellian Moment, esp. Chaps XII, XIII & 
‘Afterword’, pp. 572-3.  
149 See Arthur H. Buffinton, The Second Hundred Years’ War, 1689-1815, (NY, 1929); Linda Colley, 
Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, [1992], (Yale University Press Ed., 2005); François Crouzet, 
‘The Second Hundred Years War: Some Reflections’, French History, 10 (4), (1996), pp. 432-50; Robert 
Tombs & Isabelle Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: The French and British from the Sun King to the Present, 
(London, 2006), esp. ‘Part I: Struggle’, pp. 5-305; Whatmore, ‘Neither Masters nor Slaves’: Small States 
and Empire in the Long Eighteenth Century’ in Duncan Kelly (ed.), Lineages of Empire, The Historical 
Roots of British Imperial Thought, (Oxford, 2009), pp. 53-81. 
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that ‘beautiful Virgin seated on a Throne of Gold … Her name … Publick Credit’.150 As 
Pocock has consistently shown, then, in tandem with the historical rise of a new 
‘rentier’ class of public creditors, the onset of professionalised standing and mercenary 
armies, as well as increasing reliance on the National Debt, these governmental and 
fiscal innovations enabled England/Britain to defeat the substantial threat of France, 
thereby cementing her position as one of the most significant grandees of the post-
Utrecht world.151 Yet despite Britain’s military successes during this period, as well as 
her embracement and utilisation of the commercial apparatuses that had, in large part, 
engendered it, much of the literature of the eighteenth-century (some of it as wishful as 
it was analytical in nature) centred on the growing expectancy that Britain would likely 
fall because rather than in spite of her reliance on public credit.152 As Whatmore 
succinctly words it, then, in the event of this happening the further expectation was that 
seventeenth-century style ‘French dominance would return, and that the natural order of 
politics would be restored’.153  
 
As we have shown in preceding chapters, from the likes of Augustan thinkers like 
Shaftesbury, Addison and Steele to Mandeville, Law and Berkeley, and not least Butler 
himself amongst others, the ramifications of these various projections and 
prognostications caused widespread consternation and uncertainty among the various 
thinkers of the day, who each accepted to varying degrees and oftentimes from 																																																																			
150 Joseph Addison, The Spectator, No. 3, 3 March 1711. Cf. Goldsmith, ‘Liberty, luxury and the pursuit 
of happiness’ in Pagden (ed.), Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, p. 241. We have 
discussed the implications of Dutch-style commerce on intra-eighteenth-century English/British society in 
Chapter Two, Section III. 
151 E.g., Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, Chaps. XII-XIV; Virtue, pp. 176, 177, 195, 237; Barbarism, I, p. 
109 & Chap. 4. For England’s development as a fiscal-military state in the late-seventeenth and early-
eighteenth-century, the following works are indispensible: P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in 
England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, (London: Macmillan, 1967); Jonathan Brewer, 
The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1680-1783, (Harvard, 1990), esp. Chap. 5; 
Henry Roseveare, The Financial Revolution, 1660-1760, (London: Longman, 1991). 
152 Most notoriously in the guise of Hume’s prophesying, in which he warned that ‘either the nation must 
destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation’ in his Essays, Moral, Political and Literary 
(First Ed. Edinburgh, 1742; 1748; 1752), II. IX. ‘Of Public Credit’. For further discussion, see Hont, ‘The 
Rhapsody of Public Debt: David Hume and Voluntary State Bankruptcy’, in Jealousy, pp. 325-53. 
153 Whatmore, ‘Burke on Political Economy’ in David Dwan & Christopher J. Insole (eds.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Edmund Burke, (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 80-91. It is important to note that the 
‘rhapsody’ of public debt was not confined solely to the British context, despite the fact that the British 
model remained very much in the forefront of contemporary European thought. Indeed, increasing pan-
continental reliance on public credit generated much pessimism and uncertainty about the prospect of 
imminent European-wide collapse, a quandary neatly encapsulated once again by Hume when he invoked 
the image of corrupt European monarchs and states ‘fighting … amidst their debts, funds, and public 
mortgages’ to ‘cudgel-playing fought in a China shop’. See once more his Essays, II. IX. ‘Of Public 
Credit’. Accordingly, for the French context in relation to Britain’s fiscal example in the run up to the 
1789 Revolution, see the highly informative Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, esp. pp. 1-21, 41-66. 
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antithetical positions the transformative nature of modern forms of trade and commerce. 
As is now well known, then, in Hirschmann’s classic formulation he describes this 
phenomenon in broad terms as ‘Money-Making and Commerce as Innocent and Doux’, 
or simply the ‘Doux-commerce’ theory; Hirschman’s argument essentially being that 
the advent of commercial society at about the turn of the eighteenth century constituted 
a ‘civilising’ or ‘modernising’ moment in human history, emphasising the 
‘noneconomic and nonconsumptionist motives that are behind the struggle for economic 
advancement’. 154  Similarly, Pocock has labelled this the ‘commerce, leisure, 
cultivation’ argument, whereby, in short, commerce is seen as the civilising agent by 
which to refine the passions into manners, albeit at the expense of those political virtues 
and liberties that the ancients so venerated.155  
 
Again, then, it is in the context of these interweaving and concentric debates that 
Tucker’s economic tracts emerge today as worthy specimens, if not even foremost 
examples, of what Whatmore calls the ‘great age of comparative study in political 
economy’; political economy being, in Whatmore’s words, ‘the archetypal science of 
reform, premised on the unavoidability of commercial society as an element of human 
progress, and encompassing in consequence international relations as the correlate of 
domestic reform’.156 Viewed from this perspective, Tucker’s various and sundry reforms 																																																																			
154 Hirschman, Passions & Interests, pp. 56-63, 108. Cf. Dickey, ‘Doux-commerce and humanitarian 
values’, in Grotius and the Stoa, pp. 272-6, & Conclusion, Section III below. 
155 In other words, the classical republican ideal of robust and autonomous city-states upheld and 
protected by citizen militias, governed from above by landed elites whose political wisdom ensured the 
moderation of its laws. In his ‘Cambridge paradigms and Scotch philosophers’ in Wealth and Virtue, p. 
239, Pocock describes these various conundrums as ‘the great ambivalences of the dialogue between 
[ancient] virtue and [modern] commerce’; or, more simply put, the ‘virtue-commerce tension’ resulting in 
an ‘immensely rich and multi-faceted civil or social humanism which it was intended to replace’ (p. 251); 
significantly, Pocock links his ideas to Hirschman’s le doux commerce theory, at p. 241. As Dickey 
summarises by way of antithesis, the ‘modern’ defence of commercial society depended on the idea that 
the expansion of trade and consumerism was not necessarily detrimental to the moral well-being of 
European societies, and that this enabled its citizens to realise themselves more fully as human – though 
not necessarily political – beings, in his ‘Doux-commerce and humanitarian values’, Grotius and the 
Stoa, p. 277.  
156 Whatmore, ‘Burke on Political Economy’ in Cambridge Companion to Burke, pp. 81, 83; emphasis 
added. Cf. Rothschild, ‘Global Commerce and the Question of Sovereignty in the Eighteenth-Century 
Provinces’, Modern Intellectual History, pp. 3, 5, 6, 24, 25. Here Rothschild suggests that during the 
‘third quarter’ of the eighteenth-century the ‘relationship between the local and the global, or between the 
“local situation” of individuals and the great interconnected worlds of the statesmen, was at the heart of 
the economists’ theories […] The economists were interested, in their own provincial circumstances, in 
the communications between local and global events […] Like the distinction between political 
observation and political or economic theory, the frontier between the nation and the world was much less 
well identified for them than it is for us […] It was perhaps this juxtaposition of the provincial and the 
oceanic, the immediate and the universal, of power and of the limits of power, that was itself … a source 
of prodigious imagination’.  
	 212	
housed within the Essay and the Elements position the clergyman firmly within the 
modern camp in the contemporaneous dispute between ancients and moderns – a point 
that is to be advanced in the conclusion that follows.157 In summary of the present, 
however, the main purpose of this chapter has been to present a vision of Tucker’s 
economic tracts that were steeped in the Anglican moral psychology imparted to him 
via Butler, enabling us to highlight in turn, and in precise terms, those concepts which 
made the initial transition from Butlerian meta-ethics to Tuckerian political economy. In 
doing so, the overriding concern of the present author has been to highlight, firstly, the 
processes by which the neo-Stoic elements housed within Butler’s thought found 
tangible expression in Tucker’s major and minor economic policies; and secondly, via 
Tucker’s crucial identification of self-love with the spirit of monopolisation, the ways in 
which the theo-philosophical and socio-commercial implications of the Mandeville-
Butler (or neo-Epicurean-Augustinian versus neo-Stoic) dispute took on far greater 
resonance in an increasingly metropolitan, globalised and indeed material world.158  
  
This having been asserted, it becomes increasingly apparent that the economic tracts 
constituted, at their most fundamental, the transposition of Butler’s theo-philosophical 
framework into the realm of international, globalised politics; in turn being 
representative, this study argues, of a type of expansive Stoic universalism that 
(particularly) Butler and (to a large extent) Tucker adhered to. Here, then, the Butlerian 
scheme of harmonising the inward and outward persona, and thereby of reconciling 
self-love and sociability, is given tangible shape and form in terms of substantive 
Tuckerian economic policy. Yet even more significantly, in the process of doing so, and 
in an intriguing repetition of the Grotian-Hobbesian-Pufendorfian quandary, the 
Butlerian system is augmented by the construction of an entirely original, indeed 
Tuckerian, dialectic; one that remains constantly pensive, wary and vigilant of the 
primacy of Mandevillean self-love (i.e., Tucker’s self-love/self-interest = 
monopolisation formula), and yet always seeks reassurance, assistance and guidance 
from the Butlerian (i.e., sociability/benevolence = free trade).159 Crucially in our 
context, Dickey has described this as ‘a modernization of the oikeiosis process and a 																																																																			
157 Pocock, Virtue, p. 132. 
158 A point made by William Seeley in The Expansion of England, (London, 1883), p. 147, when he 
described eighteenth-century Britain as a ‘‘materialist’ (or mercantilist) empire created for the benefit of 
the metropolis’; cited in Armitage, Ideological Origins of the British Empire, p. 18. 
159 This will be explored in greater detail in the conclusion imminently following. 
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Christianization of it’; whereby Tucker, Dickey argues, ‘reinforces in the name of 
Christian morality and Christian providentialism what Cicero had philosophically 
sanctioned in his discussion of oikeiosis and Grotius and Pufendorf in their natural law 
versions of the sociability argument’.160 Yet, as already pointed out in conclusion to our 
opening chapter, whilst the present author concurs unreservedly with Dickey’s 
hypothesis on this point, what we have attempted to demonstrate in this study is not 
merely Butler and Tucker’s Christianisation of the Stoic providential position, but 
rather their specific Anglicisation of it – a central contention that will be reiterated 
further in what immediately follows.  
  
It has become commonplace among distinguished intellectual historians such as Hont 
and Robertson to affirm that perhaps the single overriding goal of politics for 
eighteenth-century ‘moderns’ (so far, of course, as there can be said merely to be one) 
was the desire for economic stability and security as a means towards achieving 
perpetual peace.161 Moreover this, it is commonly argued, was the one characteristic that 
differentiated such thinkers from neo-classical civic humanists, who venerated the 
patriotic and martial virtues as prerequisites of liberty above all else.162 As if to 
underscore Tucker’s affiliation with the former ‘modernist’ camp, in his conclusion to 
the Essay, the clergyman signed off with a warning. Trade and commerce, he said, and 
not war, was now the true measure by which a nation would stand or fall:  
 
I WILL only add one Reflection more […] That if we would still keep on our Trade at a 
Foreign Market, we must, at least, be upon an equal Footing with other Nations […] This 
being the State of the Case, it necessarily follows, That we must always have an Eye upon 
the Practices and Proceedings of our Rivals, and take our Measures accordingly, as far as 
regards this mutual Emulation … [For] every Country in Europe now begins to understand 
the Maxims of Trade, and apply themselves to Commerce.163 																																																																			
160 Dickey, ‘Doux-commerce and humanitarian values’, Grotius and the Stoa, p. 316; cf. Chapter One, 
Sections V-VI. 
161 Significant contemporary examples of this pan-European drive toward perpetual peace can be found 
at, though are by no means are limited to, works published at either end of the century, e.g., the Abbé de 
Saint-Pierre’s (1658-1743) Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe, [Project for Perpetual 
Peace in Europe, 1713], (London Ed., 1714) [written in the immediate aftermath of Utrecht]; & Kant’s 
Zum ewigen Frieden [Toward Perpetual Peace, 1795] in Mary J. Gregor & Allen W. Wood (eds. & tr.), 
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy (Cambridge, 1996).   
162 Summarised most succinctly in Haakonssen & Whatmore, ‘Commerce And Enlightenment’, esp. p. 
286. 
163 Essay, ‘Conclusion’, pp. 140-7. Note that Tucker calls the French (and other Europeans states) ‘rivals’ 
rather than ‘enemies’, a conscious attempt at subverting established perspectives on what we now call 
‘international relations’, and traditional notions of warfare between states. This is made even more 
interesting by the fact that he calls domestic Tories ‘enemies’. 
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This having been said, it would surely have been little surprise to find copies of the 
economic tracts resting behind that famous pulpit at L’Athénée Royal in 1816, when the 
anglophile Benjamin Constant (1767-1830) famously declared the pacifistic force of 
modern commerce. ‘War is all impulse, commerce, calculation’, he said. ‘Hence it 
follows that an age must come in which commerce replaces war. We have reached this 
age’.164  
 
																																																																			
164 Benjamin Constant, The Liberty of Ancients Compared with that of Moderns [Paris, 1816], in 
Biancamaria Fontana (ed.), Constant: Political Writings, (Cambridge, 1998), p. 313. 
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Conclusion. 
 
The Providential Argument for Free Trade. 
 
 
In the important passage in Fifteen Sermons where Butler spoke of the ‘Cements of 
Society’, there he had also stated that it was the ‘lowest of the people’ rather than their 
‘Governors’ who were the ‘inventers’ and ‘maintainers’ of the ‘ties’ that bind society 
together: 
 
There is such a natural Principle of Attraction in Man towards Man, that having trod the 
same Tract of Land, having breathed in the same Climate … becomes the Occasion of 
contracting Acquaintances and Familiarities […] Thus Relations merely nominal are sought 
and invented, not by Governors, but by the lowest of the People, which are found sufficient 
to hold Mankind together in little Fraternities and Copartnerships: Weak Ties indeed, and 
what may afford Fund enough for Ridicule, if they are absurdly considered as the real 
Principles of that Union; but they are in Truth merely the Occasions, as any thing may be of 
any thing, upon which our Nature carries us according to its own previous Bent and Bias. 1 
 
Butler’s insight here is fascinating, because it casts an alternative light on Tucker’s 
perceived opinion of the poor, in which it is typically suggested that he was hostile and 
scornful of the labouring populace.2 Yet Butler’s words are even more significant in the 
wider context, in that they also demonstrate with particular clarity some of the main 
themes of the neo-Stoic, providentialist thread we have been attempting to convey 
throughout this study – in particular, Butler’s allusion to the ‘attraction’ humans feel for 
one another, such that they ‘contract acquaintances and familiarities’, this being an 
eradicable propensity grounded firmly within the dictates of human ‘nature’. Yet more 
significantly still for the purposes of these closing pages is Butler’s important 
insinuation that it is in fact the poor, and not their governors, who constitute the rock 
upon which any successful society might be properly established (the present author’s 
allusion to St. Peter [Matt. xvi., 13-9] is both tentative and deliberate).  
 																																																																			
1 Fifteen Sermons 1726, pp. 17-8; Fifteen Sermons 1729, pp. 16-7; emphasis added. 
2 E.g., Clarke, pp. 115-20; Shelton, Dean Tucker, pp. 40-1, 46, 53-4, 57-9. 
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In these concluding remarks, then, we wish to deploy Butler’s views on the poor here as 
a springboard for final analysis, with the greatest emphasis being placed on Butler and 
Tucker’s ideas on the social ‘responsibilities’ and ‘reciprocities’ between rich and poor, 
whether that be between or within states. This being said, what follows is divided into 
two parts. In the first half (Sections I-II) we focus primarily on the domestic poor within 
eighteenth-century Britain, demonstrating the extent to which the alleviation of their 
plight was deemed to be of central importance to the wider Butlerian-Tuckerian scheme, 
especially via their emphasis on the Christian virtue of Caritas (charity). In the second 
half (Sections III-IV), we utilise these findings in order to expand upon our previous 
analysis of the economic tracts, exploring in particular Tucker’s corresponding views on 
the relationship between rich and poor countries, and how he intended his free trade 
ideas to play out in the global commercial sphere. By closing in this manner, one of our 
overriding concerns is to endorse and extend upon Whatmore’s analysis that eighteenth-
century political economy constituted the ‘archetypal science of reform, premised on the 
unavoidability of commercial society as an element of human progress, and 
encompassing in consequence international relations as the correlate of domestic 
reform’.3 Yet where we wish to further Whatmore’s assessment in final conclusion is in 
accentuating the Butlerian, neo-Stoic framework within which the Tuckerian variant 
operated.  
 
I. Introduction: Caritas, and Butler’s Continuing Legacy. 
 
As we have explored in our previous and final chapter, Tucker was clearly far terser 
than his mentor when it came to expressing his opinion of the lower classes, even going 
so far as to suggest that in spite of France’s despotic, arbitrary government, she 
nevertheless enjoyed substantial commercial advantages over Britain, on the grounds 
that she ensured the sobriety, frugality and industry of her lower ranks.4 In addition to 
the economic tracts, however, Tucker continued to voice his concerns regarding the 
plight of the poor in a variety of lesser-known, though important, supplementary works, 
published from the 1740s to the 1760s – including Hospitals and Infirmaries (1746), 
Spirituous Liquors (1751), NFP I & II (1751-2), Shrove Tuesday (1753), Causes of the 																																																																			
3 Whatmore, ‘Burke on Political Economy’ in Cambridge Companion to Burke, pp. 81, 83. Cf. Chapter 
Five, p. 211. 
4 E.g., Essay, pp. 14, 36-7; Cf. Shelton, Dean Tucker, p. 52. 
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Poor (1760), Dearness of Provisions and SPCK (both 1766). Lamenting in particular 
the ‘mob behaviour’ of the poor (especially during election time),5 Tucker was quick to 
point out, however, that the responsibility for the ills of the commonwealth should not 
be placed solely on the shoulders of the lower orders, but just as readily upon the 
ambiguities and excesses of the post-Revolution Settlement itself. 6 Echoing Hume’s 
view regarding the ‘infinitely complicated’ nature of ‘all political questions’ when 
‘moderation’ is lost amongst the ‘violent animosities’ of ‘party zealots’,7 according to 
Tucker, it was precisely this bitter factionalism amongst the higher echelons (over what 
Mark Goldie has called the ‘fragility’ of Britain’s newly-acquired liberty; and 
encapsulated more broadly by J. P. Kenyon as the debate over ‘Revolution Principles’)8 
which ensured a negative ‘trickle-down’ effect on the lower classes:  
 
In short, the present Corruption and Degeneracy, which prevail throughout all Ranks, from 
the highest to the lowest, are but too easily accounted for … Liberty and Prosperity, the two 
greatest Blessings upon Earth, are greatly abused in these Times, and are converted by too 
many into Licentiousness, and the doing in every respect whatever is right in their own 
eyes.9 
 
As Tucker put it far more brusquely elsewhere, then, the poor were now free to become 
quite literally ‘drunk with the Cup of Liberty’. 10  Yet however scathing Tucker’s 																																																																			
5 See, e.g., Shelton, Dean Tucker, Chap. 5. 
6 For discussion on this point, centring on the significance of post-1688 British party politics, see Pocock, 
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 483-4, 489, 524-5; J. A. W. Gunn, Factions no More: Attitudes to Party in 
Government and Opposition in Eighteenth-Century England, (London, 1972); Gary Stuart De Krey, A 
Fractured Society: The Politics of London in the First Age of Party, 1688-1715, (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1985); David Stasavage, ‘Partisan Politics and Public Debt: The Importance of the ‘Whig Supremacy’ for 
Britain’s Financial Revolution’, European Review of Economic History 11 (2007), pp. 123-53; Steve 
Pincus, 1688, pp. 279, 280, 294, 301-2, 367. 
7 Hume, Essays, I. III. ‘That politics may be reduced to a Science’. Cf., David Lieberman, ‘The mixed 
constitution and the feudal law’ in Cambridge Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, pp. 317-46, esp. p. 
329.  
8 Goldie, ‘The English system of liberty’, Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, pp. 42-3. Goldie’s 
utterance of the phrase ‘fragility of liberty’ is at p. 41. For older, alternative statements of these themes 
with regard to ‘English Enlightenment’, see Venturi, Utopia and Reform, pp. 47-69; Jacob, The Radical 
Enlightenment, pp. 29-64, 65-87, 109-41; J. P. Kenyon, Revolution Principles: The Politics of Party 
1689-1720 [1977], (Cambridge, 1990 Ed.). 
9 This citation is recycled in a number of publications (thereby hinting at its importance to Tucker), first 
appearing in Hospitals and Infirmaries, p. 10, and repeated in SPCK, p. 24, Six Sermons, p. 73 n. & 
Seventeen Sermons, pp. 104-5. 
10 Hospitals and Infirmaries, p. 8, 11; Reprinted as Sermon XI. in both Six Sermons (1772) & Seventeen 
Sermons (1776); citations in the former at pp. 71, 74; & the latter at pp. 102, 105. For further discussion 
of the contemporary situation, see Ernest L. Abel, ‘The Gin Epidemic: Much Ado About What?’, Alcohol 
& Alcoholism, 36/5, (2001), pp. 401-5.  
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opinions of the poor appear here, and indeed in many of the aforementioned tracts of the 
period, it is important to note that just as in the case of the Essay and Elements, Tucker 
was not merely attempting to diagnose problems but also promote remedies for their 
improvement. Considered in this light, it is very much in this vein that these works 
ought to be considered as closely akin to the economic tracts – particularly the various 
polities and proposals housed within them.11 Yet in the interests of brevity, what is of 
most importance as we proceed at this late juncture is the consistent emphasis Tucker 
places on what he calls the ‘Article [sic] of Religion and of Christian Education … the 
first in Dignity and real Importance’. This is significant, then, in that it returns us once 
again to Butler’s continuing legacy, for whom social and political reform was deemed to 
be the natural extension of the Christian virtue of Caritas (charity/love).12  
 
From the outset, it is important to note that Butler and Tucker were hardly unique in 
their theological espousal of charity. According to the classical tenets of Christianity, 
Caritas signifies far more than mere ‘charity’ or ‘love’ in the conventional sense, but 
rather that species of αγαπη [love] described by St Paul as absolutely necessary for 
maintaining the Christian way of life (I Cor 13:1-4). Hence, in Pope Benedict XVI’s 
recent encyclical entitled Caritas in Veritate [Charity/Love in Truth] (2009), Caritas 
continues to be invoked in modern times as that quality which shapes ‘everything’, and 																																																																			
11 For the policies and proposals of Tucker’s economic tracts, see esp. Chapter Five, Sections III-IV. 
Particular examples in the tracts examined in this conclusion are too exhaustive to list in their entirety. 
However, there are a select few among them worth tarrying over briefly. In Spirituous Liquors, pp. 5, 7-
15, 21-2, for example, Tucker sets out a list of replies to popular objections regarding the present 
legislation on gin-drinking (prior to Pelham’s reforms), whereupon his familiar responses range from 
introducing Lex Maritalis so as to encourage sobriety; to redirecting corn away from the distilleries and 
instead towards pig farms to be used as feed (thereby representing a better use of land and allocation of 
resources); to encouraging, as a last resort, ale-drinking as opposed to the consumption of spirits, since 
Tucker believes that ale does not generate what he calls an ‘instantaneous drunkenness’, as in the case of 
liquor.  
 Similarly, in Causes of the Poor: ‘SECT. III. General PROPOSALS’, pp. 10-16, Tucker attempts to 
improve poor-law administration by encouraging parishes to unite into larger, more efficient poor-relief 
districts under the authority of local guardians – a similar proposal to that which we visited in the Essay 
(see Chapter Five, pp. 197-8). This has been described as ‘an interesting anticipation of the Poor Law 
Commissioners of 1834-47’ by Sidney & Beatrice Webb in their classic English Local Government: Poor 
Law History: Part I: The Old Poor Law, (London, 1927), p. 267. Finally, in Dearness of Provisions [‘I. 
The unequal Division of Farms …’, pp. 6-22; ‘II. … the Bounty upon Exported Corn’, pp. 22-31’; ‘III. 
The Scarcity of Live Cattle …’, pp. 31-46], Tucker submits that the size of farms ought to be reduced and 
divided more equitably, thereby reducing the price of cattle, whilst also reducing the tax on grains.  
 In each of these examples, then, we witness all of Tucker’s favourite Stoic interests and concerns in a 
politico-economic context: resource allocation, property equalization, discipline, cost-effectiveness, the 
relationship between humanity and nature, ethics, and so on. 
12 Causes of the Poor, p. 34. We have made passing references to Butler’s espousal of charity in Chapter 
Three, p. 112, nn. 120, 121; Chapter Four pp. 142, n. 95, & Chapter Five, p. 198. 
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that, in conjunction with veritate [truth], it harbours the capacity to ‘show us the way to 
true development’.13 As Waterman reminds us, then (albeit in a roundabout way), the 
three overriding ‘senses or aspects’ of Christian conceptions of Caritas—i.e., (1) 
‘Caritas as love of God’, (2) ‘as love of neighbour’, and (3) ‘as love of self’—are 
remarkably consistent with Butler’s ‘Anglicanised’ conception of modern commercial 
sociability, explored in Chapter Three.14 Yet even more interesting is Waterman’s 
further declaration that historically, Caritas has often been viewed as ‘the cement that 
holds society’: that familiarly recurrent phrase from Butler’s Fifteen Sermons.15 As 
Tucker puts it in NFP II, then, the ‘Gospel Doctrine of Love and Charity, and mutual 
forbearance’ is tantamount no less to one’s ‘Duty towards Man’.16  Likewise, in 
Infirmary Butler calls charity that ‘hearty Love to our Fellow-creatures, as produceth a 
settled Endeavour to promote, according to the best of our Judgement, their real lasting 
Good, both present and future’.17 This being said, it is incumbent upon us to turn at this 
late juncture towards discussion of the relationship between Caritas and economics 
within Tucker’s thought, so as to strengthen our understanding of the Anglican 
providentialism which lay at the core of the overarching Butlerian-Tuckerian scheme.  
 
In substantive terms, Butler’s handling of charity features most prominently in his ‘six 
occasional sermons’, comprised of SPG (1739); Spital (1740); Martyrdom (1741); 
Charity Schools (1745); Accession (1747) and Infirmary (1748).18 In each of these 
sermons, Butler’s insistence on equating charity with public policy is so fervent (as we 
shall shortly see, this is a term he himself adopts from Scripture) that it becomes, to all 
intents and purposes, a Butlerian precept of its own.19 Tennant suggests that if he had 
lived beyond 1752, it is highly likely that Butler would have furthered these embryonic 
ideas so as to create a coherent set of principles revolving around them, just as he did in 																																																																			
13 Pope Benedict XVI. [Joseph A. Ratzinger], Caritas in Veritate, (2009), pp. 2, 3, 52. 
14 The Butlerian formula is set out in Chapter Three, pp. 116-7. 
15 Waterman, ‘The relation between economics and theology in Caritas in Veritate’, Erasmus Journal for 
Philosophy and Economics, 6/2, (Autumn, 2013), pp. 24-42, esp. pp. 33, 37-8. In linking modern Catholic 
orthodoxy with Butler and Tucker’s emphasis on Caritas and economics, Waterman reiterates his belief 
in the Catholic tendencies, or the ‘Christian organicism’, of the Anglican Church – explicitly at pp. 27, 
29, 32, 33. Cf. Chapter Two, Section II. 
16 NFP II, p. ix. 
17 Infirmary, p. 5. 
18 For an in-depth discussion of these sermons, to which this section owes a great deal for assistance, see 
Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, Chap.  5: ‘Six Sermons’. 
19 Interestingly, the term ‘fervent’ is a favourite of Wesley’s also, noted in Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy 
and Ministry, p. 151. 
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Fifteen Sermons and The Analogy. Since he did not, however, the present author 
suggests by way of conclusion that Tucker’s economic tracts were in large part intended 
to fill this vacuum; meaning in turn (in yet another reiteration of the central thrust of 
argumentation within this study) that they were a further transposition of Butler’s 
science of social psychology into the arena of institution-building, social organisation – 
and not least economic development.20 
  
Although it is not possible to delve into Butler’s sermons at any great length in this 
conclusion, suffice it to say that Butler’s main concern in each of them is to arrive at a 
dual-theory of modern (that is to say post-1688) liberty that is at once political and 
ethical.21 Restating in Martyrdom (1741), for example, one of Fifteen Sermons’ central 
messages, i.e., that it is Scripture that extols the societal aspects of human life ‘injoyed 
under civil Government’ (specifically, again, the post-1688 mixed system of 
governance), Butler admonishes the ‘Pride, and Uncharitableness’ of all forms of 
hypocrisy (i.e., that which lies beyond the civil and ethical sphere).22 Likewise, then, in 
Infirmary (1748) Butler states that ‘Preheminence’ of ‘Fervent Charity’ (Butler’s 
adoption of this term was alluded to above) is both a ‘Grace’ and a ‘Virtue’, by which 
persons can ‘even merit Forgiveness of Men’.23 Here, then, the inference is absolutely 
clear. In Butler’s view, ‘Fervent’ charity is the formal, public expression of good social 
practice. For if, Butler argues, the social affections of each and every individual are to 
be properly utilised and/or fulfilled, particularly in the ethical sense, it is imperative that 
the individual attempt to offer practicable benefits to those in need, in what he calls a 
																																																																			
20 Tennant describes the ‘six occasional sermons’ as Butler’s ‘complex statement of a gestating social 
theory’, grounded in an ‘extended consideration of the relationship between the inner and the outer, 
between the individual (self-love, property, religious experience, language as exploration) and society 
(benevolence, institution-building, religion as social love, language as social instrument) […] the political 
application of Butler’s concepts of ethical identity and charity … [the] practical public expression of the 
affection of benevolence’. Ibid., pp. 147, 149, 
21 This is declared explicitly in Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 149. The persistent 
emphasis on ‘coterminous harmony’ in Butler’s thinking is a mark of the continued application of his 
neo-Stoical maxims derived from Fifteen Sermons, e.g., the idea that existence is unitary rather than 
dialectical. 
22 Martyrdom, pp. 2, nn. 3-4; based on 1 Peter ii. 16, ‘And not using your liberty for a cloke of 
maliciousness, but as the servants of God’. This sermon is abbreviated in such a way as to draw attention 
to the fact that it was preached on ‘the day appointed to be observed as the day of the Martyrdom of King 
Charles I’. Clearly, then, Butler is far removed from his dissenting heritage at this stage of his life. 
23 Infirmary, p. 4.  
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‘Moderate Way of considering Things’.24 In Butler’s view, then, it is precisely these 
societal structures which augment notions of politico-ethical liberty, under the umbrella 
of British constitutionalism. Yet even more crucially in the context of Tucker’s 
economics, it is also by these means that Butler makes clear his concern not only for the 
purely political, social or of course religious questions of the day, but ‘more particularly 
still Persons in Trade and Commerce’; in other words, those members of Butler’s 
audiences whose duty he believes it is to promote frugality, industry and—above all—
the charitable redistribution of money amongst the poor.25 Here, then, Butler’s tentative 
steps into economic territory are palpable; and it is important to note that Infirmary was 
preached merely two years prior to the publication of Tucker’s Essay, such that the 
overlap between the two works is extremely difficult to ignore. In fact, in the earlier 
SPG (1739) Butler had gone even further in this direction when he claimed that 
‘advantageous Commerce’ was tantamount, no less, to the ‘Profession of Christianity’.26 
Based on such examples as these, it is therefore not difficult to see why Tennant claims 
that ‘virtually all of the non-political matter, considered narrowly, of the six sermons 
may be drawn into discussion of the application of charity to economic activity’.27 Yet 
as we shall imminently see, Tucker was almost identical to Butler in pursuing and 
advocating comparable systems of Christian charity.  
 
II. Education, Remedial Care and Duty to the Poor. 
 
In the opening to Dearness of Provisions (1762), Tucker reiterates Butler’s position 
with astonishing faithfulness to his mentor’s vision. Beginning with the observation that 
the ‘distresses of the poor … merit the attention of the legislature beyond all other 
subjects whatever’, Tucker proceeds with a thoroughly Butlerian account of the social 
responsibilities, or rather reciprocities, between rich and poor [italicisations for 
emphasis]: 																																																																			
24 Infirmary, pp. 4, 12. This sermon, preached before the governors of the London Infirmary, is based on 
1 Peter iv. 8, ‘And above all things, have fervent charity among yourselves; for charity shall cover the 
multitude of sins’. 
25 Infirmary, p. 24. In this, Butler may be following the latitudinarian tendency to take note ‘of the 
material interests of their city audiences by applying mercantile language to religion’ – in other words, to 
emphasise the fact that ‘religion is fitted to man in his worldly state’; see Rivers, Reason, Grace, and 
Sentiment, I, p. 58. This may be contrasted, then, with William Law’s High-Church denial of this 
position, explored in Chapter Two, Section V above. 
26 SPG, p. 12. 
27 Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 154; emphasis added. 
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THE industrious Poor, to the sweat of whose brows we are indebted for most of the 
conveniences and blessings we enjoy, have an indubitable right to our assistance. When 
these afflicted, miserable, and wretched people cannot, by their honest labour and assiduity, 
provide for the comfortable maintenance of themselves and helpless families, we are unjust 
and cruel to them, we must be divested of all humanity, of all concern for their happiness and 
welfare, if we embrace not every opportunity of contributing towards their relief.28 
 
Note Tucker’s authorial stance in this excerpt, in which he speaks in terms of ‘us’ and 
‘them’, ‘we’ and ‘their’; suggesting that he is deeply aware of the sharp demarcations 
existing between rich and poor, and, moreover, of the social obligations that exist 
between them in spite, and not because, of their differences. Granted, Tucker differs 
from Butler in one crucial respect, in that he tends to consider the poor much more 
readily in terms of their social utility.29 Yet be that as it may, this does not detract from 
Tucker’s overriding message. ‘The hardships they suffer’, he continues, ‘on account of 
extravagant prices of all sorts of provisions, is scarcely tolerable’. Furthermore, he 
reiterates, since the ‘greatness and power’ of Britain ‘depend upon the industry, 
courage, and bravery of the lower class of people’, it is therefore the ‘interest’ and 
‘duty’ of the rich ‘to treat them with tenderness and humanity’, and to do everything in 
their ‘power to render their lives comfortable and happy’. This being the case, Tucker 
concludes that it is a combination of welfare and pragmatism that ought to prevail:  
 
OUT of pity therefore to these valuable members of society, and to contribute to the public 
utility, I shall endeavour to point out the causes, and, at the same time, propose proper 
remedies for this national evil.30  
 
																																																																			
28 Dearness of Provisions, pp. 3-4.  
29 Dearness of Provisions, p. 4; emphasis added. Tucker frequently refers to the poor as ‘those useful 
members of society’. However, he is also concerned about the correlation between the ‘bad’ behaviour of 
the poor and the ‘oppressive’ dearness of the provisions and the necessaries of life. See, e.g., ‘IV. But the 
taxes laid upon the Poor are heavier, and of a more oppressive Nature than those laid upon most other 
Denominations of People of better Circumstances and higher Rank’, pp. 46-52; at p. 51: ‘Hunger, we 
know, will break through stone walls; and if the Poor are oppressed with it much longer, it is greatly to be 
feared that they will assemble in a riotous manner more generally than they have done hitherto, and fill 
the land with a ravage and destitution. 
30 Dearness of Provisions, p. 5; emphases added. Tucker may be borrowing from Hutcheson’s espousal of 
utility in a section on ‘Moral Good and Evil’ in his Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and 
Virtue [1725], p. 181. Whether this is directly or via Butler, or indeed if at all, is difficult to say. 
		
223	
Going as far back as the opening pages of the Essay, medical, curative and healing (as 
well as pestilent, infirm and diseased) metaphors were replete throughout Tucker’s 
writings during this period.31 This is no coincidence. As previously discussed, Butler’s 
system was predicated on the harmonious mental and spiritual health of the individual, 
and thereby society at large.32 Furthermore, as we have just seen, Butler’s formulation 
and utilisation of Caritas was both the theoretical and policy-based extension of this 
concept:  
 
Medicine and every other Relief, under the Calamity of bodily Diseases and Casualties … 
are natural Provisions, which God … have granted in common to the Children of Men, 
whether they be poor or rich: to the Rich by inheritance, or Acquisition; and by their Hands 
to the disabled Poor.33 
 
Hence, when Tucker writes in Dearness of Provisions that there are ‘other motives’ that 
‘powerfully incline us to acts of beneficence and generosity in favour’ of the poor, here 
we may suggest that he is appealing to the specifically Butlerian conceptions of 
‘conscience’ and ‘charity’, both of which are deemed to be mutually reinforcing.34 No 
tract demonstrates this idea with greater efficacy than Tucker’s aptly titled ‘Charity 
School sermon’, SPCK (1766), an almost verbatim replication of Butler’s sermon 
preached on the same subject over two decades earlier in 1745 (conveniently 
abbreviated as Charity Schools).35 Here Butler had placed particular emphasis on the 
importance of instilling a virtuous education in the state’s citizenry, claiming for 																																																																			
31 See e.g., Essay, pp. ix, 40, 141; Spirituous Liquors, p. 22; NFP I, p. 48; NFP II, p. 13; Letter to a 
Friend, p. 36. See also, esp., Causes of the Poor, pp. 8-9: ‘To cure a Disorder is something; but to cure, 
and at the same Time to prevent a Return, is much better’. In other words, this is the body politic 
metaphor in play, which might hearken back to the medical metaphors provided by Queen Elizabeth in 
her ‘golden speech’ of 1601, where she emphasises (royal) authority, duty, social order, and the common 
health – as well as the commonwealth. See Kelley, ‘Elizabethan political thought’, in Pocock et al. (eds.), 
Varieties of British Political Thought: 1600-1800, p. 75. 
32 Clearly, this did not preclude the importance of physical health, and the ancient adage ‘Mens sana in 
corpore sano’ [a sound mind in a sound body] immediately springs to mind. Indeed, Tucker’s Hospitals 
and Infirmaries, Butler’s Infirmary and the numerous sermons given by the likes of Maddox and others is 
testament to the emphasis placed on bodily health by orthodox ministers at about mid-century. In this we 
are to be reminded that Maddox was also a fellow pupil of Butler’s at Tewkesbury, and that both Butler 
and Secker (and again possibly Maddox) considered careers in medicine before opting for the ministry. 
For these suggestions see Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, pp. 30, 32, 37, 40 & regarding 
Secker in particular, Ingram, Religion, Reform and Modernity, pp. 35-44. 
33 Infirmary, p. 7.  
34 Dearness of Provisions, p. 4; emphasis added. 
35  This contradicts the claim made in R. Thompson’s Classics or Charity? The Dilemma of the 
Eighteenth-Century Grammar School, (Manchester, 1971), p. 67, that by the 1730s religion ceased to play 
an important role within the charity schools. 
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example that ‘Children have as much Right to … proper Education’ as they do to 
‘ensure’ that ‘their Lives [are] preserved’. If ‘this is not given them by their Parents’, he 
continues, it thereby ‘devolves upon all Persons’ and ‘becomes the Duty of all, who are 
capable of contributing to it’.36 Moreover, since Butler insists that the Anglican faith is a 
‘practical’ religion (which, as we have seen, was a fully-established precept in The 
Analogy, and was possibly modelled on Archbishop Tenison),37 he concludes that 
charitable education is all the more consistent with ‘a Frame of mind and Course of 
Behaviour suitable to the Dispensation we are under, and which will bring us to our 
final good’.38 
 
From the outset, Tucker’s SPCK concurs with this position. According to its author, the 
importance of education is ‘an undeniable Truth, even were we to extend our Views no 
farther than the present Life’.39 Hence in Tucker’s view, education teaches humanity not 
only the ‘divine Principles of Christianity’, but also, and familiarly, ‘those of common 
Honesty, of Sobriety, and Industry’. Yet even more crucially, in this sermon Tucker 
insists upon the particular imperativeness of a virtuous, Christian education both within 
and because of the modern commercial era, in light of what he calls those ever-
expanding, increasingly anonymous, and therefore socially fracturing ‘Streets of this 
great Metropolis’.40 Likening city-life in particular to a ‘School of Corruption’, the 
problem Tucker identifies is the fact that it is precisely those less affluent members of 
society who, in an effort to advance their position in life, are forced to ply their trade in 
the city municipalities, and so are far more susceptible to its numerous temptations: 
 
[What] one Virtue would have been taught them, either by Precept or Example, in this 
School of Corruption? Or what sort of Vice can you imagine that to be, however shocking in 
its Nature, however injurious to Society, or dangerous to the Public, in which they would not 
																																																																			
36 Charity Schools, p. 5; emphases added. 
37 See Chapter Four, p. 137, n. 76. 
38 Charity Schools, p. 8; emphases added. 
39 SPCK, p. 5. 
40 Tucker is referring to London in the particular here, the venue for the annual Charity school sermons; 
however, he might just as well be referring to any number of proto-industrial cities in Britain (Bristol 
immediately springs to mind), or indeed across Europe. In the context of Smith’s ideas, Winch describes 
this phenomenon as the realisation amongst contemporaries of ‘a commercial world increasingly 
characterized by impersonal and anonymous relationships – a world of hidden interdependencies rather 
than of direct dependency, the leading characteristic of its feudal predecessor’, see Winch’s ‘Adam 
Smith’s ‘enduring particular result’’, in Wealth and Virtue, p. 265. 
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have been initiated, and to which they would not have been habituated as soon as their Ages 
and Abilities would permit?41  
 
Tucker’s descriptions here of the ‘great Metropolis’ of London immediately conjure 
images of desolation, loneliness and alienation, thereby anticipating nineteenth-century 
commentaries regarding the exploitative and ultimately ‘dehumanising’ effects of 
industrial growth and urban expansion.42 This being said, it is worth noting that it was 
Tucker’s earlier reading of rising mortality and falling birth rates during the 1740s—a 
demographic tool synonymous with modern industrial development—which prompted 
him to set down perhaps his most explicitly anti-Mandevillean statement in the Essay: 
 
[How] terrible do the Effects of Vice, Lewdness, and Debauchery appear to the general 
Interests of a Kingdom, when seen from this Point of View [i.e., of rising infant mortality]? 
What an Absurdity, therefore, was it in the Author of The Fable of the Bees, to say, That 
Vices are Publick Benefits! It is Virtue alone, which can make a Nation flourish. And Vice of 
every kind is, either immediately, or in its Consequences injurious to Commerce.43 
 
As if to sharpen the contours that divided the Mandevillean scheme from the Butlerian-
Tuckerian, then, it is extremely notable that Mandeville himself had denied the value of 
charity and education in his Essay on Charity and Charity-Schools (1723), in which he 
claimed that even ostensibly ‘altruistic’ acts of charity were reliant upon individual and 
collective self-regard – much like its commercial analogue. According to Mandeville, 
then, this was just as true for familial relations as for any wider societal bond: 
 
What we do for out Friends and Kindred, we do partly for our selves.: When a Man acts in 
behalf of Nephews or Nieces, and says they are my Brother’s Children, I do it out of Charity; 
he deceives you; for if he is capable, it is expected from him, and he does it partly for his 																																																																			
41 SPCK, p. 7.  
42 The allusions to Butler’s bouts of depression and isolation immediately spring to mind, cf. Chapters 
Three & Four of this study. Again, somewhat ironically given Butler’s dislike of elements of his 
philosophy, there are also some parallels here with Shaftesbury’s temperament, e.g., An Enquiry 
Concerning Virtue, or Merit [1699], in Characteristicks, II. p. 171: ‘Now if Banishment from one’s 
Country, Removal to a foreign Place, or any thing that looks like Solitude or Desertion, be so heavy to 
endure; what must it be to feel this inward Banishment, this real Estrangement from human Commerce; 
and to be after this manner in a Desart, and in the horridest of Solitudes, even when in the midst of 
Society?’. 
43  Essay, p. 130, n. For notions of alienation in the eighteenth-century personality, see Pocock, 
Machiavellian Moment, p. 501; Virtue, pp. 117, 121, 270. Nineteenth-century views on alienation are of 
course synonymous with Marx, esp. the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), and, alongside 
Freidrich Engels (1820-95), The German Ideology, (1845-6). For an interesting discussion of alienation – 
or allotriosis – as the conceptual opposite to Stoic oikeiosis, see Annas, Morality of Happiness, p. 262. 
Cf. Brooke, Philosophical Pride, p. 43. 
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own Sake: If he values the Esteem of the World, and is nice as to Honour and Reputation, he 
is obliged to have a greater Regard to them than for Strangers, or else he must suffer in his 
Character.44 
 
Yet in sharp contrast to Mandeville’s scepticism, in both Butler’s Charity Schools and 
Tucker’s SPCK, we can clearly see the pair’s attempts to promulgate the idea that 
charitable education ought to be considered the remedial means towards a healthier 
nation – both in the psychologically inward (private) and socially outward (public) 
senses.45 This, we may suggest, is what Butler also alludes to in Martyrdom when he 
claims that it is the laws, customs, institutions and cultural structures of society that 
strengthen the various bonds and affections that comprise individual and collective 
human nature – particularly via industry (good works/commercial activity) and 
habituation (temper of mind/education). Hence, there is a ‘Law of Reputation’, Butler 
writes, and by this he means a type of emulation derived from education and 
knowledge, which enforces and upholds the ‘civil Laws’ of society, such that the 
individual may choose to progressively shun the primacy of self-love in favour of those 
virtues which they do not, and moreover cannot, possess on their own.46  
 
Likewise, towards the end of SPCK Tucker insists that charitable education ought to 
function as a type of buttress for the constitutional liberties of Britons, in tandem with 
the promotion of the moral government of God: 
 
[We] are not bound in Duty to command Success; but … we are bound in Duty to pursue 
such Measures as may probably be attended with Success … we must make the best Use we 
can of the Means we have; and after having done our Duty, and implored the Divine 
Benediction upon our Endeavours, we must leave the Event to Providence.47 
 
As we have attempted to show, then, it is very much by these means that Butler and 
Tucker continue to insist upon the importance of instilling a ‘proper and virtuous 
																																																																			
44 Mandeville, An Essay on Charity and Charity-Schools in Fable of the Bees, (Second Ed., London, 
1723), pp. 285-370, citation at pp. 285-6. 
45 As we explored in the Essay, this received particular treatment in Tucker’s proposal entitled ‘To erect 
certain Courts in all manufacturing Places of the Kingdom, where the chief Dealers themselves shall 
petition for them, with the Title of GUARDIANS of the Morals of the manufacturing Poor’, pp. 53-8. See 
also Chapter Five above, pp. 197-8. 
46 Martyrdom, p. 6. Cf. Tennant, Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 159. 
47 SPCK, p. 22. 
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Education’ within the labouring classes,48 – above all, by espousing programmes of 
social and political reform which can and ought to be referred to as ‘charitable 
enterprises’.49 And as we can now see more clearly in addition to our discussion of the 
economic tracts in Chapter Five, Tucker’s endorsement and cultivation of the science of 
political economy was undoubtedly one such charitable enterprise, in the multiple 
senses of the term – if not even its quintessence.  
 
III. Free Trade, Humanitarian Principles and ‘Moral Re-entry’ in Tucker’s 
Political Economy. 
 
The purpose of the first half of this extended conclusion has been to establish, firstly, 
the watertight connection between the Butlerian-Tuckerian emphasis on charity, 
education, moral duty to the poor on the one side with British Constitutionalism, 
politico-ethical liberty and toleration on the other; and secondly, to argue that Tucker’s 
political economy was effectively both an offspring of, and bridging agent between, the 
two wings of this dualistic model. This having been asserted, in the final sections of this 
work, it is incumbent upon us to weave the various strands under investigation 
throughout this study into one coherent whole, before advancing some further 
suggestions as to where Tucker scholarship ought to go next.  
 
In order to assist us in this task, at this penultimate stage we are required to return in 
greater detail to Laurence Dickey’s ‘Doux-commerce and humanitarian principles’. As 
previously discussed, Dickey’s particular value to this study lies in the fact that he 
positions Tucker’s free trade ideas squarely within the parameters of traditional 
conceptions of a so-called ‘humanitarian’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ Enlightenment.50 Drawing 
primarily from the work of Hirschman and Pocock,51 and therefore also grappling with 
the ideas of the likes of Hont and Robertson amongst others, in the first instance, 
Dickey’s thesis reemphasises political economy’s role as the quintessential ‘civilising’ 
or ‘modernising’ agent in the early-modern world; particularly via (1) political 																																																																			
48 Explicitly stated, e.g., in Essay, pp. 90-1; Instructions, p. 29. 
49 As Tennant does, in Butler’s Philosophy and Ministry, p. 161. 
50 See Chapter One, p. 52. 
51 Dickey, ‘Doux-commerce and humanitarian values’, in Grotius and the Stoa, I. ‘The Historiographical 
Problem’, pp. 271-2; Hirschman’s Doux-Commerce Thesis’ pp. 272-6; ‘Pocock on Commerce and the 
‘Ideology of Manners’’, pp. 276-9. At p. 277, Dickey asserts that Pocock’s ideology of ‘commercial 
humanism’ is indistinguishable from Hirschman’s doux-commerce thesis.  
		
228	
economy’s facilitation of the development of the arts and sciences; (2) its tendency 
towards refining, softening or polishing the manners of a given society; and (3) most 
importantly in our context, its capacity to enlarge the moral purpose of the state’s 
citizenry towards universal benevolence.52 As Dickey spells out further, all of these 
characteristics ought to be viewed in similar terms to the neo-Stoic concepts we have 
been exploring throughout this thesis—‘oikeiosis, sociability, ‘humanitarian virtues’’, 
and so on—and likewise can be said to be of Ciceronian, Grotian and Pufendorfian 
origin.53 Yet what is of special interest to us in the context of these closing pages is 
Dickey’s singular insistence on defining eighteenth-century political economy, and 
particularly its increasing espousal of free trade relations between competing 
commercial nations, as what he calls the ‘humanitarian agent of universal benevolence’ 
– ‘an important step’, he writes, ‘to securing peace and, eventually to promoting true 
friendship among the trading nations of the world’.54  
 
It is at this point that Dickey draws Tucker into the debate. Contending that the ‘typical 
liberal western view of trade’s role in the civilising process’ is tantamount to laissez-
faire economics and the theory of spontaneous order, Dickey acknowledges that unlike 
Hume, Benjamin Vaughan (1751-1835), Richard Price (1723-91), John Adams (1735-
1836), Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), Benjamin Franklin and Jonathan Shipley (1714-88) 
amongst others, Tucker simply does not belong within this camp.55 For whilst certainly 
being a ‘leading thinker in the free trade movement’, according to Tucker the prospect 
of ‘economic universalism’ was simply not possible without some sort of mechanism in 
place to guide the transition. As a case in point, Dickey points to Tucker’s views on the 
increasingly complex relations between rich and poor countries during the eighteenth 
century. Here Tucker’s main argument is that, in light of the primacy of the principle of 
national self-preservation as the correlate of individual self-love, broad/spurious 
‘liberal’ appeals to humanitarian values are simply not enough to sway policymakers 
into recognising the mutual benefits that would likely arise from fostering economic 
																																																																			
52 Ibid. Here Dickey’s reiteration of the formula is broadly as follows – (a) Commerce à Prosperity à 
Leisure à Human Self-Realisation à Multiplication of Desires à Cultivation of the Arts; or put more 
simply (b) Commerce à Leisure à Cultivation of Manners. 
53 Ibid., ‘Oikeoisis, Sociability and the Humanitarian Virtues’, pp. 279-83. 
54 Ibid., ‘Free Trade as the Humanitarian Agent of Universal Benevolence’, pp. 283-8, citation at p. 284. 
For Dickey’s summation of Viner’s contribution, see also pp. 286-8. 
55 Ibid., ‘The Laissaiz-Faire Argument Against ‘Jealousy’ in Trade’, pp. 290-300.  
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friendship between richer and poorer nations.56 Yet accordingly for Dickey, it is 
precisely this issue which marks Tucker out as perhaps the unique thinker of the 
eighteenth-century free trade movement. For as Dickey correctly contends, Tucker’s 
distinctive answer to the interminable ‘self-love-sociability’ conundrum was, of course, 
to vest an unusual degree of optimism in the role religion ought to play in maintaining 
‘a system of natural liberty in the face of the vagaries of market fluctuation’.57  
 
In specific terms, and unsurprisingly given the subject of this thesis, Dickey describes 
this as the Tuckerian appeal to ‘Christian Providentialism’, whereby the moral choices 
of civilised, and especially rich and powerful nations begin to take precedence in 
international affairs. Viewed from this perspective, the Tuckerian scheme enjoins all 
individuals and institutions—civil, jurisprudential, religious—to act as ‘socialising 
agents’ (in what we may now claim to be of neo-Stoic/Anglican origin), gradually 
lifting the consciousness of peoples and policy-makers (in what we may now claim to 
be of specifically Butlerian origin) to a level of religious maturity, so as to override 
narrow considerations of national economic self-interest:58  
 
Can you suppose, that Divine Providence has really constituted the Order of Things in such a 
Sort, as to make the Rule of national self Preservation to be inconsistent with the 
fundamental Principle of universal Benevolence, and the doing as we may be done by? I 
must confess, I never could conceive that an all-wise, just, and benevolent Being would 
contrive one part of his plan to be so contradictory to the other.59 
 
As should now be clear to the reader, then, it is very much this ‘religious dimension’ to 
Tucker’s thought that corresponds most conspicuously with the neo-Stoic providential 
naturalism so imperative to this study – or that which Dickey terms the point of ‘moral 
re-entry’ within the Tuckerian scheme.60 Claiming that the transition from free trade ‘as 																																																																			
56 Ibid., ‘Humane Trade Policy and the Rich Country/Poor Country Problem’, pp. 288-90. For further 
discussion, see esp. Semmel, ‘The Hume-Tucker Debate and Pitt’s Trade Proposals’, The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 75, No. 300 (Dec., 1965), pp. 759-70; B.T. Elmslie, ‘Retrospectives: The Convergence 
Debate Between David Hume and Josiah Tucker’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 4 
(Autumn, 1995), pp. 207-16; Hont ‘‘The Rich Country-Poor Country’ Debate in the Scottish 
Enlightenment’, in Jealousy, pp. 267-322. 
57 Ibid., ‘Religion and Moral Re-entry in Josiah Tucker’s Critique of Laissez-Faire Liberal Economics’, p. 
290. 
58 Ibid., ‘Economic Liberalism and Christian Providentialism: Tucker on Rich Country/Poor Country’, pp. 
300-10. Dickey links Tucker’s ideas directly to Ciceronian oikeiosis at p. 300, n. 135. 
59 Four Tracts, p. 20. 
60 Dickey, ‘Doux-commerce and humanitarian values’, ‘Providential Naturalism: Free Trade and Moral 
Re-entry in Tucker’s Theory of Sociability’, pp. 310-17, with the term cited at p. 314. 
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an economic agent of self-preservation’ towards free trade as an ‘ethical agent of 
universal benevolence in an humanitarian sense’ is only possible for Tucker if rooted in 
a religious conception of sociability, Dickey’s main point is thus to stress why it was 
that Tucker taught that rich and civilised countries ought to act magnanimously towards 
their poorer neighbours, in an attempt to expand the circle of human sociability via acts 
of international trade (and in direct opposition, too, to neo-Machiavellian values of 
‘reason of state’ in the global economic sphere).61  
 
Nevertheless, there is a yet further distinction that ought to be made as we approach the 
close of this study. Forced to acknowledge major aspects of the cynicism of Mandeville 
(just as Pufendorf had done in the similar case of Hobbes in the previous century), the 
Tuckerian system was constructed around the human (Epicurean-Augustinian) desire 
for self-preservation – granted. Yet cunningly, Tucker’s solution to this problem lay in 
acknowledging the social utility of self-love, considered merely as an agent of what he 
termed ‘secular Happiness’. Tantamount to the ‘artificial wants’ mechanism of the 
Elements (which we explored in Chapter Five), this is essentially Tucker’s theory about 
the ‘Rudiments of Commerce’, or what is more familiarly known today as the division 
of labour, in which the wants and desires of individuals multiply in direct proportion to 
the opportunities that arise out of mutual commercial exchange – a phenomenon that is 
all the more perceptible, therefore, in rich countries where the arts and sciences have 
become advanced.62 Naturally, this entailed a great deal of sensitivity on the part of 
Tucker towards those ethical problems that tended to arise as a result of increasing 
luxury and corruption in modern commercial societies. This explains too, then, why the 
clergyman was so at pains to emphasise the importance of moralising the state’s 
citizenry, which Tucker felt was the most effective ‘counter-agent’ to, or ‘panacea’ for, 
the luxury problem. As he himself put it in Sermon VIII of the Seventeen Sermons in a 
homily dedicated to the issue of luxury, and which reverts once more to the Butlerian 
analogy of psychological disease and cure: though the individual (and likewise again the 
body politic) ought always to ‘observe a due Regimen’, ‘never deviate from the Paths of 
Virtue’, and ‘never impoverish himself by Luxury, nor impair his Faculties by 
Debauchery’; yet if this cannot be at all avoided, ‘he [should] rightly apply the proper 																																																																			
61 Ibid., pp. 310-11. 
62 Ibid., pp. 311-12. See esp. Elements, ‘Preliminary Discourse’ – the term ‘secular Happiness’ at p. 6, & 
also Chapter Five, Section I of this study above for a more detailed explanation. 
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Medicines (that is, frame good Laws, and see them duly and wisely executed) … [so as 
to] recover from this dangerous Disease’. Hence Tucker writes by way of conclusion: 
 
[Whoever] will limit his Pleasures, Diversions, or Expences, by these Regulations, he is not 
a luxurious but a temperate Man. He doth not abuse the good Things of Providence, but 
rightly uses them, according to the gracious Design of the Donor. Nay, were he to do less 
[…] he would be the covetous Man, whom God abhorreth; a Man, who, by not using the 
World enough, does not promote that Circulation of Labour and Industry in it which he 
ought to do. He is therefore injurious to Society by a Defect, as the other was proved to be by 
an Excess.63 
  
Again, then, it is this central component of Tucker’s thought which distinguishes him 
from the ‘laissez-faire’ free traders of the eighteenth century listed above, who were far 
more optimistic about the prospect of a naturally-occurring, ostensibly ‘spontaneous’, 
free market mechanism. Labelling Tucker a ‘qualified providential naturalist’ in 
consequence, Dickey’s crucial moment of ‘moral re-entry’ within the Tuckerian scheme 
therefore presents itself in the clergyman’s ‘Providential plan from economic self-
preservation towards ethical self-perfection’, in turn [transferring] the responsibility for 
achieving universal benevolence from God or an automatic market mechanism to 
human beings of ‘higher character’ in advanced civilizations’. Considered in this light, 
it is very much by these means that Christianity becomes for Tucker both a ‘humanistic’ 
and, in light of all we have recently discussed, a ‘practical’ or ‘charitable’ religion; the 
main function of which is to encourage individuals to become active ‘participants in the 
providential plan for human redemption’ (in what we may take to be a further salutary 
nod to Tucker’s Pufendorfian-Augustinianism).64  
 
Put yet another way, Tucker’s unique brand of political economy was based around the 
idea that wise government was tantamount to what Dickey calls a ‘political delivery 
system’, attempting to foster those ‘religious and moral values’ intended by Tucker to 
act as ‘Counter-Agent[s] to inordinate Self-Love’.65 This, then, was precisely the point 
of the economic tracts; evidenced most fulsomely for example in Tucker’s vehement 
criticisms of the spirit of monopolisation, alongside his likeminded endorsement of the 
																																																																			
63 Seventeen Sermons, pp. 157-8, 162. 
64 Dickey, ‘Doux-Commerce and Humanitarian Values’, p. 314. 
65 Ibid., p. 315; Elements, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, p. 8. 
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prospect of opening and extending Anglo-Irish commercial relations.66 Borrowing once 
more from Stoic principles of oikeiosis, Tucker was well aware of the fact that the 
benevolent affections weakened as they extended further and further away from the 
immediate locale, in what Tucker termed ‘social Love [i.e., agape/αγαπη], or diffusive 
Benevolence’.67  Accordingly, then, for Tucker, the complex transition from ‘self-
love/monopolisation to ‘sociability/free trade’ in both the domestic and international 
context—or what might otherwise be described as the trajectory from individual self-
preservation towards the prospect of universal benevolence—could only be achieved in 
his mind via the Butlerian appeal to ‘REASON and REFLECTION’ on behalf of 
society’s collective conscience; by which means, Tucker insisted, human beings would 
eventually be free to choose between inordinate self-love on the one side, or a mature 
life of Christian morality on the other:68 
 
Now the Great End of Government is to promote the Good and Happiness of the Governed: 
And if you ask, How is this to be done? I will answer, That this is best effected by causing 
each Individual to conduct himself in such a Manner, as shall contribute to the general Good 
... And what is this, but Religion appearing under another Shape? Religion is the basis, Civil 
Government is the Superstructure; and neither can be completely established, without the 
friendly Assistance and Helping hand of the other.69 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks: The Providential Argument for Free Trade. 
 
Throughout this study, there have been three core arguments advanced which require 
highlighting in conclusion. The first of these, revolving around the ‘theo-philosophical 
background’ to Tucker’s economics, concerns the neo-Stoic providentialist trajectory 
first introduced in Chapter One and repeated time and again in subsequent chapters, 
thereby constituting the widest context within which Tucker’s ideas operated. 
Thereafter the second, which we have labelled the ‘Butler-Tucker axis’, documented the 
transposition of said neo-Stoical maxims from Bishop Butler’s mature thought to the 
youthful Tucker’s; analysed, furthermore, through the prism of the orthodox-
establishment/heterodox-radical debate so peculiar to eighteenth-century British 
commercial society. Lastly, therefore, and summarised most aptly in the phrase 																																																																			
66 Which Dickey also notes in ibid., pp. 301-2, 312, 315. 
67 Elements, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, p. 8; emphasis added. 
68 Dickey, ‘Doux-Commerce and Humanitarian Values’, pp. 315-6. For ‘Reason’ and ‘Reflection’ in 
Tucker’s economics, see again Chapter Five, Sections I & V. 
69 Seventeen Sermons, pp. 137-8. 
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‘Tuckerian Political Economy’, we have endeavoured to show the extent to which 
Butler’s novel ideas on commercial sociability nestled themselves firmly within 
Tucker’s developing theories in political economy, with special attention paid to 
Tucker’s Stoic-inspired emphasis on the interconnections between rich and poor at the 
domestic level, flowing outwards in ever-expanding ‘circles’ in the global economic 
sphere, and so finally pointing towards the prospect of ‘economic universalism’, and in 
time, perpetual peace.  
 
In the context of Smith’s economic ideas, Fonna Forman-Barzilai has recently 
elaborated on the aforementioned links between the Stoic tradition and the eighteenth-
century free trade movement, concentrating most fully and familiarly on Stoic oikeiosis, 
and thereby setting down in piecemeal fashion the various relationships between, and 
transitions from, what she calls ‘The Circle of the Self’ to ‘The Circle of Society’, 
thence to ‘The Circle of Humanity’ and finally to the notion of the ‘Commercial 
Cosmopolis’. 70  Though Forman-Barzilai notes the influence Butler’s neo-Stoicism 
exerted on Smith, it is once again extremely telling, however, that Tucker’s name does 
not merit even one mention in this otherwise enlightening narrative.71 As we have noted 
in the introduction to this present study, then, generic links made between Tucker and 
Smith’s free trade ideas have long been a commonplace, and these are certainly 
justifiable on many grounds. Yet in light of all that has been discussed in the 
intervening period, the following questions are surely worth raising at the close of 
study. How many of these scholarly assertions have considered the neo-Stoic tradition 
to be a fruitful starting point for enquiry into the relationship between the pair? And 
more significantly still, how many have acknowledged, let alone accounted for, the 
extent of Butler’s role as the intermediary figure indicating the points of agreement and 
disagreement between them?  
 
It is precisely for these reasons, then, that this study has placed – for the first time – 
Butler’s ideas on commercial sociability at its core. Since our most significant 
intellectual premise rests not merely on Butler and Tucker’s ‘Christianisation’ of the 
neo-Stoic providentialist process, as Dickey correctly asserts, but rather their 																																																																			
70 Fonna Forman-Barzilai, Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy: Cosmopolitanism and Moral 
Theory, (Cambridge, 2010). 
71 Ibid., pp. 12, 37-40, 42-45, 47-9, 78, n. 11, 231-2, for mentions of Butler. 
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Anglicanisation of it, future Tucker scholarship will therefore require us to explore and 
revise, in far greater detail than has previously been attempted, Tucker’s mature theories 
on government, war, empire and the established Church and State – subjects which were 
all deeply intertwined with the so-called age of ‘colonial crisis’ in the latter half of the 
eighteenth-century, as Peter N. Miller has put it.72 Characterised by Tucker’s polemic 
against a putatively ‘Lockean-inspired’ radical republicanism taking root in the North 
American colonies, supported by rational dissent at home, and which he therefore 
identified as a new variant of that religious enthusiasm which proved so catastrophic to 
the seventeenth-century social order,73 our chief point of interest will thereby consist in 
Tucker’s attempts to grapple with, and incorporate, predominantly Scottish conjectural 
history – the preeminent tool utilised by leading thinkers of the day to explain the 
origins of modern civil, and therefore commercial, society; and, moreover, for defining 
the parameters within which government could be said to be legitimate.74 Garnering 
through scholarly innovation a heightened sense of their own ‘historicity’, and thereby 
of their unique place on the cusp of modernity within ‘secular’ historical time, it is by 
these means, according to Pocock, that ‘Smith and Tucker present the response to the 
American Revolution of essentially conservative Whig Enlightenment at its most 
intellectually adventurous; at the high point of its grasp of history’.75 Yet however that 
may be, and as this study has attempted to convey throughout, the ‘simultaneous kinship 
and distance’ B. W. Young discerns between Scottish and English varieties of 
Enlightenment, in which – indeed – Smith and Tucker ‘sit uneasily’ alongside each 
other, surely requires further development.76  
 
As shall be argued at a future date, then, this is attributable above all to the fact that 
Tucker’s rendition of conjectural history was both typical and idiosyncratic, in the sense 
that whilst on the one side, like Smith et al., he too was concerned with accounting for 																																																																			
72 Miller, Defining the Common Good, pp. 18 n. 165, 63, 202, 353 n. 6, 354, 415. Cf. Armitage, 
Ideological Origins of the British Empire. 
73 See esp. Pocock, ‘Josiah Tucker on Burke, Locke and Price: A study in the varieties of eighteenth-
century conservatism’, in Virtue, pp. 157-91. 
74 Other than fleeting allusions in the economic tracts, Tucker’s most conspicuous engagement with what 
is variously labelled Scottish ‘philosophical’, ‘conjectural’ or ‘stadial’ history, or the ‘four-stages theory’ 
of human societal development, can be found in his NFP I & II, Apology, Letter to Burke and the 
Treatise. 
75 For discussion see Pocock, ‘Political thought in the English-speaking Atlantic, 1760-1790’, in Pocock 
et al. (eds.), Varieties of British Political Thought, (i) ‘The imperial crisis’, pp. 246-82, (ii) ‘Empire, 
revolution and an end of early modernity’, pp. 283-317; citation at p. 294. 
76 Young, ‘Christianity, Commerce and the Canon’, p. 395. 
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the rise of civil society in terms of stages of development from rudeness and rusticity to 
refinement and enlightenment; yet on the other, Tucker’s demonstrably weightier 
insistence on the role divine providence played in human history, and particularly his 
belief that the English Reformation constituted the progressive march towards 
enlightenment, ensured that for him, the development of the science of man (or homo 
economicus) was not merely a result of unintended historical consequences, which was 
broadly-speaking the Scottish view, but rather a direct corollary of God’s divine 
intervention in human affairs.77  
 
And yet in the final analysis, there is a still further distinction to be made between 
Tucker and the Scottish moralists. Centring on the clergyman’s likeminded attempts to 
construct a narrative of human history based on ‘sacred history’ in tandem with Scotch 
philosophical history, this will return us once more to Butler’s dissenting heritage, and 
particularly the ex-Presbyterian’s indebtedness to continental Witsian ‘covenant 
theology’. As explored briefly in Chapter Three, within the reformed tradition, covenant 
theology is often perceived to be in direction opposition to ‘dispensational theology’ – 
the former sharing closer affinities with English dissent, and the latter with the 
Established Church.78 Inevitably, then, such inquiry will direct us swiftly back to 
Tucker’s immediate intellectual locale, i.e., the clash between orthodox prelates and 
heterodox freethinkers (including, in the latter half of the century, rational dissenters), 
whose differences regarding the sufficiency of natural or revealed religion continued to 
pockmark the contemporary intellectual landscape. Interestingly, then, in doing so, we 
shall be obliged to incorporate the views of perhaps the most rambunctious orthodox 
thinker of the day, William Warburton, who became Tucker’s superior in the capacity 
of Bishop of Gloucester from 1758 until his death in 1779.79 In his two most enduring 
works of orthodox scholarship, the Alliance between Church and State (1736) and The 
Divine Legation of Moses (1737-41), Warburton had advanced a theory of providence 																																																																			
77 On this score, it is notable that there was at least one Scottish Enlightenment thinker who thought in 
overtly providentialist terms – namely William Robertson. For discussion see Phillipson, ‘Providence and 
progress: an introduction to the historical thought of William Robertson’, in William Robertson and the 
Expansion of Empire, Steward J. Brown (ed.), (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 55-73. It is notable too, then, that 
Tucker was an avid reader of Robertson. For implicit and explicit references made to the Scot, see 
Tucker’s Treatise, pp. 170, 201, 376. Cf. Pocock, ‘Tucker on Burke, Locke and Price’, Virtue, pp. 177, n. 
90; 179, n., 105; 181, n. 112; 188.  
78 Chapter Three, pp. 88-9. 
79 For Warburton’s theological importance, see Young, Religion and Enlightenment, Chap. 5: ‘William 
Warburton: A Polemic Divine’; Robertson, Case for Enlightenment, pp. 280-3. 
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which, we shall argue, tended to refute elements of Witsian (and thereby Butlerian and 
Tuckerian) covenantalism, instead leaning more towards the dispensational. 80  In 
consequence, we will contend that it was this which accounted for Tucker and 
Warburton’s famous clash over the fundamental role of Church and State; Tucker 
stressing on the one hand the providential role he felt the two elements ought to play in 
tandem over saving human souls, particularly via the government’s cultivation of 
political economy; whilst Warburton arguing on the other that this was the sole business 
and jurisdiction of the Church as opposed to the civil magistrate.81 In light of these bold 
claims, Warburton’s bon mot that Tucker ‘made trade his religion and religion his trade’ 
will take on a far greater degree of profundity, bringing into even sharper relief the 
extent to which the Georgian Church can be said to have been at war within itself.82 In 
final conclusion, then, it will be incumbent upon us to examine the deep historical 
connotations which lay behind Tucker and Warburton’s differences, whether secular or 
sacred, alongside the ways in which this further impinged upon Tucker’s ambitious 
plans for the economic liberation of humankind.  
 
In Seventeen Sermons, which is particularly notable in that it harbours an intriguing and 
eclectic mix of both covenantalism and dispensationalism, and yet is a work that has 
barely warranted any attention from Tucker’s biographers, Tucker labels this ‘the divine 
Oeconomy’.83 Yet as this thesis has shown, the reader has every reason to be confident 
that this turn of phrase is yet another bold pronouncement of the Butlerian/neo-Stoic 
‘cements of society’ – upon which Tucker’s political economy was erected, and upon 
which he intended its future progress: 
 
And how are the Ends both of Religion and Government to be answered, but by the System 
of universal Commerce?—Commerce, I mean, in the large and extensive Signification of 
that Word; Commerce, as it implies a general System for the useful Employment of our 
Time; as it exercises the particular Genius and Abilities of Mankind in some Way or other, 
either of Body or of Mind, in mental or corporeal Labour, and so as to make Self-interest and 																																																																			
80 For background information to this claim, see Gascoigne, ‘‘The Wisdom of the Egyptians’ and the 
Secularisation of History in the Age of Newton’, in Stephen Gukroger (ed.), The Uses of Antiquity: The 
Scientific Revolution and the Classical Tradition, (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1991), pp. 171-212, with particular 
reference to Warburton at pp. 200-3. 
81 This interpretation of Warburton’s scheme is derived from Taylor, ‘William Warburton and the 
Alliance Between Church and State’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol. 43, No. 2, (April, 1992), pp. 
271-86. 
82 Cf. Chapter Two, Sections I-II above. 
83 Seventeen Sermons, p. 26. 
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Social coincide. And in pursuing this Plan, it answers all the great Ends both of Religion and 
Government; it creates social Relations; and it serves as a Cement to connect together the 
Religious and Civil Interests of Mankind [italicisations added]. It is a Friend to both, when 
rightly understood, and is befriended by them. 
 AND thus I have endeavoured to proceed, Step by Step, in tracing the several Links of 
this universal Chain: We must consider Things apart; we have no Capacities to take in one 
universal Whole; nor is it the Province of human Nature to see every Part of the grand 
Machine in Motion at once [i.e., Butler’s ‘limited capacities’ argument]. But even these 
transient and imperfect Surveys of the Designs of Providence, as exemplified in the Christian 
Plan, are enough to fill us with the most awful Impressions of that Being [i.e., Tucker’s 
allusion to neo-Epicurean-Augustinian pessimism], whose Mercies are over all his Works, 
and whose continued Aim in every Instance, is to pronounce the Good and Happiness of his 
Creatures. […] 
 … [This, then,] is the Foundation, not only of distributive Justice, but of universal 
Benevolence, of Charity, Compassion,---and, above all, of Liberty of [i.e., Butlerian] 
Conscience. Apply now this Maxim to the Affairs of Government, and see the Effects of it, 
were it Universally to take Place,---Liberty would then subsist without Licentiousness; 
Subordination would be preserved without Tyranny or Oppression; and both the Governors 
and Governed would in all Respects be the safer, the better, the happier for each other. Apply 
it in the next Place to the System of Commerce; and then Monopolies and Exclusions would 
immediately be at an End;---a general Encouragement would be given to the Diligent and 
Industrious of all Professions; a general Emulation would excite their genius and improve 
their Abilities; and every Man would find his own Account in doing to his Neighbour, as he 
wishes to be done himself.84 
																																																																			
84 Seventeen Sermons, pp. 139-41. 
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